SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MNG. COMMITTEE vs. SIDDHA MATH .

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Vs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3446 OF 2010 JUDGMENT CIVIL APPEAL NOS.14631-14632 OF 2015 (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.9167-9168 of 2010) AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.9627 OF 2010 J U D G M E N T V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. Page 1 2 2. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original

judgment dated 07.07.2009 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents herein and held that as the disputed land was earlier settled in the name of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije Puri, Marfat Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das and thus, the subsequent settlement made in favour of the Temple Managing Committee in OEA Claim Case No. 68/90 was without jurisdiction. 3. As the facts in all the appeals are common, for JUDGMENT the sake of convenience, we refer to the facts of Civil Appeal No. 7729 of 2009, which are stated in brief hereunder: The present case revolves around the ancient temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri. The lands in question have been accorded the status of ‘ amrutamanohi’ properties. On 18.03.1974, the State Government of Orissa issued a notification under Section 3-A of the Orissa Estate Page 2 3 Abolition Act, 1951(hereinafter referred to as the “OEA Act, 1951”), whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath

before the High Court of Orissa in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 233 of 1977. The High Court rejected the claim of the Temple. The same was upheld by this Court vide its judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath through Jagannath Singri Narasingh Das Mahapatra Sridhar Panda 1 and Ors v. State of Orissa . We will advert to this judgment in detail at a later part of this judgment. The State Government of Orissa subsequently issued a notification dated 18.04.1989 and extended the time for JUDGMENT filing claims under Section 8-A of the OEA Act, within which the Temple filed Claim Case No. 68 of 1990 for recording the lands in question in favour of Shree Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat Shree Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. Vide order dated 30.11.1992, the OEA Collector and Tahsildar, Puri observed that the suit lands in question have been recorded in the name of 1 1989 (1) Suppl.SCC 553 Page 3 4 Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Srikhetra, and accordingly settled the suit lands in favour of the

in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000, challenging the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 on the ground that the lands in question have been accorded the status of ‘ amrutamanohi ’ and that they were recorded as Trust Estate as defined under Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 and that lands had wrongly been settled in favour of the Temple. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2009 set aside the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 and held as under: JUDGMENT “……it is seen in the instant case, the property has been dedicated as Amrutmonahi to Lord Sri Jagannath of Puri and the marfatdar of the property is Mahanta Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Thus, the property is attached with a charge of rendering service to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs threof as food offering to Lord Jagannath. It is further found that on the above analysis, the property cannot be held to be under the control of the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple but is a trust property attached with a charge and the trustee has to fulfil the wish of the dedicator Page 4 5

JUDGMENT Hence, the present appeals have been filed by the appellant Temple and State Government and others. Page 5 6 4. We have heard the learned senior counsel for both the parties. We have also heard Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, the

2010 and Ms. V.S. Lakshmi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Math in C.A. No. 9627 of 2010. On the basis of the factual evidence on record produced before us, the circumstances of the case and also in the light of the rival legal contentions urged by the learned senior counsel for both the parties, we have broadly framed the following points which require our attention and consideration:- 1) Whether the suit lands can vest in the respondent Math in the light of the provisions of JUDGMENT the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955? 2) Whether even otherwise, the Math had the right to prefer claim rights in respect of the Temple Lands and initiate the proceedings under the OEA Act, 1951 by virtue of being an intermediary? 3) What order? Page 6 7 Answer to Point No.1 5. At the outset, before we advert to the rival legal

examine the provisions of the relevant Acts, as well as the previous judgments of this Court on the issue. There are two important acts which operate in the instant case. The first is the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the “Temple Act, 1955”). The long title of the Act reads as follows: “An Act to provide for better administration and governance of Shri Jagannath Temple at Puri and its endowments.” JUDGMENT The Preamble of the Temple Act, 1955 states as under: “Whereas the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has ever since its inception been an institution of unique national importance in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and have regarded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. And whereas by Regulation IV of 1809 passed by the Governor-General in Council on 28th April, 1809 and thereafter by other laws and regulations and in pursuance of arrangement entered into with the Raja of Khurda, later designated the Raja of Puri, the said Raja Page 7 8 came to be entrusted hereditary with the management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties as Superintendent subject to the control and supervision of the ruling power; And whereas in view of grave and serious irregularities thereafter Government had to intervene on various occasions in the past; And whereas the administration under the Superintendent has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better administration and governance therefore in supersession of all previous laws, regulations and arrangements, having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals contained in the Record-of-Rights prepared under the Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act, 1952 (Orissa Act XIV of 1952)…………” (emphasis laid by this Court) Section 2 of the Temple Act, 1955 bars the operation of JUDGMENT the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 on the Temple, and reads as follows: “ 2 (1): The provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa Act 2 of 1952) shall cease to apply to the said Temple except with respect to actions taken, things done and contributions levied and the same shall be deemed to have been validly taken, done and levied as if this Act had not been passed: (2) All laws, regulations and other enactments passed for the purpose of providing for the management of the affairs of the Temple and Page 8 9

Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 provides for the setting up of a Temple Managing Committee as under: “5. Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or contract, Sanad, deed or engagement, the administration and the governance of the Temple and its endowments shall vest in a Committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee constituted as such by the State Government, and it shall have the rights and privileges in respect thereof as provided in Section 33.” JUDGMENT Section 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 grants power of general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments to the State Government which may pass orders for the maintenance and administration of the temple, which reads as under: “30. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments shall vest in the State Government which may pass any orders that may be deemed necessary for the proper maintenance Page 9 10 or administration of the Temple or its endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple.”

immoveable properties belonging to the Temple. It reads as under: “33. (1) The Committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelries, records, documents and other assets belonging to Temple.” 6. A Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to examine the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 in detail, while adjudicating upon its constitutional JUDGMENT validity in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb v . State 2 of Orissa . Wanchoo, J., speaking for the bench observed as under: “This review of the provisions of the Act shows that broadly speaking the Act provides for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not interfere, with the religious affairs thereof, which have to be performed according to the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952 and where 2 AIR 1964 SC 1501 Page 10 11

the Temple, it was also held: “Finally the preamble says that the administration under the superintendent has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better administration and governance therefore in supersession of all previous laws, regulations and arrangements, having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals contained in the record of rights prepared under the 1952 Act. So for all these reasons the appellant was removed from the sole superintendence of the Temple and a committee was appointed by s. 6 of the Act for its management.” (emphasis laid by this Court) JUDGMENT A perusal of the provisions of the Act and the decision of this Court in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb referred to supra clearly shows that as far as Shri Jagannath Temple of Puri is concerned, the position of law is that all the endowments and properties belonging Page 11 12 to the Temple vest in the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee.

The long title of the Act reads as follows: “An act to provide for the abolition of all the rights, title and interest in land of intermediaries by whatever name known, including the mortgagees and lessees of such interest, between the raiyat and the state of Orissa, for vesting in the said state of the said right, title and interest and to make provision for other matter connected therewith……” All estates of the intermediaries were thus, abolished and by way of a notification, stood vested in the State Government. Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 (which JUDGMENT was inserted by way of an Amendment in 1974) defines a Trust Estate as under: “‘trust estate’ means an estate the whole of the net income whereof under any trust or other legal obligation has been dedicated exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual : Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates Page 12 13 by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates.”

under: “3. Notification vesting an estate in the State – (1) The State Government, may from time to time by notification, declare that the estate specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances.” “(3) Such publication shall be conclusive evidence of the notice of the declaration to everybody whose interest is affected by it.” 8. Section 2(oo) was inserted by way of an amendment on 26.02.1974. On 18.03.1974, a notification was issued by the State Government under Section 3-A whereby the JUDGMENT estate of Lord Jagannath vested with the State Government. The validity of the notification was challenged, which came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra. This Court upheld the validity of the notification declaring the estate of Page 13 14 Lord Jagannath as ‘ trust estate ’ after giving the reasons as follows:

from such a declaration This aspect is dealt within s 13-I, which is quoted as under (omitting sub-section (2) which is not relevant in the present context): "13-1. Effect of orders passed under section 13-G: (I) All estates declared under this Chapter to be trust estates by the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, shall he deemed to have been excluded from the operation of the vesting notification and never to have vested in the State in pursuance thereof." JUDGMENT It is manifest from the language of the Section that it saves a ''trust estate" so declared under s. 13-G from the operation of a notification issued under s. 3 or 3-A, but does not extend the benefit any further The provisions do not confer protection from the Act itself and cannot be interpreted to clothe it with a permanent immunity from being vested by a later notification issued under the Act Such an estate could be vested in the State of Orissa by a subsequent Page 14 15 notification was made clear by clause (b) of s 13-K which reads as follows:

It is important to note at this stage that while upholding the validity of the notification, this Court JUDGMENT did not advert to the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 at all. 9. Another judgment of this Court which is important to be examined is the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Page 15 16 3 Surjanarayan Das , which examined the nature of ‘ amrutamanohi’ properties.

