Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 295 of 2008
PETITIONER:
Balu @ Bakthvatchalu
RESPONDENT:
State of Tamilnadu
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/2008
BENCH:
S.B. SINHA & V.S. SIRPURKAR
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 295 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4905 of 2007)
S.B. SINHA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant was prosecuted for commission of an offence under Section
302 of the India Penal Code. The occurrence took place on 20th April, 1998.
He was arrested on the charge of murder of one Ramu Maistry on 8th May,
1998. Upon completion of investigation a charge sheet was filed against
him on 30th November, 1998. The learned trial court delivered a judgment
on 28th April, 2000. In the said judgment his age was shown to be ’18’. An
application was filed for sending him to Borstal School in terms of Section
10-A of the Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, which was refused. An appeal
preferred by the appellant before the High Court has been dismissed by
reason of the impugned judgment.
This Court issued a limited notice as to whether the appellant was a
juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident.
3. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, submitted that in view of the materials placed on records, an
inquiry should have been initiated as regards the age of the appellant.
4. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"
was applicable when the incident took place, In terms whereof, a juvenile,
under Section 2(h) was defined as a boy who has not attained the age of 16
years.
5. The Parliament, however, enacted, the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. It came into force with effect from 1st
April, 2001.
6. Section 2(k) defines ’juvenile’ to mean a person who has not
completed eighteen years of age.
7. Section 20 of the Act reads as under :-
"20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
in any area on the date on which this Act comes into
force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if
this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that
the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record
such finding and instead of passing any sentence in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5
respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board
which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in
accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had
been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile
has committed the offence."
8. A question was raised as to whether the date on which the incident
took place or the date on which the accused was produced before the Court
would be the relevant date for computing the age of juvenile in view of the
decision of this Court in Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar : (2000) 5 SCC 488.
The correctness of the said decision came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand :
(2005) 3 SCC 551. The Constitution Bench held;
"31 . Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with
the special provision in respect of pending cases and
begins with a non obstante clause. The sentence
"notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court
in any area on the date on which this Act came into
force" has great significance. The proceedings in respect
of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section
20 of the Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before
the 2000 Act came into force and which are pending
when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "any court"
would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the
person was a "juvenile" under the 1986 Act the
proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts.
They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy
had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 years.
This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person
had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had
not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case
shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act has not
been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and
instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile,
shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass
orders in respect of that juvenile. "
It concluded :-
"37 . The net result is:
\005. \005.. \005..
( b ) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending
proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986
Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force
and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on
1-4-2001."
In a separate judgment, one of us (S.B. Sinha, J.) stated :-
"95. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be
applicable when a person is below the age of 18 years as
on 1-4-2001. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of
the Act, it must be established that: ( i ) on the date of
coming into force the proceedings in which the petitioner
was accused were pending; and ( ii ) on that day he was
below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said
Act, both the aforementioned conditions are required to
be fulfilled. By reason of the provisions of the said Act of
2000, the protection granted to a juvenile has only been
extended but such extension is not absolute but only a
limited one. It would apply strictly when the conditions
precedent therefor as contained in Section 20 or Section
64 are fulfilled. The said provisions repeatedly refer to
the words "juvenile" or "delinquent juveniles"
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5
specifically. This appears to be the object of the Act and
for ascertaining the true intent of Parliament, the rule of
purposive construction must be adopted. The purpose of
the Act would stand defeated if a child continues to be in
the company of an adult. Thus, the Act of 2000 intends to
give the protection only to a juvenile within the meaning
of the said Act and not an adult. In other words, although
it would apply to a person who is still a juvenile having
not attained the age of 18 years but shall not apply to a
person who has already attained the age of 18 years on
the date of coming into force thereof or who had not
attained the age of 18 years on the date of commission of
the offence but has since ceased to be a juvenile."
9. Recently the Parliament has introduced Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2006 (which came into force with
effect from 23.8.2006), in terms whereof retrospective and restorative
meaning was given to the definition of ’juvenile’ stating :-
‘ "4. In section 2 of the principal Act, -
(iv) for clause (l), the following clause shall be
substituted, namely :-
(l) "juvenile in conflict with law" means a
juvenile who is alleged to have committed an
offence and has not completed eighteenth year of
age as on the date of commission of such offence;"
10. In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court as also
the amendments carried out by the Parliament, evidently the question as to
whether the appellant was aged ’18’ as on 1st April, 2001 requires
consideration.
12. In a situation of this nature, where despite the possibility of a juvenile
having been tried and convicted for rigorous imprisonment for life by the
trial court or the High Court, this Court has in a large number of decisions
directed an enquiry to be made as regards the age of the juvenile.
