Bhola Nath vs. The State Of Jharkhand

2026 INSC 99

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 30762 OF 2024)


BHOLA NATH …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 28352 OF 2024)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 3430 OF 2025)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants in the above-captioned appeals are
the employees of the respondent-State. The relevant
particulars pertaining to the appellants, necessary for
adjudication of the issues arising for consideration
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2026.01.30
17:01:52 IST
Reason:
herein, may be summarized as follows:
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3. The present appeals are directed against the
th th
judgments dated 17 September, 2024, 15 October,
nd
2024 and 2 December, 2024, passed by the High
1
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Letter Patent Appeal
Nos. 390 of 2024, 356 of 2024 and 368 of 2024,
respectively, whereby the Division Bench dismissed the
intra-Court appeals preferred by the appellant-
employees and, in consequence, affirmed the common
th
judgment dated 14 May, 2024, passed by the learned
Single Judge dismissing the three writ petitions ( supra
table) filed by the appellants.
4. Brief facts, in a nutshell, essential for the disposal
of the present appeals, are as follows: -
th
4.1. Vide Office Order No. 1395 dated 6 September,
2012, the Director of Soil Conservation stated, inter alia ,
that a total of 22 regular posts of Junior Engineers
(Agriculture) stood sanctioned for the Land

1
Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.
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Conservation Directorate of the respondent-State and
its subordinate offices. Pursuant thereto, in September
2012, respondent No. 5 issued an advertisement
inviting applications for appointment against the
aforesaid 22 sanctioned posts. The terms and
conditions of the advertisement stipulated that the
appointments would be temporary and on a contractual
basis and that the respondent-State would not be liable
to regularize the appointees. It was further provided that
the initial term of engagement would be for a period of
one year, extendable thereafter subject to satisfactory
performance.
4.2. Upon conclusion of the aforesaid recruitment
process, the appellants were declared successful vide
th
Office Order dated 27 December, 2012, and were
thereafter allotted their respective postings vide Office
th
Order dated 29 December, 2012.
4.3. The appellants were granted extensions on
completion of their annual contractual terms. During
this period, respondent No. 5, vide letter dated 25th
August, 2015, forwarded their representation to the
respondent-State apropos regularization of services of
the appellants and proposed that steps be taken to
frame rules and consider regularization of their services.
4.4. The respondent-State continued to grant yearly
extensions to the appellants from time to time. However,
by the last extension orders issued for the period from
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December 2022 to February 2023, the appellants
apprehended that their engagement was likely to be
discontinued and that the said extension would be the
final one. In this backdrop, the appellants submitted
representations to the respondents, requesting
regularization of their long years of dedicated service
and invoking the obligation of the State to act as a model
employer.
4.5. Aggrieved by the persistent inaction on the part of
the respondents, the appellants approached the High
Court by filing writ petitions seeking, inter alia , a writ of
mandamus directing the respondent-State to regularize
and absorb them against the vacant sanctioned posts of
Junior Engineers (Agriculture), and also seeking a
th
declaration that Office Order dated 28 February, 2023,
whereby stipulations were introduced declining further
extension of their engagement, was illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.
4.6. The learned Single Judge, vide common judgment
th
dated 14 March, 2024, dismissed the writ petitions,
holding that the appellants possessed no legal right to
seek renewal or extension of their contractual
engagement and that no corresponding obligation was
cast upon the respondent-State to renew or extend such
contractual appointments.
4.7. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single
Judge, the appellant-Bhola Nath preferred an intra-
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Court appeal. The Division Bench, by judgment dated
th
17 September, 2024, dismissed the appeal, holding
that the appellant’s engagement being purely
contractual in nature, no interference with the decision
of the learned Single Judge was warranted, and
accordingly affirmed the same.
4.8. Thereafter, the remaining appellants also preferred
intra-Court appeals before the High Court, which came
th
to be dismissed by separate judgments dated 15
nd
October, 2024 and 2 December, 2024, respectively,
following and relying upon the decision rendered by the
Division Bench in the intra-Court appeal preferred by
appellant-Bhola Nath.
5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants have preferred
the present appeals before this Court assailing their
respective impugned judgment and orders passed by
the High Court.


SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
6. Shri K. Parameshwar, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants strenuously assailed the
concurrent judgments of the High Court, contending,
inter alia , as follows: -
6.1. that the appellants were appointed against vacant
and sanctioned posts pursuant to a duly issued
advertisement and after undergoing the prescribed
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selection process, including roster clearance. Upon
joining service, the appellants were subjected to
transfers, postings and other service incidents
ordinarily applicable to regular employees. The
appellants have rendered continuous service without
any break and there is no adverse material on record
against them. Their performance has consistently been
found satisfactory, as is evident from repeated
recommendations for extension and the uninterrupted
renewals granted to them over the years.
6.2. that the appellants have rendered service for a
period exceeding a decade and are entitled to
consideration for regularization in the light of the
decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Uma
2
Devi . Denial of such consideration, while continuing to
take advantage of their unequal bargaining position, is
contended to be contrary to the principles of equity and
fairness and violative of the constitutional mandate to
ensure dignity in public employment.
6.3. that the stipulation contained in the appellants’
appointment letters barring any claim for regularization
or permanent absorption is contrary to public policy and
hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It is
contended that at the time of initial appointment, the
appellants were unemployed job seekers and, therefore,

2
(2006) 4 SCC 1.
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did not possess any real or equal bargaining power vis-
à-vis the respondent-State.
6.4. that the appellants were appointed against
sanctioned and vacant posts and, having worked on
such posts for a period of nearly 10 years, are fit to be
considered for regularization in accordance with the
existing policy of the respondent-State.
6.5. that the refusal of the respondent-State to
regularize the appellants is violative of their
fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the
3
Constitution of India . It is contended that although the
appellants have been treated at par with regular
employees in matters relating to service conditions,
including postings, transfers and increments, they have
been denied the benefit of regularization. It is further
urged that similarly situated persons have been
extended favourable treatment, while the appellants
have been singled out without any rational or justifiable
basis.
6.6. that the appellants have crossed the age of
eligibility for alternative public employment and that
discontinuation of their services after years of dedicated
public service would leave them and their dependents in
a precarious financial condition, contrary to the

3
Hereinafter, referred to as “Constitution”.
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obligation of the State, as a model employer, to ensure
fairness, dignity and welfare of its employees.
6.7. that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service
has given rise to a legitimate expectation of
consideration for regularization. It is contended that
having diligently served for over a decade pursuant to a
due process of selection, the appellants justifiably
believed that their services would be regularized and
that discontinuation at this stage would result in grave
hardship.
On the aforesaid grounds, the learned senior
counsel urged this Court to set aside the impugned
judgments passed by the High Court, allow the present
appeals, and issue appropriate directions to the
respondent-State for regularization of the services of the
appellants.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
7. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
respondents opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellants and made the following
submissions: -
7.1. that the appellants were engaged purely on a
contractual basis for a period of one year by Office Order
th
issued vide Memo No. 1893 dated 27 December, 2012,
wherein Clause 1 of the terms and conditions expressly
stipulated that the engagement was temporary and
contractual in nature and that the respondent-State
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was under no obligation to regularize or absorb the
appointees. It was further pointed out that Clause 10 of
the said terms barred any claim for regular appointment
on the basis of such contractual engagement.
7.2. that the appellants entered into an agreement with
the respondent-State with full knowledge of the terms
and conditions governing their engagement, including
an express stipulation that no claim for regularization
or absorption would be made in future. Having
voluntarily accepted such conditions, the appellants are
precluded from resiling therefrom or seeking to deviate
from the contractual terms.
7.3. that the appellants were appointed on a purely
contractual basis and continued in service only by
virtue of periodic renewals for specified terms, and
therefore did not acquire any enforceable right to seek
continuation of service or regularization in the absence
of any applicable scheme governing regularization of
contractual employees.
7.4. that the appellants, having expressly accepted the
terms and conditions of their contractual engagement
and rendered services accordingly, cannot now seek
directions under Article 226 of the Constitution, as any
such relief would amount to re-writing the contract
between the parties, which is impermissible in law.
On these grounds, the learned counsel for the
respondents prayed that the present appeals be
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dismissed and the impugned judgments passed by the
High Court be upheld.

ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT:
8. Having heard learned senior counsel for the
appellants and learned counsel for the respondents, the
following issues arise for our consideration: -
I. Whether the judgments passed by the High Court
warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India?
II. Whether the action/inaction of the respondent-
State in not recognizing the appellants’ continuous
service for the purpose of regularization is
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India?
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION:
ISSUE I. Whether the judgments passed by the High
Court warrant interference by this Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India?
9. Both the learned Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench, in the intra-Court appeals, have
rejected the claim of the appellants seeking
regularization. We are conscious that the appellants are
assailing concurrent findings of the High Court;
nevertheless, the scope and ambit of this Court’s
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jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution stands
well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.
9.1. Article 136 of the Constitution confers upon this
Court a plenary and discretionary power to entertain
appeals against any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order passed or made by any court or
tribunal within the territory of India. The only limitation
on this power is contained in Article 136(2), which
excludes decisions of tribunals constituted by or under
any law relating to the Armed Forces. The non obstante
clause, namely the expression “notwithstanding
anything in this Chapter”, accords overriding effect to
the power vested in this Court under Article 136 over
the other provisions contained in the preceding and
succeeding Articles of this Chapter.
9.2. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that this Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution, is competent to interfere with concurrent
findings of the High Court where such findings are
shown to be perverse, rendered in violation of the
principles of natural justice or in disregard of statutory
provisions, or where the operation of the impugned
judgment would result in substantial and grave
injustice. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Chandra
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4
Singh v. State of Rajasthan , wherein it was held as
follows: -
“43. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary
remedy. (See Champalal Binani v. CIT [(1971) 3 SCC
20].) The High Court and consequently this Court
while exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of
India may not strike down an illegal order
although it would be lawful to do so. In a given
case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to
extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the
applicant. Furthermore, this Court exercised its
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India which need not be
exercised in a case where the impugned judgment
is found to be erroneous if by reason thereof
substantial justice is being done . [See S.D.S.
Shipping (P) Ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co. (P)
Ltd. [(2003) 4 Supreme 44]] Such a relief can be
denied, inter alia , when it would be opposed to
public policy or in a case where quashing of an
illegal order would revive another illegal one . This
Court also in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India is entitled to pass
such order which will do [ Corrected as per Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/ Ed. B.J./11/2004 dated 27-1-
2004] complete justice to the parties.
…
45. This Court said that this principle applies to all
kinds of appeals admitted by special leave under
Article 136, irrespective of the nature of the subject-
matter. So even after the appeal is admitted and
special leave is granted, the appellants must show
that exceptional and special circumstances exist,
and that, if there is no interference, substantial
and grave injustice will result and that the case
has features of sufficient gravity to warrant a
review of the decision appealed against on merits .
So this Court may declare the law or point out the
lower court's error, still it may not interfere if special
circumstances are not shown to exist and the justice
of the case on facts does not require interference or

4
(2003) 6 SCC 545
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if it feels the relief could be moulded in a different
fashion. ”
(emphasis laid)

It therefore follows that an appellant must
demonstrate the existence of exceptional and special
circumstances warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution; failing which, interference would be
declined unless non-interference is likely to result in
substantial or grave injustice.
9.3. In the present case, the respondent-State has
engaged the services of the appellants for a period
exceeding 10 years. Upon completion of this long
tenure, the respondents, as apprehended by the
appellants, declined to grant any further extension on
the ground that the engagement was contractual in
nature. Such a decision necessarily warrants
examination on the touchstone of the equality principles
enshrined in the Constitution, which obligate the State
to act as a model employer and to take decisions free
from arbitrariness. In our consideration of the second
issue, we shall examine whether non-interference with
the impugned judgments would result in substantial
and grave injustice to the appellants.

