Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
U.P. ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
R. K. SHUKLA ANR. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/04/1969
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 237 1970 SCR (1) 507
1969 SCC (2) 400
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1971 SC2521 (11)
RF 1972 SC 451 (20)
RF 1972 SC1579 (4)
D 1975 SC1745 (2,3)
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Electricity undertaking taken once by
U.P. State Electricity Board under s. 6 of Indian
Electricity Act, 1910-Retrenchment compensation claimed by
workmen-Dispute whether to be decided under Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (Central) or under U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947-Sec. 6-H(2) of U.P. Act-Jurisdiction of
Labour Court under--Whether can decide question as to
retrenchment compensation being payable-Effect of s. 6-O-
Board whether liable to pay the compensation Effect of ss. 6
and 7 of Indian Electricity Act and Cl. V of Sixth
Schedule.
HEADNOTE:
In exercise of the power under s. 6 of the Indian
Electricity Act, 1910 the undertakings of the appellant
company at Allahabad and Lucknow were taken over by the
State Electricity Board, U.P. with effect from September 17,
1964. The workmen of the company were taken into the
employment of the Board without any break in continuity of
employment. Certain workmen of the Allahabad undertaking
filed before the Labour Court applications under s. 6-H(2)
of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947, for payment of
retrenchment compensation and salary in lieu of notice. A
group of workmen ’from the Lucknow undertaking also sub-
mitted applications under s. 6-H(2) with the same prayers;
in addition they claimed compensation for accumulated earned
leave not enjoyed by them till September 16, 1964. The
Labour Court allowed the applications. The Company appealed
to this Court by special leave. According to the
company there was no retrenchment of the workmen because
they had voluntarily left the service of the company to join
the service of the Board with no break in their service.
The questions that fell for consideration wer (i) Whether
the matter was to be decided under the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or those of the U.P.
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Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (ii) Whether the Labour Court
had jurisdiction under s. 6-H(2) of the U.P. Act to decide
the applications or because of there being dispute as to the
liability to pay retrenchment compensation the matter was in
view of item 10 of the second schedule to the U.P. Act
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal; (iii) Whether s. 6-0 of the U.P. Act also
necessitated that the question of liability to pay
retrenchment compensation be first determined; (iv) Whether
in view of ss. 6 & 7 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and
ss. 57 & 57A of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948
read with Cl. V of the sixth schedule thereto, the
liability to pay retrenchment compensation was that of the
Board and not that of the company; (v) Whether the claim of
the Lucknow workmen for compensation for earned leave not
enjoyed by them was allowable.
Held : (i) Under the Seventh Schedule to the constitution
legislation in respect of ’Trade Union Industrial and Labour
Disputes’ falls within Entry 22 of the Concurrent List and
both the State and the Union are competent to legislate in
respect of that field of legislation. Act 1 of 1957 added
to the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, s. 6-R(2) which
enacts that the rights and liabilities of employers and
workmen relating to lay-off and retrenchment shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of
508
ss. 6-J to 6-0. Act 1 of 1957 received the assent of the
President and by virtue of Art. 254(2) of the Constitution
s. 6-R(2) of the U.P. Act prevails notwithstanding any prior
law made by the Parliament. The rights and obligations of
the parties had therefore to be decided under the U.P. Act
including s. 6-R(2). [511 H-512 D]
Rohtak & Hissar Districts Electric Supply Company v. State
of U.P., [1966] 11 L.L.J. 330, distinguished.
(ii) Section 6-H(1) and (2) of the U.P. Act were
substantially the same as sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 33-C
of the Central Act and cases decided by this Court under
the latter provisions were applicable in the interpretation
of the former. According to the rule laid down in s. 6-H(2)
the Labour Court was competent to determine what each
workman was entitled to receive from the employer by way of
retrenchment compensation payable in terms of money and the
denial of liability of the company did not affect the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Where, however, as in the
present case, the dispute was whether the workmen had been
retrenched and computation of the amount of compensation was
subsidiary or incidental, the, Labour Court had no authority
to trespass upon the powers of the industrial Tribunal which
had exclusive jurisdiction under item 10 of the second
schedule of the U.P. Act to decide disputes relating to
retrenchment. [514 B-D 517 F]
The Central Bank of India, Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan etc.
