Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SASTI @ SATISH CHOWDHARY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT02/05/1972
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
SHELAT, J.M.
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1668 1973 SCR (1) 467
1972 SCC (3) 826
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1973 SC 207 (7)
R 1974 SC1214 (6)
F 1975 SC 623 (3)
ACT:
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971-Detention
under s. 3--Alleged theft of copper wire by detenu mentioned
as ground of detention-Detention under Act whither valid
when prosecution under Indian Penal Code can be launched
against detenu.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was detained by an order under s. 3 of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971. In a petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution it was urged on behalf of
the petitioner that a prosecution for theft under the
Indian Penal Code could have been launched on the facts
alleged against him in the grounds of detention and
therefore his- detention was illegate.
Rejecting the plea,
HELD : It is always open to the detaining authority to pass
an order for the detention of a person if the grounds of
detention are germane to the object for which a detention
order can legally be made.The fact that the particular act
of the detenue which provides the reason for the making of
the detention order constitutes ,in offence under the Indian
Penal Code would not prevent the detaining authority from
passing the, order for detention instead of proceeding
against him in a court of law. The detaining authority
might well feel that though there was not sufficient
evidence admissible under the Indian Evidence Act for
securing a conviction, the activities of the person ordered
to be detained were of such a nature as to justify the order
of detention. Even in cases where a person has been
actually prosecuted in a court of law in respect of an
incident and has been discharged by the trying magistrate, a
valid order of his detention can be passed against him in
connection with that very incident. [46 H-470 C]
Mohd. Salim Khan v, Shri C. C. Bose & Anr. (Writ petition
No. 435 of 1971 decided on April 25, 1972) relied on.
Sahib Singh Duggal v. Union of India, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 323
referred to.
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The particulars of the incident in the grounds of detention
in the present case showed that the petitioner and his
associates committed theft in respect of overhead electric
wires. The above act of the petitioner and his associate
created complete dislocation of electric supplies of the
area. The above ground of detention was germane to the
object for which a detention order can be made under section
3(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. According to that provision, the
detaining authority may, if satisfied with respect to any
person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and
services essential to the community, it is. necessary so to
do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
[470 E-F]
Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors, v. The State of West Bengal, [1969]
2 S.C.R. 635, Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [1970] 3
S.C.R. 288 and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal,
[1972] 2 S.C.C. 498, referred to.
468
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 37 of 1972.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in
the nature of habeas corpus.
T. S. Arora, for the petitioner.
S. C. Majumdar and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
Khanna, J. This is a petition through jail under article 32
of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus by Sasti alias Satish Chowdhary, who has been ordered
by the District Magistrate Howrah to be detained under
section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The order recited
that it was made with a view to preventing the petitioner
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community.
The order of detention was passed by the District Magistrate
on September 8, 1971. The petitioner, it is stated, was
found to be absconding soon after the passing of the order.
He was arrested on November 23, 1971 and was served with the
order of detention and the grounds of detention together
with vernacular translation thereof on the same day. in the
meanwhile on September 8, 1971 the District Magistrate sent
report to the State Government about his having made the
order of detention along with the grounds of detention and
other necessary particulars. The matter was then considered
by the State Government. It approved the detention order on
September 10, 1971. The same day the State Government sent
report to the Central Government along with necessary
particulars regarding the necessity a the order. On
December 10, 1971 the State Government received a
representation of the petitioner. The said representation,
after being considered, was rejected by the State Government
on December 21, 1971. On December 22, 1971 the. State
Government placed the case of the petitioner before the
Advisory Board. The representation of the petitioner was
also sent to the Advisory Board. The said Board, after
considering the material placed before it, including the
representation of the petitioner, and after
hearing him in person, sent its report to the state
on
January 28, 1972. Opinion was expressed by the Advisory
Board that there was sufficient cause for the petitioner’s
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detention. On February 11, 1972 the State Government
confirmed the order of detention of the petitioner.
Communication of the said confirmation was thereafter sent
to the petitioner.
469
In opposition to the petition Shri Dipak Kumar Rudra, Dist-.
rict Magistrate, who made the impugned order, has filed his
affidavit. Mr. Arora has argued the case amicus curiae on
behalf of’ the petitioner, while the State has been
reprensented by Mr.Majumdar,
Before dealing with the contention advanced by Mr. Arora, it
would be pertinent to reproduce the portion of the grounds
of,’ detention which contains the necessary particulars :
"You are being detained in pursuance of detention order made
in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) read
with sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act No. 26 of 1971), on the
grounds that you have beer acting in a manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community as evi-denced by
the particulars given below :-
(1) On 9.7.71 at about 23.30 hrs. you and your associates
Sk. Nazam, Kesta Adhikary, Bablu Das, Kachi Chakravarty and
3/4 others were found to committee in respect of overhead
electric wires between two posts near Zanana
Latrine of Lawrence & Co. at Chakkashi by the
darwans on duty. You and your associate Sk.