ISSUE II. Whether the action/inaction of the
respondent-State in not recognizing the appellants’
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continuous service for the purpose of regularization is
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India?
10. The learned Single Judge, vide common order,
dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent-
State to regularize their services. In doing so, the writ
Court placed reliance on the terms and conditions of the
employment agreement entered into between the
appellants and the respondents. The learned Single
Judge, in this regard, recorded the following findings: -
i. The appellants were appointed on a purely
contractual basis pursuant to a decision of the
Finance Department to fill 22 sanctioned posts
through contractual engagement, the
expenditure being met from non-plan funds.
Following issuance of an advertisement and
completion of the selection process, the
appellants were appointed by entering into
contracts of employment for an initial period of
one year, extendable from time to time for fixed
durations.
ii. The appellants were granted extensions
periodically, with the last extensions having
been issued in the year 2023 as a one-time
measure. The respondent-State treated the said
decision as a conscious policy determination,
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which, according to the learned Single Judge,
did not warrant interference by the Court.
iii. The appellants were held not entitled to
regularization under the regularization scheme
framed by the respondent-State in the year
2015, as modified in 2019, which prescribed
completion of ten years of continuous service as
on the cut-off year 2019. It was further noted
that the appellants had not laid any challenge
to the validity of the said regularization scheme.
iv. Since the appellants were appointed on a
contractual basis and continued only through
periodic extensions, it was held that they did not
possess any statutory or legal right to continue
in service once the contractual period, including
its extensions, came to an end.
v. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the
appellants were fully aware, and were put to
notice on each occasion of renewal, that their
engagement was contractual and limited to a
specified tenure. In view thereof, the learned
Single Judge held that no question of legitimate
expectation or enforceable right to renewal or
regularization could arise, nor could any right
be said to have crystallised in their favour.
vi. It was further noted that the appellants had not
been replaced by another set of contractual
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employees. On the contrary, the material on
record indicated that the respondent-State had
undertaken regular recruitment and appointed
nine persons as regular employees through a
fresh advertisement.
10.1. Aggrieved by the decision of the writ Court, the
appellants preferred intra-Court appeals before the High
Court. The learned Division Bench upheld the judgment
of the writ Court and recorded the following findings: -
i. The law relating to regularization or absorption
of contractual employees was held to be well
settled, namely that such employees are
governed by the terms and conditions of their
engagement, the relationship being founded
upon a bilateral contract between the employee
and the employer.
ii. It was further held that the terms and
conditions of a contract cannot be altered, nor
can new conditions be introduced, by issuance
of judicial directions, as doing so would amount
to impermissible re-writing of the contract.
Once the parties have consciously entered into
contractual terms, they cannot subsequently
resile therefrom or question those conditions.
State as model employer: -
11. At the outset, we find it necessary to express our
disapproval of the manner in which the High Court has
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approached the present lis . The controversy before the
Court was not one of mere acquiescence or implied
waiver of rights. The High Court, in our view, has
proceeded on a mechanical application of precedents
without engaging with the core constitutional issues
involved, thereby reducing the dispute to one of
acceptance of contractual terms, divorced from its larger
constitutional context.
11.1. This Court has consistently held that the State,
being a model employer, is saddled with a heightened
obligation in the discharge of its functions. A model
employer is expected to act with high probity, fairness
and candour, and bears a social responsibility to treat
its employees in a manner that preserves their dignity.
The State cannot be permitted to exploit its employees
or to take advantage of their vulnerability, helplessness
or unequal bargaining position.
11.2. It therefore follows that the State is required to
exercise heightened caution in its role as an employer,
the constitutional mandate casting upon it a strict
obligation to act as a model employer, an obligation from
which no exception can be countenanced.
Fundamental Rights and their waiver:
11.3. In the present case, the appellants were appointed
by the respondent-State against sanctioned posts of
Junior Engineers (Agriculture), with the engagement
being described from the inception as contractual in
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nature. The terms and conditions governing the
engagement stipulated that the appointment would be
for an initial period of one year, extendable thereafter
subject to satisfactory performance.
11.4. The respondent-State accordingly granted
extensions to the appellants from time to time until the
year 2023, when it was expressly clarified that the
extension being granted would be the last. It was
thereafter that the appellants approached the High
Court by filing writ petitions seeking a writ of
mandamus directing the State to regularize their
services.
11.5. The consistent case of the appellants has been that
the respondent-State’s refusal to grant regularization is
arbitrary and therefore warrants judicial interference.
Article 14 of the Constitution casts a negative obligation
upon the State to treat all persons equally, and
arbitrariness, being antithetical to the equality
principle, is proscribed as violative of Article 14.
11.6. The Constitution Bench in Basheshar Nath v.
5
Comm. Income Tax , long ago clarified that
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution
are incapable of waiver. Consequently, if the action of
the respondent-State is found to be violative of Article
14 of the Constitution, the mere fact that the appellants’