the controversy in the instant case is squarely covered by two judgments of this Court, the Division Bench judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath and the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra. The learned senior counsel places strong reliance on the following paragraphs of the decision in the case of Surjanarayan Das (supra) : “40. We may now consider the properties in schedule Kha said to be the Amruta Monohi properties of Lord Jagannath and held by the plaintiff as marfatdar. The plaintiff alleges that these properties were acquired either by purchase or 'krayadan' or by way of gift subject to a charge of some offering to Lord Jagannath which depended upon the individual judgment and discretion of the plaintiff, and that the public had no concern with the enjoyment or management of the usufruct thereof. The Gazetteer makes a reference to such properties and states:- JUDGMENT ‘Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The lands of the latter are known as Amruta Manohi (literally nectar food), because they were given with the 3 AIR 1967 SC 256 Page 16 17

JUDGMENT (emphasis laid by this Court) Page 17 18 11. The learned senior counsel contends that since an earlier decision of this Court already covers the

respect the principle of stare decisis. He further contends that the judgments delivered in the case of Surjanarayan Das and Lord Jagannath have held field since 1967 and 1989, respectively. The learned senior counsel places reliance on a seven judges Bench decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti 4 Kureshi Kassab Jamat, wherein, while examining the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis, it was held as under: JUDGMENT “111. Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means "to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudication". This principle is expressed in the maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movers" which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as "Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace". However, according to Justice Frankfurter, the doctrine of stare decisis is not "an imprisonment of reason" (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd 4 (2005) 8 SCC 534 Page 18 19

xxx xxx xxx 119. Sir John Salmond, while dealing with precedents and illustrating instances of departure by the House of Lords from its own previous decisions, states it to be desirable as 'it would permit the House (of Lords) to abrogate previous decisions which were arrived at in different social conditions and which are no longer adequate in present circumstances. This view has been succinctly advocated by Dr. Goodhart who said: "There is an obvious antithesis between rigidity and growth, and if all the emphasis is placed on absolutely binding cases then the law looses the capacity to adapt itself to the changing spirit of the times which has been described as the life of the law". This very principle has been well stated by William O' Douglas in the context of constitutional jurisprudence. He says: "So far as constitutional law is concerned, stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component of history. Once it does, the cycle starts again".” JUDGMENT The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of R. 5 Unnikrishnan v. V.K. Mahanudevan , wherein it was held 5 (2014) 4 SCC 434 Page 19 20 as under:

‘It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.’ 20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res-judicata is also fairly well settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee this Court observed: JUDGMENT ‘There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of Page 20 21

‘In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate issues which have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, every time either a statute or a provision thereof is declared ultra vires, it would have the result of reopening of the decided matters within the period of limitation following the date of such decision.” JUDGMENT 12. The learned senior counsel contends that the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra cannot be wished away by branding it as per incuriam. It is an extremely serious matter to contend that a judgment is per incuriam. It is Page 21 22 contended that in order to render a judgment per incuriam, it must be first shown that the oversight or

appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee, on the other hand, contends that the decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra is per incuriam as it was passed in ignorance of the Temple Act, 1955. The learned senior counsel contends that the judgment does not even notice Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The judgment was passed only on considering the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951. The judgment held that it cannot be said that the estate of Lord Jagannath JUDGMENT could not be vested in the State government by a notification issued subsequently. The learned senior counsel contends that the OEA Act, 1951 is an Act which was principally enacted for the purpose of abolishing all rights in land of “intermediaries” between the Raiyats and the state by whatever name known and for the vesting of the same in the state. It could thus, only divest the intermediaries of its rights in land by Page 22 23 vesting it in the State but cannot affect the statutory vesting of all endowments in the managing committee

of Section 3A and the issue of a subsequent notification cannot divest the absolute ownership of the endowments of the Temple. The learned senior counsel submits that the endowments vested in the managing committee and hence it ceased to be an intermediary interest and became the absolute vested property of Lord Jagannath. The learned senior counsel contends that a decision given in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of a statue can be held to be per incuriam, as was JUDGMENT held by a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of 6 Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur . The learned senior counsel further places reliance on another decision of this Court in the case of State of 7 U.P v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., wherein the principle of per incuriam was discussed as under: 6 (1989) 1 SCC 101 7 (1991) 4 SCC 139 Page 23 24

The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Fuerst Day 8 Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., wherein this Court JUDGMENT examined the prior decisions on the issue of per incuriam at length and arrived at the following conclusion: “23. A prior decision of this court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. This is not an exceptional case by inadvertence or oversight of any judgment or statutory provisions running counter to the reason and 8 (2001) 6 SCC 356 Page 24 25

14. The learned senior counsel contends that in the Lord Jagannath case, not only did the Court ignore the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, it also ignored the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raja Kishore Deb referred to supra, wherein this Court has held that the Lord Jagannath Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Odisha and is a temple of national importance and no other temple in that state can be compared with it. It stands in a class by itself JUDGMENT and with respect to be a subject of special consideration by the State Government and thus requires special treatment. 15. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced by Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath (supra) does not bar Page 25 26 the present case by res judicata. The principle of res judicata, codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil

