Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
REPORTABLE
2023INSC743
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.706 OF 2015
PRAKASH (DEAD) BY LR. … Appellant(s)
VERSUS
G. ARADHYA & ORS. … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Rajesh Bindal, J.
1. The appellant has filed the present appeal before this Court
1
impugning the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
2
by which the Appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and
decree of the trial Court was upheld.
FACTS
2. The facts, as evident from the record, are that on 16.10.1963
a property measuring 30 ft. x 60 ft. was purchased by the father of the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
GEETA AHUJA
Date: 2023.08.18
17:26:26 IST
Reason:
1
Dated 09.12.2009 in RFA No.969/2000
2
O.S. No.3752/1987 dated 23.08.2000
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appellant, Gangaramaiah, in the name of the appellant, who was minor
at that time. On 24.12.1973 the father of the appellant, Gangaramaiah
sold the aforesaid property to one Rudramma for a sum of ₹ 5000/-
(Rupees Five Thousand). The age of the appellant, who claimed himself
to be minor at that time, was mentioned as 13 years. On the same day,
another unregistered document was executed between the parties
claiming to be Reconveyance Deed in terms of which on the request of
the vendor, the vendee had agreed to re-transfer the property back
within five years of the Sale Deed in case the sale consideration of
₹ 5000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) is paid.
3. A notice dated 24.11.1978 was got issued by the father of the
appellant to the vendee seeking execution of the Conveyance Deed
back in favour of the vendor in terms of the Reconveyance Deed
executed on 24.12.1973. The same was replied to by the vendee-
Rudramma through her counsel on 02.12.1978 stating that the Sale Deed
dated 24.12.1973 was not a mortgage by conditional sale. It was an
outright sale of the property. It was admitted that on the same date, an
3
agreement of reconveyance was entered into. On 24.07.1978, a suit was
filed by Rudramma seeking eviction of the Gangaramaiah in terms of the
Lease Agreement dated 24.12.1973 as he had not been paid the rent.
3
SC No.3608/78 before the Small Cause Court, Bangalore.
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While reserving her rights in the aforesaid suit, Rudramma stated in the
reply to the notice that she is ready and willing to get the Conveyance
Deed executed on receipt of ₹ 7000/- (Rupees Seven Thousand).
4. A suit was filed by Ganagaramaiah seeking permission from
the Court to mortgage the property of the minor. A public notice was
issued inviting objections. Vide order dated 27.09.1978 permission was
granted to execute fresh Mortgage Deed in order to discharge the
earlier mortgage for a sum of ₹ 7000/- (Rupees Seven Thousand). On
26.03.1987, the legal heirs of Rudramma sold the property in-question
in favour of defendant no.4 in the suit, namely, N. Shashidar.
Gangaramaiah died on 30.04.1987.
2
5. A suit was filed by the appellant praying for various reliefs,
which was dismissed by the trial Court. The judgment of the trial Court
was upheld by the High Court.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
6. In the aforesaid factual matrix, Mrs. Kiran Suri, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the finding recorded
by the courts below, that the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff was time
barred, is totally erroneous. The prayer in the suit was for redemption
of the mortgage. On interpretation of the documents, it is clearly made
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out that the intention of the vendor was to mortgage the property. On
the very same date, the Reconveyance Deed was executed though
separately, in terms of which the vendee had agreed to re-transfer the
property on returning back the consideration money within a period of
five years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed. The terms
mentioned in the document need to be interpreted. It can be very well
made out that, it was a mortgage and not an agreement for re-purchase
of the property. It was submitted that even if under Section 58(c) of the
4
1882 Act , it is provided that clauses to treat the transaction of sale as a
mortgage have to be in a single document, it is not a pre-condition, as
the intention of the parties can be inferred from two separate documents
executed on the same date.
7. The finding recorded by the trial Court, as upheld by the
High Court regarding the suit being time barred, is totally erroneous.
