Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 866
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 35093510/2010
GURDIAL SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JAGIR KAUR (DEAD) AND ANR. ETC. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
The appeals are directed against the common judgment and decree
1.
dated 13.11.2009 passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
R.S.A. No.837 of 1996 and R.S.A. No.958 of 1996 setting aside the
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court,
st
and declaring the 1 respondent as the owner and in possession of the
suit land.
Facts
One Maya Singh was owner of land measuring 67 kanals 4 marlas in
2.
1 st
village Sathiala . Appellant is the nephew of Maya Singh. 1
Signature Not Verified
respondent is Maya Singh’s wife. Gurpal Singh (hereinafter referred to
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.08.02
11:06:45 IST
Reason:
nd
as 2 respondent) claimed to be the adopted son of Maya Singh and
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”.
Page 1 of 14
st
1 respondent. Maya Singh died on 10.11.1991. On 27.10.1992, the
st
suit land was mutated in favour of 1 respondent. Apprehending that
st
1 respondent was taking steps to alienate the property, appellant
filed a Suit RBT No. 329/1992 by propounding a Will executed by
Maya Singh on 16.05.1991, bequeathing the land to him. In this
suit, appellant contended his uncle, Maya Singh was married to one
st
Joginder Kaur who had predeceased him and 1 respondent was not
nd
his lawfully wedded wife or 2 respondent, their adopted son.
st
3. Whereas respondents filed another suit seeking declaration that 1
nd
respondent is the lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh and 2
respondent is their adopted son.
nd
4. Trial Court dismissed the respondents’ suit holding that 2
respondent was not the adopted son of Maya Singh and decreed the
appellant’s suit declaring that the Will dated 16.05.1991 propounded
by the latter was genuine and by virtue of the Will, he was the lawful
st
owner of the suit land. However, the Court held 1 respondent is the
lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh.
st
5. 1 respondent preferred two appeals challenging the dismissal of her
suit as well as against the judgment and decree passed in the
appellant’s suit. The appeals were disposed of by the Additional
District Judge, Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate
Court”) upholding the judgment and decree passed in the appellant’s
suit.
Page 2 of 14
st
6. Being aggrieved, 1 respondent filed Second Appeals being RSA
No.958 of 1996 and RSA No.837 of 1996. The High Court framed the
following substantial question of law:
“Whether the execution of Will dated 16.05.1991, set up by
Gurdial Singh, was duly proved?”
st
Holding that the suspicious circumstance namely, nonmention of 1
respondent who is the wife of the testator Maya Singh and the reasons
for her disinheritance in the Will exposed absence of ‘free disposing
mind’ of the testator, High Court reversed the concurrent findings of
st
the Trial Court and First Appellate Court and held 1 respondent was
the owner and was entitled to possession of the suit land.
7. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant is before us.
st
During the pendency of the appeal, both the appellant and 1
respondent died and have been substituted by their respective legal
representatives.
8. The principal issue which falls for consideration is as follows:
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, non
mention of the status of 1st respondent as wife of the testator
and failure to give reasons for her disinheritance in the Will
dated 16.05.1991 is a suspicious circumstance which exposes
lack of a free disposing mind of the testator, rendering the Will
invalid?
Arguments
9. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel argued that the Will is a
registered one and its execution has been lawfully proved. Appellant
had examined PW2 Surinder Kumar, Scribe of the Will and PW3
Page 3 of 14
Chanan Singh, one of the attesting witnesses. PW2 deposed he
scribed the Will at the instance of Maya Singh. It was read over to
Maya Singh and the latter had signed in presence of the attesting
witnesses Chanan Singh (PW3) and Pesra Singh. PW3 stated he was
the attesting witness and the Will was presented before SubRegistrar
where it was again read over to the testator. Their evidence could not
st
be discredited during crossexamination. Mere nonmention of 1
respondent’s name cannot be a ground to hold that the Will is not a
genuine one. It was further contended that the monies left by Maya
st
Singh had been given to 1 respondent and she was also entitled to
his pension.
st
10. Per contra, Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel submitted 1
respondent was the lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh. Relationship
st
between the couple was good as would be evidenced from 1
respondent’s deposition that she was living with Maya Singh till his
death. The Trial Court glossed over this evidence and came to a
perverse finding that she had not served Maya Singh. While relations
st
between the couple were good, appellant disputed 1 respondent’s
st
status as the wife of Maya Singh. Nonmention of 1 respondent’s
name and the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will must be
viewed from this sinister design of the appellant. His effort not only to
st
disinherit the 1 respondent but also to deny her the very status as
his wife is eloquent in the omission of her status as wife in the Will.