Nazam were seen on the top of the post cutting
one end of the electric wire, while your
associates were rolling the cut end of the
wire from other post. The darwans raised
alarm and surrounded you with the help, of
local people. Your associate Sk. Nazam with
other escaped and you and two other of your
associates could be arrested at the spot with
stolen copper wire. This created complete
dislocation of electric supplies of the area."
It is argued by Mr. Arora that as the act attributed to the-
petitioner in the grounds of detention constituted an
offence under the Indian Penal Code, the petitioner could
only be tried in a court of law for the offence and no order
for his detention On that score could be made. This
contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. It is
always open to the detaining authority to pass an order for
the detention of a person if the grounds of detention are
germane to the object for which a detention order can
legally be made. The fact that the particular act of the
detenu which provides the reason for the making of the
detention order constitutes an offence under the Indian
Penal Code would not prevent the detaining authority from
passing the order for detention instead of proceeding
against him in a court of law. The detaining authority
might well feel that though there was
470
-not sufficient evidence admissible under the Indian
Evidenre Act for securing a conviction, the activities of;
the person ordered to be detained were of such a nature as
to justify the order of detention. There would. be no legal
bar to the making of detention order in such a case. It
would, however, be imperative that the incident which gives
rise to the apprehension in the mind of the detaining
authority and induces that authority to pass the order for
detention should be relevant and germane to, the object for
which a detention order can be, made under the Act. Even
in cases where a person has been actually prosecuted in a
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court of law in respect of an incident and has been
discharged by the trying magistrate, a valid order of his
detention can be passed against him in connection with that
very incident. It was recently observed by this Court in
the case of Mohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose & Anr.
(Writ petition No. 435 of 1971 decided on April 25, 1972)
that from the mere fact that a detenu was discharged in a
criminal case relating to an incident by A magistrate, it
could not be said that the detention order on the basis of
that incident was incompetent, nor could it be inferred that
it was without basis or mala fide. Reliance in this
connection was placed upon the case of Sahib Singh Duggal v.
Union India(1).
The particulars of the incident in the grounds of detention
show that the petitioner and his associates committed theft
in respect of overhead electric wires between two posts near
Zanana Latrine of Lawrence & Co. at Chakkashi. the above act
of the petitioner and his associates created complete
dislocation of electric supplies of the area. The above
ground of detention, in our opinion, was germane to the
object for which a detention order ,can be made under
section 3(1)(a) (iii) of the Act. According to that
provision, the detaining authority may, if satisfied with
respect to any person that with a view to preventing him
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community, it is
necessary so to do make an order directing that such person
be detained.
Mr. Arora has referred to the case of Pushkar Mukherjee &
Ors. v. The State of West Bengal(2) wherein this Court dealt
with the difference between the concept of public order and
law and order and observed that the said difference was
similar to the distinction between public and private crimes
in the realm of jurisprudence. It was observed that a line
of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated
forms of disorder which directly affect the community any
injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches
of peace of a purely local significance which primarily
injure specific individuals and only in a secondary
sense public interest.
(1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 313.
(2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635.
471
Pushkar Mukherjee’s case(1) was referred to in a later deci-
sion of this Court in the case of Arjun Ghosh v. State of
West Bengal(2) and it was pointed out that the true
distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public
order" was one of degree and extent of the reach of the act
in question upon society. Acts similar in nature, but
committed in different contexts and cir-cumstances might
cause different reactions; in one case it might affect the
problem of the breach of law and order, and in another the
breach of public order. It was observed that the analogy
resorted to in the Pushkar Mukherjee’s case (supra) of
crimes against individuals and crimes against the public
though useful to a limited extent would not always be apt.
An assault by one individual upon another would affect law
and order only and cause its breach. A similar assault by a
member of one community upon a leading individual of another
community, though similar in quality, would differ in
potentiality in the sense that it might cause reverberations
which might affect the even tempo of the life of the
community. The Court pointed out that "the act by itself
is, not determinant of its own gravity.. , In its quality it
may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very
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different." (see ,also Nagendra Nath, Mondal v. State of
West Bengal (3).
The distinction between public order and the maintenance of
law and order has, however not much material bearing ’on
the present case because, as stated above, the petitioner
has been detained not with a view to preventing him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order but with a view to preventing him from acting
in any maner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and
services essential to the community.
No other infirmity in the detention order and the consequent
detention of the petitioner has been brought to our notice.
The, petition consequently fails and is dismissed.
G.C.
Petition dismissed.
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 635. (2) [1970] 3
S.C.R. 288.
(3) [1972] 2 S.C.C. 498.
472