[1964] 3 S.C.R. 140 and Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva
and Others, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709, applied.
The Board of Directors of the South Arcot Electricity
Distribution Co. Ltd. v. N. K. Mohammad Khan etc., [1969] 2
S.C.R. 902, explained.
Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar
and Others, [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140, State Bank of Bikaner and
Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal, [1968] 1 L.L.J. 589 and Punjab
National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
977, referred to.
(iii) Assuming that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to
determine the liability of the company to pay retrenchment
compensation no order awarding retrenchment compensation
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could still be made without recording a finding that workmen
were retrenched and compensation was payable for the
retrenchment. For s. 6-0 of the U.P. Act deprives the
workmen of the right to retrenchment compensation in the
conditions mentioned therein. The company asserted , that
the conditions precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction
did not exist while the workmen asserted the existence of
the conditions. Without deciding the, issue the Labour
Court could not compute the amount of compensation payable
to the workmen on the assumption that the workmen had been
retrenched and their claim fell within s. 6-0. [518 B; 519
B-C]
(iv) Sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Electricity Act did not
support the case of the Company that the liability was
enforceable against the Board after it took over the
undertaking. Under these sections when the undertaking
vests in the purchaser, any debt, mortgage or similar
obligation attaches to the purchase money in substitution of
the undertaking. The liability to pay retrenchment
compensation is a debt : if it arises on transfer it will
attach to the purchase money payable to the Company in
substitution of the undertaking. [521 A-B]
509
(v) The provisions of ss. 57 and 57A of the Indian
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, also did not assist the case
of the Company. These sections deal with the licencee’s
charges to consumers and the Rating Committees. In the
Sixth Schedule to the Act (incorporated into every license
by s. 57 ’aforesaid) it is provided by cl. IV that certain
amount shall be appropriated towards Contingencies Reserve
from the revenues of each year of account. Clause V then
provides for the appropriation of the Contingencies Reserve
:it requires the undertaking to hand over the Contingencies
Reserve to the purchaser. If the retrenchment compensation
becomes properly due to the employees of the Company, it
would, by virtue of cl. V sub-cl. (2) proviso, be charged
upon the Contingencies Reserve and the balance alone would
be handed over to the purchaser. In the present case
however there was no finding by the Labour Court that the
Contingencies Reserve had been paid over to the purchaser.
521 C-522 Cl (vi) The claim of the Lucknow workmen to
compensation in lieu of earned leave not enjoyed by them
could not be allowed. After the company closed its business
it could obviously not give any earned leave to these
workmen ’and the latter could not claim it. In the absence
of a statutory provision to that effect no such compensation
was payable. [522 E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1567 of
1968, 585 to 1026 and 1027 to 1082 of 1969.
Appeals by special leave from the orders dated March 28,
1968 and July 20, 1968 of the Labour Court (11), U.P.,
Lucknow in Misc. Cases Nos. 102 of 1965 etc.
M. C. Chagla, Harish Chandra, H. K. Purl and Bishambar Lal
for the appellant (in all the appeals).
J. P. Goyal and V. C. Prashar, for respondent No. 1 (in
all the appeals).
S. P. Nayar, for the Attorney-General (in C.As. Nos.
585 to 1026 and 1027 to 1082 of 1969).
The Judgment of the, Court was delivered by
Shah, J. These three groups of appeals arise out of orders
made by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court (11), U.P.,
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Lucknow awarding retrenchment compensation to certain
employees of the U.P. Electric Supply Company Ltd. (in
liquidation). In the last group of appeals orders of the
Labour Court awarding in addition thereto compensation for
earned leave not enjoyed by the employees are also
challenged.
The U.P. Electric Supply Company Ltd.-hereinafter called the
Company’-held two licences issued in 1914 by the Government
of U.P. for generating and distributing electricity within
thetowns of Allahabad and Lucknow. The periods of the
licenses expired in 1964. Pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 12(1) in each of the said licenses and in exercise
of the power under s. 6 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910,
the State Electricity Board, U.P.-hereinafter referred to as
"the Board took over the undertaking of the Company at
Allahabad and Lucknow from the mid-night of September 16,
1964. The Company accordingly
510
ceased to carry on the business of generation and
distribution of electricity in the areas covered by the
original licences. All the workmen of the undertakings at
Allahabad and Lucknow were taken over in the employment of
the Board with effect from September 17, 1964, without any
break in the continuity of employment.