9 Singh v. Daryao Kunwar , held as under: “A plain reading of s. 11 shows that to constitute a matter res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, namely - (i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; (iii) The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit.” JUDGMENT The above legal principles laid down by this Court have been reiterated in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai 10 & Ors. v. Mohd.Hanifa & Ors . , as under: 9 AIR 1966 SC 1332 10 AIR 1976 SC 1569 Page 26 27

In the Lord Jagannath case referred to supra, this Court was concerned only with the validity of the vesting notification dated 18.03.1974, whereas in the instant case, it is the validity of the order dated 30.11.1992 that is being examined, along with the question whether land once vested for a particular purpose, namely, as property of Lord Jagannath can be divested by operation of another legislation. Since the subject matter of the JUDGMENT two cases is not identical, the bar of res judicata does not operate on the proceedings in the instant case. Further, it is well settled law that a question of law can be raised at any time during the proceedings. In the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. v . Naresh 11 Kumar Badrikumar Jagad , it was held as under:- 11 (2011) 12 SCC 695 Page 27 28

16. We agree with the contention advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee. Most respectfully, we opine that the decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra, wherein this Court upheld the validity of the notification dated 18.03.1974 in so far as it pertains to the estate of Lord Jagannath is per-incuriam for non-consideration of the provisions of Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 and the law JUDGMENT laid down by this Court as regards between the two State enactments, which one will be the Special Act over other. While the doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to maintain judicial discipline, what cannot be lost sight of the fact is that decisions which are rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and law laid down by this Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of Page 28 29 this Court. In the case of Moti Kureshi Jamat referred to supra, it was held as under:

It becomes clear from a perusal of the case law adverted to by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee that a judgment can be said to be per incuriam when it is passed in forgetfulness or ignorance of a statute operating in that field. The notification dated 18.03.1974 vested the estates of Lord Jagannath, Puri in the State Government JUDGMENT in view of the amended provision of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 inserted by way of an Amendment in the year 1974. The judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath was passed only on consideration of the OEA Act, 1951. The provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, which is the principal Act that applies to the Lord Jagannath Temple, Puri were not adverted to at all. Page 29 30 17. We now turn our attention to the validity of the vesting order dated 30.11.1992 passed by the Tahsildar

appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee contends that in view of Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 read with Sections 16 and 33 of the said Act, all endowments of the temple, including the properties belonging to or given or endowed for the support of the Temple or given or endowed for the performance of any service including the service of offerings to the deity or charity connected therewith vest in Temple Committee. The learned senior counsel contends that the JUDGMENT Temple Act,1955 is a special legislation enacted by the State Government of Odisha and thus overrides any general law enacted. The learned senior counsel contends that by Section 5 of the said Act, the property vested in Temple Committee. The vesting of the property in the Temple Committee is statutory in nature by virtue of Section 5 of the Temple Act,1955. He Page 30 31 further contends that once land has been vested with the State, the same is not available for vesting again

counsel further contends that the Temple Act,1955 is a special law enacted by which the properties and endowments of Lord Jagannath Temple, Puri stood statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. The OEA Act, 1951, on the other hand, was enacted for the purpose of abolishing all rights of ‘intermediaries’ between the raiyats and the State by whatever name known and for the vesting of the same in the State. Thus, the provisions of the OEA Act, even by way of JUDGMENT insertion of Section 3A and the issue of a subsequent notification cannot divest the absolute ownership of the endowments of the Temple. The learned senior counsel contends that the endowments vested in the Temple Committee, and thus, ceased to be an intermediary interest and became the absolute vested property of Lord Jagannath. The learned senior counsel places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the Page 31 32 case of U.P State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Hari 12 Shankar Jain & Ors. , wherein this Court while holding

“8. The maxim "Generalia Specialibus non derogant" is quite well known. The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary Seward v. The Owner of the "Vera Cruz" as follows: Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. 9. The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject. When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament………” JUDGMENT The learned senior counsel further places reliance on a more recent judgment of this Court, in the case of 12 (1978) 4 SCC 16 Page 32 33 Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements 13 Ltd. & Anr. , wherein after adverting to a number of

JUDGMENT 13 (2014) 8 SCC 319 Page 33 34 provision relating to a specific, defined and descriptable subject is regarded as an exception to and would prevail over a general provision relating to a broad subject.”

