Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PRABHAWATI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. PRITAM KAUR
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/03/1972
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
BENCH:
HEGDE, K.S.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
MITTER, G.K.
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1910 1972 SCR (3) 991
1972 SCC (1) 849
ACT:
U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947--S.
3--its scope--order of the High Court directing the State
Govt. to rehear a revision petition--Respondent filed
eviction suit before rehearing--Whether the suit for
eviction maintainable.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a tenant, was sought to be evicted by
Respondent, She applied to the District Magistrate, who was
also the Rent Controller under s. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, for permission to sue
the appellant for her eviction and the permission was
granted. As against that order, the appellant went up in
revision to the State Government. During the pendency of
that proceeding, the State Government passed an order
staying the operation of the permission granted by the
Commissioner pending consideration of the case by the State
Government. Later, the State Government allowed the
revision petition and set aside the premission granted.
Respondent challenged the legality of the order made by the
State Govt. before the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the
Government on the ground that the State Govt. in deciding
the revision petition had allowed itself to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations. It directed the State Govt. to
rehear the appellant’s revision application according to
law. This order was passed on February 28, 1967. On the
very next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of
the appellant. When the revision petition came up for
hearing before the State Govt., the Respondent submitted
that in view of the institution of the suit, the State Govt.
was not competent to hear the revision petition and
accordingly, the State Govt. dismissed the petition on the
sole ground that the proceeding before it became infructuous
in view of the institution of the civil suit.
The appellant challenged that order of the State Government
by means of a writ petition before the High Court. The High
Court held that the stay granted by the State Govt. had
lapsed when the revision petition was disposed of.
Therefore, on the institution of the civil suit for
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eviction, her revision petition before the State Govt.
become infructuous. As against that order, this appeal has
been brought by special leave. Allowing the appeal, and
directing the State Govt. to restore and decide the revision
petition according to law.
HELD : The State Government and the High Court were not
justified in dismissing the revision petition as being
infructuous because of the institution of the suit. One of
the implications of the order of the High Court directing
the State Government to rehear the revision petition of the
appellant was that the respondent was precluded from filing
the intended suit for eviction till the State Government
heard the revision petition. Otherwise, the direction given
by the High Court would remain unobeyed. The respondent
cannot be permitted to obstruct the implementation of that
direction and that too, a direction given at her instance.
Consequently, it me not open to the respondent to file the
suit before
992
the revision petition was disposed of by the State
Government. The suit filed by the respondent was a
premature one. Such a suit did not bar the State Government
from disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the
order made by the High Court. [999 B]
Shri Bhagwan v. Ramachand, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 218, Bhagwan Das
v. Paras Nath, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 297 and Mohammad Ismail v.
Naney Lal, [1969] 3 S.C. R. 894, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1813 of
1971.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
February 5, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Special
Appeal No. 1116 of 1969.
M. V. Tarkunde and S. S. Shukla, for the appellant.
M. C. Chagla and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. Though this appeal relates to a comparatively
small matter, it has exposed several disturbing features.
Hence it is necessary to set out the facts of the case in
some detail.
The appellant is a‘ tenant of the respondent. She is
occupying one of the premises belonging to the respondent.
The respondent is seeking to evict her from the said
premises. For that purpose she applied to the District
Magistrate, Dehradun, who is also the Rent Controller, under
S. 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947 (to, the hereinafter referred to as the Act) for
permission to sue the appellant) for her eviction’ The
permission asked for was granted by the Rent Controller. As
against that order, the appellant went up in revision to the
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut who affirmed the order
of the District Magistrate. Thereafter the appellant went
up in revision to the State Government. During the pendency
of that proceeding the State Government passed an order of
stay which reads :
"Operation of the permission under S. 3 of the
Act granted by the Commissioner, Meerut
Division, Meerut to the opposite party,
landlady to file the suit for the petitioner’s
ejectment from the house in question is stayed
pending consideration of the case by the State
Government."
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Later the State Government allowed the reyision,petition and
set aside the permission granted. The respondent challenged
the legality of the order made by the State Government
before the
993
High Court of Allahabad in a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the
Government on the ground that the State Government in,
deciding the revision petition had allowed itself to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations. The concluding
portion of the order of the High Court reads :
"The petition is allowed. The order of the
State Government dated 14-6-1966 (Annexure E
to the,petition) is quashed. The State
Government is directed to rehear Smt.