On December 22, 1964, 443 workmen employed in the Allahabad
undertaking filed before the Labour Court, applications
under S. 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
for payment of retrenchment compensation and salary in lieu
of notice. The work-men submitted that fresh letters of
appointment were issued by the Board on September 16, 1964,
taking them in the employment of the Board with effect from
September 17, 1964 "in the posts and positions which they
previously held", but without giving credit for their past
services with the Company. The workmen contended that they
were entitled to retrenchment compensation and salary in
lieu of notice, and prayed for computation of those benefits
in terms of money and for directions to the Company to pay
them the amount so computed.
A group of 56 workmen employed at the Company’s undertaking
at Lucknow also submitted applications under s. 6H(2) of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, for payment of retrenchment
compensation and salary in lieu of notice and also for
compensation for accumulated earned leave not enjoyed by
them till September 16, 1964.
In the applications filed by the workmen of the Allahabad
undertaking, the Labour Court awarded to each workman
retrenchment compensation at the rates specified in the
order and also one month’s salary and costs. To each
workman of the Lucknow undertaking the Labour Court awarded
retrenchment compensation at the rate specified, salary in
lieu of one month’s notice, and also, wages for 30 days for
earned leave not enjoyed by the workman before the closure
of the undertaking, and costs. The Company has appealed to
this Court against the orders with special leave.
The orders for payment of retrenchment compensation are
resisted by the Company on two grounds-
(i) that the Labour Court was incompetent to
entertain and decide the applications for
awarding retrenchment compensation; and
(ii) that the workmen were not in fact
retrenched, and in any event since the workmen
were admitted to the service of the Board
without break in continuity, and on terms not
less favourable than the terms enjoyed by them
with the Com-
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511
pany, the Company was under no liability to
pay retrenchment compensation.
Some argument was advanced before us that in determining
matters relating to the award of retrenchment compensation,
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, apply. The question
is academic, because on the points in controversy between
the parties, the statutory provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, are substantially the same. We may, however, briefly
refer to this argument since, relying upon a judgment of
this Court to be presently noticed, counsel for the workmen
insisted that s. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
alone may apply.
After the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by
the Dominion Parliament, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, was enacted by the Provincial Legislature. The scheme
of them two Acts is substantially the same. Chapter V-A
relating to layoff and retrenchment was added in the
Industrial Disputes Act by Act 43 of 1953 with effect from
October 24, 1953. From time to time amendments were made in
the provisions of the Act. By
s. 25-J (2) it was provided
"For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that nothing contained in this
Chapter shall be deemed to affect the
provisions of any other law for the time being
in force in any State in so far as that law
provides for the settlement of industrial
disputes, but the rights and liabilities of
employers and workmen in so far as they relate
to lay-off and retrenchment shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter."
After this sub-section was incorporated in the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a group of
sections including s. 6-R were incorporated in
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act by U.P. Act 1
of 1957. Section 6-R(2) provided :
"For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that nothing contained in Sections 6-
H to 6-R shall ’be deemed to affect the
provision of any other law for the time being
in force so far as that law provides for the
settlement of industrial disputes, but the
rights and liabilities of employers and
workmen in so far as they relate to lay-off
and retrenchment shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of Sections 6-H
to 6-Q."
By virtue of s. 6-R(2) the provisions of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, prima facie, apply in the matters of lay-off
and retrenchment, because under the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution
512
legislation in respect of "Trade Unions, Industrial and
Labour Disputes" falls within Entry 22 of the Concurrent
List and both the State and the Union are competent to
legislate in respect of that field of legislation. Whereas
by adding s. 25-J(2) it was enacted that under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the rights and liabilities of
employers and workmen in so far as they relate to lay-off
and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of Ch. V-A of that Act, by the U.P. Act as
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amended by Act 1 of 1957, s. 6-R(2) enacts that the rights
and liabilities of employers and workmen relating to lay-off
and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of ss. 6-J to 6-Q.
