Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
T. P. DAVER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
LODGE VICTORIA NO. 363, S. C. BELGAUM
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
12/12/1962
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
KAPUR, J.L.
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION:
1963 AIR 1144 1964 SCR (1) 1
ACT:
Domestic Tribunal-Masonic Lodge-Source of power to expel
members-Contract by which they become members-Rules must be
strictly observed-Must act honestly and in good faith-Should
not exceed its jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.
HEADNOTE:
There is a Scotish Masonic institution known as Grand Lodge
of Scotland. Under this institution there are District
Grand Lodges. Under its superintendence there are Daughter
Lodges. These institutions arc governed by their own
constitutions and laws. Under those laws a member against
whom disciplinary action has been taken by a Daughter Lodge
can appeal to the District Grand Lodge and there is a right
of second appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland. The
appellant was a member of one of the Daughter Lodges at
Belgaum known as Lodge Victoria. The second respondent made
a complaint against the appellant alleging that he has
committed 12 masonic offences. A notice was issued to the
appellant by the Secretary of the Victoria Lodge alleging
the commission of these offences and requiring him to reply
within 14 days. The appellant submitted his answer in
extenso to the various charges. A special meeting of the
Lodge was held at which each charge was read, members gave
their comments and each charge was put to vote and it was
unanimously decided that the appellant was guilty of each
charge. By a resolution the appellant was expelled subject
to the confirmation of the District Grand Lodge. The
decision was communicated to the appellant who therefore
filed an appeal to the District Lodge which body after
giving him adjournment to appear in person dismissed the
appeal at the next meeting at which the appellant absented
himself. A further appeal was filed to the Grand Lodge
which was also dismissed. Thereafter the appellant filed a
suit before the Civil judge, Belgaum for a declaration that
the resolution of the
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Lodge Victoria expelling him was void and that he still
continued to be a member of that Lodge. The Civil Judge
dismissed the suit. Thereupon an appeal was filed before
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the High Court of Mysore. The High Court dismissed the
appeal. The present appeal is by way of a certificate
granted by the High Court.
The appellant contended that the Lodge Victoria had no
jurisdiction to try Masonic offences since such offences
were within the jurisdiction of the District Grand Lodge,
Bombay.
Secondly, it was contended that the disciplinary proceedings
prescribed by law 198 which governs such proceedings were
not strictly complied with. It was further contended that
the fourteen days to which he was entitled after he filed
his answer were not granted to him. Lastly, it was argued
that the decision to expel him was wrong on merits.
Held, that the source of the power of associations, clubs
and Lodges to expel their members is the contract on the
basis of which they become members.
Bonsor v. Musicians Union, [1956] A. C. 104, followed.
A member of a Masonic Lodge is bound to abide by the rules
of the Lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he
shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.
Maclean v. The Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and Ezra v.
Mahendra Nath Banerji, I. L.R. [1946] 2Cal. 88, approved.
The Lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules;
whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to
be decided in each case, having regard to the well settled
rules of construction in that regard. The jurisdiction of
the Civil Court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit
as a court of appeal from the decision of such a body, it
can set aside the order of such a body if the said body acts
without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or act,,
in violation of natural justice.
Maclean v. The Workers Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 623 and L.A.P.0’
Beilly v. C. C. Gettens, A I.R. (1949) P. C. 313, referred
to.
The rules governing tribunals cannot mutatis mutandis be
applied to such bodies as Lodges. One has to see broadly in
the circumstances of cacti case whether the principles of
natural justice has been applied. In the circumstances of
this case,
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particularly when it is found that the appellant had not
raised any objection, it cannot be said that the resolution
passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any
principles of natural justice.
Maclean v. The Workers Union, [1929] 1 Ch. 602, referred to.
Law 198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge
to try a member if he commits an offence, the jurisdiction
conferred on it cannot be excluded by Law 128 which is a
general law. The word offence’ in the context of Law 198
can only mean the infringement of laws of the Daughter
Lodge.