Prabhawati Devi’s revision under section 7-F
of (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, according to law. The petitioner shall
get costs of this petition from respondent No.
1."
This order was Dassed on February 28, 1967. On the very
next day, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the
appellant. When the revision petition came up for hearing
before the State Government, the respondent submitted before
the State Government that it was not competent to hear the
revision petition in view of the institution of the suit and
for that purpose, it relied on a decision of the High Court
holding that a revision petition pending before the State
Government becomes infructuous once a suit for eviction is
filed in pursuance of the permission given by the
Commissioner. The State Government accepted that contention
and dismissed the revision petition on the sole ground that
the proceeding before it became infructuous in view of the
institution of the civil suit. The appellant challenged
that order by means of a writ petition before the Allahabad
High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the
stay granted by the State Government had lapsed when the
revision petition was disposed of and the same did not stand
revived when the High Court directed the State Government to
rehear the matter and dispose of the same according to law.
Consequently, on the institution of the civil suit for
eviction of the appellant, her revision petition before the
State Government became infructuous. As against that order,
this appeal has been brought by special leave.
Before proceeding to discuss the points
arising for decision, it will be convenient to
read the relevant provisions of the Act.
Though the Act purports to be a temporary measure, it has
continued to be in force from 1947. This is but a small
anomaly compared with the difficulties created by some of
its provisions. Now let us have a look at those provisions.
They read :
"Restriction on eviction.--
(1) Subject to any order passed under sub-
section (3) no suit shall. without the
Permission of the
994
District Magistrate be filed in any civil
court against a tenant for his eviction from
any accommodation, except on one or. more of
the following grounds
(a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for
more than three months and has failed to pay
the same to the landlord within one month of
the service upon him of notice of demand;
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(b) that the tenant has wilfully caused or
permitted to be caused substantial damage to
the accommodation;
(c) that the tenant has, without the
permission in writing of the landlord, made or
permitted to be made any such construction as,
in the opinion of the court, has materially
altered the accommodation or is likely
substantially to dimish its value;
(d) that the tenant has created a nuisance or
has done any act which is inconsistent with
the purpose for which he was admitted to the
tenancy of the accommodation, or which is
likely to affect adversely and substantially
the landlord’s interest therein;
(e) that the tenant has on or after the 1st
day of October, 1946, sub-let the whole or any
portion of the accommodation without the
permission of the landlord;
(f) that the tenant has renounced this
character as such or denied the title of the
landlord and the latter has not waived his
right or condoned the conduct of the tenant;
(g) that the tenant was allowed to occupy the
accommodation as a part of his contract of
employment under the landlord and, his employ-
ment has been determined.
Explanation.-For the purposes of subsection
(e) lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging
house shall not be deemed to be subletting.
2.Where any application has been made to the
District Magistrate for Permission to sue a
tenant for eviction from any accommodation and
the District Magistrate grants or refuses to
grant the permission, the party aggrieved by
his order may within 30 days from
995
the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to
the Commissioner to revise the order.
3. The Commissioner shall hear the application made under
sub-section (2) as far as may be, within six weeks from the
date of making it, and. he may, if he is not satisfied as to
the correctness, legality or propriety Of the order passed
by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of
proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order or
make such other order as may be just and proper.
4. The order of the Commissioner under sub-section
(3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State
Government under section 7-F be final."
The only other relevant section for our present purpose is
s. 7-F which says :
"Power of State Government.-The State
Government may call for the record of any case
granting or _refusing to grant permission for
the filing of a suit for eviction referred to
in section 3 or requiring any accommodation to
be let or not to be let to any person under
section 7 or directing a person to vacate any
accommodation under section 7-A and may make
such order as appears to it necessary for the
ends of justice."