Competence of the State Legislature to enact s. 6-R(2) is
not denied. Act 1 of 1957 received the assent of the
President and by virtue of Art. 254(2) of the Constitution
s. 6-R(2) of the U.P. Act prevails, notwithstanding any
prior law made by the Parliament. The provisions of the
U.P. Act including s. 6-R(2) therefore apply in determining
the rights and obligations of the parties in respect of
retrenchment compensation. The observation to the contrary
made by this Court in Rohtak & Hissar Districts Electric
Supply Company v. State of U.P. (1) which primarily raised a
dispute relating to the validity of certain model standing
orders proceeded upon a concession made at the Bar, and
cannot be regarded as decisive. Since the relevant
provisions of the two Acts on the matter in controversy in
these groups of appeals are not materially different, we do
not think it necessary in this case to refer the question to
a larger Bench.
We, accordingly, propose to refer only to, the provisions of
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 4-A of the
U.P. Act authorises the State Government to constitute one
or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial
disputes relating to any matter specified in the First
Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be
assigned to them under the Act. The items specified in the
First Schedule are-
1. The propriety or legality of an order
passed by an employer under the Standing
Orders;
2 . The application and interpretation of
Standing Orders
3 . Discharge or dismissal of workman
including reinstatement of, or grant of relief
to, workmen wrongfully dismissed;
4. Withdrawal of any customary concession
or privilege;
(1) [1966] 11 L.L.J. 330.
513
5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or
lock-out; and
6. All matters other than those, specified
in the Second Schedule."
Section 4-B authorises the State Government to
constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals
for the adjudication of industrial disputes
relating to any matter whether specified in
the First Schedule or the Second Schedule.
Item 10 of the Second Schedule relates to
"Retrenchment of workmen and closure of
establishment". Prima facie, disputes relating
to retrenchment of workmen and closure of
establishment fall within the exclusive
competence of the Industrial Tribunal, and not
within the competence of the Labour Court
constituted under s. 4-A. The Company had
expressly raised a contention that they had
not retrenched the workmen and that the
workmen had voluntarily abandoned the
Company’s service by seeking employment with
the Board’ even before the Company closed its
undertaking.
The workmen contended by their petitions filed
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before the Labour Courts that they were
retrenched, the Company contended that the
workmen had voluntarily abandoned the
employment under the Company because they
found it more profitable to take up employment
under the Board without any break in the same
post and on the same terms and conditions on
which they were employed by the Company. This
clearly raises the question whether there was
retrenchment of workmen, which gave rise to
liability to pay retrenchment compensation. A
dispute relating to retrenchment is
exclusively within the competence of the
Industrial Tribunal by virtue of item 10 of
the Second Schedule to the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, and is not within the competence
of the Labour Court. Section 6-H of the U.P.
Act provides :
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from
an employer under the provisions of Sections
6-J to 6-R or under a settlement or award, or
under an award given by an adjudicator or the
State Industrial Tribunal appointed or
constituted under this Act, before the com-
mencement of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1956, the workman may,
without prejudice to any other mode of
recovery, make an application to the State
Government for the recovery of the money due
to him, and if the State Government is
satisfied that any amount is so due, it shall
issue a certificate for that amount to the
Collector who shall proceed to recover the
same as if it were an arrear of land revenue.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive
from the employer any benefit which is capable
of being computed in terms of money, the
amount at which such
514
benefit should be computed may, subject to any
rules that may be made under this Act be
determined by such Labour Court as may be
specified in this behalf by the State
Government, and the amount so determined may
be recovered as provided for in sub-section
(1).
(3)
Under S. 6-H(2) the Labour Court was competent to determine
what each workman was entitled to receive from the employer
by way of retrenchment compensation payable in terms of
money and the denial of liability by the Company did not
affect the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
In several decisions of this Court the inter-relation
between sub-ss. (1) & (2) of s. 33-C (which are
substantially in the same terms as sub-ss. (1) & (2) of S.