In the present case the rules relating to the disciplinary
proceedings have been strictly complied with. With regard
to the contention that the additional fourteen days, to
which he is entitled to file his case, were not granted to
him it is held that there was no prejudice caused to him by
this failure and since he never made a complaint of it
before any of the two appellate bodies, he has waived the
requirement of the rule. From the facts and circumstances
of the case, particularly when it is found that the
appellant did not raise any objection, it cannot be said
that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for
violating natural justice. Since Civil Courts have no
jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by
a domestic tribunal and since both courts below have found
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concurrently that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith
and since no exceptional circumstance has been shown, this
Court will not examine the merits of the decision.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 414 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 25,
1958, of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal (B) No. 256
of 1956.
Naraindas C. Malkani and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the
appellant.
Bishan Narain and S. P. Verma, for the respondent No. 1.
1962. December 12. The judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SUBBA RAO, J.-This appeal on certificate relates to an
internal dispute of the members of a
4
Masonic Lodge called the "Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C." at
Belgaum.
There is a Scotish institution known as "Grand Lodge of
Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland" at Edinburgh,
hereinafter called the "Grand Lodge of Scotland". Under its
supervision there arc Provincial or District Grand Lodges
spread throughout the world. There are Daughter Lodges
under the superintendence of the District Grand Lodges. The
Grand Lodge of Scotland is governed by its own written
Constitution and Laws. There is also a separate
Constitution and Laws for every District Grand Lodge. One
such District Grand Lodge known as "The Grand Lodge of All
Scotish Freemasonary in India and Pakistan" has its
headquarters at Bombay. The aforesaid daughter Lodge at
Belgaum is directly under the said District Grand Lodge and
is governed by the Constitution and Laws of the latter.
The appellant was a member of the lodge Victoria, having
joined it in the year 1948. On October 16, 1952, the second
respondent made a complaint against the appellant to the
Master, Lodge Victoria, alleging that the appellant was
guilty of 12 masonic offences. It was alleged therein that,
as the appellant had committed masonic offences, he should
be tried by the Lodge for the charges levelled against him
under Law 198 of the Constitution. On October 20, 1952,
notice of the said complaint was issued to the appellant and
he was required to send to the Secretary of the Lodge his
answers to the charges within 14 days from the date of the
notice. He was also informed that he was entitled to be
present and to state his defence at the special meeting to
be held on November 8, 1952. On the same day, the Secretary
of the Lodge sent notices to all the members of the Lodge
asking them to attend the said special meeting convened for
considering and
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passing judgment on the said complaint. On October 27,
1952, the appellant submitted his answer in extenso to the
various charges levelled against him in the complaint; in
that answer he requested that "my complete replies be read
in toto to the brethren assembled to decide this matter and
I be informed of the total number of brethren present and
the number of votes cast one way or the other." A perusal of
that reply also shows that the appellant under-stood the
charges levelled against him as relating to certain offences
alleged to have been committed by him and his reply
proceeded on that basis. On November 8, 1952, the special
meeting of the Lodge was held and the minutes show that 18
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members attended the meeting, that each charge was read at
the meeting, that comments of the members were invited and
that decision was taken on each of the charges. Each of the
charge was put to vote and the members present unanimously
held that every one of the charges levelled against the
appellant was established. In the result they passed a
resolution excluding the appellant from the Lodge until the
exclusion was confirmed by the District Grand Lodge under
Law 199 of the Constitution. On November 15, 1952, the said
decision was communicated to the appellant. On November 24,
1952, the appellant preferred an appeal against that order
to the District Grand Lodge. On October 5, 1953, a meeting
of the District Grand Lodge was convened to consider the
appeal and the appeal was dismissed. It was noted in the
proceedings of the District Grand Lodge that though earlier
an adjournment was given to enable the appellant to appear
in person at the meeting, he remained absent. On a further
appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland, the said Lodge
considered the sentence imposed on the appellant as one of
"suspension sine die" and recommended to the Lodge Victoria
to review the suspension after a period of 12 months if the
appellant applied for reinstatement. It does not
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appear that the appellant filed any application for review.
On September 7, 1954, the appellant instituted a suit in the
Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, for a
declaration that the resolution of the Victoria Lodge dated
November 8, 1952, was illegal and void and that he continued
to be a member of the Lodge despite the resolution, for an
injunction to restrain the officers and servants of the said
Lodge from preventing him from exercising his rights
therein, and for recovery of damages. To that suit he made
the Victoria Lodge, the first defendant ; the complainant,
the second defendant ; the Secretary of the Lodge, the third
defendant ; and the District Grand Lodge, Bombay, the fourth
defendant. The defendants contested the suit. The learned
Civil judge dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the
appellant to the High Court of Mysore was also dismissed.