appearing on behalf of the respondent Math, on the other hand, contends that Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 only pertains to the administration and governance of the Temple and its endowments that vest in the committee. The Temple Act, 1955 was enacted because of serious irregularities in the administration and governance of the Temple and its endowments and for reorganizing the scheme of management of the affairs of the temple and its properties. Only what was being JUDGMENT managed by the Raja of Puri was taken over under the Temple Act, 1955. The learned senior counsel places reliance on B.K Mukherjea ’ s ‘ The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust ’ and contends that the respondent Math is a Vaishnava Math of Puri. The Math and the Jagannath Temple have co existed for centuries. Each is a separate legal entity, holding its properties separately and performing its religious and other Page 34 35 functions in accordance with religious customs and usage. The Math and the Temple hold their own properties

counsel contends that the appellant Temple Committee has not produced any evidence on record through which it could claim the ownership over the property of the respondent Math. The learned senior counsel contends that the ‘ amrutamanohi’ properties are endowed to two different legal entities- the Temple and the Math. Thus, it cannot be contended that the properties of the Math belong to the Temple. 20. The learned senior counsel further contends that JUDGMENT Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 which defines Trust Estate, was inserted in the year 1974. Under the proviso, all estates belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the estate of Lord Jagannath came to be vested in the State Government vide notification dated 18.03.1974. The amendments to the OEA Act, 1951 were effected when the Temple Act, 1955 was in force. The learned senior Page 35 36 counsel contends that it is a well settled principle of law that a subsequent legislation prevails over a prior legislation.

senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee and are unable to agree with the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The Temple and the Math are two distinct legal entities. The OEA Act, 1951 was enacted to provide for the abolition of all rights, title and interest in the land of intermediaries and vesting the same in the State. The Act was thus meant to abolish the interest of the JUDGMENT intermediaries in the land. A Constitution Bench of this Court, upholding the constitutional validity of the Act in the case of K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo & Ors. v. State 14 of Orissa held as under: “The primary purpose of the Act is to abolish all zamindari and other proprietary estates and interests in the State of Orissa and after eliminating all the intermediaries, to bring the ryots or the actual occupants of the lands 14 AIR 1953 SC 375 Page 36 37

JUDGMENT Page 37 38

On the other hand, keeping in view the growing irregularities in the management of the affairs of the temple, the Temple Act, 1955 was enacted by the state, which received the assent of the President on 15.10.1955. We agree with the contention advanced by Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee that as far as the Jagannath Temple of Puri and its endowments are concerned, the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, being JUDGMENT the special law, take priority over the provisions of any other legislation. Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 makes it clear that the properties and endowments of the Temple stand statutorily vested in the Temple Committee. The Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra draws a distinction between the ‘ amrutamanohi’ properties of the Math and Page 38 39 the Temple in the following terms: “40. The Gazetteer makes a reference to such properties and states:-

JUDGMENT Page 39 40 22. The OEA Act, 1951 was enacted with a view to abolish the rights, title and interest of

JUDGMENT The OEA Act, 1951 was thus enacted with a view to protecting the interest of the cultivators of the soil and to do away with the evils of the zamindari system. In the light of the same, it cannot be said that the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 will apply to the land of the appellant Temple Committee over the provisions of Page 40 41 the Temple Act, 1955, which is clearly the special legislation in the instant case. At this stage, it is

Section 2(oo) was inserted in the OEA Act, 1951. It states as under: “The Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 provides for the abolition of temporarily and permanently settled zamindaris and other intermediary interests and tenures in the State of Orissa. All estates except trust estates have vested in the Government by virtue of notifications issued in that behalf by the Government under the Act. For carrying out the purposes of trusts efficiently and to ensure proper performance of traditional rites and rituals in the religious institutions when trust estates are vested in the Government……and that any land or building (being part of a trust estate) vested in the Government maybe settled in certain circumstances with the person who immediately before such vesting was an intermediary in respect of such land or building.” (emphasis laid by this Court) JUDGMENT A perusal of the aforementioned objects and reasons makes it clear that the said amendment clearly encroaches upon the field of the Temple Act, 1955. Page 41 42 The said amendment has been enacted with a view to ensuring the proper performance of traditional rites and

Legislature had already enacted the Temple Act, 1955 and vested the land belonging to the Temple in the Temple Management Committee by virtue of Sections 5 and 30 of the Act of 1955. The object of the said Act was to provide for better administration and governance of the affairs of the Temple and its properties. Thus, proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, by which the estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the JUDGMENT Temple Act, 1955 are deemed to be Trust Estates is in direct contravention and subversion of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Further, even the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent Math that a subsequent legislation takes precedence over a prior decision is liable to be rejected as the same is not tenable in law. The same becomes clear from the decision of this Court in the Page 42 43 case of U.P State Electricity Board referred to supra, wherein a three judge bench had to adjudicate the

following terms: “We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying as they do hard-won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed by Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must prevail over S. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.” JUDGMENT Further, Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of LIC v. 15 D.J. Bahadur , while examining the difference between general and special statutes held as under: 15 AIR 1980 SC 2181 Page 43 44