The case of the appellant will not fall under Article 60 of the Schedule
5
attached to the 1963 Act . Rather, it will fall under Article 61 thereof. It
was not a simplicitor case of challenging the Sale Deed executed by the
guardian of the appellant when at the relevant point of time, he was a
4
The Transfer of Property Act, 1882
5
The Limitation Act, 1963
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minor. Rather it was a case of redemption of mortgage for which
limitation prescribed was 30 years.
8. It was further submitted that the appellant was the absolute
owner of the property for which the Sale Deed was got registered by his
father when he was a minor. Considering his age at that time, it could not
be established that purpose of the sale of property was for the benefit of
the minor. Even otherwise, the onus to prove the same was on the
alienee of the property, which he had failed to discharge. A sale of
property belonging to a minor being without any legal necessity,
deserved to be set aside.
9. Further, argument raised is that a suit for possession filed by
the vendee in the year 1978, shows that the possession of the property
always remained with the vendor. This clearly establishes that it was not
an outright sale, rather it was a mortgage, which the father of the
appellant could get redeemed within a period of five years. The
intention of the vendee is evident from the fact that she started
demanding ₹ 7,000/- as against ₹ 5,000/- as is mentioned in the document
at the time of execution of the Reconveyance Deed. It was not disputed
that the property in-question is a vacant plot and the property tax thereof
was not being paid by the appellant.
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10. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant placed
reliance on the judgments of this Court in Indira Kaur (Smt.) and others
v. Sheo Lal Kapoor, (1988) 2 SCC 488 ; Sunil Kumar and another v.
Ram Parkash and others, (1988) 2 SCC 77 ; Ramlal and another v.
Phagua and others, (2006) 1 SCC 168 ; and Ahilyabai and others v.
Shantabai (Dead) and others, (2001) 10 SCC 583 in support of her
arguments.
RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
11. On the other hand, Mr. Aditya Sondhi, learned Senior
counsel, appearing for the respondents, submitted that the argument
raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is a case of
mortgage, is not made out from the record. Section 58(c) of the 1882
4
Act clearly provides that it can be inferred from the document, in case
it is a single document and the clauses are contained therein. In the case
in hand, admittedly two separate documents were executed. The prayer
in the suit was not to declare that the transaction between the parties was
a mortgage. In the absence thereof, no relief for redemption could be
claimed directly. The suit filed by the appellant is clearly barred by
limitation. Though exact date of birth of the appellant has not come on
the record, however, his mother while appearing as PW-1, in her cross-
examination stated that he was born in December 1962. Meaning
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thereby that he had attained the age of majority in the year 1980. The
suit having been filed in the year 1987 challenging the Sale Deed of
1973, was thus, clearly time-barred. It was further submitted that the
appellant or his father who was the guardian had failed to avail of any
appropriate remedy in case, the vendee had refused to get the Sale
Deed registered back in terms of the Reconveyance Deed. Nothing
hinges on the permission taken by the father of the appellant for re-
mortgaging the property in-question as it is not disputed that at the time
of sale of the property, permission was not taken.
12. A suit was filed by the vendee seeking possession from the
father of the appellant and also payment of rent in terms of the Lease
Deed dated 24.12.1973. The same was decreed in favour of the vendee.
Though it transpired at the time of the hearing that, further proceeding
was taken by the father of the appellant against the judgment in the
aforesaid suit, however, none of the parties was aware of the status
thereof. The possession of the property was delivered to the vendee at
the time of execution of the Sale Deed, as is even mentioned therein.
The house tax was also being paid by the vendee. The judgments relied
upon by the appellant are distinguishable. Reliance was placed upon
the judgment of this Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra
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Prasad and another, (2006) 4 SCC 432 wherein earlier judgment of this
Court in Ramlal’s (Supra), was distinguished.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material available on record and referred to at the time of hearing.
DISCUSSIONS
14. At the very outset, before we deal with the arguments raised
by the parties, it may not be out of place if not mentioned here that some
of the relevant documents were not produced by the parties in evidence.