The present appeal has been filed on a certificate issued by
the said High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us all the
contentions which his client had unsuccessfully raised in
the courts below. Before we advert to the said contentions
it would be convenient to notice briefly the law on the
subject relevant to the present enquiry.
The source of the power of associations like clubs and
lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis
of which they become members. This principle has been
restated by Lord Morton in Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, (1).
There, one Bonsor, who became a member of a trade union, was
expelled. In that context Lord Morton observed :
"When Mr. Bonsor applied to join the respon-
dent union, and his application was accepted,
a contract came into existence between Mr.
Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr. Bonsor
agreed to abide by the rules of the
(1) [1956] A.C. 104,127.
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respondent union, and the union impliedly
agreed that Mr. Bonsor would not be excluded
by the union or its officers otherwise than in
accordance with the rules".
This contractual origin of the rule of expulsion has its
corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the
conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied-
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with. In Maclean v. The Workers’ Union, (1), the
contractual foundation of the power is described thus :
"In such a case as the present, where the
tribunal is the result of rules adopted by
persons who have formed the association known
as a trade union, it seems to me reasonably
clear that the rights of the plaintiff against
the defendants must depend simply on the
contract, and that the material terms of the
contract must be found in the rules".
Proceeding on that basis,the learned Judge observed:
"It is certain, therefore, that a domestic
tribunal is bound to act strictly according to
its rules and is under an obligation to act
honestly and in good faith."
The same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in
Ezra v. Mahendra Nath Banerji (1) thus :
"......... Where the rule provides in any
particular respect that some condition must be
fulfilled, then that condition must be
strictly complied with, since the power of
expulsion is itself dependent on the terms of
the rule."
The next question is whether the doctrine of strict
compliance with the rules implies that every minute
deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not, would
render the act of such a body void. The answer to this
question will depend upon the
(1) [1929] 1 Ch. 602, 623.
(2) I.L.R. (1946) 2 Cal, 88, 109,
8
nature of the rule infringed ; whether a rule is mandatory
or directory depends upon each rule, the purpose for which
it is made and the setting in which it appears. We shall
consider this aspect of the doctrine when we deal with the
argument of the learned counsel that in the present case the
rules have not been complied with.
The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court vis-a-vis the
decisions of tribunals is also well settled. In Maclean v.
The Workers’ Union Maugham,J., observed:
"It appears to me that we have no power to
review the evidence any more than have a power
to say whether the tribunal came to a right
conclusion."
Much to the same effect the judicial Committee observed in
L.A.P.0’ Beilly v. C.C. Gittens, (2).
"................ It is important to bear in
mind that neither the learned.Judge nor their
Lordships’ Board is " entitled to sit as a
Court of appeal from the decisions of a
domestic tribunal such as the Stewards of the
Trinidad Turf Club".
Later on the Privy Council stated:
"All these matters, however, are essentially
matters for the domestic tribunal to decide as
it thinks right. Provided that the tribunal
does not exceed its jurisdiction and acts
honestly and in good faith, the Court cannot
intervene even if it thinks that the penalty
is severe or that a very strict standard has
been applied".
Another aspect which may also be noticed is how far and to
what extent the doctrine of bias may be
(1) [1929] 1 Ch, 602, 628.
(2) A.I.R. (1949) P.C. 313, 316, 317.
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invoked in the case of domestic tribunals like those
of clubs. The observations of Maugham J. in
Maclean’s case(1) in this context may be noticed.
The learned judge observed in that case thus:
"A person who joins an association governed by
rules under which he may be
expelled ........................ has in my
judgment no legal right of redress if he be
expelled according to the rules however unfair
and unjust the rules or the action of the
expelling tribunal may be provided that it
acts in good faith .........................
The phrase, "the principles of natural
justice," can only mean in this connection the
principles of fair play so deeply rooted in
the minds of modern Englishmen that a
provision for an inquiry necessarily imports
that the accused should be given his chance of
defence and explanation. On that point there
is no difficulty. Nor do I doubt that in most
cases it is a reasonable inference from the
rules that if there is anything of the nature
of a lis between two persons, neither of them
should sit on the tribunal."