Viewed from this perspective, the tenor of the Will demonstrates the
Page 4 of 14
masked voice and intention of the appellant and not the free disposing
mind of the testator. Courts below erred in applying the correct legal
principles and erroneously held that this suspicious circumstance did
not vitiate the Will.
Proof of Will: Legal Principles
11. A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the
requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and
Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that is examination of at
least of one of the attesting witnesses . However, unlike other
documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the
land of living. This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain
whether the Will propounded had been duly proved. Onus lies on the
propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind
of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the
free disposing mind of the testator. Only when the propounder dispels
the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court
that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition
without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as
2
genuine. In Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and others , this
Court referring to H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma &
3
Ors . enumerated the principles relating to proof of Will:
“10. *
2 (1977) 1 SCC 369.
3 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426.
Page 5 of 14
“1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document,
the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the
prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other
documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof
with mathematical certainty.
2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be
attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section
68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called
for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of
giving evidence.
3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the
testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for
deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be
executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the
decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved
to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus
which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof
of the essential facts which go into the making of the will.
4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky
signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of
property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making
of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such
other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will.
That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the
propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the
testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at
the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and
children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in
his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his
own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious
circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases
where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will
excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all
legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last
will of the testator.
5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded
by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the
judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in
determining the question as to whether an instrument produced
before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon
to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious
circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has
been validly executed by the testator.
6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard
to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but
even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances
Page 6 of 14
surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether
the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of
the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in
the matter.”
The Court further held:
“9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion,
its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the
defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in
such cases a matter of the court's conscience and then the true
question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led
by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of
the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is
impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up
the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious
circumstances surrounding the making of the will.”
4
12. Similarly in Ram Piari vs. Bhagwant & Ors . this Court held when
suspicious circumstance exists, Courts should not be swayed by due
execution of the Will alone:
“ 3. ……………….Unfortunately none of the courts paid any attention
to these probably because they were swayed with due execution
even when this Court in Venkatachaliah case [AIR 1959 SC 443 :
1959 Supp 1 SCR 426] had held that, proof of signature raises a
presumption about knowledge but the existence of suspicious
circumstances rebuts it…………….”
13. There is no cavil when suspicious circumstances exist and have not
been repelled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would not be
justified in holding that the Will is genuine since the signatures have
5
been duly proved and the Will is registered one .
Parameters to ascertain ‘suspicious circumstances’ vitiating a Will:
4 (1993) 3 SCC 364.
5 AIR 1962 SC 567, Para 23.
Page 7 of 14
14. This brings us to the next issue i.e. what are the suspicious
circumstances which may vitiate the disposition. In Indu Bala Bose &
6
Ors. vs. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr . the Court held any and every
circumstance is not a “suspicious” circumstance.
Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a
“8.
“suspicious” circumstance. A circumstance would be “suspicious”
when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal
situation or is not expected of a normal person.”
in
The Court quoted the Privy Council’s elucidation Hames v.
7
Hinkson of suspicious circumstances as follows:
“ 17 …………… where a Will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin
a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief.
They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave
suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never
required to close his mind to the truth.”
It was again reiterated in PPK Gopalan Nambier vs. PPK Balakrishnan
8
Nambiar & Ors . that suspected features should not be mere fantasies
of a doubting mind.
“ 5 ……………It is trite that it is the duty of the propounder of the will
to prove the will and to remove all the suspected features. But there
must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy
of the doubting mind.”
15. It is from this prism, we need to examine whether the High Court was
justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and
the appellate court and holding the Will was vitiated due to existence
of suspicious circumstances.
Findings of the Trial Court
6 (1982) 1 SCC 20.
7 AIR 1946 PC 156.
8 1995 Supp (2) SCC 664.
Page 8 of 14
Trial Court dealt with this issue in the following manner:
“As discussed above, defendant No. 1 is the widow of Maya Singh
deceased. In Smt. Bhagya Wati Jain’s case (supra) it was held that
deprivation of legal heir from succession may be one of the suspicious
circumstances along with other but that by itself is not sufficient ground
to raise presumption against the Will. Admittedly, defendant No. 1, who
is widow of Maya Singh, has been disinherited. Statement of Jagir Kaur
defendant No. 1 who appeared as DW3 reads as follow:
“I was married with Maya Singh, I lived with Maya Singh as his
wife till his death. We took Guirpal Singh as our adopted son. He is the
son of my sister. At the time of adoption Gurwas distributed. Maya Singh
was in service and I draw pension. We are in possession of the land in
suit. Maya Singh never told me having executed a Will in favour of the
plaintiff. He was not on speaking terms with the plaintiff. I reside in the
house of Maya Singh”.