JUDGMENT Page 44 45 Further, on the point of a subsequent legislation taking precedence over a prior legislation, he observed as under: “The general rule, that prior statutes are held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant, is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general, the rule of law being, as stated by Lord Selbourne in Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10 AC 59 "that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so", "There is a well-known rule which has application to this case, which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. That this is the law cannot be doubted, and the cases on the subject will be found collected in the third edition of Maxwell is generalia specialibus non derogant-i.e. general provisions will not abrogate special provisions. "When the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.” JUDGMENT (emphasis laid by this Court) Page 45 46 23. In the instant case, there is a clear conflict between the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act,

of the Acts cannot survive together. While the rule of harmonious construction must be given effect to as far as possible, when the provisions of two statutes are irreconcilable, it needs to be decided as to which provision must be given effect to. In the instant case, Section 2(oo) proviso in its entirety is not violative of the provisions of the Temple Act. At the cost of repetition, we reproduce the relevant part of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as under: JUDGMENT “Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estate Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates.” (emphasis laid by this Court) It is only the first part of the proviso which is in contravention of the Temple Act, 1955. If that part of the proviso continues to be given effect, Sections 5 and Page 46 47 30 of the Temple Act, 1955, by which the estates of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are vested in the Temple

provisions will be able to operate. 16 In Commercial Tax Officer v. Binani Cements Ltd. this Court held as under: “It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origins in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field on same subject.” (emphasis laid by this Court) JUDGMENT In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. 17 v. State of U.P. , a three judge bench of this Court held as under: “9. ...We reach the same result by applying another well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that while this rule of construction is 16 (2014) 8 SCC 319 17 (1961) 3 SCR 185 Page 47 48

JUDGMENT Page 48 49 we must hold that Clause 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of Clause 23 are applicable.” (emphasis laid by this Court)

two judgments of this Court that while provisions of different statutes must be harmoniously constructed as far as possible, in cases where it is not possible, the Court needs to examine as to which provision must be given effect to. 24. In the case in hand, the first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 cannot be allowed to sustain. Clearly, the intention of the legislature could not have been to render virtually the entire JUDGMENT Temple Act, enacted on the specific subject, meaningless, by way of enacting a proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as an amendment in 1974, which is the general legislation in the instant case. Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, thus, to that extent requires to be struck down so that both the OEA Act, 1951 as well as the Temple Act, 1955 can be given due effect in their respective field of operation. In Page 49 50 exercise of the powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court can pass any order as may

caused to the appellant Temple if the rights conferred upon it by the Temple Act are allowed to be taken away by operation of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act. Therefore, we have to strike down the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act and also quash the notification dated 18.03.1974 in so far as it relates to the property of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. 25. Further, it is a settled principle of law that once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to JUDGMENT achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law. Similarly, if in the instant case, we were to accept the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math, then Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 will be rendered useless and nugatory and thereby the laudable object and intendment of the Temple Page 50 51 Act will be defeated and the interest of the public at large will be affected. Thus, the notification dated

Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri vested in the State Government (in terms of Point (ii) of the notification), is liable to be quashed to that extent. As a consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 passed by the OEA Tahsildar, who falls within the inclusive definition of Collector in terms of Section 2 (d) of the OEA Act, 1951, settling the land in favour of the Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars of the Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the provisions JUDGMENT of the Temple Act, 1955 and is thus, liable to be set aside. Answer to Point No. 2 26. We will now examine whether even according to the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951, the respondent Math had the right to file an application for settlement of the suit lands in terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, Page 51 52 1951. There are certain provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 which need to be appreciated at this stage.

“‘Intermediary interest’ means an estate or any rights or interest therein held or owned by or vested in an Intermediary and any reference to ‘estate’ in this Act shall be construed as including a reference to ‘Intermediary Interest’ also” Section 8-A provides for filing of claims under Section 6,7 and 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 which reads as under: “8-A. Filing of claims under Section 6, 7 and 8 and dispute relating thereto – (1) The Intermediary shall file his claim in the prescribed manners for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of lands and building which are deemed to be settled with him under Section 6 or Section 7 before the Collector within 6 (six) months from the date of vesting.” JUDGMENT 27. Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math contends that Section 2(oo)of the OEA Act,1951 was amended in the year 1974, in terms of which all estates belonging to the temple of Lord Jagannath were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the Page 52 53 same vested in the State Government after notification of 18.03.1974. Thus, the provisions of Section 8A of the OEA

