Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6270 of 2012
| Pravin Kumar | ..... Appellant(s) |
|---|---|
| VERSUS | |
| Union of India and Ors. | .....Respondent(s) |
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J:
The present civil appeal, which has been heard over video
conferencing, is directed against the order dated 05.05.2009 passed by
a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in WP No. 1001/2001,
whereby appellant’s plea for quashing disciplinary proceedings and
settingaside a dismissal order on charges of corruption and extra
constitutional conduct while employed as a paramilitary officer, was
rejected.
F ACTUAL M ATRIX
2. The appellant joined the Central Industrial Security Force
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2020.09.10
18:35:29 IST
Reason:
(“CISF”) in January, 1995 as a SubInspector. After completing
requisite training in Hyderabad, he was allocated to Mumbai Office of
Page | 1
the Western Zone and posted at the local unit of Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd (“BPCL”) in March, 1996. Although he was initially
deputed to perform shift duty, but since July, 1997 he was deployed
in the Crime and Intelligence Wing. As evidenced by an office order
dated 08.05.1998, the appellant was specifically entrusted with
conducting surprise searches of personnel and taking strict action
against anyone indulging in corruption.
3. On 28.02.1999 at around 6PM, Constable Ram Avtar Sharma
(CW1; hereinafter “Sharma”) was commuting in a CISF bus near the
BPCL compound when Inspector Hiralal Chaudhary (PW1;
hereinafter, “Chaudhary”) noticed a large bundle of highdenomination
notes in Sharma’s pocket. Suspicious, Chaudhary got the bus turned
back towards the BPCL compound, and forcibly made Sharma
deboard near the Northgate. Amidst witnesses, Chaudhary searched
Sharma’s person, during which a total sum of Rs 10,780 in the form of
100 notes of Rs 100 and the rest in smaller denominations was
recovered. No explanation for the large sum of unaccounted cash was
forthcoming from Sharma, except for a plea for mercy, post which the
amount was seized and the incident recorded in the General Diary
(“GD”) kept at the Northgate of the BPCL compound.
Page | 2
4. Later, it was found that a conflicting GD entry had been made at
the Maingate of the BPCL compound a little earlier at around 6:05PM,
noting how an amount of Rs 9,000 had been handed over by dog
handler Constable KK Sharma (PW2) on behalf of another official, as
personal loan to Sharma (CW1). It was discovered over the course of
investigation that this entry was false and had been registered at the
instance of the present appellant who made numerous phone calls
between 6:30 and 7PM to ASI Surjan Singh (PW5) who was stationed
at the Maingate and was incharge of the other GD register.
5. The following morning, KK Sharma (PW2) who was projected to
have delivered the cash to Sharma, was pressurised by the appellant
to falsely support his alternate ‘loan’ theory by deposing that he
indeed had delivered the impounded sum of money.
6. An FIR was thus registered by the respondentauthorities with
the regional AntiCorruption Branch of the Central Bureau of
Investigation (“CBI”) on 06.03.1999 under various provisions of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Simultaneously, an enquiry under Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 1969, with
Assistant Commandant PB Patil as the enquiry officer, was also
initiated and the appellant was placed under suspension vide order
dated 31.05.1999.
Page | 3
a. Chargesheet
7. The chargesheet contained three charges against the appellant,
first, gross misconduct and indiscipline by virtue of ordering of a false
GD Entry (No. 257, on 6:05PM at 28.02.1999); second, becoming an
extraconstitutional authority by issuing unlawful orders to Constable
KK Sharma to give false statement to substantiate the aforementioned
fake GD entry; and third, corruption for illegally collecting bribes from
contractors of BPCL through his subordinates. All these charges were
contested by the appellant, who sought and was provided a detailed
list of evidence and documents.
b. Investigation and Enquiry Report
8. The enquiry officer submitted a selfspeaking report on
17.09.1999, which contained written statements and depositions of
six witnesses who were substantiating the charges, as well as evidence
led by the appellant in the form of five defence witnesses. Inspector
Hiralal Chaudhary (PW1) testified to the search of Sharma, the
seizure of a sum of Rs 10,780 from his person, and the lack of any
explanation by him on the spot regarding source of the suspicious
sum. Head Constable KK Sharma (PW2), who as per the appellant’s
defence had handed over the seized amount as loan amount to
Sharma, negated this alternate version and instead implicated the
appellant by mentioning that not only did he not give any money to
Page | 4
anyone, but that he had instead been threatened by the appellant into
giving a false statement. Head Constable RK Sharma (PW3) claimed to
have witnessed the search and seizure, and denied any talk of a loan
during such event. ASI Karan Singh (PW4) deposed that two empty
garbage trucks had entered the BPCL premises earlier in the
afternoon. ASI Surjan Singh (PW5) testified that at around 6:30PM
when he was on duty at the BPCL Maingate, he received a call from
the appellant intimidating him into registering a false GD Entry with
earlier time of 6:05PM to substantiate a fictitious loan transaction
with the stated objective of protecting Sharma (CW1).