5
1958 SCC OnLine SC 7
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engagement was governed by contractual terms and
conditions cannot be construed as a waiver of their
fundamental rights.
Unconscionable Agreements- Contract between Lion
and Lamb:
12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v.
6
Brojo Nath Ganguly , this Court acknowledged the
increasing imbalance in the bargaining power of
contracting parties. The Court held thus: -
“89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country. Our
judges are bound by their oath to “uphold the
Constitution and the laws”. The Constitution was
enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country
social and economic justice. Article 14 of the
Constitution guarantees to all persons equality
before the law and the equal protection of the
laws. The principle deducible from the above
discussions on this part of the case is in
consonance with right and reason, intended to
secure social and economic justice and conforms
to the mandate of the great equality clause in
Article 14. This principle is that the courts will
not enforce and will, when called upon to do so,
strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract,
or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a
contract, entered into between parties who are
not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to
give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type.
No court can visualize the different situations
which can arise in the affairs of men. One can
only attempt to give some illustrations. For
instance, the above principle will apply where the
inequality of bargaining power is the result of the
great disparity in the economic strength of the
contracting parties. It will apply where the
inequality is the result of circumstances, whether
of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply
to situations in which the weaker party is in a

6
(1986) 3 SCC 156
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position in which he can obtain goods or services
or means of livelihood only upon the terms
imposed by the stronger party or go without
them. It will also apply where a man has no
choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to
give his assent to a contract or to sign on the
dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to
accept a set of rules as part of the contract,
however unfair, unreasonable and
unconscionable a clause in that contract or form
or rules may be . This principle, however, will not
apply where the bargaining power of the contracting
parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may
not apply where both parties are businessmen and
the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's
complex world of giant corporations with their vast
infrastructural organizations and with the State
through its instrumentalities and agencies entering
into almost every branch of industry and commerce,
there can be myriad situations which result in unfair
and unreasonable bargains between parties
possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal
bargaining power. These cases can neither be
enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must
judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. ”
(emphasis laid)

Therefore, the Court has held that the Constitution
obliges courts to advance social and economic justice
and to give effect to the equality mandate under Article
14. Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor
hesitate to invalidate contracts, or contractual clauses,
that are unfair or unreasonable when entered into
between parties with unequal bargaining power.
12.1. Relying on the aforesaid reasoning, another two-
7
Judge Bench in Pani Ram v. Union of India ,

7
(2021) 19 SCC 234
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reiterated that the guarantee of equality under Article
14 extends even to situations where a person has no
meaningful choice but to accept imposed contractual
terms, however unfair or unreasonable they may be.
Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court
observed thus: -
“23. As held by this Court, a right to equality
guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution
of India would also apply to a man who has no
choice or rather no meaningful choice, but to give
his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted
line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept
a set of rules as part of the contract, however
unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause
in that contract or form or rules may be . We find
that the said observations rightly apply to the facts
of the present case. Can it be said that the mighty
Union of India and an ordinary soldier, who having
fought for the country and retired from Regular
Army, seeking re-employment in the Territorial
Army, have an equal bargaining power. We are
therefore of the considered view that the reliance
placed on the said document would also be of no
assistance to the case of the respondents. ”
(emphasis laid)

