Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1463 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23718 of 2018)
The Commissioner,
Mysore Urban Development
Authority ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
S.S. Sarvesh ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Signature Not Verified
1.
Leave granted.
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2019.03.02
12:50:44 IST
Reason:
1
2
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 19.02.2018 passed by the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition
No.34313 of 2017 whereby the High Court
dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant
herein.
3.
In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in this appeal, it is necessary to set out a
few relevant facts.
4. The appellantMysore Development
Authority(in short, “the Authority”) is the defendant
whereas the respondent is the plaintiff in the suit
out of which this appeal arises.
5. The respondent filed a civil suit (O.S.
No.685/2006) against the appellantAuthority in the
Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge and Small
Causes Court, Mysuru. The suit was for declaration
of title and permanent injunction in relation to the
2
3
nd
land bearing No. 2442 situated in Vijaynagara, 2
stage, Devaraja Mohalla, Mysuru (hereinafter
referred to as ‘suit land’).
6. The appellantAuthority, on being served filed
their written statement. The parties adduced their
evidence. By judgment/decree dated 20.03.2012,
the Trial Court decreed the respondent's suit and
passed a decree against the appellantAuthority in
relation to the suit land.
7. The appellantAuthority felt aggrieved and filed
first appeal (R.A.No.370/2012) under Section 96 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Code”) in the Court of Principal
District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru. This appeal
was listed for hearing on 25.04.2014. On that day,
the appellant's counsel did not appear when the
appeal was called on for hearing and, therefore, the
Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in default.
3
4
8. The appellantAuthority, therefore, filed an
application before the Appellate Court praying for
recall of the order dated 25.04.2014 and sought
restoration of their appeal for its hearing on the
merits. By order dated 29.06.2016, the Appellate
Court dismissed the application, which gave rise to
filing of the writ petition by the appellantAuthority
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. By
impugned order, the High Court dismissed the writ
petition and affirmed the order of the Appellate
Court, which has given rise to filing of this appeal
by way of special leave by the defendant in this
Court.
9. So, the short question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the
Appellate Court and the High Court were justified in
dismissing the application (M.A.No.77/2014) filed
4
5
by the appellantAuthority(defendant) and were,
therefore, justified in refusing to restore their first
appeal.
10. Heard Mr. Mahesh Thakur, learned counsel
for the appellantAuthority and Mr. Anand Sanjay
M. Nuli, learned counsel for the respondent.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to allow the appeal, set aside the
impugned order and also the order dated
29.06.2016 passed by the Principal District and
Sessions Judge in M.A. No.77 of 2014 and, in
consequence, allow the application filed by the
appellantAuthority(defendant) and recall the order
dated 25.04.2014 passed by the Appellate Court.
5
6
12. At the outset we consider it apposite to clarify
one legal position, which was rightly brought to our
notice by the learned counsel for the appellant
Authority.
13. The first appeal (R.A. No.370/2012) filed by
the appellantAuthority suffered dismissal in default
on 25.04.2014 because on that day none appeared
for them when the appeal was called on for hearing.
14. Such dismissal attracted the provisions of
Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code and, therefore, the
appeal could be readmitted for hearing at the
instance of the appellantAuthority only by taking
recourse to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 19 and
subject to their making out a sufficient cause which
prevented them from appearing on 25.04.2014
when the appeal was called on for hearing.
6
7
15. An order of refusal to readmit the appeal
passed by the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule
19 of the Code is made expressly appealable under
Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code to the High Court. In
this case, since the Appellate Court refused to re
admit the appeal and dismissed the application filed
by the appellantAuthority, the remedy of the
appellantAuthority was to file an appeal in the High
Court against the order dated 29.06.2016 under
Order 43 Rule 1 (t) of the Code.