Another difficulty that one is confronted with in
proceedings held by committees constituted by clubs is to
demarcate precisely the line between the prosecutor and
the,Judge. Maugham, J. noticed this difficulty and observed
in Maclean’s case (1) at p. 626 thus :
"In many cases the tribunal is necessarily
entrusted with the duty of appearing to act as
prosecutors as well as that of judges; for
there is no one else to prosecute. For
example, in a case where a council is charged
with the duty of considering the conduct of
any member whose conduct is disgracefull and
of expelling him if found guilty of such an
offence, it constantly occurs that the matter
is brought to the
(1) [1929] 1 Ch. 602, 628.
10
attention of the council by a report of legal
proceedings in the press. The member is
summoned to appear before the council. The
council’s duty is to cause him to appear and
to explain his conduct. It may be that in so
acting the council are the prosecutors. In
one sense they are; but if the regulations
show that the council is bound to act as I
have mentioned and to that extent to act as
prosecutors, it seems to be clear that the
council is not disqualified from taking the
further steps which-the rules require."
Though it is advisable for a club to frame rules to avoid
conflict of duties, if the rules sanction such a procedure,
the party, who has bound himself by those rules, cannot
complain, unless the enquiry held pursuant to such rules
discloses malafides or unfair treatment.
The following principles may be gathered from the above
discussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to
abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide
for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner
provided by the rules. (2) The lodge is bound to act
strictly according to the rules, whether a particular rule
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is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case,
having regard to the well settled rules of construction in
that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather
limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from
decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such
a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does
not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles
of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited
supra.
Bearing the said principles in mind, we shall now proceed to
consider the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant.
11
The first contention is that Lodge Victoria has no
jurisdiction to decide on the question whether a member
committed a masonic offence, for, it is said, such offences
are within the jurisdiction of a District Grand Lodge,
Bombay. The question falls to be decided on a construction
of the relevant Laws of the Lodge :
The said Laws read:
Law 198. Every Daughter Lodge shall be
entitled to try any member accused of any
offence. A complaint, in writing, shall be
served on the accused brother, by registered
letter posted to his last known address,
specifying the offence of which he is charged,
which he shall be entitled to answer in
writing within fourteen days of the date of
posting of the complaint, or within such
longer time as may be specified in the
complaint. On the answer being lodged, or on
the expiry of the time for doing so, the
matter of the complaint shall be brought
before the Lodge for consideration and
judgment, either at a special meeting called
for that purpose, or at a regular meeting of
the Lodge. The meeting at which it is to be
considered must be called by circular sent by
the Secretary, which shall state the fact that
the complaint, and answer, if any, are to be
brought before the Lodge for consideration and
judgment. In the case of a Lodge which does
not convene its meetings by circular, the
meeting shall be called in such manner as may
be ordered by Grand Committee, or by Grand
Secretary on its behalf. Notice of the
meeting shall be sent to the accused brother
by registered letter posted to his last known
address at least fourteen clear days prior to
the day of the meeting and that whether he has
lodged a written answer or not, and he shall
be entitled
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to appear at the. meeting and any adjournment
thereof and state his defence. After the case
has been considered, the Lodge shall give its
decision. Such decision shall be by votes of
a majority of the qualified members voting
thereon and only those present throughout the
hearing of the case shall be entitled to vote.
If the complaint be sustained, the Lodge shall
pronounce such admonition or sentence as shall
be decided by the majority of votes as
aforesaid. A Daughter Lodge may not, however,
pronounce a sentence of expulsion as power to
expel is vested in Grand Lodge alone; but, if
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the circumstances are deemed of sufficient
gravity, a Daughter Lodge may recommend to
Grand Lodge that a brother be expelled from
the craft. The judgment pronounced shall be
intimated forthwith in writing by registered
letter to the said brother, who shall therein
be apprised that it shall ’be final unless
appealed against to the Provincial or District
Grand Lodge, or to Grand Lodge in the case of
a Daughter Lodge not within the jurisdiction
of a Province or District within one month
after the date of posting the said intimation.
In special circumstances, Grand Committee,
through Grand Secretary, may extend the period
within which an appeal may be made.