Therefore, it is clear that Courts are empowered to
invalidate unconscionable elements of a contract where
the parties lack the ability to exercise any real or
meaningful choice in negotiating its terms. In the
present case, the appellants were left with no alternative
but to accept the conditions unilaterally prescribed by
the respondent-State in order to secure their livelihood
and sustain a source of income. It would be entirely
unrealistic to assume that, in such circumstances, an
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employee seeking temporary employment could
meaningfully negotiate or assert a position against the
overwhelming might of the State machinery.
12.2. At this juncture, the analogy of apples and oranges
serves as a useful reminder that certain relationships
are inherently incapable of being assessed on an equal
plane. A contract between the State and an employee
stands on a similar footing. The State, in such a
relationship, assumes the role of a metaphorical lion,
endowed with overwhelming authority, resources and
bargaining strength, whereas the employee, who is yet
an aspirant, is reduced to the position of a metaphorical
lamb, possessing little real negotiating power. To
suggest parity between the two, i.e. the lion and the
lamb, would be to ignore the stark imbalance that
defines the relationship.
12.3. Therefore, where a lion contracts with a lamb, the
inequality is not incidental but structural, and it is
precisely this disproportion that calls for judicial
sensitivity. In such situations, the conscience of
Constitutional Courts must inevitably tilt in favour of
protecting the lamb. We have no hesitation in holding
that Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to act to
safeguard those who are vulnerable to exploitation, so
that employees are not compelled to meekly submit to
the demands of a vastly dominant contracting party like
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the State, but are instead assured that constitutional
protections will intervene to prevent such exploitation.
Legitimate Expectation of the employees: -
13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case
of contractual employees, such as the present
appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
Where employees have continued to discharge their
duties on contractual posts for a considerable length of
time, as in the present case, it is but natural that a
legitimate expectation arises that the State would, at
some stage, recognize their long and continuous service.
It is in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions
granted by the Executive, that such employees continue
in service and refrain from seeking alternative
employment, notwithstanding the contractual nature of
their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to
advert to the principles governing the doctrine of
legitimate expectation as enunciated by this Court in
Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar
8
Sharma , wherein it was held as follows: -
“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth
the following features regarding the doctrine of
legitimate expectation:
63.1. First , legitimate expectation must be based
on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or
anticipation ;

8
(2024) 16 SCC 598
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63.2. Secondly , legitimate expectation must arise
either from an express or implied promise ; or a
consistent past practice or custom followed by an
authority in its dealings;
. . .
63.5. Fifthly , legitimate expectation operates in
the realm of public law, that is, a plea of
legitimate action can be taken only when a public
authority breaches a promise or deviates from a
consistent past practice, without any reasonable
basis .
. . .
64. The aforesaid features, although not
exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help us in
deciding the applicability of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation to the facts of the case at
hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation,
jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to
maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action.
It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation
of contracts between private parties, wherein the
doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field. ”
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the
expectation with which such contractual employees
continue in the service of the State. The repeated
conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence
in their performance and consistently granting
monetary upgrades & tenure extensions reasonably
nurtures an expectation that their long and continuous
service would receive further recognition.
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13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of
9
Karnataka v. Umadevi , cautioned that the doctrine of
legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily be extended to
persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or
contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the
judgment reads as follows: -
“47. When a person enters a temporary
employment or gets engagement as a contractual
or casual worker and the engagement is not based
on a proper selection as recognised by the
relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the
consequences of the appointment being
temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such
a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate
expectation for being confirmed in the post when
an appointment to the post could be made only
by following a proper procedure for selection and
in cases concerned, in consultation with the
Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory
of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully
advanced by temporary, contractual or casual
employees . It cannot also be held that the State has
held out any promise while engaging these persons
either to continue them where they are or to make
them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally
make such a promise. It is also obvious that the
theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of
being made permanent in the post. ”
(emphasis laid)
However, this Court in Umadevi ( supra ) clarified
that the bar against invocation of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation applies only to those temporary,
contractual or casual employees whose engagement was
not preceded by a proper selection process in