within six months. The learned senior counsel contends that the lands of the respondent Math were recorded in the Record of Rights, and the Tahsildar issued an inquiry report which stated that the said respondents were in possession of the lands. The lands were accordingly settled in favour of the respondent Math vide order dated 30.09.1981. The learned senior counsel further contends that the application filed by the appellant Temple Committee under Section 8-A, in which an order dated JUDGMENT 30.11.1992 settling the lands in their favour was passed was liable to be set aside, as the respondent Math herein was not a party to the same. It is further contended that the order was liable to be set aside, as the lands already settled by way of order dated 12.01.1982 in favour of the respondent Math, could not be re-settled as the same were not available for the Collector to do so in view of the earlier order, referred to supra. Page 53 54 28. Mr. Shibasis Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Odisha, the appellant in Civil

supra, the State Government vide notifications dated 18.04.1989 and 20.11.1990, extended the time period for filing of claims in respect of estates of Lord Jagannath. On 20.11.1990, the Temple Committee lodged its claim recording the estates of Lord Jagannath in favour of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat through Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee by filing Claim Case No. 68 of 1990. On 30.11.1992, the order was passed by the OEA Collector recording the JUDGMENT properties in favour of the Temple Committee. 29. We cannot accept the contentions advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The Form ‘H’ submitted in terms of the OEA Act, 1951 in Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while Column 9 “ [Whether with respect to the lands in possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or Page 54 55 mortagagee on the date of vesting]” is marked as ‘Self Possession’, and Column 11 “ [If in the possession of a

the claim of the respondent Math and the basis of its claim is not stated in the claim petition. In the absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order dated 12.01.1982, passed in OEA Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 filed by the respondent Math to settle the lands in their favour has been passed by the Tahsildar, Puri. Section 8-A of the Act clearly provides JUDGMENT that the claims have to be filed before the Collector. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Tahsildar contends that the definition of Collector in the OEA Act, 1951 is an inclusive one, and therefore he had the authority to determine the rights of the respondent. We cannot agree with this legal contention advanced by the learned senior counsel. The proceedings under Section 8-A, OEA Page 55 56 Act, 1951 are quasi judicial in nature. The Orissa High Court in the case of Bharat Bihari Mishra v. State of

30. It is well settled in law that a quasi judicial function cannot be delegated and therefore, the inclusive reading of the definition of Collector under Section 2(d) of the OEA Act, 1951 to also include Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it pertains to the discharge of administrative powers of the Collector. JUDGMENT In reference to the role of the Tahsildar under the OEA Act, 1951, this Court has held that the Tahsildar performs an administrative function and not a quasi judicial one. In the case of Basanti Kumar Sahu v. 19 State of Orissa a three judge bench of this Court has held as under: 18 2012 (II) OLR 968 19 (1998) 8 SCC 722 Page 56 57

31. Since the Tahsildar performs only an administrative function under the OEA Act, 1951 and not a quasi judicial function, thus, he was not competent to pass the order of settlement of claim either under Section 6 JUDGMENT or 7 or 8 of the OEA Act, 1951. For the reasons stated in answer to Point No.1 above, vesting of the suit lands in favour of the Math is bad in law. Further, as we have already held supra that once the land already vested in the Temple Committee under Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to deal with the properties endowed to the appellant Temple Page 57 58 Committee, the same could not have been divested by applying the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 by way of

said Act and the Temple Act, 1955 are in different fields and the objects and intendment of the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. A constitution bench of this Court in the case of 20 Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal held that in case of a conflict or overlap between different entries, the rule of harmonious construction must be applied to give effect to all the entries. This Court held as under: JUDGMENT “8. ……Before construing the said entries is would be useful to notice some of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of constructing the entries. The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But 20 AIR 1962 SC 1044 Page 58 59 some of the entries in the different List or in the same List may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between them. When the question arose about reconciling entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer, C.J., in In re The Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938, observed : "A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implication of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act." The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state : "........... an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non-obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail." The Federal Court in that case held that the JUDGMENT Page 59 60 entry "taxes on the sale of goods" was not covered by the entry "duties of excise" and in coming to that conclusion, the learned Chief Justice observed :

JUDGMENT Page 60 61

In the light of the reasons assigned by us in answer to Point No.1 and held in favour of the Temple, there JUDGMENT was no need for the Temple Committee to file claim proceedings under Section 8-A of the OEA Act, 1951, in respect of its own lands which were already vested in it under Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The suit lands vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, in view of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the settlement of the suit lands in favour of the respondent Math cannot be sustained, as it is bad in law. Page 61 62 Answer to Point No. 3