Primarily, onus thereof certainly falls on the appellant, who was the
plaintiff as he had to stand on his own legs. Some of these documents
are, the Sale Deed dated 16.10.1963 by which the property in-question
was purchased by his father in his name; the notice got issued by the
father of the appellant on 24.11.1978 to the vendee qua execution of the
Sale Deed in terms of the Reconveyance Deed and the Lease Deed which
was allegedly executed by the vendee in favour of the father of the
appellant on 24.12.1973 regarding the property in-question.
15. Insofar as the age of the appellant is concerned, though
certain dispute was raised by the appellant claiming that he was 3 years
of age when the Sale Deed was got registered by his father in favour of
Rudramma on 24.12.1973, however, the fact is otherwise. It came in the
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cross-examination of the mother of the appellant who appeared as PW-
1, that the appellant was born in December 1962. That means that he
attained the age of majority in the year 1980. This fact is further
corroborated from the suit filed by the appellant in the year 1987
wherein he claimed himself to be 24 years of age.
16. In the civil suit, though N. Shashidar was impleaded as
defendant no.4, however, the Sale Deed executed by Rudramma in his
favour was not challenged. The following prayers were made in the suit:
“ Wherefore the plaintiff prays for judgment and decree
against the defendants:
a) declaring that the document dated 24-12-73
styled as a sale deed executed by late Gangaramaiah in
favour of late Rudramma conveying the schedule property
in her favour and registered as No.3266/73-74 at pages 172
to 174 in volume No.400 of Book-l in the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Sreerampuram-Bangalore, is null and void and
not binding on the plaintiff and does not convey any right,
title or interest in respect of the schedule property to the
defendants herein claiming through late Smt. Rudramma;
b) alternatively, declaring that the plaintiff is
entitled to redeem the Mortgage of the schedule property
under the above-mentioned sale deed coupled with the
agreement of Reconveyance on payment of Rs.5,000/- to the
defendants; on receipt of this sum, the defendants shall
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execute the deed of redemption and return all the
documents of title of the schedule property in their custody.
c) a decree for permanent injunction restraining
the defendants, or any other person or persons claiming
through them from interfering in any manner with the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule
property by the plaintiff; and
d) a decree for costs of this suit and grant other
relief/relief's as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the
circumstances of the case, in the interests of justice and
equity.”
17. A perusal of the prayers made in the suit shows that the same
was filed by the appellant against the legal heirs of late Rudramma
(vendee) and N. Shashidar in whose favour legal heirs of Rudramma
executed the Sale Deed in-question on 26.03.1987. The first prayer was
for declaring the document dated 24.12.1973, styled as a Sale Deed
executed by late Gangaramaiah in favour of late Rudramma being null
and void and not binding on the appellant. In the alternative, prayer was
made for declaring that the appellant is entitled to redeem the mortgage
of the scheduled property in terms of the Sale Deed and the agreement
of reconveyance on payment of ₹ 5,000/-. Further prayer was made for
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protecting the possession of the appellant-plaintiff. The trial Court
initially framed the following issues:
1. Does Plaintiff prove his title to the suit property?
“
2. Does plaintiff further prove that his father Sri
Gangaramaiah was not competent to execute
the Sale Deed dt.24.12.73 in favour of
Smt.Rudramma?
3. Does plaintiff further prove that there was no
legal necessity for Gangaramaiah to sell the suit
property in favour of Smt.Rudramma?
4. Does plaintiff prove that the transaction as per
the Sale Deed dt.24.12.73 was in the nature of
mortgage?
5. Does plaintiff prove his lawful possession of the
suit property?
6. Is plaintiff entitled for declaration of declaring
of Sale Deed dt. 24.12.73 executed by
Gangaramaiah in favour of Smt. Rudramma as
null and void and not binding on the plaintiff?
7. Is plaintiff entitled to redeem the mortgage of
the suit property?
8. Is plaintiff entitled for permanent injunction
sought for?
9. What order or decree? ”
17.1. Following additional issue was framed by the trial Court on
27.11.1993:
“Whether the suit is barred by limitation?”
17.2. Thereafter, following additional issues were framed by the
trial Court on 16.08.1994 :
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“1. Do the defendants prove that the defence
in regard to the benami nature of the transaction
between late Gangaramaiah and late Smt.