9. Additionally, the enquiry officer examined Constable Ram Avtar
Sharma (CW1) who testified that at around 2PM on 28.02.1999 he
received a bundle of notes totalling Rs 10,000 on behalf of the
appellant from one DK Parmar, who was contracted by BPCL for the
job of lifting garbage/waste. These notes were in his possession, in
addition to his personal cash of Rs 780, when he was caught around
6:15PM by Chaudhary (PW1) while he was travelling in the CISF Bus.
He admitted that he had falsely claimed that the money had been
given to him by KK Sharma (PW2), and in response to a question
disclosed that bribes were illegally collected from BPCL’s contractors
at the rate of Rs 20 per vehicle entering the plant and Rs 5 per vehicle
exiting. The seized sum of money, particularly, was to be handed over
Page | 5
to the appellant for facilitating theft of ‘iron scrap’ and ‘brass’ which
was smuggled out of the compound in the middle of the garbage. CW
1, later on though, retracted and claimed that the record reflected
something other than what he had stated, and that his signatures
ought not to be relied upon as he had not read the document.
10. The appellant in his defence evidence examined Constable MN
Dhanwat (DW1) who deposed that although he was posted at North
gate on the date of the incident, he had left for personal work during
duty hours with the permission of the appellant. Constable Jaimal
Singh (DW2) testified that he had witnessed the search of Sharma
and recording of the GD Entry by Chaudhary when he reached the
Northgate at around 6:40PM. Further, he claimed that Sharma was
repeatedly trying to get in touch with the appellant, but could only get
through at around 7PM and then informed him that he was caught
carrying his own money. ASI SP Mishra (DW3) who was on duty at
the CISF Control room in Vashi stated that in his presence no
message had been conveyed to the appellant regarding the incident.
PK Nashkar (DW4) states that during his duty at the ‘Quarter Guard’
in the Vashi Complex at 7PM, he was directed by ASI SP Mishra (DW
3) to convey a message to the appellant that there was a phone call for
him from Jaimal Singh (DW2). Finally, Pravin Dhanji Parmar (DW5),
who had been performing housekeeping work at the BPCL refinery for
Page | 6
the past twenty years on behalf of contractor DK Parmar & Co, stated
that he did not hand over any money to Sharma. In addition, the
enquiry officer perused the relevant GD entries and other documents
on record.
11. Based on these numerous evidences and after according the
appellant an opportunity to crossexamine all the witnesses as well as
leading his own substantive arguments, the enquiry officer through
report dated 17.09.1999 held the appellant guilty under each of the
three charges. The enquiry officer found as a matter of fact that the
GD No. 257, entered at 6:05PM on 28.02.1999, was a false entry made
at the instance of the appellant by Surjan Singh (PW5), so that an
alternate version could be crafted in which Sharma (CW1) had
allegedly received the seized money as loan. Qua the second charge, it
stood established from the version of KK Sharma (PW2) that he had
not advanced any loan and that he was approached by the appellant
to give a false statement to substantiate the GD No. 257. Finally, upon
a holistic interpretation of all evidence, that is, falsification of GD,
threatening of KK Sharma (PW2), as well as indications of wrongdoing
from the statements of other witnesses like DW1; the enquiry officer
concluded that illegal sums were being collected by the appellant from
BPCL’s contractors through his subordinate officers and therefore, the
third charge of corruption too had been proved.
Page | 7
c. Proceedings before the Disciplinary Authority
12. This voluminous enquiry report was placed before the
disciplinary authority, which gave the appellant both a copy of the
report as well as an opportunity to respond to it. Detailed rebuttals
put forth by the appellant through his written submission dated
14.10.1999 were examined at length by the disciplinary authority.
Preliminary objections of the enquiry officer being biased and of being
predisposed to convict the appellant, were rejected by the disciplinary
authority with cogent reasons. It was noted that not only had proper
opportunity of crossexamining witnesses and of availing assistance
been accorded to the appellant, but that sufficient opportunities of
seeking explanations, clarifications and records of testimonies and
documents had in fact also been availed of by him.