Committee, the impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is liable to be set aside and accordingly, we set aside the same. 33. Since we have categorically recorded the finding both on facts and in law while answering Point No. 1 in favour of the appellant Temple Committee holding that the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 have no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there JUDGMENT is no need for us to pass an order in favour of the Temple under the OEA Act, 1951 as the suit lands were already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Page 62 63 34. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following order :-

of 2010,3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is hereby set aside. ii) We strike down the first part of the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, which pertains to the properties of JUDGMENT Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri. iii) The notification dated 18.03.1974 issued by the State Government under Section 3A of the OEA Act, 1951 in so far as point No. (ii) is concerned, is also quashed by this Court, to the extent, it applies to Page 63 64 the lands and estate of Lord Jagannath

Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as mentioned above and quashing of the notification referred to supra will be prospective and this judgment shall not be applicable to the settled claim of the claimants hitherto under the provisions of the OEA Act of 1951 in so far as the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri are concerned. JUDGMENT v) In view of the disposal of appeals above-mentioned in favour of the Temple Managing Committee, C.A. Nos. @ SLP (C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 (filed by Sri Raghab Das Math) and C.A. No. 9627 of 2010 (filed by Bauli Matha) are hereby dismissed. Page 64 65 vi) No costs are awarded in these proceedings.

…………………………………………………………J. [C. NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, December 16, 2015 JUDGMENT Page 65 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. NO.7 OF 2016 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7729 OF 2009 Sri Jagannath Temple Mng. Committee Appellant (s) VERSUS Siddha Math & Ors. Respondent(s) O R D E R Heard learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the I.A. No. 7 of 2016. It is pointed out that in the judgment dated 16.12.2015 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7729/2009 and other connected appeals in Paragraph Nos. 16, 22, 23, 25 and 31 there is an inadvertent typographical error with regard to mentioning the correct provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. Therefore, we direct that in the aforesaid paragraphs wherever Section 30 is written it shall be substituted with Section 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 after deleting Section 30 of the Act. Accordingly, I.A. No. 7 of 2016 is allowed. JUDGMENT The office is directed to issue corrigendum in these matters and issue the copy of the corrected copy of the judgment along with corrigendum to all concerned parties. The Registry is also further directed to communicate the corrigendum to all the recognized Reporters for effecting correction. ........................J. (V. GOPALA GOWDA) ........................J. (C. NAGAPPAN) New Delhi; Date: 27.04.2016. Page 66 ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.10 SECTION XIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 7729/2009 SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MNG. COMMITTEE Appellant(s) VERSUS SIDDHA MATH & ORS. Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 7730/2009 C.A. No. 142/2010 C.A. No. 221/2010 C.A. No. 2981/2010 C.A. No. 3414/2010 C.A. No. 3415/2010 C.A. No. 3446/2010 C.A. Nos.14631-14632 of 2015 @ SLP(C) No. 9167-9168/2010 C.A. No. 9627/2010 Date : 16/12/2015 These matters were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. JUDGMENT For Appellant(s) Mr. Swetaketu Mishra, Adv. Mr. Sanjay R. Das, Adv. Mr. V. K. Monga,Adv. Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv. Mr. Radha Shyam Jena,Adv. Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, Adv. Mr. Rutwik Panda,Adv. Ms. Anshu Malik, Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv. Page 67 For Respondent(s) Mr. Rajiv S. Roy, Adv. Mr. Pranab Kumar Mullick, Adv. Mr. Avrojyoti Chatterjee, Adv. Mr. Sukumar, Adv. Mrs. Soma Mullick, Adv. Mr. Sebat Kumar Devria, Adv. Mr. Abhijit S. Roy, Adv. Mr. Satya Mitra,Adv. Mr. S. K. Verma,Adv. Mr. Atul Kumar, Adv. CA 7730/09, 221/10 Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, Adv. and 3414/2010 Mr. Rutwik Panda,Adv. Ms. Anshu Malik, Adv. Mr. Kunal Verma,Adv. Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra,Adv. Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan. Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010. C.A. Nos.7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009,142 of 2010, 221 of 2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414 of 2010,3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed and C.A. Nos.14631-14632 of 2015 @ SLP(C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 and C.A. No.9627 of 2010 are dismissed in terms of the Signed Reportable Judgment. JUDGMENT (VINOD KUMAR) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file) Page 68 69 ITEM NO.301 COURT NO.9 SECTION XIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

VERSUS SIDDHA MATH & ORS. Respondent(s) (for correction of typographical error and office report) Date : 27/04/2016 This application was called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. GOPALA GOWDA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN For Appellant(s) Mr. J.K.Das,Sr.Adv. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Das,Adv. Mr. Swetaketu Mishra,Adv. Mr. Sandeep Devashish Das,Adv. Mr. V. K. Monga,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Satya Mitra,Adv. JUDGMENT Mr. S. K. Verma,Adv. UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R I.A. No. 7/2016 is allowed in terms of the signed order. (SUMAN WADHWA) AR-cum-PS (CHANDER BALA) COURT MASTER Signed order is placed on the file. Page 69