6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act) was examined. It
was held by this Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
P. S. Rajagopalan etc.(1) that the scope of s. 33-C(2) is
wider than that of S. 33-C(1). Claims made under s. 33-C(1)
can only be those which are referrable to settlement, award
or the relevant provisions of Ch. V-A, but those
limitations are not to be found in S. 33-C(2). The three
categories of claims mentioned in S. 33-C(1) fall under S.
33-C(2) and in that sense s. 33-C(2) can itself be deemed to
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be a kind of execution proceeding, but it is possible that
claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the
provisions of Ch. V-A may also be competent under s. 33-
C(2). Elaborating this thesis Gajendragadkar, J., who
delivered the judgment of the Court observed (pp. 155-156)
"There is no doubt that the three, categories
of claims mentioned in s. 33C(1) fall under s.
33C(2) and in that sense, s. 33C(2) can itself
be deemed to be a kind of execution
proceeding; but it is possible that claims not
based on settlements, awards or made under the
provisions of Chapter V-A, may also be
competent under s. 33C(2) and that may
illustrate its wider scope. We would,
however, like to indicate some of the claims
which would not fall under s. 33C(2), because
they formed the subject matter of the appeals
which have been grouped together for our
decision along with the appeals with which we
are dealing at present. If an employee is
dismissed or demoted and it is his case that
the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it
would not be open to him to make a claim for
the recovery of his salary or wages under s.
33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give
rise to an industrial dispute which may
(1) [1964] 3 S.C. 140.
515
be appropriately tried, but once it is shown
that the employer has dismissed or demoted
him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is
unlawful and, therefore, the employee
continues to be the workman of the employer
and is entitled to the benefits due to him
under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made
under s. 33C(2)."
The same view was reiterated in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal
Bhiva and Others(1).
Mr. Goyal on behalf of the workmen, however, contended that
in a recent judgment of this Court a different view has been
expressed. He invited our attention to The Board of
Directors of the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co.
Ltd. v. N. K. Mohammad Khan, etc.(2). In that case the
Electricity undertaking was taken over by the Government of
Madras in exercise of the powers conferred by the Madras
Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1954, and
the employees of the undertaking were taken over by the new
employer. The employees claimed retrenchment compensation
from the old employer under s. 25FF, of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. It was urged before this Court that the
Labour Court was incompetent to decide the claim for
retrenchment compensation. This Court observed that s.
25FF(b) applied as the terms of service under the new
employer were less favourable than those under the old
employer, and under the terms of ss. 15 (1 ) & (2) of the
Acquisition Act and ss. 9A and 10 of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, liability to pay
retrenchment compensation rested upon the previous employer
and on that account the Labour Court was competent to
entertain the petitions under s. 33C(2). The language of s.
25FF in the view of the Court made it perfectly clear that
if the right to compensation accrued under the Act, the
workmen became entitled to receive retrenchment
compensation, when under the Madras Act the undertaking
stood transferred to the State Government from the Company.
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Referring to the contention that the Labour Court was not
competent to determine the liability to Day retrenchment
compensation, where the liability itself was denied, the
Court referred to the judgments of this Court in Chief
Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar and
Others(3); State Bank of Bikaner (4) ; and Jaipur v. R. L.
Khandelwal Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda(5);
Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan and Others(6);
and Bombay Gas Company Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Others(1),
and proceeded to observe that the right
(1) [1964]
(2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902.
(3) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140.
(4) [1968] 1 L.L.J. 589.
(5) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 977.
(6) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140.
516
which has been claimed by the various workmen in their
applications under S. 33C(2) of the Act was a right which
accrued to them under s. 25FF of the Act and was an existing
right at the time when those applications were made, and the
Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide, in dealing with the
applications under that provision, whether such a right did
or did not exist. The mere denial of that right by the
Company, it was said, could not take away its jurisdiction
and that the order of the Labour Court was competently made.