Jagir kaur has no where stated that the served Maya Singh
during his life time. That she actually resided with Maya Singh on the
day the Will was executed i.e. on 16.5.91. She is again silent whether
she performed the last rites of Maya Singh. In the circumstances if Maya
Singh did not mention about her in the Will the same is not required to be
explained by the plaintiff. No doubt Arjan Singh and Naranjan Singh
have stated that last rites were performed by the defendant No. 1. But
their statements are to corroborate the statement of the defendant No. 1
and when the defendant No. 1 herself is silent about the service rendered
to Maya Singh, statement of Arjan Singh and Naranjan Singh did not
prove that Maya Singh was actually served and lived with defendant No.
1. As stated above there is nothing against Surinder Kumar and Chanan
Singh PWs who proved the due execution of the Will by Maya Singh and
if the widow had been deprived, of the Will cannot be discarded on this
sole ground.”
Findings of the First Appellate Court
First Appellate Court upheld the findings of the Trial Court holding:
“From this catena of judicial pronouncements there can be no manner
of doubt that mere deprivation of a legal; heir or mere non mention of
such legal heir’s name in the testamentary disposition, in itself, does
not invalidate the will. A careful perusal of the will would reveal that
the same purport to beat the signatures of testator Maya Singh (since
deceased) in English. It is an admitted case of the parties that Maya
Singh had been serving as a Havaldar in the Army and had retired
from Military service which implies that he was an educated person.
The will in dispute is a registered document on which the signatures of
the testator or of the attesting witnesses have not been challenged by
Jagir Kaur. There is nothing on the record, if Maya Singh was
suffering from any mental incapacity to execute the will. The written
Page 9 of 14
statement of Jagir Kaur is quite silent with regards to the fact that
Maya Singh was not in sound state of disposing mind. She has alleged
that Maya Singh deceased was suffering from paralysis for the last
more than 10 months before his death. Assuming it to be so, he might
had been treated upon. Evidence regarding his treatment could have
been produced by Jagir Kaur. There is no such evidence to the effect
that he was paralytic without there being evidence, this plea remains
unsubstantiated. Jagir Kaur, appearing as DW3 stated in her cross
examination that Maya Singh had executed a will in her favour. She
has not set up the same in her written statement nor produced the
sesame on record for the reasons best known to her. Therefore, an
adverse inference can be drawn to the effect that no valid will has
been executed by Maya Singh deceased in her favour. Further, there is
no allegation from the side of Jagir Kaur defendant that the marginal
witnesses of the will Ex. P. 1 or the Sub Registrar by whom the same
was registered were in collusion with the legatee Gurdial Singh. There
is no gain saying the fact that Jagir Kaur is drawing pension of Maya
Singh being his widow. Ex. P. 7, is the certified copy of the order dated
29.9.1994 which purport to have been handed down by Commissioner
(Appeals) Jalandhar Division. In its concluding paragraph, it has been
mentioned that the petitioner (referring to Gurdial Singh) has explained
that respondent No. 1 (referring to Jagir Kaur) was given the entire
money left by the deceased (Maya Singh) and she was also entitled to
get pension. My be that due to adjustment of pension and other
deposits, Maya Singh had deprived Jagir Kaur of her state in the will
and for that he did not think it proper to make reference to her in the
disputed will.”
Findings of the High Court
High Court reversed these findings and held as under:
“The complete silence on the part of the executant qua his wife, while
executing the Will, renders the will a suspicious document and leads
to the inference that the same had not been executed by the
executant of his free disposing mind. Rather it leads to the inference
that the propounder of the Will might have influenced the executant
to execute the Will in his favour. In these circumstances, the Courts
below erred in holding that the Will dated 16.5.1991 was a genuine
document.”
Analysis
16. We are conscious that deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not
amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind
Page 10 of 14
the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of
9
succession. However, in Ram Piari (supra), this Court held prudence
requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs
and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases,
shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to
the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the
10
disposition was a voluntary act.