16. The appellantAuthority instead of filing the
appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code filed
the writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution against the order dated 29.06.2016. It
was an error on the part of the appellantAuthority
and the High Court should have declined to
entertain the writ petition and instead either
7
8
converted the writ petition into the appeal under
Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code or permitted the
appellantAuthority to withdraw the writ petition
with a liberty to file an appeal under Order 43 Rule
1(t) of the Code, as the case may be, in its
discretion. It was, however, not noticed and the
High Court dismissed the writ petition on merits.
17. We, therefore, clarify the legal position that
the appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1(t) of the Code
to the High Court against the order dated
29.06.2016 passed by the Appellate Court which
dismissed the application made under Order 41
Rule 19 of the Code.
18. Be that as it may, in our considered opinion,
the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition.
The High Court should have allowed the writ
petition and the appellantAuthority should have
8
9
been given the indulgence of hearing of their appeal
on merits.
19. Indeed, this case reminds us of the subtle
observations of the learned JudgeVivian Bose, J.,
which His Lordship made in one of the leading
cases of this Court in Sangram Singh vs. Election
Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425.
20. Vivian Bose J., speaking for the Bench, in his
distinctive style of writing made the following
observations while dealing with the case arising out
of Order 9 and reminded the Courts of their duty
while deciding the case. The observations are apt
and read as under:
“ A code of procedure must be regarded as
such. It is procedure something designed to
facilitate justice and further its ends: not a
penal enactment for punishment and
penalties; not a thing designed to trip people
up. Too technical a construction of sections
that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity
of interpretation should therefore be guarded
against (provided always that justice is done
9
10
to both sides) lest the very means designed
for the furtherance of justice be used to
frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are
grounded on a principle of natural justice
which requires that men should not be
condemned unheard, that decisions should
not be reached behind their backs, that
proceedings that affect their lives and
property should not continue in their
absence and that they should not be
precluded from participating in them. Of
course, there must be exceptions and where
they are clearly defined they must be given
effect to. But taken by and large, and subject
to that proviso, our laws of procedure should
be construed, wherever that is reasonably
possible, in the light of that principle.”
21. Keeping the aforementioned statement of law
in consideration and applying the same to the facts
of this case, we have no hesitation in allowing this
appeal and set aside the impugned order.
22. In our view, the Courts below should have
seen that the first appeal is a valuable right of the
appellant and, therefore, the appellantAuthority
was entitled for an opportunity to prosecute their
appeal on merits. If the appellant’s advocate did not
10
11
appear may be for myriad reasons, the Court could
have imposed some cost on them for restoration of
their appeal to compensate the respondent(plaintiff)
instead of depriving them of their valuable right to
prosecute the appeal on merits. This is what Justice
Vivian Bose has reminded to the Courts while
dealing with the cases of this nature in Sangram
Singh (supra) to do substantial justice to both the
parties to the lis . Indeed, dismissal of the appeal in
default and dismissal of the appeal on merits makes
a difference. The former dismissal is behind the
back of the litigant and latter dismissal is after
hearing the litigant. The latter is always preferred
than the former.
23. We have perused the application made by the
appellantAuthority for recalling of the order and we
find that it constitutes a sufficient cause within the
meaning of Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code. The
11
12
application, therefore, deserves to be allowed.
However, it is subject to payment of cost of
Rs.10,000/ payable by the appellantAuthority to
the respondent(plaintiff). Let the cost be paid before
hearing of the appeal.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside. As a consequence, the application
filed by the appellant (MA No.77/2014) is allowed.
The R.A. 370/2012 is accordingly restored to its
original number for its hearing on merits in
accordance with law.
25. Parties are directed to appear before the
concerned Appellate Court on 05.03.2019 to enable
the Appellate Court to fix a date for hearing of the
appeal on merits uninfluenced by any of our
observations on the merits because we have not
applied our mind to the merits of the controversy
12
13
involved in the appeal. Let the appeal be heard and
disposed of as expeditiously as possible preferably
within six months from the date of this order.
.………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J.
[DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
February 05, 2019
13