13. The disciplinary authority noted that no material contradictions
could be pointed out in the witnesses’ testimonies, and no compelling
alternate evidence had been produced. Keeping in mind the nature of
the allegations which entailed surreptitious corruption amongst
members of the paramilitary, the disciplinary authority observed that
it was unlikely that there would be independent witnesses to many
incidents like the charge of intimidating KK Sharma (PW2) to give
false testimony, or of collecting bribe from BPCL’s contractors.
14. The disciplinary authority noticed that it was an undisputed fact
Page | 8
that a sum of Rs 10,780 had been recovered from Sharma (CW1),
which was far in excess of the maximum permissible amount of Rs 10.
The testimonies of different officials revealed the appellant’s modus
operandi of collecting illegal monies through a network of subordinate
officers; and more crucially, his attempts at supressing witnesses and
fabricating evidence when caught. The disciplinary authority noted
that the enquiry officer had followed the prescribed procedure and no
challenge had been made earlier to his impartiality and no request to
change the enquiry officer was ever made. Therefore, no malice or bias
could even be suggested at this stage of the disciplinary proceedings.
Similarly, the appellant’s attempt to implicate other officials was held
to be irrelevant, as the present enquiry was limited only to the
appellant’s conduct.
15. Thus, considering the serious nature of the misconduct and the
rank and duty bestowed upon the appellant, and the multiplicity of
the charges which called into question both the personal integrity of
the delinquent officer and the collective image of the force, the
Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 20.11.1999, imposing
exemplary punishment of dismissal from service under Rule 29(a) read
with Rule 31(a) Schedule II of CISF Rules, 1969.
Page | 9
d. Decision of the Appellate Authority
16. The appellant preferred departmental appeal against the order of
his dismissal from service before the Deputy Inspector General of the
CISF Western Zone. In addition to highlighting contradictions in
testimonies and reinterpreting the evidence on record, the appellant
also raised a new defence that the entire proceedings were at the
behest of a particular superior officer.
17. The appellate authority went into each and every contention of
the appellant and after reappreciating the evidence on record, it
dismissed the appeal vide order dated 12.07.2000, concluding that:
“Further I find that there is no material irregularity or miscarriage of
justice in the departmental enquiry proceedings. After considering
the gravity of proven misconduct, the petitioner is not found fit for
retention in an armed force of the Union of India like CISF. The
contentions made in his appeal petitions are totally devoid of merits
both in fact and in law. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority is not excessive in view of proven misconduct. As such I do
not find any reason to interfere with the orders passed by the
disciplinary authority and do hereby reject the appeal petition being
devoid merits.”
e. Writ before the High Court
18. A further challenge was laid to the orders passed by the
Disciplinary and Appellate authorities by way of a writ petition under
Article 226 before the High Court of Bombay. The appellant sought in
Page | 10
sum and substance, reappraisal of the evidence on record, claiming
that it was qualitatively insufficient to hold him guilty of the charges
levelled against him. Additionally, the appellant raised a new ground
of noncompliance with Rule 34(10)(ii)(b) of CISF Rules, 1969 which
specified serving of a second show cause notice and opportunity of
hearing regarding the proposed penalty. The appellant fairly submitted
before the High Court that it was not his case that the penalty
imposed against him was disproportionate, if the charges against him
were held to be proved.
19. The High Court, through the orderunderchallenge, conducted a
detailed reexamination of the facts and materialonrecord, expanding
the scope of judicial review under Article 226 and concluded that there
existed ample evidence to establish the appellant’s involvement in the
organised collection of illegal monies from BPCL’s contractors and his
role in fabricating official records and intimidating subordinate officers
to falsely testify to support his alternate version.
20. The High Court categorically held that the domestic enquiry
followed all procedures and was in conformity with principles of
natural justice and the appellant had been accorded numerous
opportunities of putting forth his version of events. The CISF Rule
sought to be relied upon by the appellant, was found to have been
amended in 1981, therefore, leaving no requirement for a separate
Page | 11
show cause notice at the stage of penalty. The writ petition was
accordingly dismissed on 05.05.2009.
C ONTENTIONS OF P ARTIES
21. The instant appeal being the last resort, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, once more, took us through the enquiryrecord and
highlighted how the main witness (CW1) had retracted his statement,
and how there was no corroboration between witnesses and
documents. The conduct of the enquiry officer was called into
question, contending that his decision to put questions to witnesses
was unfair. Acting as both the judge and prosecutor, the enquiry
officer was alleged to have vitiated the entirety of the proceedings. Till
the last minute, the appellant vehemently stuck to his alternate
version that the recovered sum of Rs 10,780 was nothing but a loan
extended between two officials in a private capacity, and that the false
charges were levelled on him with oblique motives at the instance of
certain superiors. Finally, the appellant sought leniency and urged
that given another 21 years of remaining service, imposition of the
severest punishment of dismissal from service was highly
disproportionate which ought to shock the conscience of this Court.