17. It was rightly indicated in Leela Rajagopal vs. Kamala Menon
11
Cocharan when unusual features appear in a Will or unnatural
circumstances surround its execution, the Court must undertake a
close scrutiny and make an overall assessment of the unusual
circumstances before accepting the Will. The Court held as follows:
“13. A will may have certain features and may have been
executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be
somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a
will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its
execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the
same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the
court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of
the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh
with the court in the determination required to be made by
it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis
of a consideration of all the unusual features and
suspicious circumstances put together and not on the
impact of any single feature that may be found in a will or a
singular circumstance that may appear from the process
leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence
of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the
subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon
before us.”
9 (1995) 4 SCC 459, (2004) 2 SCC 321 and (1995) Supp 2 SCC 665.
10 (1990) 3 SCC 364, Para 2.
11 (2014) 15 SCC 570.
Page 11 of 14
18. What boils down from this discussion is that suspicious circumstance
i.e. nonmention of the status of wife or the reason for her
disinheritance in the Will ought not to be examined in isolation but in
the light of all attending circumstances of the case. It would be argued
that proof of signatures on the Will and its registration dispels such
suspicious circumstance. On a first blush, this submission appears to
be attractive till one delves further into the peculiar and unique
circumstances of the case.
19. Appellant’s case was not only to propound the Will in his favour but
st
even to deny the very status of 1 respondent as Maya Singh’s wife.
When one reads the contents of the Will, appellant’s stand is stark and
palpable in its tenor and purport. The Will is a cryptic one where Maya
Singh bequests his properties to his nephew i.e. the appellant, as the
latter was taking care of him. However, the Will is completely silent
st
with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the 1
respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance. Evidence on record
st
shows 1 respondent was residing with Maya Singh till the latter’s
death. Nothing has come on record to show the relation between the
couple was bitter. As per the appellant, she was nominated by Maya
Singh and was entitled to receive his pension which demonstrates the
st
testator’s conduct in accepting 1 respondent as his lawfully wedded
wife. Further, the Trial Court erroneously observed that non
st
performance of last rites of Maya Singh by 1 respondent hinted at sour
relations between the couple. Ordinarily, in a Hindu/Sikh family, last
Page 12 of 14
st
rites are performed by Male Sapinda relations. Given this practice, 1
respondent not performing last rites could not be treated as a contra
indicator of indifferent relationship with her husband during the latter’s
lifetime. In this backdrop, it cannot be said Maya Singh had during his
st
lifetime, denied his marriage with 1 respondent or admitted that their
relation was strained, so as to prompt him to erase her very existence
in the Will. Such erasure of marital status is the telltale insignia of the
propounder and not the testator himself. A cumulative assessment of
the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to
mention the very existence of his wife in the Will, gives rise to serious
doubt that the Will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant
and is not the ‘free will’ of the testator.
20. In this background, we have no hesitation to hold that nonmention of
st
1 respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will, is an
eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated
by the undue influence of the appellant.
We are not impressed with reference to
21. Dhanpat vs. Sheo Ram
12
(deceased) through LRs. & Ors . that mere nonmention of some
natural heirs would not vitiate the Will. In Dhanpat (Supra), the wife
who had been disinherited, herself admitted that she had been ousted
by her husband. On the other hand, DW3 unequivocally stated that she
was living with her husband till his death and the specious rationale
given that she may have been disinherited as Maya Singh’s monies had
12 (2020) 16 SCC 209.
Page 13 of 14
been settled in her favour and she was entitled to pension is hardly
convincing. No evidence was led to show whether the quantum of
st
money said to be settled in favour of 1 respondent was reasonable and
would satisfy the conscience of a man of ordinary prudence with regard
to her complete expungement in the Will.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the impugned judgment and
dismiss the appeals. Pending application (s), if any, stands disposed of.
…………………………………………., J
( SANJAY KAROL )
…………………………………………, J
( JOYMALYA BAGCHI )
NEW DELHI,
JULY 17, 2025
Page 14 of 14
2025 INSC 866
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 35093510/2010
GURDIAL SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LR APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JAGIR KAUR (DEAD) AND ANR. ETC. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Joymalya Bagchi, J.
The appeals are directed against the common judgment and decree
1.
dated 13.11.2009 passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
R.S.A. No.837 of 1996 and R.S.A. No.958 of 1996 setting aside the
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court,
st
and declaring the 1 respondent as the owner and in possession of the
suit land.