Law 128: A Provincial or District Grand Lodge
shall hear and determine all subjects of maso-
nic complaint, dispute, or difference
initiated before or appealed or remitted to it
respecting Daughter Lodges or brethren of the
Scotish Craft within the Province or District,
and may admonish, or pronounce a sentence of
suspension, and, in the case of a Lodge, may
suspend its Charter. The procedure in all
such subjects of complaint, dispute, or
difference shall be re-
13
gulated mutatis mutandis by Laws 104 to III
inclusive.
Law 56: The Grand Lodge shall hear and de-
termine, through its Grand Committee as here-
inbefore provided, all subjects of Masonic
complaint or irregularity respecting Lodges or
Brethren within the jurisdiction, and may
proceed to admonish, or fine, or suspend, or
expel.
Under Law 198, every Daughter Lodge will be entitled to try
any member accused of an offence; under Law 128, a
Provincial or District Grand Lodge shall hear and determine
all subjects of masonic dispute or difference initiated
before it respecting the brethren of the Scotish Craft; and
Law 56 provides that the Grand Lodge shall hear such
complaints and inflict suitable punishments in respect
thereof It will be seen that two different expressions are
used: the expression "’offence" is used in Law 198, while
the expression "masonic complaint" is used in Law 128. It
is, therefore, said that, as in the complaint the appellant
is alleged to have committed masonic offences, the proper
forum is the District Grand Lodge and not the Daughter
Lodge. It is common case that the expressions "offence" and
"masonic complaint" have not been defined in the Laws. In
its legal significance an offence means an act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
expression "masonic complaint" is a comprehensive term; it
may mean any complaint pertaining to masonic matters. It is
not necessary to decide whether the expression "masonic
complaint" is wide enough to take in an "offence". But Law
198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to
try a member if he commits an offence; the jurisdiction
conferred on it cannot be excluded by law 128, which is a
general law. The question therefore is whether the
allegations made against the appellant constituted
"offences" within the meaning of law 198.
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The word "’offence" in the context of that Law can only mean
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the infringement of the Laws of the Daughter Lodge. As all
the Laws have not been placed before us, we are not in a
position to hold whether the allegations amounted to
"offence" or not in the aforesaid sense. But the
complainant, the appellant and the members of the Lodge,
including its officebearers, proceeded on the basis that the
appellant committed "’offences". The complaint discloses as
many as 12 charges. The appellant answered them seriatim.
Indeed, in his answer he specifically stated:
"Further if my accuser and others of his mind
have thought this alleged "offence" serious
enough to be included in this complaint, why
did they not take any action in the matter
immediately instead of taking it up after
sleeping over it for no less than 3-4 years ?"
This shows that even the appellant proceeded on the basis
that the allegations, if established, would amount to
"offences" within the meaning of the said law. In the
special meeting of the Lodge it was held that the charges
have been established; and on that basis punishment was
imposed on the appellant. The appellant did not take any
objection either that the allegations did not amount to
"offences" within the meaning of law 198 or that the Lodge
had no jurisdiction to decide whether he committed the
offences. It is, therefore, manifest that all the parties
concerned in the matter accepted the position that if the
acts alleged to have been committed by tile appellant were
established, he would have committed "offences" under the
laws. If the allegations against the appellant amounted to
""offences" Law 198 is immediately attracted. If that be
so, neither Law 128 nor Law 56, which deal with the
jurisdiction of a District Grand Lodge in respect of
"masonic complaints", can just the jurisdiction expressly
conferred on the
15
Daughter Lodge. We, therefore, hold that the Daughter Lodge
had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the 2nd
respondent against the appellant and decide it on merits.
The next question is, whether Law 198 has been strictly
complied with. Relevant part of Law 198 reads :
"On the answer being lodged, or on the expiry
of the time for doing so, the matter of the
complaint shall be brought before the Lodge
for consideration and judgment, either at a
special meeting called for that purpose, or at
a regular meeting of the Lodge. The meeting
at which it is to be considered must be called
by circular sent by the Secretary, which shall
state the fact that the complaint, and answer,
if any, are to be brought before the lodge for
consideration and judgment."
As we have already indicated in the narration of facts,
notice was issued to the members fixing the date of the
special meeting along with the notice issued to the
appellant i.e., the notice was issued to the members before
the appellant filed his answer in respect of the allegations
made against him in the complaint. It is, therefore,
contended that the notice of the special meeting issued to
the members was not in strict compliance with the said Law.