22. These contentions have dexterously been countered by the
learned counsel for the respondents, who highlights through specific
reference to the impugned order that retraction of CW1’s statement
Page | 12
had been noted by all prior authorities and that no significant reliance
had been placed on it while holding the appellant guilty. Adequate
opportunities were granted and had been availed by him. Attention
was drawn to the fact that the present proceedings constituted the
fifth venue where the appellant was pleading his case, with the first
four and the CBI having found his guilt concurrently.
23. The deliberate and planned manner of the falsifications, and the
blatant threats made to subordinate officials was highlighted by the
respondents, and the loan theory propounded by the appellant was
shown as having been recurrently agitated and discarded by all the
previous forums. Given the concurrent findings of the enquiry officer,
disciplinary authority, appellate authority, and the High Court; as well
as the detailed evaluation and reasoned order passed by each, it was
submitted that there remained little scope of reappreciation or further
1
adjudication. The ratio of Shashi Prasad v. CISF was distilled to
drive home the argument that departmental enquiries don’t stand on
the same pedestal as criminal proceedings. Acquittal in one would not
prejudge the other owing to a difference in standards of proof. It was
claimed that there could be no reappreciation of evidence as per Govt
2
of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd Nasrulla Khan , and that
1
2019 7 SCC 797.
2
2006 2 SCC 373.
Page | 13
Constitutional Courts ought not to act as appellate authorities against
disciplinary proceedings of government employees. Finally, given the
delicate nature of employment in paramilitary forces and breach of the
high trust reposed in him by society, the strict punishment of
dismissal of the appellant from service was justified.
A NALYSIS
24. At the outset, it may be noted that the appellant has chosen to
raise some new grounds before this Court, despite those issues
involving questions of fact. Nevertheless, a few pertinent questions of
service jurisprudence do arise in this appeal, which we deem
appropriate to answer.
I. Scope of Judicial Review in Service Matters
25. Learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking
us through the various evidencesonrecord with the intention of
highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise
was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present
proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by
Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in
appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power
exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid
that judicial review is an evaluation of the decisionmaking process,
Page | 14
and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to
ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought
to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might
result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross
3
unreasonableness of outcome.
26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by a threejudge
4
Bench of this Court in in the
BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India
following extract:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review
is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and
not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is
conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was
held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or
evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When
the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support
therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its
3
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373, ¶ 11.
4
(1995) 6 SCC 749 ¶ 12.
Page | 15
power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where
the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based
on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere
with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to
make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
13.
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power
to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on
that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of
evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 :
AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if
the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the
face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued.”
27. These parameters have been consistently reiterated by this Court
in a catena of decisions, including:
(i) State of Tamil Nadu v. S Subramaniam, (1996) 7 SCC 509.
(ii) Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583.
(iii) Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd v. Mahesh
Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768.
Page | 16
28. It is thus well settled that the Constitutional Courts while
exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of
an appellate authority. Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of
correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice
or violation of principles of natural justice. Put differently, judicial
review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an
appellate authority.
29. The High Court was thus rightly concerned more about the
competence of the enquiry officer and adherence to natural justice,
rather than verifying the appellant’s guilt through documents and
statements. It clearly noted that evidence was led, crossexamination
was conducted and opportunities of addressing arguments, raising
objections, and filing appeal were granted. The conclusion obtained
was based upon these very evidences and was detailed and well
reasoned. Furthermore, the High Court didn’t restrict the scope of
judicial review, rather adopted a liberal approach, and delved further
to come to its own independent conclusion of guilt. Similarly, we have
no doubt in our minds that the appellate authority had carefully dealt
with each plea raised by the appellant in his appeal and had given
detailed responses to all the contentions to satisfy the appellant’s
mind. The disciplinary authority too was impeccable and no infirmity
can be found in the report of the enquiry officer either.
Page | 17
30. Even in general parlance, where an appellate or reviewing
Court/authority comes to a different conclusion, ordinarily the
decision under appeal ought not to be disturbed in so far as it remains
plausible or is not found ailing with perversity. The present case is
neither one where there is no evidence, nor is it one where we can
arrive at a different conclusion than the disciplinary authority,
especially for the reasons stated hereunder.