Providing against unlawful eviction is undoubtedly a
laudable object. It is necessary in social interest that
improper eviction of tenants should be prohibited, Various
States have enacted laws prohibiting the landlords from
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evicting their tenants except on grounds mentioned in those
laws. The implementation of those measures is left in the
hands of either regular courts or regularly constituted
tribunals who are the principal repositories of the judicial
power of the State and not with executive authorities
burdened with other duties. But strangely enough under the
Act two rounds of litigations are provided for. A landlord
seeking to evict a tenant must first go to the District
Magistrate for permission. As against the order of the
District Magistrate the aggrieved party can go. up in re-
vision, to the Commissioner. The order of the Commissioner,
subject to any order passed by the State Government under
section 7-F of the Act, is final. Section 7-F empowers the
State Government to revise the order of the order of the
Commissioner at any time it pleases. There is no time limit
for exercising that power. This entire long drawn out
process Ls. only for the purpose of deciding whether the
permission should be granted to the landlord to sue his
tenant for ejectment
996
If the permission sought is granted then starts another
round Of litigation from one court to another. The
principal function of courts and tribunals is to settle the
dispute between the parties and thereby give a quietus to
the social frictions generated by the unresolved disputes.
As long as a litigation lasts, the tension continues and
useful energies will. be wasted. This is not all. Every
litigation means heavy financial burden to the parties. The
merry go-round of litigation provided by the Act instead of
helping the tenants who ordinarily belong to the weaker
sections of the society is likely to result in their
ruination. These problems are for the legislatures to
consider.
The power conferred on the District Magistrate, the Commis-
sioner and the State Government has been held to be a
judicial power by this Court-see Shri Bhagwan and anr. v.
Ramachand and anr.(1). Therefore let us see how that power
is required to be exercised. Neither s. 3 nor s. 7-F
prescribes under what circumstances the permission asked for
should be granted and on what grounds the same can be
refused. Prima facie the power conferred on the authorities
under ss. 3 and 7-F has no limits. It is neither controlled
nor guided. The validity of that power cannot be and was
not challenged in these proceedings. Hence we shall not go
into it. If one desires to know how and to what extent the
power conferred on the authorities under those provisions
can be misused, one has only to look to the facts of this
case.
The appellant filed the revision petition before the State
Government on April 2, 1965. On the same day she sent a
copy of that petition alongwith an application to the
Minister for Irrigation who had nothing to do with the
revision petition in question as revision petitions under s.
7-F were being dealt with by the Ministry of Civil Supplies.
It is reasonable to infer that she must have done so because
either she or some of her friends or relations had some
influence with that Minister. Otherwise there was no pur-
pose in sending a copy of the revision petition to the
Irrigation Minister. The Irrigation Minister sent the copy
received by him to the Secretary, Civil Supplies after
making the following note
"P1. look into it. So much is in my,
knowledge that occupants are very very old
tenant of this shop. I hope... proper view
will be taken of the dispute."
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Thereafter some official in the Secretariat prepared a
detailed note giving the history of the case. That office
note concluded thus :
"In this connection observations Minister for
Irrigation and Power on serial No. 12 an
orders of J.S.
(1) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 218.
997
at the bottom thereon may also please be seen, submitted.
K.B. may please see for orders."
In due course the Government allowed the revision petition.
That order has its own special features. It reads :
"GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH
RENT CONTROL DEPARTMENT
No. 1696/E-1(10)/1965.
Dated Lucknow, June 14, 1966.
ORDER
Subject Smt. Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur.
regarding a portion of premises No. 11 Rampur
Mandi Road, Dehra Dun.
With reference to her petition dated April 2, 1965.
Smt. Prabhawati is informed that after a careful
examination of the records of the case and consideration of
the version of the opposite party and also in view of other
facts revant to the case, it appears expedient in the ends
of justice that the petitioner should not be dispossessed
from the disputed premises.
Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section
7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction
Act, 1947, the Governor is pleased to revoke the permission
under section 3 of the said Act granted by the Rent Control
and Eviction Officer Dehra Dun and confirmed by the
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, vide his orders dated
March 30, 1965, passed in revision No. 13, to file a civil
suit of ejectment against the petitioner from the premises
in dispute.