The decision in the Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajago-
palan and Others(1), to which we have already referred,
makes it clear that all disputes relating to claims which
may be computed in terms of money are not necessarily within
the terms of S. 33C(2). Again in Chief Mining Engineer,
East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar and Others (2 ) Shelat,
J., observed :
"........ that the right to the benefit which
is sought to be computed under S. 33C(2) must
be an existing one, that is to say, already
adjudicated upon or provided for and must
arise in the course of and in relation to the
relationship between an industrial workman and
his employer. Since the scope of sub-s. (2)
is wider than that of sub-s. (1) and the sub-
section is not confined to cases arising under
an award, settlement or under the provisions
of Ch. V-A, there is no reason to hold that a
benefit provided for under a statute or a
scheme made thereunder, without -there being
anything contrary under such statute or s.
33C(2), cannot fall within sub-s. (2).
Consequently, the benefit provided in the
bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provi-
dent Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948, which
remains to be computed must fall under sub-s.
(2) and the Labour Court therefore had
jurisdiction to entertain and try such a
claim, it being a claim in respect of an
existing right arising from the relationship
of an industrial workman and his employer."
That judgment clearly indicates that in order that a claim
may be adjudicated upon under S. 3 3C (2), there must be an
existing right and the right must arise under an award,
settlement or under the provisions of Ch. V-A, or it must
be a benefit provided by a statute or a scheme made
thereunder and there must be nothing .contrary under such
statute or S. 3 3C (2). But the possibility of a mere claim
arising under Ch. V-A is not envisaged by the Court in that
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case as conferring jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to
decide matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Tribunal.
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140.
(2) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 140.
517
The legislative intention disclosed by ss. 33 C ( 1 ) and 3
3 -C (2) is fairly clear. Under s. 33-C(1) where any money
is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or
an award or under the provisions of Ch. V-A, the workman
himself, or any other person authorised by him in writing in
that behalf, may make an application to the appropriate
Government to recover of the money due to him. Where the
workman who is entitled to receive from the employer any
money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in
terms of money, applies in that behalf, the Labour Court may
under s. 33-C(2) decide the questions arising as to the
amount of money due or as to the amount at which such
benefit shall be computed. Section 33-C(2) is wider than s.
33C(1). Matters which do not fall within the terms of s.
33C(1) may, if the workman is shown to be entitled to
receive the benefits, fall within the terms of s. 33C(2).
If the liability arises from an award, settlement or under
the provisions of Ch. V-A, or by virtue of a statute or a
scheme made thereunder, mere denial by the employer may not
be sufficient to negative the claim under s. 33-C(2) before
the Labour Court. Where however the right to retrenchment
compensation which is the foundation of the claim is itself
a matter which is exclusively within the competence of the
Industrial Tribunal to be adjudicated upon a reference, it
would be straining the language of section 33C(2) to hold
that the question whether there has been retrenchment may be
decided by the, Labour Court. The power of the Labour Court
is to compute the compensation claimed to be payable to the
workmen on the footing that there has been retrenchment of
the workmen. Where retrenchment is conceded, and the only
matter in dispute is that by virtue of s. 25FF no liability
to pay compensation has arisen the Labour Court will be
competent to decide the question. In such a case the
question is one of computation and not of determination, of
the conditions precedent to the accrual of liability.
Where, however, the dispute is whether workmen have been
retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or
incidental, in our judgment, the Labour Court will have no
authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with
which it is statutorily invested. In the unreported
judgment of this Court in The Board of Directors of the
South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. N. K.
Mohammed Khan, etc.(1) apparently the only argument advanced
before this Court was that s. 25FF applied to that case
having regard to the fact that the terms of employment under
the new employer were not less favourable than those
immediately applicable to them before the transfer, and the
Court proceeded to hold that the Labour Court was competent
to determine the compensation.
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902.
518
The finding that the Labour Court was incompetent to
decide .the applications of the workmen would be sufficient
to dispose of the appeals before us. But other arguments
were advanced before us, and which have an important bearing
on the claims made : we propose briefly to deal with these
arguments.