Rudramma is not hit by Section 4 of the Benami
Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988?
2. Do the defendants prove that the
transaction between late Gangaramiah and late
Smt. Rudramma is an absolute sale and is valid
according to Sec.8 of the Hindu Minority &
Guardianship Act, 1956?”
18. The findings on the above issues recorded by the trial Court,
as mentioned in para 20 of the judgment, are as under:
“20. By findings on the above issues are
Issue No. 1 - Negative
Issue No. 2 - Negative
Issue No. 3 - Negative
Issue No. 4 - Negative
Issue No. 5 - Negative
Issue No. 6 - Negative
Issue No. 7 - Negative
Issue No. 8 - Negative
Addl. Issue dt. 27.11.93 - Affirmative
Addl. Issue No.1 dt. 16.08.94- Doesn’t arise
Addl. Issue No.2 dt. 16.8.94 - Affirmative”
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19. In the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and
decree of the trial Court, following two questions were framed by the
High Court:
“1. Whether the trial Court was justified in holding the
document dated 20.12.1973 [registered on
24.12.1973] as sale deed and consequently rejecting
the claim of the plaintiff that the said sale deed if read
along with the agreement of buy back dated
24.12.1973 would not constitute mortgage of suit
schedule property in favour of Smt. Rudramma? .
2. Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing
the suit holding that the documents dated 20.12.1973
[registered on 24.12.1973] as absolute sale deed and
consequently rejecting the prayer of the plaintiff for
redemption of mortgage?”
20. Both the aforesaid questions were decided against the
appellant by the High Court.
21. A perusal of the aforesaid questions framed by the High
Court shows that, these are co-related. The core issue was as to whether
the transaction between the parties was an absolute sale of the property
or it was a mortgage. The issue of limitation, with reference to the
challenge to the Sale Deed having been decided against the appellant
by the trial Court, was not raised before the High Court, as is evident
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from the questions framed. Hence, this aspect could not be addressed
before this Court.
22. The argument raised by Mrs. Kiran Suri, learned Senior
counsel for the appellants, on the aforesaid issue was that on a perusal
of the documents the Court can always opine as to whether the intention
of the party was to get an absolute Sale Deed registered or it was a
mortgage. The submission was that, both the documents were executed
on the same day. Reconveyance of the property in favour of the vendor,
father of the appellant, on the payment of the same amount of
consideration within five years, would clearly lead to an inference that
the said transaction was a Mortgage Deed. Coupled with the fact that
possession of the property had always remained with the appellant,
otherwise the same would have been delivered to the vendee.
23. Before we appreciate the arguments raised at the Bar, we
4
may refer to Section 58 of the 1882 Act wherein the terms: “mortgage”,
“mortgagor” and “mortgagee” etc. have been defined. Sub-section (c)
which deals with “mortgage by conditional sale” relevant for the point
in issue, are extracted below:
“ 58. “Mortgage ”, “mortgagor”, “mortgagee”,
“mortgage-money” and “mortgage-deed”
defined.-
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(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) Mortgage by conditional sale. - Where,
the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged
property-
On condition that on default of payment of the
mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall
become absolute, or
On condition that on such payment being made the
sale shall become void, or
On condition that on such payment being made the
buyer shall transfer the property to the seller,
the transaction is called mortgage by conditional
sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by
conditional sale:
Provided that no such transaction shall be
deemed to be a mortgage, unless the
condition is embodied in the document
which effects or purports to effect the sale.”
24. A perusal of the aforesaid proviso to sub-section (c) of
4
Section 58 of the 1882 Act provides that no transaction shall be deemed
to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document
which effects or purports to effect the sale. It is the undisputed case in
hand that it was not a single document, the conditions contained wherein
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have to be considered by this Court to opine that the transaction was not
a sale, but a mortgage. Admittedly, there are two separate documents.