We do not see any contravention of the Law. The Law does
not say that notice to the members should be issued only
after the answer was lodged by the person against whom a
complaint was made. But what it says is that the matter of
the complaint shall be brought before the Lodge for
consideration after the answer was lodged or on the expiry
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of the time for doing so. It also does not prescribe that
the answer should be communicated to the members, but only
indicates that the notice shall state the fact that
16
the complaint and the answer, if any, will be brought before
the Lodge for consideration and judgment. To put it in
other words, the gist of the relevant part of the law is
that in the special meeting convened for the purpose or at a
regular meeting of the Lodge, the matter of the complaint
shall be brought for consideration and judgment. In the
present case it is not disputed that the prescribed notice
was given to the members and at the meeting all of them had
considered the complaint as well as the answer lodged by the
appellant. Therefore, the law in this regard has been
strictly complied with.
The next contention relates to the following part of Law 198
: "Notice of the meeting shall be sent to the accused
brother by registered letter posted to his last known
address at least fourteen clear days prior to the day of the
meeting and that whether he has lodged a written answer or
not, and he shall be entitled to appear at the meeting and
any adjournment thereof and state his defence." It is
contended that under the said part of the Law, the accused
is entitled to have another 14 days after he filed his
answer to enable him to file his case before the Lodge and
that in the instant case no such additional period was given
to him. That is so. The position, therefore, is that the
appellant was given notice of the hearing as required by the
law, but he was not given the entire period prescribed
thereunder. The question is whether this error in the
procedure vitiated the trial.It is obvious that the
appellant wag not prejudiced. He never made a complaint of
it. Indeed in his answer he made it clear that he would not
be present at the inquiry. The Law itself enabled him to
apply for further time, but he did not ask for it, as he did
not want to appear at the meeting. He did not raise this
objection either in the appeal before the District Grand
Lodge or in the second appeal before the Grand Lodge of
Scotland. Before the said appellate Lodges he took
17
the decision on merits. Indeed, by his answer and
subsequent conduct he clearly waived the said requirement of
the Law. Can he now be allowed to rely upon a breach of the
procedural rule to invalidate the proceeding ? In our view,
he cannot do so. There is a distinction between the
jurisdiction of a Lodge and the irregular exercise of it in
the matter of the taking of procedural steps. A party to a
dispute can certainly waive his objections to some defects
in procedure. In this case, the appellant could have taken
objection for his being given a shorter period of notice
than prescribed under the Law for his appearance before the
meeting of the Lodge. He did not do so. The appellant has,
by his aforesaid conduct, clearly waived his right under the
said Law. Having waived it, he is now precluded from
relying upon the said defect. We, therefore, hold that it
is not open to the appellant to rely upon the said defect
for invalidating the proceeding.
The lie argument that the members of the Lodge were both
the prosecutors and the judges, and therefore the principles
of natural justice have been violated has not much force in
the context of the present enquiry. We are dealing with a
case of a Lodge and not with that of a tribunal or a court.
It is true that the earlier resolution, Ex. II 4-, shows
that 11 members of the Lodge were not well disposed towards
the appellant; but here we are concerned with the complaint
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filed by the 2nd respondent. Notice of the complaint was
given to all the members of the Lodge. It may be that some
of them did not like the appellant, and one of them is the
complainant himself But 22 members of the Lodge met and
unanimously held-, after considering the complaint and the
answer given by the appellant, that he was guilty. If the
appellant had any objection for one or some of the members
taking part in the meeting, he could have raised an
objection, but he did not do so. The rules
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governing tribunals and courts cannot mutatis mutandis be
applied to such bodies as Lodges. We have to see broadly in
the circumstances of each case whether the principles of
natural justice have been applied. In the circumstances of
this case, particularly when we find that the appellant had
not raised any objection, we cannot say that the resolution
passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any
principles of natural justice.
Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to resurvey the
entire material to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of
the decision of the Lodge. As we have pointed out earlier,
civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of
a decision given by a private association like a Lodge.
Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge has
acted in good faith in the matter of the complaint against
the appellant. That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it
is the practice of this Court not to interfere ordinarily
with concurrent findings of fact. There are no exceptional
circumstances for our departing from the said practice.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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