13. We shall refer to a few of them.
13. In Gurpreet Singh vs. State of Punjab : (2005) 12 SCC 615 a Bench
of this Court opined :-
"18. Shri Prabha Shanker Misra, learned Senior Counsel
appearing in support of Criminal Appeal No. 710 of 1995
apart from challenging the conviction of the appellant
Mohinder Pal Singh on merits, which we have already
dealt with, submitted that on the date of the alleged
occurrence, he was a juvenile within the meaning of
Section 2( h ) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as on that date he
had not attained the age of 16 years. It appears that this
point was not raised either before the trial court or the
High Court. But it is well settled that in such an
eventuality, this Court should first consider the legality or
otherwise of conviction of the accused and in case the
conviction is upheld, a report should be called for from
the trial court on the point as to whether the accused was
juvenile on the date of occurrence and upon receipt of the
report, if it is found that the accused was juvenile on such
date and continues to be so, he shall be sent to juvenile
home. But in case it finds that on the date of the
occurrence, he was juvenile but on the date this Court is
passing final order upon the report received from the trial
court, he no longer continues to be juvenile, the sentence
imposed against him would be liable to be set aside.
Reference in this connection may be made to a decision
of this Court in Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P. 7 in which
case at the time of grant of special leave to appeal, report
was called for from the trial court as to whether the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5
accused was juvenile or not which reported that the
accused was not a juvenile on the date of the occurrence
but this Court, differing with the report of the trial court,
came to the conclusion that the accused was juvenile on
the date the offence was committed and as he was no
longer a juvenile on the day of judgment of this Court,
sentence awarded against him was set aside, though the
conviction was upheld. In the present case, we have
already upheld the conviction of the appellant Mohinder
Pal Singh as well but it would be just and expedient to
call for a report from the trial court in relation to his age
on the date of the occurrence."
It was directed :-
"20. In Criminal Appeal No. 710 of 1995 filed by
appellant Mohinder Pal Singh, call for a report from the
trial court as to whether on the date of occurrence this
appellant was juvenile within the meaning of Section
2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986? The trial court
shall give opportunity to both the parties to adduce
evidence on this point. Let the entire original records of
the trial court be returned to it. Report as well as records
must be sent to this Court within a period of three months
from the receipt of this order. Upon receipt of report from
the trial court, final order shall be passed in this appeal."
14. In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P : (2006) 5 SCC 584 this
Court held :-
"21. Determination of the date of birth of a person before
a court of law, whether in a civil proceeding or a criminal
proceeding, would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. Such a date of birth has to be
determined on the basis of the materials on records. It
will be a matter of appreciation of evidence adduced by
the parties. Different standards having regard to the
provision of Section 35 of the Evidence Act cannot be
applied in a civil case or a criminal case.
It was furthermore held :-
"38. The age of a person as recorded in the school
register or otherwise may be used for various purposes,
namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an
appointment; for contesting election; registration of
marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling
laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil
forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of
law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground
that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately
represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf
was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the
purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis,
having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the
Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No
different standard can be applied in case of an accused as
in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where
the victim or the prosecutrix although might have
consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries
made in the register maintained by the school, a
judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be
deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of
the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly
be convicted.
39. We are, therefore, of the opinion that until the age of
a person is required to be determined in a manner laid
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5
down under a statute, different standard of proof should
not be adopted. It is no doubt true that the court must
strike a balance. In case of a dispute, the court may
appreciate the evidence having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case. It would be a duty of the court
of law to accord the benefit to a juvenile, provided he is
one. To give the same benefit to a person who in fact is
not a juvenile may cause injustice to the victim. In this
case, the appellant had never been serious in projecting
his plea that he on the date of commission of the offence
was a minor. He made such statement for the first time
while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
40. The family background of the appellant is also a
relevant fact. His father was a "Pradhan" of the village.
He was found to be in possession of an unlicensed
firearm. He was all along represented by a lawyer. The
court estimated his age to be 18 years. He was tried
jointly with the other accused. He had been treated alike
with the other accused. On merit of the matter also the
appellant stands on the same footing as the other accused.
The prosecution has proved its case. In fact no such plea
could be raised as the special leave petition of the
persons similarly situated was dismissed when the Court
issued notice having regard to the contention raised by
him for the first time that he was a minor on the date of
occurrence."
15. However, in Jitendra Ram vs. State of Jharkhand : (2006) 9 SCC 428
this Court noticed that in a similar situation it would be necessary to make
an enquiry. It was stated :-
"20. We are, however, not oblivious of the decision of
this Court in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar wherein an
obligation has been cast on the court that where such a
plea is raised having regard to the beneficial nature of the
socially oriented legislation, the same should be
examined with great care. We are, however, of the
opinion that the same would not mean that a person who
is not entitled to the benefit of the said Act would be
dealt with leniently only because such a plea is raised.
Each plea must be judged on its own merit. Each case has
to be considered on the basis of the materials brought on
records."
It was furthermore held :-
22. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the
determination of the age of the appellant as on the date of
the commission of the offence should be done afresh by
the learned Sessions Judge."
16. We are, therefore, of the view that in this case the trial judge should
be directed to hold the enquiry in regard to the age of the appellant on the
date of commission of the offence and in the event it is found that the
appellant was a juvenile within the meaning of the provisions of the said
Act, he should proceed with the matter in accordance with law. It is directed
accordingly.
17. The appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms.