Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. of 2023
(@ SLP (Crl.) No.4241 of 2019)
Surendra Singh …Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan and Anr. …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
impugned judgment and order dated 20.11.2018
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Neetu Sachdeva
Date: 2023.04.29
12:39:09 IST
Reason:
passed by the High Court of Judicature for
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Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur passed in D.B.
Criminal Appeal No.818 of 2013 by which the
Division Bench of the High Court has partly
allowed the said appeal preferred by the
respondent accused – Vijendra Singh and has set
aside the conviction for the offence punishable
under Section 302/149 IPC but has convicted for
the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC, the
original complainant/informant has preferred the
present appeal.
2.
The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell
are as under:
2.1
An FIR was lodged by the police on 01.12.2010 for
an incident which took place on 28.11.2010. In
the FIR it was alleged that on 28.11.2010, while
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complainant’s younger brother Narendra Singh
was filling water from hand-pump at around 9.30
a.m. accused Bhupendra Singh, Vijendra Singh
and Bhawani Singh, Sangeeta and Gulab Kanwar
caused lathi blows to Narendra Singh. In the
said incident Narendra Singh and Bhawani Singh
became unconscious. Both of them were taken to
the hospital. Bhawani Singh died. The FIR was
registered as FIR bearing no.445/2010. Though
the five persons were named in the FIR the police
filed charge-sheet only against two persons
namely Bhupendra Singh and Vijendra Singh for
the offence under Sections 341, 323, 325/34,
308/34 and 302 and alternatively, Section
302/34 IPC. Both the aforesaid accused came to
be tried for the aforesaid offence. To prove the
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charge against the accused the prosecution
examined ten witnesses and brought on record
seven documentary evidences. The statements of
the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were
recorded.
2.2
During the trial, the accused Bhupendra Singh
died. Thus, the proceedings against him stood
abated. The prosecution submitted an application
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the remaining
three accused persons so left out by the
prosecution. The said application was dismissed
by the learned Trial Court. However, on a
challenge before the High Court and on remand,
the learned Trial Court directed to try the
remaining three accused as accused and passed a
summoning order of additional accused.
4
However, as the remaining three accused
absconded for number of years pursuant to the
order passed by the High Court, the trial against
the respondent herein accused Vijendra Singh
came to be separated. Charge came to be
reframed and the accused Vijendra Singh came to
be charged for the offence under Section 302/149
IPC also. Thereafter on conclusion of the trial, the
learned Trial Court convicted the accused
Vijendra Singh for the offence punishable under
Sections 147, 323, 302/149 IPC and sentenced
him to undergo life imprisonment for the offence
punishable under Sections 302 read with Section
149 IPC, one year R.I. for the offence under
Section 323 IPC and two years R.I. for the offence
under Section 147 IPC.
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2.3 The respondent herein – accused preferred the
present appeal before the High Court. By the
impugned judgment and order the High Court has
set aside the conviction of the accused Vijendra
Singh for offence under Section 302 read with
Section 149 IPC by observing that no case is
made out for conviction with the aid of Section
149 IPC. That thereafter the High Court has
considered the individual act of the accused and
thereafter after taking into consideration the fact
that the fatal blow on the head was given by
accused Bhupendra Singh (who died during the
trial) and the weapon used by the accused was
lathi, the High Court by the impugned judgment
and order has convicted the accused for the
offence under Section 323 IPC.
6
2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court convicting the accused for the offence
under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, the
original complainant/informant Surendra Singh has
preferred the present appeal.
3.
Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate
has appeared as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the
appellant, Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned counsel
has appeared on behalf of the respondent – State
and Shri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel has
appeared on behalf of respondent no.2.
4.
Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant has
vehemently submitted that in the facts and
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circumstances of the case the Division Bench of
the High Court has materially erred in observing
that no case was made out for conviction with the
aid of Section 149 IPC.
4.1
It is vehemently submitted by Shri Dave, learned
Senior Counsel that the High Court has materially
erred in observing that after the registration of the
FIR, even the police found the case only against
the two accused and the cognizance of the offence
against the other accused are taken subsequently
on the remand of the case by the High Court after
rejection of application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
and the learned trial Court took cognizance
against the accused later on and therefore no case
is made out for conviction with the aid of Section
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149 IPC.
4.2
It is vehemently submitted by Shri Dave learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court has not properly
appreciated and/or considered the fact that as
such in the FIR the allegations were specific
against five accused persons. However, at the
relevant time the investigating officer filed the
charge-sheet only against the two accused
persons and the remaining three persons were
arrayed as accused subsequently pursuant to the
order passed by the learned Magistrate allowing
the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is
submitted that therefore when all the five persons
came to be tried may be separately there was an
involvement of five persons who form the unlawful
9
assembly and therefore Section 149 IPC would be
attracted.
4.3 Heavy reliance is placed on the decision of this
Court in the case of Bharwad Mepa Dana &
Anr. Vs. State of Bombay 1960 (2) SCR 172 as
well as Mizaji and Anr. Vs. The State of U.P.
(1959) Supp. (1) SCR 940.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State
has supported the appellant.
6. Shri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of accused no.2 relying upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Roy
Fernandes vs. State of Goa and others, (2012)
3 SCC 221, has vehemently submitted that as
such on facts no case is made out to convict the
10
accused with the aid of Section 149 IPC.
6.1
It is submitted that merely because the accused
might have been present at the time of
commission of the offence and in fact might have
participated in commission of the offence but has
not played a vital role unless it is proved that the
other accused knew that in prosecution of the
common object any one of them is likely to
commit the murder of the deceased, Section 149
IPC shall not be attracted.
6.2 Now so far as the conviction of the accused for the
offence under Section 323 IPC, it is vehemently
submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the accused that though the respondent no.2
has not preferred the appeal challenging the
11
conviction under Section 323 IPC, still in an
appeal preferred by the State against the
acquittal, the accused can submit that he could
not have been convicted for other offence.
Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court
State of Rajasthan vs. Ramanand
in the case of
(2017) 5 SCC 695.
6.3
In support of his submission that even the
respondent - accused could not have been
convicted even for the offence under Section 323
IPC, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent – accused has made the following
submissions:
(i)
That there was a delay of 3 ½ days in
lodging the FIR;
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(ii) That the injury on the neck has not been
established and proved;
(iii) That there are material contradictions on the
injuries caused by the accused persons.
He has taken us to the deposition of doctor
examined as PW7 and the injury report.
7.
Making above submissions it is prayed to acquit
the accused even for the offence under Section
323 IPC.
8. We have heard learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respective parties at length.
9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the
learned trial Court convicted the respondent –
accused for the offence under Section 302 IPC
13
with the aid of Section 149 IPC. However, the
High Court has observed and held that as the
initial charge-sheet was filed only against two
persons /accused and further three persons were
subsequently arrayed as the accused and they are
being tried separately, Section 149 IPC shall not
be attracted. The High Court has also observed
that even as per the FIR three accused came at
the place of occurrence when they saw Narendra
Singh was filling water and it was thus not
assembly of five accused.
10.
However, the High Court has not properly and
considered the fact that in the report/FIR there
were specific allegations against five accused
persons and five accused persons were named in
the FIR. However, the investigating officer charge-
14
sheeted only two persons. The remaining three
accused persons came to be added as accused by
the learned trial Court while allowing the
application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. As they
absconded and therefore their trial came to be
ordered to be separated and it is reported that the
trial against the remaining accused is still
pending who are also facing the charges for the
offence under Section 302/149 IPC. In that view
of the matter when five persons were specifically
named in the FIR and five persons are facing the
trial may be separately, Section 149 IPC would be
attracted. At this stage the decision of this Court
in the case of Bharwad Mepa Dana (supra) on
applicability of Section 149 IPC is required to be
referred to. Before this Court it was the case on
15
behalf of the prosecution that thirteen named
persons formed an unlawful assembly and the
common object of which was to kill the three
brothers. Twelve of them were tried by the
Sessions Court who acquitted seven and the High
Court acquitted one more. This brought the
number to four. It was the case on behalf of the
accused that as the High Court convicted only
four persons falling below the required number of
five, they could not have been convicted with the
aid of Section 149 IPC. The aforesaid contention
was negated by this Court. This Court observed
that merely because two other persons forming
part of the unlawful assembly were not convicted
as their identity was not established, the accused
cannot be permitted to say that they are not
16
forming part of the unlawful assembly and they
cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149
IPC. In the said decision it is specifically observed
and held that the essential question in a case
| under Section | 147 | is whether there was an |
|---|
| unlawful assembly as defined under | 141 | , I. P. C., |
|---|
of five or more than five persons. The identity of
the persons comprising the assembly is a matter
relating to the determination of the guilt of the
individual accused, and even when it is possible
| to convict less than five persons only, Section |
|---|
| 147 | still applies, if upon the evidence in the case |
|---|
the Court is able to hold that the person or
persons who have been found guilty were
members of an assembly of five or more persons,
known or unknown, identified or unidentified.
17
10.1 In view of the above facts and circumstances of
the case the High Court has seriously erred in
observing that no case is made out to invoke
Section 149 IPC.
10.2 Now once the respondent – accused was found to
be member of the unlawful assembly of more than
five persons and he actually participated in
commission of the offence may be the fatal blow
might have been given by the another accused, in
the present case Bhupendra Singh, still with the
aid of Section 149 IPC, Respondent Accused can
be convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC
with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The case would
certainly fall within first part of Section 149 IPC.
As per first part of Section 149 IPC if an offence is
committed by any member of unlawful assembly
18
in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, every person who, at the time of that
offence, is a member of the same assembly, is
guilty of that offence. In the case of Mizaji and
Anr. (supra), this Court had occasion to consider
Section 149 of the IPC and the distinction
between two parts of Section 149 IPC. It is
observed and held as under:
“This section has been the subject matter of
interpretation in the various High Court of
India, but every case has to be decided on its
own facts. - The first part of the section
means that the offence committed in
prosecution of the common object must be
one which is committed with a view to
accomplish the common object. It is not
necessary that there should be a preconcert
in the sense of a meeting of the members of
the unlawful assembly as to the common
object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the
members and is shared by all of them. In
order that the case may fall under the first
part the offence committed must be
connected immediately with the common
19
| object of the unlawful assembly of which the | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| accused were members. Even if the ofef nce | ||||||||
| committed is not in direct prosecution of the | ||||||||
| common object of the assembly, it may yet | ||||||||
| fall under | s. 149 | if it can be held that the | ||||||
| ofef nce was such as the members knew was | ||||||||
| likely to be committed. The expression I | ||||||||
| know' does not mean a mere possibility, | ||||||||
| such as might or might not happen. For | ||||||||
| instance, it is a. matter of common | ||||||||
| knowledge that when in a village a body of | ||||||||
| heavily armed men set out to take a woman | ||||||||
| by force, someone is likely to be killed and | ||||||||
| all the members of the unlawful assembly | ||||||||
| must be aware of that likelihood and would | ||||||||
| be guilty | under the second part 'of | s.149 | . | |||||
| Similarly, if a body of persons go armed to | ||||||||
| take forcible possession of the land, it would | ||||||||
| be equally right to say that they have the | ||||||||
| knowledge that murder is likely to be | ||||||||
| committed if the circumstances as to the | ||||||||
| weapons carried and other conduct of the | ||||||||
| members of the unlawful assembly clearly | ||||||||
| point to such knowledge on the part of them | ||||||||
| all. There is a great deal to be said for the | ||||||||
| opinion of Couch, C. J., in Sabid Ali's case | ||||||||
| (1) that when an ofef nce is committed in | ||||||||
| prosecution of the common object, it would | ||||||||
| generally be an ofef nce which the members | ||||||||
| of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to | ||||||||
| be committed in prosecution of the common | ||||||||
| object. That, however, does not make the | ||||||||
| converse proposition true; there may be | ||||||||
| cases which would come within the second |
20
| part, but not within the first. The distinction | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| between the two parts of | s.149 | , | Indian Pena l | ||||||||
| Code | cannot be ignored or obliterated. In | ||||||||||
| every case it would be an issue to be | |||||||||||
| determined whether the ofef nce committed | |||||||||||
| falls within the first part of | s. 149 | as | |||||||||
| explained above or it was an ofef nce such as | |||||||||||
| the members of the assembly know to be | |||||||||||
| likely to be committed in prosecution of the | |||||||||||
| common object and falls within the second | |||||||||||
| part.” |
10.3 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Roy
Fernandes (supra) , relied upon on behalf of the
respondent – accused is concerned, on facts the
said decision shall not be applicable. In the said
decision this Court had considered the second
part of Section 149 IPC. This Court did not
consider the first part of Section 149 IPC and the
distinction between the first part and the second
part of Section 149 which has been considered by
this Court in the case of Mizaji and Anr. (supra).
21
11. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the
accused that he ought not to have been convicted
for the offence under Section 323 IPC is
concerned, though the accused has not
challenged the impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court challenging the offence
under Section 323 IPC we have heard the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused on
merits on his conviction under Section 323 IPC.
11.1 The submission on behalf of the accused that
there was a delay of 3 ½ days has been
elaborately dealt with and considered by the
learned trial Court in detail. A proper explanation
has been given by the complainant - Surendra
Singh. Immediately after the occurrence the
injured were taken to the hospital for treatment.
22
The condition of Bhawani Singh was serious.
Complainant concentrated on his treatment.
Another injured Narendra Singh was also
remained busy for the treatment. Thus, when the
delay has been sufficiently and properly
explained, we see no reason to give benefit of
doubt to the accused on the aforesaid ground that
there was a delay of 3 ½ days in lodging the FIR.
11.2 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the
accused on the injuries and the contradictions in
the injuries, at the outset, it is required to be
noted that the deposition of the eye-witness PW1
and PW4 and the deposition of the doctor - PW7
are relevant material/deposition against the
accused. The deceased sustained following
injuries:
23
1. 2xl/2 cm scratched injury in the middle of head with
red color soft clotting and hematoma beneath the skin
of the head
2. Blue colored swelling on right head measuring 2.SxL
INTERNAL hematoma in frontal head lobe.
3. 2cm stitch wound on occipital region of head. Blood
clotting a parietal region of right side of head.
4. 3x2 cm scratched injury in front parietal part.
5. lxl/2 cm injury over nose.
6. 2xl/2 cm scratched I injury over right knee.
7. 5X0.5 cm scratched injury on the lower part of left
leg.
8. 0.5X0.5 cm scratched injury on the middle part of left
leg.
24
9. 6xl.5 cm blue colored wound on the back of neck.
While further dissecting it was found that on left
muscles there is hematoma and fourth and fifth
cervical ribs were broken. There was swelling on it.
10. On front of stomach 2.5xl.5 cm Blue coloured
wound on naval side.
All these wounds and injuries lead to death as per
the opinion of the doctor. As per the medical
opinion and the deposition of doctor the death
occurred due to injury no.9 from the shock of
wound at spinal bone of neck. Though the injury
no.9 was caused by the accused Bhupendra
Singh as observed and held hereinabove the
respondent accused being a part of the unlawful
assembly and who also participated in
commission of the offence, he shall also be liable
25
to be convicted for the offence under Section 302
IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC, even for the
act of the accused Bhupendra Singh who gave the
fatal blow.
12.
Under the circumstances the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court acquitting the
accused for the offence under Section 302 read
with Section 149 IPC is unsustainable and the
same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
In view of the above and for the reason stated
above the present appeal succeeds. The
impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court acquitting the respondent – accused for the
offence under Section 302 under Section 149 IPC
is hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment
and order passed by the learned Trial Court
26
convicting the respondent – accused for the
offence under Sections 147, 323 and 302/149 IPC
is hereby restored. The respondent no.2 –
accused to undergo life imprisonment for the
offence under Section 302/149 IPC. The
respondent no.2 now to surrender before the
concerned authority/court to undergo the
remaining sentence of life imprisonment within a
period of three weeks from today, failing which, he
shall be taken into custody forthwith.
Present appeal is accordingly allowed.
……………
…………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
27
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
New Delhi,
April 11, 2023.
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