Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NEW CENTRAL JUTE MILLS CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE,ALLAHABAD & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
08/09/1970
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
SHAH, J.C.
HEGDE, K.S.
CITATION:
1971 AIR 454 1971 SCR (2) 92
1970 SCC (2) 820
CITATOR INFO :
D 1975 SC 17 (31)
R 1979 SC 789 (8)
RF 1989 SC 222 (3)
RF 1989 SC 516 (49)
ACT:
Central Excise & Salt Act 18 of 1947--Section 12 whether
void for excessive delegation-Power under section to alter
provisions of Sea Customs Act, 1878 in applying them to Act
18 of 1947 whether includes power to make changes in
legislative policy.
General Clauses Act, s. 8(1)-whether enables provisions of
Customs Act, 1962 to be applied under s. 12 of Act 18. of
1947 in place of the provisions of Sea Customs Act, 1878.
Customs Act, 1962, S. 105(1)--Conditions for issue of search
warrant.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant company had a factory at Varanasi at which
chemicals including ammonia were manufactured. It was
considered by the Central Excise authorities that there had
been evasion of duty on ammonia by the company. The
Assistant Collector Central Excise issued a warrant for
search and seizure of goods and documents, pursuant to which
the premises of the aforesaid factory were raided in May,
1968 and certain documents seized. The company-filed a writ
petition in the High Court which was dismissed by the Single
Judge. The Division bench upheld the order of the Single
Judge. In appeal to this Court by special leave, the
questions that fell for consideration- were (i) Whether s.
12 of the Central Excise Act was void because the powers
delegated to the Central Government thereby including the
power to make alterations in the Act applied were excessive;
(ii) Whether the Sea Customs Act, 1875 having been re-
pealed, it was open thereafter to the Central Government
under s. 12 of the Excise Act to apply s. 105 of the Customs
Act 1962; and (iii) Whether the Assistant Collector issued
the warrants in the present case after due application of
mind to relevant materials and ’facts in terms of
s. 105(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
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HELD : (i) In the notifications issued inter alia applying
S. 105(1) and s. 1 10 of the Customs Act, 1962, no such
changes had been made as could possibly fall within the
meaning of the word ’alterations. The power to restrict and
modify does not import the power to make essential changes.
It is confined to alterations of minor character and no
change in principle is involved. The word ’alteration’ in
s. 12 must be understood in the sense in which it was open
to the legislature to employ it legitimately and in a
constitutional manner. No question was thus involved of
delegation either of any essential legislative functions or
any change of legislative policy. [96 B-D]
In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] S.C.R. 747, referred to.
(ii)S. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act provides that where
any Central Act repeals and re-enacts with or without
modification any provision of the former enactment then
references in any such enactment or in any instrument, to
the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different
intention appears, be construed as references to the
provisions so re-
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enacted. By virtue of this provision it could not be
disputed that in s. 12 of the Central Excise and Salt Act,
1947, the Customs Act, 1962 can be read in place of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878. [96 E]
The contention that s. 12 of the Act empowers incorporation
of the provision of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 in the Act
itself and, therefore, 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, does
not apply could not be accepted. Section 12 only contained
a provision delegating limited powers to the Central
Government to draw upon the provisions of the Sea Customs
Act, 1878 for the purpose of implementing s. 3 of the Act.
[96 F; 97 A]
Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-
operative Insurance Society, 58 I.A. 259, distinguished;
The Collector of Customs Madras v. Nathella Sampatha Chetty
JUDGMENT:
The extension of s. 105 could not be said to be illegal
merely because under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act it was a
Magistrate who after applying judicial mind had to issue
search warrant whereas under the present notification after
the enactment of the Customs Act, 1962, it was the Assistant
Collector of Customs performing executive functions who had
been empowered to issue a search warrant. By the latter
notification the previous notification applying the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act was superseded and no
question with regard to the validity of the notification
issued in 1963 and then amended in 1965 could survive.
Collector Custom & Excise Cochine & Ors, v. A. S. Bava
[1968] 1 S.C.R. 82, distinguished [98 A-C]
(iii)On the facts of the case it could not be said that
the Assistant Collectorhad no relevant material upon which
the belief could be founded in termsof s. 105(1) of the
Customs Act, 1962. [98 D]
&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
May 20, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal
No. 1177 of 1968.
M. C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad, P. C. Chandi, B. D. Sharma and
S. P. Nayar, for the respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a
judgement of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a writ
petition by which the appellant challenged the validity of a
warrant issued by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise,
Allahabad, authorising the Superintendent Central Excise,
Varanasi, to enter certain premises, search the same and
seize the documents therefrom.
The appellant, which is a public limited company having its
registered office at Calcutta, owns and runs a factory known
as Sahu Chemicals and Fertilisers at Varanasi where
chemicals such
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as ammonia and soda ash are manufactured. In February 1962
excise duty was fixed on manufacture of ammonia for the
purpose of fertilisers at Rs. 25/- per metric ton, the rate
being Rs. 125/- per metric ton if it was used for other
purposes. The notification by which the aforesaid duty was
payable was later withdrawn by means of another notification
dated March 1, 1964 and thereafter no excise duty was
required to be paid on the manufacture of ammonia. For the
period from May 1962 to the beginning of March 1964 the
appellant had paid duty at the rate of Rs. 25/- per metric
ton on the ground that ammonia had been utilised for the
purpose of manufacture of chemical fertiliser. The Central
Excise authorities, however, had received information that
part of the ammonia had been utilised for purposes other
than the manufacture of fertilizers on which higher duty of
Rs. 125/- per metric ton was payable. It was considered
that there had been evasion of duty. On May 11, 1968, the
Assistant Collector issued a warrant for the search and
seizure of goods and documents pursuant to which the
premises of the factory at Varanasi were searched on May 11,
12 and 13, 1968 and various documents were seized.
The writ petition was heard in the first instance by the
learned single judge who dismissed it. In appeal his
judgment was upheld by the Division Bench. Three
contentions were raised before the Division Bench; the first
was that S. 1.2 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944,
hereinafter called, the "Act" was void as the powers
delegated to the Central Government by the legislature were
excessive and beyond permissible limits. The second point
was that the Sea Customs Act 1878 having been repealed it
was not open to the Central Government under s. 12 of the
Act to apply s. 105(1) of the Customs Act 1962 to the Act
and the notification dated May 4, 1963 by which this was
done was illegal and ultra vires. The, third was that the
search and seizure made by the respondents under the
impugned authorisation dated August 11, 1968 and the
authorisation itself were not in accordance with the
provisions of s. 105 of the Customs Act 1962.
Section 12 of the Act is in the following
terms:
S. 12. Application of the provisions of Act
VIII of 1878 to Central Excise Duties.-The
Central Government may, by notification in the
official Gazette declare that any of the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act 1878
relating to the levy on and exemption from
customs duties, drawback of duty, warehousing
offences and penalties, confiscation, and
procedure relating to offences and appeals,
shall, with such modifications and alterations
as it may consider necessary or desirable to
adapt them to the circumstances, be applicable
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in regard to
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like matters in respect of the duties imposed
by section
3."
When the Act was enacted s. 172 of the Sea
Customs Act 1878 which could be applied to the
Act under s. 12 provided :
S.172. "Any Magistrate may, on
application by a Customs-Collector, stating
his belief that dutiable or prohibited goods
(or any documents relating to such goods) are
secreted in any place within the local limits
of the, jurisdiction of such Magistrate, issue
a warrant to search for such goods.
Such warrant shall be executed in the same way
and shall have the same effect, as a search
warrant issued under the law relating to
Criminal Procedure."
It may be mentioned that the words "or documents" were
inserted by the Sea Customs Amendment Act 1955. After the
enactment of the Customs Act 1962 by the notification dated
May 4, 1963 as amended by the Notification dated February 6,
1965 amongst other provisions of the Customs Act 1962, sub-
s. (1) of s. 105 and s. 1, IO were made applicable with
certain modifications of a minor nature under s. 12 of the
Act. The material part of these sections are reproduced
below ;-
"S. 105(1) Power to search premises.-(1) if
the Assistant Collector of Customs, or in any
area adjoining the land frontier or the coast
of India an officer of Customs specially
empowered by name in this behalf by the Board,
has reason to believe that any goods liable to
confiscation or any documents or things which
in his opinion will be useful for or relevant
to any proceeding under this Act are secreted
in any place, he may authorise any officer of
customs to search or may himself search for
such goods, documents or things."
"S. 110(3). The proper officer may seize any
document or things which, in his opinion, will
be useful for, or relevant to, any proceeding
under this Act."
On the first point it has been urged on behalf of the
appellant that s. 12 of the Act gave unrestricted and
unlimited power to the Central Government to modify or alter
the provisions of the Sea Customs Act 1878 and to apply the
provisions of that Act with such modifications and
alterations as the Central Government might consider
appropriate. Modification, it has been pointed out, may be
permissible, and may not fall within the vice of excessive
delegation because the basic structure is not changed but
alteration, it is suggested, has a much wider connotation
and it emm-
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braces even the changing of the essential pattern of a thing
or object. Such a power inherently involves the making of
changes even in regard to matters pertaining to legislative
policy.
In our opinion the above contention is purely of academic
interest in the present case. In the notifications which
were issued applying, inter alia, s. 105 (1) and S. 1 10 of
the Customs Act 1962 no such changes have been made as can
possibly fall within the meaning of the word "alterations".
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It has been pointed out in the previous decisions of this
Court that the power to restrict and modify does not import
the power to make essential changes. It is confined to
alterations of a minor character and no change in principle
is involved. See In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912.(1) It was
conceded before the High Court and has not been urged before
us that the word "modifications" could not be taken as con-
ferring on the Central Government any legislative power
which was in excess of the permissible limits. Objection
was taken only with regard to the word "alterations" but
that word must be understood in the sense in which it was
open to the legislature to employ it legitimately and in a
constitutional manner. No question is thus involved of
delegation either of any essential legislative functions or
any change of legislative policy.