Assuming that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine
the liability of the Company to pay retrenchment
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compensation no order awarding retrenchment compensation
could still be made without recording a finding that there
was retrenchment of the workmen and compensation was payable
for retrenchment. Section 6-0 of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act (which in its phraseology is somewhat different
from s. 25FF of the Industrial -Disputes Act) provides :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in Section
6-N no workman shall be entitled to
compensation under that section by reason
merely of the fact that there has been a
change of employers in any case where the
ownership or management of the undertaking in
which he is employed is transferred, whether
by agreement or by operation of law, from one
employer to another
Provided that-
(a) the service of the workman has not been
interrupted by reason of the transfer;
(b) the terms and conditions of service
applicable to the workman after such transfer
are not in any way less favourable than those
applicable to him immediately before the
transfer; and
(c) the employer to whom the ownership or
management of the undertaking is so
transferred is, under the terms of the
transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay
to the workman, in the event of his
retrenchment, compensation on the basis that
his service has been continuous and has not
been interrupted by the transfer."
In the present groups of appeals it is common ground that
-there was no interruption resulting from the undertaking
being -taken over by the Board. The agreements between the
Board and the workmen to admit the workmen into employment
of the Board were reached before the undertakings of the
Company were taken over. The Company contended that the
terms and conditions of service applicable to workmen after
the transfer were not in any way less favourable to the
workmen than those applicable to them immediately before the
undertakings were taken ,over, and that the employer to whom
the ownership or manage-
519
ment of the undertakings were so transferred was, under the
terms of the transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay to
the workmen, in the event of their retrenchment,
compensation on the basis that their services had been
continuous and had not been interrupted by the taking over.
The workmen denied that claim. The Labour Court could award
compensation only if it determined the matter in controversy
in favour of the workmen it could not assume that the
conditions of the proviso to s. 6-0 were fulfilled. Section
6-0 is in terms negative. It deprives the workmen of the
right to retrenchment compensation in the conditions
mentioned therein. The Company asserted that the conditions
precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction did not exist.
The workmen asserted the existence of the conditions.
Without deciding the issue, the Labour Court could not
compute the amount of compensation payable to the workmen.
On the assumption that the workmen had been retrenched and
their claim fell within the proviso to s. 6-0.
It was urged by Mr. Goyal on behalf of the workmen that this
plea was not raised or argued before the Labour Court, and
it cannot be permitted to be raised in this Court. But this
contention was raised in the reply filed by the Company, and
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the judgment of the Labour Court does indicate that its
authority to decide that question was disputed. We are
unable to hold that the objection though raised was not
urged before the Labour Court, and on that account to
confirm the decision of the Labour Court which until the
matter in controversy was decided could not be rendered.
Even if, therefore, the Labour Court was competent to
entertain the dispute relating to award of retrenchment com-
pensation, the order made by the Labour Court must be set
aside.
One more contention raised at the Bar by Mr. Chagla for the
Company may be considered. It was urged that the obligation
to pay retrenchment compensation in the event of liability
arising must in law be deemed to be taken over by the Board.
In The Board of Directors of the South Arcot Electricity
Distribution Company Ltd. v. N. K. Mohammad Khan, etc.(1),
to which we have already made a reference, it was contended
on behalf of the Electricity Company that the liability to
pay retrenchment cornpensation did not fall on the licensee,
but on the Madras Government. This Court held, having
regard to the scheme of the Act that if retrenchment
compensation is payable, it is the original undertaking
which remains liable, and not the undertaking which takes
over the business. Counsel however relied upon ss. 6 and 7
of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, in support of his plea
that the liability to pay retrenchment compensation rests
upon the
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 902.
14Sup. Cl/69-4
520
undertaking which takes over the undertaking. Section 6 of
the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, provides :
"(1) Where a license has been granted to pay
person, not being a local authority, the State
Electricity Board shall---
(a) in the case of a license granted before
the commencement of the Indian Electricity
(Amendment) Act, 1959, on the expiration of
each such period as is specified in the
license; and
(b)
have the option of purchasing the undertaking
and such option shall be exercised by the
State Electricity Board serving upon the
licensee a notice in writing of not less than
one year requiring the licensee to sell the
’Undertaking to it at the expiry of the
relevant period referred to in this sub-
section.
ln the present case notice was given of
termination of the license after the expiry of
the period of the original license and the
Board took over the undertaking of the
Company. Section 7 of the Indian Electricity
Act provides :
"Where an undertaking is sold under
section .... 6 then upon the completion of the
sale or on the date on which the undertaking
is delivered to the intending purchaser under
sub-section (6) of section 6
(i) the undertaking shall vest in the
purchaser .......... free from any debt,
mortgage or similar obligation of the licensee
or attaching to the undertaking :
Provided that any such debt, mortgage or
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similar obligation shall attach to the
purchase money in substitution for the
undertaking;
(ii) the rights, powers, authorities, duties
and obligations of the licensee under his
license shall stand transferred to the
purchaser and such purchaser shall be deemed
to be the licensee :
Provided that where the undertaking is sold or
delivered to a State Electricity Board or the
State Government, the license shall cease to
have further operation."