Facts
One Maya Singh was owner of land measuring 67 kanals 4 marlas in
2.
1 st
village Sathiala . Appellant is the nephew of Maya Singh. 1
Signature Not Verified
respondent is Maya Singh’s wife. Gurpal Singh (hereinafter referred to
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2025.08.02
11:06:45 IST
Reason:
nd
as 2 respondent) claimed to be the adopted son of Maya Singh and
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the suit land”.
Page 1 of 14
st
1 respondent. Maya Singh died on 10.11.1991. On 27.10.1992, the
st
suit land was mutated in favour of 1 respondent. Apprehending that
st
1 respondent was taking steps to alienate the property, appellant
filed a Suit RBT No. 329/1992 by propounding a Will executed by
Maya Singh on 16.05.1991, bequeathing the land to him. In this
suit, appellant contended his uncle, Maya Singh was married to one
st
Joginder Kaur who had predeceased him and 1 respondent was not
nd
his lawfully wedded wife or 2 respondent, their adopted son.
st
3. Whereas respondents filed another suit seeking declaration that 1
nd
respondent is the lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh and 2
respondent is their adopted son.
nd
4. Trial Court dismissed the respondents’ suit holding that 2
respondent was not the adopted son of Maya Singh and decreed the
appellant’s suit declaring that the Will dated 16.05.1991 propounded
by the latter was genuine and by virtue of the Will, he was the lawful
st
owner of the suit land. However, the Court held 1 respondent is the
lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh.
st
5. 1 respondent preferred two appeals challenging the dismissal of her
suit as well as against the judgment and decree passed in the
appellant’s suit. The appeals were disposed of by the Additional
District Judge, Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as the “First Appellate
Court”) upholding the judgment and decree passed in the appellant’s
suit.
Page 2 of 14
st
6. Being aggrieved, 1 respondent filed Second Appeals being RSA
No.958 of 1996 and RSA No.837 of 1996. The High Court framed the
following substantial question of law:
“Whether the execution of Will dated 16.05.1991, set up by
Gurdial Singh, was duly proved?”
st
Holding that the suspicious circumstance namely, nonmention of 1
respondent who is the wife of the testator Maya Singh and the reasons
for her disinheritance in the Will exposed absence of ‘free disposing
mind’ of the testator, High Court reversed the concurrent findings of
st
the Trial Court and First Appellate Court and held 1 respondent was
the owner and was entitled to possession of the suit land.
7. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant is before us.
st
During the pendency of the appeal, both the appellant and 1
respondent died and have been substituted by their respective legal
representatives.
8. The principal issue which falls for consideration is as follows:
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, non
mention of the status of 1st respondent as wife of the testator
and failure to give reasons for her disinheritance in the Will
dated 16.05.1991 is a suspicious circumstance which exposes
lack of a free disposing mind of the testator, rendering the Will
invalid?
Arguments
9. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel argued that the Will is a
registered one and its execution has been lawfully proved. Appellant
had examined PW2 Surinder Kumar, Scribe of the Will and PW3
Page 3 of 14
Chanan Singh, one of the attesting witnesses. PW2 deposed he
scribed the Will at the instance of Maya Singh. It was read over to
Maya Singh and the latter had signed in presence of the attesting
witnesses Chanan Singh (PW3) and Pesra Singh. PW3 stated he was
the attesting witness and the Will was presented before SubRegistrar
where it was again read over to the testator. Their evidence could not
st
be discredited during crossexamination. Mere nonmention of 1
respondent’s name cannot be a ground to hold that the Will is not a
genuine one. It was further contended that the monies left by Maya
st
Singh had been given to 1 respondent and she was also entitled to
his pension.
st
10. Per contra, Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel submitted 1
respondent was the lawfully wedded wife of Maya Singh. Relationship
st
between the couple was good as would be evidenced from 1
respondent’s deposition that she was living with Maya Singh till his
death. The Trial Court glossed over this evidence and came to a
perverse finding that she had not served Maya Singh. While relations
st
between the couple were good, appellant disputed 1 respondent’s
st
status as the wife of Maya Singh. Nonmention of 1 respondent’s
name and the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will must be
viewed from this sinister design of the appellant. His effort not only to
st
disinherit the 1 respondent but also to deny her the very status as
his wife is eloquent in the omission of her status as wife in the Will.
Viewed from this perspective, the tenor of the Will demonstrates the
Page 4 of 14
masked voice and intention of the appellant and not the free disposing
mind of the testator. Courts below erred in applying the correct legal
principles and erroneously held that this suspicious circumstance did
not vitiate the Will.