The second contention has hardly any merit. Section 8(1) of
the General Clauses Act provides that where any Central Act
repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any
provision of a former enactment then references in any such
enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed
shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as
references to the provision so re-enacted. By virtue of
this provision it cannot be disputed. that in s. 12 of the
Act the Customs Act 1962 can be read in place of the Sea
Customs Act 1878. An attempt has been made to argue that s.
12 of the Act empowers incorporation of the provisions of
Sea Customs Act 1878 in the Act itself and whenever a
notification is issued under it such provisions of the Sea
Customs Act as have been applied become incorporated as in
integral part of the Act. Section 8 of the General Clauses
Act would not be applicable to a case of such incorporation
and it can only apply if s. 12 can be regarded as containing
a reference to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act. In
Secretary of State for Indian in Council v. Hindusthan
Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. (2) it was accepted as a
settled rule of construction that where a statute is
incorporated by reference into a second the repeal of the
first statute does not affect the second. The law laid down
by the Privy Council can have no applicability to the
present case. Section 12 of the Act did not bodily lift, as
it were, certain provisions of the Sea Customs Act 1878 and
incorporate
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.
(2) 58 I.A.259.
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them as an integral part of the Act. It only empowered the
Central Government to apply the provisions of the Sea
Customs Act 1878 with such modifications and alterations as
might be considered necessary or desirable by the Central
Government for the purpose of implementation and enforcement
of s. 3 of the Act. No exception could be taken to the view
of the High Court that s. 12 contained a provision
delegating limited powers to the Central Government to draw
upon the provisions of the Sea Customs Act 1878 for the
purpose of implementing s. 3 of the Act. in The Collector of
Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty & Another(1)
this Court examined at length the meaning and effect of
incorporation by reference of one statute into another and
discussed the Privy Council case referred to before in
detail. Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, it was
pointed out, ’dealt with reference or citation of one
enactment in another without incorporation. The usual or
recognised formulae generally employed to effect
incorporation were considered; for instance the words used
in s. 20 of 53 and 54 Vict. Ch. 70-Housing of the Working
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Classes Act, 1890, the words used were
" shall, for that purpose, be deemed to form
part of this Act in the same manner as if they
were enacted in the body thereof."
In 54 and 55 Vict. Ch. 19, s. 1(3), the
language employed was,:
"The provisions of s. 134 of the said Act (set
out in the schedule) shall apply as if they
were herein enacted."
It is unnecessary to mention the other provisions because a
comparison of the recognised formulae with the text of s. 12
of the Act shows that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act
1878 were not meant to be incorporated in the Act and were
only to be applicable to the extent notified by the Central
Government for the purpose of the duty leviable under s. 3.
Another aspect which has been presented under the second
contention is that the impugned notification is bad and
stands vitiated because under the previous notification
which applies s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act 1878 it was a
Magistrate who had to bring his judicial mind to bear on the
expediency or desirability of issuing a warrant for search
whereas under the present notification after the enactment
of the Customs Act 1962 it is the Assistant Collector of
Customs who performs executive functions and who has been
empowered to issue the warrant for search and seizure. The
decision of this Court in Collector of Customs & Excise.
Cochin & Ors. v. A. S. Bava(2) has been sought to be pressed
into service in support of the argument that extension of s.
105 (1),
(1) [1962] (3) S.C.R. 786.
(2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 82.
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is illegal. In that case the provisions of S. 129 of the
Sea Customs Act 1878 had been applied under S. 12 of the
Act. Section 129 dealt with the procedure relating to
appeals and required an appellant to deposit pending the
appeal the duty or penalty imposed and empowered the
appellate authority, in its discretion, to dispense with
such deposit pending the appeal in any particular case.
There was a provision in the Act itself, s. 35, which gave
an unfettered right of appeal to a person aggrieved by any
decision or order made under the Act. It was in these
circumstances that it was held that s. 129 of the Sea
Customs Act 1878 could not be made applicable so as to
whittle down the substantive right of appeal conferred by s.
35 of the Act. The ratio of that decision can afford no
assistance to the appellant in the present case. By the
notification issued under s. 12 of the Act after the
enactment of Customs Act 1962, the previous notification
under the Sea Customs Act 1878 stood superseded and no
question survives with regard to the validity of the
notification issued in 1963 and amended in 1965.
On the third point an attempt was made to argue that the
Assistant Collector, while issuing the, warrant for search
and seizure did not apply his mind to the relevant and
necessary facts. Our attention has been invited to the
warrant itself in which the documents have not been
particularised or specified but the words certain documents"
have been used. The learned single judge dealt with this
matter fully and repelled the contention that there was no
relevant material before the authority upon which the belief
could be founded in terms of s. 105(1) of the Customs Act
1962 by the Assistant Collector. We find no merit in this
contention.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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G.C. Appeal dismissed.
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