25. Similar argument, where two separate documents were
Bishwanath
executed, came up for consideration before this Court in
Prasad Singh’s case (supra). One was the Sale Deed and the second
was the agreement for sale. Both were executed on the same date. It
was opined therein that to appreciate a document its contents are to be
read in entirety and the intention of the parties is to be gathered from
the language used therein. Para 16 of the aforesaid judgment is referred
to for ready reference:
“ 16. A deed as is well known must be construed
having regard to the language used therein. We have
noticed hereinbefore that by reason of the said deed of
sale, the right, title and interest of the respondents
herein was conveyed absolutely in favour of the
appellant. The sale deed does not recite any other
transaction of advance of any sum by the appellant to
the respondents which was entered into by and
between the parties. In fact, the recitals made in the sale
deed categorically show that the respondents
expressed their intention to convey the property to the
appellant herein as they had incurred debts by taking
loans from various other creditors. ”
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25.1. Further, in the aforesaid judgment, this Court while
interpreting the terms of the agreement executed along with the Sale
Deed and opined that the same cannot be treated to be a mortgage as
the expression used therein were ‘vendor’, ‘vendee’, ‘sold’ and
‘consideration’. Fixed period was granted for execution of the Sale
Deed.
4
25.2. The scope of Section 58(c) of the 1882 Act was considered in
detail in paras 27 to 33 thereof which are extracted below:
“27. A bare perusal of the said provision clearly
shows that a mortgage by conditional sale must be
evidenced by one document whereas a sale with a
condition of retransfer may be evidenced by more than
one document. A sale with a condition of retransfer, is
not mortgage. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of
such a transfer all rights have been transferred
reserving only a personal right to the purchaser
( sic seller), and such a personal right would be lost,
unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time.
| | |
| 28. In Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat | |
| Ali [(1955) 1 SCR 174 : AIR 1954 SC 345] this Court | |
| clearly held: (SCR p. 177) | |
| | |
| “We think that is a fruitless task because two | |
| documents are seldom expressed in | |
| identical terms and when it is necessary to | |
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| | | consider the attendant circumstances the | | |
|---|
| | | imponderable variables which that brings in | | |
| | | its train make it impossible to compare one | | |
| | | case with another. Each must be decided on | | |
| | | its own facts.” | | |
| | | | | |
| 29. Yet again in Mushir Mohd. Khan v. Sajeda<br>Bano [(2000) 3 SCC 536] this Court upon construing<br>Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act opined:<br>(SCC pp. 541-42, para 9)<br>“9. The proviso to this clause was added by<br>Act 20 of 1929 so as to set at rest the conflict<br>of decisions on the question whether the<br>conditions, specially the condition relating<br>to reconveyance contained in a separate<br>document could be taken into consideration<br>in finding out whether a mortgage was<br>intended to be created by the principal<br>deed. The legislature enacted that a<br>transaction shall not be deemed to be a<br>mortgage unless the condition for<br>reconveyance is contained in the document<br>which purports to effect the sale.” | | 29. Yet again in Mushir Mohd. Khan v. Sajeda | | | |
| | Bano [(2000) 3 SCC 536] this Court upon construing | | | |
| | Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act opined: | | | |
| | (SCC pp. 541-42, para 9) | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | “9. The proviso to this clause was added by | | |
| | | Act 20 of 1929 so as to set at rest the conflict | | |
| | | of decisions on the question whether the | | |
| | | conditions, specially the condition relating | | |
| | | to reconveyance contained in a separate | | |
| | | document could be taken into consideration | | |
| | | in finding out whether a mortgage was | | |
| | | intended to be created by the principal | | |
| | | deed. The legislature enacted that a | | |
| | | transaction shall not be deemed to be a | | |
| | | mortgage unless the condition for | | |
| | | reconveyance is contained in the document | | |
| | | which purports to effect the sale.” | | |
| | | | | |
| | 30. Referring to Chunchun Jha [(1955) 1 SCR | | | |
| | 174: AIR 1954 SC 345] it was held: (SCC p. 544, para | | | |
| | 14) | | | |
| | |
| “14. Applying the principles laid down | |