Proof of Will: Legal Principles
11. A Will has to be proved like any other document subject to the
requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and
Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that is examination of at
least of one of the attesting witnesses . However, unlike other
documents, when a Will is propounded, its maker is no longer in the
land of living. This casts a solemn duty on the Court to ascertain
whether the Will propounded had been duly proved. Onus lies on the
propounder not only to prove due execution but dispel from the mind
of the court, all suspicious circumstances which cast doubt on the
free disposing mind of the testator. Only when the propounder dispels
the suspicious circumstances and satisfies the conscience of the court
that the testator had duly executed the Will out of his free volition
without coercion or undue influence, would the Will be accepted as
2
genuine. In Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and others , this
Court referring to H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma &
3
Ors . enumerated the principles relating to proof of Will:
“10. *
2 (1977) 1 SCC 369.
3 1959 Supp (1) SCR 426.
Page 5 of 14
“1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document,
the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the
prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other
documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof
with mathematical certainty.
2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be
attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section
68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called
for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of
giving evidence.
3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the
testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for
deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be
executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the
decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved
to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus
which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof
of the essential facts which go into the making of the will.
4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky
signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of
property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making
of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such
other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will.
That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the
propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the
testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at
the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and
children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in
his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his
own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious
circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases
where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will
excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all
legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last
will of the testator.
5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded
by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the
judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in
determining the question as to whether an instrument produced
before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon
to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious
circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has
been validly executed by the testator.
6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard
to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but
even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances
Page 6 of 14
surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether
the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of
the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in
the matter.”
The Court further held:
“9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion,
its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the
defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in
such cases a matter of the court's conscience and then the true
question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led
by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of
the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is
impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up
the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious
circumstances surrounding the making of the will.”
4
12. Similarly in Ram Piari vs. Bhagwant & Ors . this Court held when
suspicious circumstance exists, Courts should not be swayed by due
execution of the Will alone:
“ 3. ……………….Unfortunately none of the courts paid any attention
to these probably because they were swayed with due execution
even when this Court in Venkatachaliah case [AIR 1959 SC 443 :
1959 Supp 1 SCR 426] had held that, proof of signature raises a
presumption about knowledge but the existence of suspicious
circumstances rebuts it…………….”
13. There is no cavil when suspicious circumstances exist and have not
been repelled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court would not be
justified in holding that the Will is genuine since the signatures have
5
been duly proved and the Will is registered one .
Parameters to ascertain ‘suspicious circumstances’ vitiating a Will:
4 (1993) 3 SCC 364.
5 AIR 1962 SC 567, Para 23.
Page 7 of 14
14. This brings us to the next issue i.e. what are the suspicious
circumstances which may vitiate the disposition. In Indu Bala Bose &
6
Ors. vs. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr . the Court held any and every
circumstance is not a “suspicious” circumstance.
Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a
“8.
“suspicious” circumstance. A circumstance would be “suspicious”
when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal
situation or is not expected of a normal person.”
in
The Court quoted the Privy Council’s elucidation Hames v.
7
Hinkson of suspicious circumstances as follows:
“ 17 …………… where a Will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin
a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief.
They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave
suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never
required to close his mind to the truth.”
It was again reiterated in PPK Gopalan Nambier vs. PPK Balakrishnan
8
Nambiar & Ors . that suspected features should not be mere fantasies
of a doubting mind.
“ 5 ……………It is trite that it is the duty of the propounder of the will
to prove the will and to remove all the suspected features. But there
must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy
of the doubting mind.”
15. It is from this prism, we need to examine whether the High Court was
justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and
the appellate court and holding the Will was vitiated due to existence
of suspicious circumstances.
Findings of the Trial Court
6 (1982) 1 SCC 20.
7 AIR 1946 PC 156.
8 1995 Supp (2) SCC 664.