9
(2006) 4 SCC 1
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accordance with the extant rules. Consequently, where
such engagement is made after following a due and
lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute bar in
law preventing such employees from invoking the
doctrine of legitimate expectation.
Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements:
13.2. In the present case, the respondent-State had
engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned
posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end
of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated
that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement
was likely to be granted.
13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is
not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear
derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially
engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge
public duties and functions. Having rendered long and
dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to
fend for themselves, particularly when the employment
opportunities that may have been available to them a
decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age
constraints.
13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the
respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the
appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service.
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We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship
between the appellants and the respondent-State was
mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of
the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity,
while the appellants remained in public service. In such
circumstances, any departure from a long-standing
practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the
legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be
supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking
order.
13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious
and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily
discharged his duties over several years and has been
granted repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be
treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to
accept the justification advanced by the respondents as
the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends
to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether
their engagement is contractual or regular.
13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated
the practice adopted by States of engaging employees
under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or
“temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them
by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union
10
of India , this Court underscored that government

10
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
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departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and
stable employment, and evolved the test of examining
whether the duties performed by such temporary
employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of
the organization.
11
13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam , and Vinod Kumar
12
v. Union of India , this Court cautioned against a
mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi ( supra ) to
deny regularization to temporary employees in the
absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi
( supra ) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise
exploitative engagements continued for years without
undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further
clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between
appointments that are “illegal” and those that are
merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to
regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed
conditions.
13
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. , this Court
strongly deprecated the culture of “ ad-hocism ” adopted
by States in their capacity as employers. The Court
criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing
recruitment as a means to evade regular employment
obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate

11
2025 SCC OnLine SC 221
12
(2024) 9 SCC 327
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735
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precarious working conditions while circumventing fair
and lawful engagement practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time
employees, such as the appellants, constitute an
integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery of
the State continues to function. They are not merely
ancillary to the system, but form essential components
thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution,
therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in
a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that
decisions of the State affecting the careers and
livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees
are guided by fairness and reason.
13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to
persuade ourselves to accept the respondent-State’s
contention that the mere contractual nomenclature of
the appellants’ engagement denudes them of
constitutional protection. The State, having availed of
the appellants’ services on sanctioned posts for over a
decade pursuant to a due process of selection and
having consistently acknowledged their satisfactory
performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons
or a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such
engagement by taking refuge behind formal contractual
clauses. Such action is manifestly arbitrary,
inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a
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model employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under
Article 14 of the Constitution.

FINAL CONCLUSION:
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing
paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in
continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant
posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of
contractual engagement and thereafter denying
them consideration for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing
engagement solely on the basis of contractual
nomenclature, without either recording cogent
reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims
for regularization cannot override constitutional
guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does
not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and
contractual stipulations cannot immunize
arbitrary State action from constitutional
scrutiny.

IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on
contractual labels or mechanical application of
Umadevi ( supra ) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or
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to discard long-serving employees in a manner
inconsistent with fairness, dignity and
constitutional governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the
respondent-State to forthwith regularize the
services of all the appellants against the
sanctioned posts to which they were initially
appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all
consequential service benefits accruing from the
date of this judgment.
15. Accordingly, the present appeals are disposed of
and all writ petitions are allowed and the judgments
th th nd
dated 17 September, 2024, 15 October, 2024 and 2
December, 2024, in LPA Nos. 390 of 2024, 356 of 2024
and 368 of 2024, respectively, passed by the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi are set aside.
16. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.

………………………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]


………………………………………..J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI
JANUARY 30, 2026
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