| above, the two documents read together | |
| would not constitute a ‘mortgage’ as the | |
| condition of repurchase is not contained in | |
| the same documents by which the property | |
| was sold. The proviso to clause (c) of Section | |
| 58 would operate in the instant case also and | |
| the transaction between the parties cannot | |
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| | |
| 31. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba | |
| Chavan [(2005) 6 SCC 243] wherein one of us was a | |
| party, this Court held: (SCC p. 254, para 21) | |
| “21. There exists a distinction between<br>mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with<br>a condition of repurchase. In a mortgage, the<br>debt subsists and a right to redeem remains<br>with the debtor; but a sale with a condition of<br>repurchase is not a lending and borrowing<br>arrangement. There does not exist any debt<br>and no right to redeem is reserved thereby.<br>An agreement to sell confers merely a<br>personal right which can be enforced strictly<br>according to the terms of the deed and at the<br>time agreed upon. Proviso appended to<br>Section 58(c), however, states that if the<br>condition for retransfer is not embodied in<br>the document which effects or purports to<br>effect a sale, the transaction will not be<br>regarded as a mortgage. (See: Pandit<br>Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali [(1955) 1 SCR<br>174 : AIR 1954 SC 345] , Bhaskar Waman<br>Joshi v. Narayan Rambilas Agarwal [(1960) 2<br>SCR 117 : AIR 1960 SC 301] , K.<br>Simrathmull v. S. Nanjalingiah Gowder [1962<br>Supp (3) SCR 476 : AIR 1963 SC 1182]<br>, Mushir Mohd. Khan [(2000) 3 SCC 536]<br>and Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal [Tamboli<br>Ramanlal Motilal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal<br>Keshavlal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 295] .)” | | | | | |
| | | “21. There exists a distinction between | | |
| | | mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with | | |
| | | a condition of repurchase. In a mortgage, the | | |
| | | debt subsists and a right to redeem remains | | |
| | | with the debtor; but a sale with a condition of | | |
| | | repurchase is not a lending and borrowing | | |
| | | arrangement. There does not exist any debt | | |
| | | and no right to redeem is reserved thereby. | | |
| | | An agreement to sell confers merely a | | |
| | | personal right which can be enforced strictly | | |
| | | according to the terms of the deed and at the | | |
| | | time agreed upon. Proviso appended to | | |
| | | Section 58(c), however, states that if the | | |
| | | condition for retransfer is not embodied in | | |
| | | the document which effects or purports to | | |
| | | effect a sale, the transaction will not be | | |
| | | regarded as a mortgage. (See: Pandit | | |
| | | Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali [(1955) 1 SCR | | |
| | | 174 : AIR 1954 SC 345] , Bhaskar Waman | | |
| | | Joshi v. Narayan Rambilas Agarwal [(1960) 2 | | |
| | | SCR 117 : AIR 1960 SC 301] , K. | | |
| | | Simrathmull v. S. Nanjalingiah Gowder [1962 | | |
| | | Supp (3) SCR 476 : AIR 1963 SC 1182] | | |
| | | , Mushir Mohd. Khan [(2000) 3 SCC 536] | | |
| | | and Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal [Tamboli | | |
| | | Ramanlal Motilal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal | | |
| | | Keshavlal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 295] .)” | | |
| | | | | |
| | 32. The High Court relied upon Indira | | | |
| | Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor [(1988) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1988 | | | |
| | SC 1074]. Therein the Court took into consideration the | | | |
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factors adumbrated therein, particularly, a long
stipulated period of 10 years for conveying the
property and the vendee was prohibited from selling
and parting with his right, title and interest for 10 years.
The vendor was allowed to occupy the property as a
tenant on payment of Rs 80 per month. No order of
mutation was passed in his favour. It was held:
“ 6 . … In the present case having regard to
the facts and circumstances highlighted in
the course of the discussion pertaining to the
question as to whether or not the transaction
was a transaction of mortgage having regard
to the real intention of the parties it would be
difficult to hold that the agreement to sell
executed by the defendant in favour of the
plaintiff was by way of a ‘concession’. It was
a transaction entered into by the defendant
who was a hard-headed businessman and
the documents in question have been
carefully framed in legal terminology taking
into account the relevant provisions of law.