Page 8 of 14
Trial Court dealt with this issue in the following manner:
“As discussed above, defendant No. 1 is the widow of Maya Singh
deceased. In Smt. Bhagya Wati Jain’s case (supra) it was held that
deprivation of legal heir from succession may be one of the suspicious
circumstances along with other but that by itself is not sufficient ground
to raise presumption against the Will. Admittedly, defendant No. 1, who
is widow of Maya Singh, has been disinherited. Statement of Jagir Kaur
defendant No. 1 who appeared as DW3 reads as follow:
“I was married with Maya Singh, I lived with Maya Singh as his
wife till his death. We took Guirpal Singh as our adopted son. He is the
son of my sister. At the time of adoption Gurwas distributed. Maya Singh
was in service and I draw pension. We are in possession of the land in
suit. Maya Singh never told me having executed a Will in favour of the
plaintiff. He was not on speaking terms with the plaintiff. I reside in the
house of Maya Singh”.
Jagir kaur has no where stated that the served Maya Singh
during his life time. That she actually resided with Maya Singh on the
day the Will was executed i.e. on 16.5.91. She is again silent whether
she performed the last rites of Maya Singh. In the circumstances if Maya
Singh did not mention about her in the Will the same is not required to be
explained by the plaintiff. No doubt Arjan Singh and Naranjan Singh
have stated that last rites were performed by the defendant No. 1. But
their statements are to corroborate the statement of the defendant No. 1
and when the defendant No. 1 herself is silent about the service rendered
to Maya Singh, statement of Arjan Singh and Naranjan Singh did not
prove that Maya Singh was actually served and lived with defendant No.
1. As stated above there is nothing against Surinder Kumar and Chanan
Singh PWs who proved the due execution of the Will by Maya Singh and
if the widow had been deprived, of the Will cannot be discarded on this
sole ground.”
Findings of the First Appellate Court
First Appellate Court upheld the findings of the Trial Court holding:
“From this catena of judicial pronouncements there can be no manner
of doubt that mere deprivation of a legal; heir or mere non mention of
such legal heir’s name in the testamentary disposition, in itself, does
not invalidate the will. A careful perusal of the will would reveal that
the same purport to beat the signatures of testator Maya Singh (since
deceased) in English. It is an admitted case of the parties that Maya
Singh had been serving as a Havaldar in the Army and had retired
from Military service which implies that he was an educated person.
The will in dispute is a registered document on which the signatures of
the testator or of the attesting witnesses have not been challenged by
Jagir Kaur. There is nothing on the record, if Maya Singh was
suffering from any mental incapacity to execute the will. The written
Page 9 of 14
statement of Jagir Kaur is quite silent with regards to the fact that
Maya Singh was not in sound state of disposing mind. She has alleged
that Maya Singh deceased was suffering from paralysis for the last
more than 10 months before his death. Assuming it to be so, he might
had been treated upon. Evidence regarding his treatment could have
been produced by Jagir Kaur. There is no such evidence to the effect
that he was paralytic without there being evidence, this plea remains
unsubstantiated. Jagir Kaur, appearing as DW3 stated in her cross
examination that Maya Singh had executed a will in her favour. She
has not set up the same in her written statement nor produced the
sesame on record for the reasons best known to her. Therefore, an
adverse inference can be drawn to the effect that no valid will has
been executed by Maya Singh deceased in her favour. Further, there is
no allegation from the side of Jagir Kaur defendant that the marginal
witnesses of the will Ex. P. 1 or the Sub Registrar by whom the same
was registered were in collusion with the legatee Gurdial Singh. There
is no gain saying the fact that Jagir Kaur is drawing pension of Maya
Singh being his widow. Ex. P. 7, is the certified copy of the order dated
29.9.1994 which purport to have been handed down by Commissioner
(Appeals) Jalandhar Division. In its concluding paragraph, it has been
mentioned that the petitioner (referring to Gurdial Singh) has explained
that respondent No. 1 (referring to Jagir Kaur) was given the entire
money left by the deceased (Maya Singh) and she was also entitled to
get pension. My be that due to adjustment of pension and other
deposits, Maya Singh had deprived Jagir Kaur of her state in the will
and for that he did not think it proper to make reference to her in the
disputed will.”
Findings of the High Court
High Court reversed these findings and held as under:
“The complete silence on the part of the executant qua his wife, while
executing the Will, renders the will a suspicious document and leads
to the inference that the same had not been executed by the
executant of his free disposing mind. Rather it leads to the inference
that the propounder of the Will might have influenced the executant
to execute the Will in his favour. In these circumstances, the Courts
below erred in holding that the Will dated 16.5.1991 was a genuine
document.”