Sd/- B. N. Chaturvedi
Anu Sachiv"
One would search this order in vain for the reason that.
persuaded. the State Government to allow the revision
petition., ,Not a single reason is given for setting aside
the order of the Commissioner. But if one delves into the
records of the Government as the High Court of Allahabad
did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the
Irrigation Minister must have weighed heavily on the
concerned authority. Our experience in dealing with
litigations of this type does not embolden us to say that
what happened, in this case is a rare exception to the rule.
998
It may also be noted that when the revision petition was
pending before the State Government,’some ’ busy body by
name Ramesh Puri wrote la letter to the Minister for Food
and Civil Supply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of
the appellant. In his letter he set forth his
qualifications as a a social worker and a fighter for
freedom since childhood" That letter appears to have found a
respectable place in the records of the case.One can only
regret for this sorry state of affairs.
The appellant has found a match in the respondent.It is
interesting to note how the ’respondent cleverly queered the
pitch against the appellant. We have earlier noticed that
it was at her instance the High Court had quashed the order
of the State Government and directed the State Government to
rehear and dispose of the revision petition according to,
law. Soon after getting that order, she tried to over-reach
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that order by filing a suit for eviction the very next day
after the High Court passed its order. The High Court of
Allahabad as well as this, Court have held that a suit valid
instituted after obtaining the required permission under g.
3(1) does ’not sease to be maintainable because of any order
made by the State Government under s. 7-F during the pen-
dency of the suit-see Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath (1) and
mohammad Ismail v. Nanney Lal (2). In a rather desperate
bid to take some advantage from those decisions, the
respondent appears to have rushed to the Civil court even
before the ink on the High Court’s order had dried up.
Having instituted the, suit she presented to Government what
according to her was a fait accompli. The State Government
as Mentioned earlier felt that the revision petition before
it became infrurtuous because of the institution of the
suit. Unfortunately the High Court concurred with that
view.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for, the appellant contended
before us that no sooner the High Court set aside the order
of the Government and directed the State Government to
rehear and dispose of the matter according to law, the
interim order of stay passed by the State Government stood
revived. In support of that contention of his,, he has
placed reliance on the decision of the Patna High Court in
Bankim Chandra and ors. v. Chandi Prasad (3); the decisions
of the madras high Court in Tavvale Veeraswami v. Pulim
Ramanna and ors., (4) and Saranatha Aiyangar v. Muthiah
Moopparwr and ors.(5) and the decision of-the Calcutta High
’Court in Sushila Bali ’Dasi v. Guest Keen Williams Ltd.(6)
We do not think it is necessary to consider that contention
in this appeal. The principle of law contended for by Mr.
Tarkunde,
(1) [1969] 2. S.C.R. 297;
(2) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 894;
(3) AIR 1956 Pat./271.
(4) I.L.R. 58, Mad. 721;
(5) 65,,M.L.J. 844;
(6) I.L.R. (1949) Vol. I Cal. 177.
999
has several facets; but there is no need to go into those
facets in this appeal. In our opinion this appeal has to
succeed on a much broader ground. No party to a litigation
can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by
having recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order
made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the
question whether the respondent should be permitted to We a
suit for ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone into
and decided afresh by the State Government. One of the
implications flowing from that order is that the respondent
is precluded from filing the intended suit for eviction till
the State Government decides the revision petition.
Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain
unobeyed. The respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct
the, implementation of that direction and that to a
direction given at her instance. Consequently it was not
open to the respondent to file the suit before the revision
petition was disposed of by the State Government. In our
opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature
one. Such a suit does not bar the State Government from
disposing of the revision petition in pursuance of the order
made by the High Court. The State Government was not
justified in dismissing the revision petition as being
infructuous.
In the result this appeal is allowed, the order of the High
Court dismissing the writ petition as well as the order of
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the State Government dismissing the revision petition are
set aside. Further the State Government is directed to
restore the said revision and- E dispose of the same
according to law. This, has been a long drawn out
litigation. Hence it is necessary for us to direct the
State Government to dispose of the revision petition within
four months from the date of the receipt of this order.
Meanwhile it is open to the respondent to move the court in
which she has filed the civil suit to stay further
proceedings. In the circumstances of the case, we direct
the parties to bear their own costs both in the High Court
as well as in this Court.
S.C. Appeal allowed.