521
It is clear that when the undertaking vests in the
purchaser, any debt mortgage or similar obligation attaches
to the purchase money in substitution of the undertaking.
The liability to pay retrenchment compensation is a debt :
if it arises on transfer it will attach to the purchase
money payable to the Company in substitution for the
undertaking. Sections 6 and 7 of the Indian Electricity Act
do not support the case of the Company that the liability is
enforceable against the Board after it takes over the
undertakings.
The provisions of ss. 57 and 57A of the Indian Electricity
(Supply) Act, 1948, also do not assist the case of the,
Company. Sections 57 & 57A of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948, deal with the licensee’s charges to consumers and the
Rating Committees. By the Sixth Schedule dealing with
financial principles and their application, it is provided
by cl. TV that certain amount shall be appropriated towards
Contingencies Reserve from the revenues of each year of
account. By cl. V of the Sixth Schedule it is provided :
"(1) The Contingencies Reserve shall not be
drawn upon during the currency of the licence
except to meet such charges as the State
Government may approve as being-
(a) expenses or loss of profits arising out
of accidents, strikes or circumstances which
the management could not have prevented;
(b) expenses on replacement or removal of
plant or works other than expenses requisite
for normal maintenance or renewal;
(c) compensation payable under any law for
the time being in force and for which no other
provision is made.
(2) On the purchase of the undertaking, the
Contingencies Reserve, after deduction of the
amounts drawn under sub-paragraph (1), shall
be handed over to the purchaser and maintained
as such Contingencies Reserve :
Provided that where the undertaking is
purchased by the Board or the State
Government, the amount of the Reserve computed
as above shall, after further deduction of the
amount of compensation, if any, payable to the
employees of the outgoing licensee under any
law for the time being in force, be handed
over to the Board or the State Government, as
the case may be."
522
Clause V only provides for the appropriation of the
Contingencies Reserve : it requires an undertaking to hand
over the Contingencies Reserve to the purchaser. If any
amount of compensation is payable to the employees of the
outgoing licensee under any law for the time being in force,
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it is chargeable to the Contingencies Reserve. If the
retrenchment compensation becomes properly due to the
employees of the Company, it would, by virtue of cl. V sub-
cl. (2) proviso, be charged upon the Contingencies Reserve
and the balance alone would be handed over to the purchaser.
It was urged that the Contingencies Reserve has been paid
over to the purchaser. There is, however, no finding by the
Labour Court in that behalf. If it be found in appropriate
proceedings that retrenchment compensation is payable to the
workmen and the Contingencies Reserve out of which it is
payable has been handed over to the Board, the charge for
payment of that amount may attach to that amount. On that
matter we need express no opinion at this stage.
Finally it was contended-and that contention relates only to
the cases of 56 workmen in the Lucknow undertaking-that the
workmen who had not availed themselves of earned leave were
,entitled to compensation equal to thirty days wages. But
we do not think that any such compensation is statutorily
payable. So long as the Company was carrying on its
business, it was obliged to give facility for enjoying
earned leave to its workmen. But after the Company closed
its business, it could not obviously give -any earned leave
to those workmen, nor could the workmen claim -any
compensation for not availing themselves of the leave. In
the absence of any provision in the statute governing the
right to compensation for earned leave not availed of by the
workmen before closure, or transfer of an undertaking, we do
not think that any such compensation is payable.
On the view taken by us that the Labour Court was incom-
petent to determine the question as to liability to pay
retrenchment compensation, these appeals must be allowed and
the petitions under s. 6-H(2) filed by the respondents must
be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs
throughout.
G.C. Appeals allowed.
523