The transaction also discloses the awareness
of the defendant about Section 58( c ) of the
Transfer of Property Act as is evident from
the fact that the reconveyance clause is not
embodied in the sale deed itself. In the
agreement to sell, no reference has been
made to the transaction of sale though it has
been executed contemporaneously. The
defendant who has permitted the plaintiff to
continue in possession on payment of rent
equivalent to about 13½ per cent interest
and was evidently aware of all the
dimensions of the matter would not have
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| | |
| 33. In the instant case, as noticed hereinbefore, | |
| the transfer is complete and not partial, no stipulation | |
| has been made that the appellant cannot transfer the | |
| property. Not only that, the appellant was put in | |
| possession of the land, his name was also mutated.” | |
25.3. A perusal of the aforesaid paras of the judgment shows that
4
the proviso was added in Section 58(c) of the Act vide Act No.20 of 1929,
so as to put at rest the conflicting decisions on the issue. A deeming
fiction was added in the negative that a transaction shall not be deemed
to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in
the document which purports to effect the sale.
25.4. The judgment of this Court in Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan, (2005) 6 SCC 243, has also been referred to, which defines the
distinction between mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with a
condition of repurchase. In a mortgage, the debt subsists and a right to
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Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
redeem remains with the debtor; but a sale with condition of repurchase
is not a lending and borrowing arrangement. Proviso to Section 58(c) of
4
the 1882 Act was referred to in the aforesaid judgment to hold that if the
condition for re-transfer is not embodied in the document which effects
or purports to effect a sale, the transaction will not be regarded as a
mortgage. The judgment of this Court in Ramlal’s case (supra), relied
upon by learned Senior counsel for the appellant, was specifically dealt
with and distinguished in paras 34 and 35 thereof in Bishwanath Prasad
Case (supra) and the same are extracted below:
“34. In Ramlal v. Phagua this Court having regard
to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein opined: (SCC
p. 173, para 18)
"18. In our opinion, agreement to
reconvey the property will not ipso facto
lead to the conclusion that the sale is
nominal and in view of the stand of
Defendant 8, as also of the fact that the
property worth Rs 700 has been purportedly
sold for Rs 400, we are of the considered
opinion that the sale deed dated 1-12-1965
did not convey any title to Defendant 8. It is
well settled by a catena of decisions that the
vendor cannot convey to the vendee better
title than she herself has."
35. As of fact, it was held therein that the sale deed
in question was not a real sale deed but was by way of a
surety. In that case, furthermore, the defendant
categorically admitted that the plaintiff had taken loan. It is
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Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
in that situation, the transaction was held to be a mortgage.
Apart from it, there were other circumstances which led the
court to arrive at the said conclusion. The said decision,
therefore, cannot have any application in the instant case.”
26. Before we proceed to consider the legal effect thereof, we
find it appropriate to extract the contents of the two documents. The
contents of the Sale Deed are extracted below:
th
“On this 24 day of December, 1973 I, Gangaramaiah,
S/o. late Kambaiah, residing at No.62, Hosaguddadahalli,
Mysore Road, Bangalore City on behalf of minor son
Prakashaiah, aged about 13 years as his guardian and father
is executing this Absolute Sale Deed in favour of Smt.
Rudramma, W/o. Sri Gangappa, aged about 48 years,
residing at No. 68, Nehru Road, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore
Road, Bangalore City as follows:-
The schedule property mentioned below was
acquired by us from Smt. Sharadamma, S/o P.V.
Raghavendra Naidu and her children under a registered
sale dated 16-10-1963 registered as Document No. 5676 of
Book-l in Volume No. 2332 at pages 238-241 registered at
the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North Taluk and
ever since the possession of the property is with us. In order
to meet domestic expenses and to meet the education of the
minor son and also to discharge some of the petty debts the
schedule property is sold for a sale consideration of
Rs.5,000/-. I have received a sum of Rs.3,000/- in the
presence of the witnesses and also agreed to receive the
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Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
remaining sale consideration of Rs.2,000/- at the time of the
registration of this sale deed in the presence of the Sub-
Registrar. Thus, total sale consideration of Rs.5,000/- is paid
to me. Therefore, on this day of the registration the
possession of the schedule property is delivered to you.