Analysis
16. We are conscious that deprivation of a natural heir, by itself, may not
amount to a suspicious circumstance because the whole idea behind
Page 10 of 14
the execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of
9
succession. However, in Ram Piari (supra), this Court held prudence
requires reason for denying the benefit of inheritance to natural heirs
and an absence of it, though not invalidating the Will in all cases,
shrouds the disposition with suspicion as it does not give inkling to
the mind of the testator to enable the court to judge that the
10
disposition was a voluntary act.
17. It was rightly indicated in Leela Rajagopal vs. Kamala Menon
11
Cocharan when unusual features appear in a Will or unnatural
circumstances surround its execution, the Court must undertake a
close scrutiny and make an overall assessment of the unusual
circumstances before accepting the Will. The Court held as follows:
“13. A will may have certain features and may have been
executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be
somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a
will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its
execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the
same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the
court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of
the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh
with the court in the determination required to be made by
it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis
of a consideration of all the unusual features and
suspicious circumstances put together and not on the
impact of any single feature that may be found in a will or a
singular circumstance that may appear from the process
leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence
of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the
subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon
before us.”
9 (1995) 4 SCC 459, (2004) 2 SCC 321 and (1995) Supp 2 SCC 665.
10 (1990) 3 SCC 364, Para 2.
11 (2014) 15 SCC 570.
Page 11 of 14
18. What boils down from this discussion is that suspicious circumstance
i.e. nonmention of the status of wife or the reason for her
disinheritance in the Will ought not to be examined in isolation but in
the light of all attending circumstances of the case. It would be argued
that proof of signatures on the Will and its registration dispels such
suspicious circumstance. On a first blush, this submission appears to
be attractive till one delves further into the peculiar and unique
circumstances of the case.
19. Appellant’s case was not only to propound the Will in his favour but
st
even to deny the very status of 1 respondent as Maya Singh’s wife.
When one reads the contents of the Will, appellant’s stand is stark and
palpable in its tenor and purport. The Will is a cryptic one where Maya
Singh bequests his properties to his nephew i.e. the appellant, as the
latter was taking care of him. However, the Will is completely silent
st
with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir, i.e. the 1
respondent, or the reason for her disinheritance. Evidence on record
st
shows 1 respondent was residing with Maya Singh till the latter’s
death. Nothing has come on record to show the relation between the
couple was bitter. As per the appellant, she was nominated by Maya
Singh and was entitled to receive his pension which demonstrates the
st
testator’s conduct in accepting 1 respondent as his lawfully wedded
wife. Further, the Trial Court erroneously observed that non
st
performance of last rites of Maya Singh by 1 respondent hinted at sour
relations between the couple. Ordinarily, in a Hindu/Sikh family, last
Page 12 of 14
st
rites are performed by Male Sapinda relations. Given this practice, 1
respondent not performing last rites could not be treated as a contra
indicator of indifferent relationship with her husband during the latter’s
lifetime. In this backdrop, it cannot be said Maya Singh had during his
st
lifetime, denied his marriage with 1 respondent or admitted that their
relation was strained, so as to prompt him to erase her very existence
in the Will. Such erasure of marital status is the telltale insignia of the
propounder and not the testator himself. A cumulative assessment of
the attending circumstances including this unusual omission to
mention the very existence of his wife in the Will, gives rise to serious
doubt that the Will was executed as per the dictates of the appellant
and is not the ‘free will’ of the testator.
20. In this background, we have no hesitation to hold that nonmention of
st
1 respondent or the reasons for her disinheritance in the Will, is an
eloquent reminder that the free disposition of the testator was vitiated
by the undue influence of the appellant.
We are not impressed with reference to
21. Dhanpat vs. Sheo Ram
12
(deceased) through LRs. & Ors . that mere nonmention of some
natural heirs would not vitiate the Will. In Dhanpat (Supra), the wife
who had been disinherited, herself admitted that she had been ousted
by her husband. On the other hand, DW3 unequivocally stated that she
was living with her husband till his death and the specious rationale
given that she may have been disinherited as Maya Singh’s monies had
12 (2020) 16 SCC 209.
Page 13 of 14
been settled in her favour and she was entitled to pension is hardly
convincing. No evidence was led to show whether the quantum of
st
money said to be settled in favour of 1 respondent was reasonable and
would satisfy the conscience of a man of ordinary prudence with regard
to her complete expungement in the Will.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the impugned judgment and
dismiss the appeals. Pending application (s), if any, stands disposed of.
…………………………………………., J
( SANJAY KAROL )
…………………………………………, J
( JOYMALYA BAGCHI )
NEW DELHI,
JULY 17, 2025
Page 14 of 14