II. Appropriateness of procedure and PNJ
31. Significant emphasis has been placed by the appellant on the
fact that the enquiry officer put his own questions to the prosecution
witness and that he crossexamined the witnesses brought forth by
the defence. This, it is claimed, amounts to making the prosecutor the
judge, in violation of the natural justice principle of “ nemo judex in sua
causa ”. However, such a plea is misplaced. It must be recognized that,
under Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any
question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or
to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules of evidence
are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put
questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the
truth. Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in
certain circumstances. Further, learned counsel for the appellant,
except for making a bald allegation that the enquiry officer has
Page | 18
questioned the witnesses, did not point to any specific question put by
the officer that would indicate that he had exceeded his jurisdiction.
No specific malice or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer,
and even during the enquiry no request had been made to seek a
replacement; thus, evidencing how these objections are nothing but an
afterthought.
32. Rather it appears that the delinquent person received a fair trial,
which can illustratively be determined by analysing whether he
received an opportunity of adducing evidence, crossexamining
5
witnesses and whether depositions were recorded in his presence.
The record clearly elucidates that all these essentials had been duly
observed in the present proceedings. Opportunity to seek assistance of
another officer was accorded, right of making representation was
granted before each authority, multiple opportunities were granted to
lead evidence, crossexamine witnesses, and raise objections. The
appellant exercised most of these options, though some were given up
despite reminders. Minor delays on part of the appellant were ignored
and each concern of his had been addressed through detailed reasons.
III. Effect of criminal enquiry on disciplinary proceedings
33. The incident of 28.02.1999 raised serious questions of
criminality under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of
5
Union of India v. T.R. Varma, 1958 SCR 499 ¶ 10.
Page | 19
Corruption Act, as well as of violation of Service Regulations and
administrative misconduct. Thus, in addition to appointment of
enquiry officer, the authorities also registered a criminal complaint
with the CBI. After investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate
material to launch criminal prosecution against the appellant but
through its selfspeaking report dated 07.03.2000, the CBI
recommended major disciplinary action against the appellant and a
few others.
34. It is beyond debate that criminal proceedings are distinct from
civil proceedings. It is both possible and common in disciplinary
matters to establish charges against a delinquent official by
preponderance of probabilities and consequently terminate his
services. But the same set of evidence may not be sufficient to take
6
away his liberty under our criminal law jurisprudence. Such
distinction between standards of proof amongst civil and criminal
litigation is deliberate, given the differences in stakes, the power
imbalance between the parties and the social costs of an erroneous
decision. Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and
procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements
7
made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances.
6
Karnataka SRTC v. MG Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442, ¶ 11.
7
Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corp Ltd (2005) 7 SCC 764, ¶ 11.
Page | 20
35. Thus, the appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in
the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the
8
CBI after enquiry, is liable to be discarded. The employer always
retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding,
irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the
CBI report dated 07.03.2000 does recommend major disciplinary
action against the appellant. The said report also buttresses the
respondent’s case.
IV. Punishment and plea of leniency
36. In our considered opinion, the appellant’s contention that the
punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of
corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the
Disciplinary Authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for
a proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality
and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which
prohibits State authorities from treating varyingdegrees of misdeeds
with the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a
function of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must
also factor the financial effect and societal implication of such
9
misconduct. But unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary
8
BHEL v. M Mani, (2018) 1 SCC 285, ¶ 2022, 33.
9
Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 532, ¶ 1416.
Page | 21
proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when
they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree,
or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked. Thus, whereas
imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in
rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds;
but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of
deterrence to the society. Charges such as corruption,
misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the
latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly.
37. Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case in hand, it is
clear that the punishment of dismissal from service is far from
disproportionate to the charges of corruption, fabrication and
intimidation which have unanimously been proven against the
appellant. Taking any other view would be an anathema to service
jurisprudence. If we were to hold that systematic corruption and its
blatant coverup are inadequate to attract dismissal from service, then
the purpose behind having such major penalties, which are explicitly
provided for under Article 311 of the Constitution, would be
obliterated.
38. Still further, the appellant’s actions would most probably have
caused huge consequential losses to BPCL and lowered the reputation
of the CISF amongst members of the public. Given the paramilitary
Page | 22
nature of the appellant’s force, a sense of integrity, commitment,
10
discipline, and camaraderie is paramount. This expectation is only
heightened in the case of the appellant given how he was specifically
tasked with weeding out corruption and conducting surprise raids.
Once shattered through acts of intimidation, forgery, and corruption;
only the severest penalty ought to be imposed.
ONCLUSION
C
39. In light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in this
appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
…………………………...J.
(SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 10.09.2020
10
Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 369, ¶ 40.
Page | 23