Here afterwards you can change Katha in respect of the
schedule site in your name and you are at liberty to enjoy
all such resources available/standing over the schedule site
by paying tax, cess etc., and you shall enjoy the schedule
site as the absolute owner thereof from generation to
generation. There are no other claimants, legal heirs and
there is no charge such as the payment of maintenance,
Shreedhan rights, minor disputes, court decrees,
attachment etc. In the event of any dispute, I will undertake
to resolve them at my cost. I have handed over the sale deed
dated 16-10-1963 and the Survey Endorsement, Tax paid
receipts, Katha Endorsements.”
27. The contents of the reconveyance/agreement of buy back
deed dated 24.12.1973 are extracted below:
“On this 24th day of December, 1973 I, Smt.
Rudramma, W/o. Sri Gangappa residing at No. 68, Nehru
Road, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City is
executing this Reconveyance Agreement in favour of Sri.
Gangaramaiah, S/o. late Kambaiah, residing at No.62,
Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City as
follows:-
Page 24 of 27
Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
You are aware that the property mentioned under
the schedule given below was sold and registered by you in
my name for a sum of Rs.5,000/- at the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Srirampuram, Bangalore City on 24-12-1973
which is registered as Document No. 3265, in Book-l. Since
you requested me to resell the schedule property but I
permitted you to repurchase the schedule property within a
given time, I am granting you 5 years of time for you to
repurchase the same. In the event, you pay me the sale
consideration of Rs.5,000/-, I will reconvey the schedule
property in your favour. This agreement shall cease on the
next day of the expiry of 5 years. At the time of repurchase
you must bear the registration charges.”
28. In the case in hand, the specific term used in the document is
“reconveyance agreement” executed by Rudramma in favour of
Gangaramaiah. It is clearly mentioned therein that the property in-
question had already been sold and registered in the name of
Rudramma. On a request made by Gangaramaiah, the right to purchase
the property was given within a period of five years on payment of sale
consideration of ₹ 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand). The agreement
states that it shall cease to have effect on expiry of a period of five years.
29. A perusal of the contents of the Sale Deed shows that it is
clearly mentioned therein that the same was an absolute sale for a total
sale consideration of ₹ 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) required by the
Page 25 of 27
Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
vendor to meet domestic expenses and to meet education expenses of
his minor son and to discharge some debts. Total sale consideration was
₹ 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand). Out of this amount, a sum of ₹ 3,000/-
(Rupees Three Thousand) was received earlier and ₹ 2,000/- (Rupees
Two Thousand) was to be received in the presence of the Sub-Registrar
at the time of the registration of the Sale Deed. Possession of the
property was to be delivered on registration of the Sale Deed. The
vendee was entitled to get the mutation entered in her name and enjoy
the property by paying the taxes, if any. She would become an absolute
owner thereof from generation to generation. There were no
encumbrances attached to the property.
30. The agreement of buy back dated 24.12.1973 mentioned,
that after registration of the Sale Deed, the vendor had requested the
vendee to resell the property within the time given. The vendee granted
him five years’ time to repurchase the property in case sale
consideration of ₹5000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) is paid. It was agreed
that the agreement shall cease immediately after expiry of 5 years. It
further mentions that at the time of repurchase, registration expenses
are to be borne by the father of the appellant, who had to get the Sale
Deed registered back.
Page 26 of 27
Civil Appeal No. 706 of 2015
31. In terms of the Sale Deed and the Reconveyance Deed,
reconsidered in the light of the enunciation of law, as referred to above,
in our opinion, the same cannot be held to be a transaction of mortgage
of property. Sale of property initially, was absolute. By way of execution
of Reconveyance Deed, namely, on the same day, the only right given
to the appellants was to repurchase the property.
32. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any error in
the judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………, J.
(Hima Kohli)
……………….., J.
(Rajesh Bindal)
New Delhi
August 18, 2023.
Page 27 of 27