Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4166 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12644 of 2009)
Guru Granth Saheb Sthan Meerghat Vanaras …… Appellant
Vs.
Ved Prakash & Ors. ……Respondents
JUDGMENT
R.M. LODHA, J.
JUDGMENT
Leave granted.
2. The short question for consideration in this appeal by special
leave is whether High Court was justified in staying the proceedings in civil
suit till the decision in criminal case.
3. It is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. Suffice it to
say that the appellant filed an FIR (P.S. Case No. 8 of 2003) at
Dharampura Police Station against respondent nos. 1 to 4 for commission
of the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 120B, IPC alleging that
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they had executed a false, forged and fabricated will on 02.07.1997 in the
name of late Devkinandan Sahay with the intention to grab his property. It
was further alleged that based on the fabricated will, these respondents
| order dat | ed 24.11. |
|---|
Ajaygarh. On completion of investigation in the above F.I.R., the challan
has been filed against the above respondents and trial against them is
going on in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ajaygarh, Panna
(M.P.).
4. On 09.02.2004, the appellant brought legal action in
representative capacity against the respondents nos. 1 to 4 by way of a
civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Panna (M.P.) praying for a decree
for declaration of title, perpetual injunction and possession in respect of
disputed lands and for annulling the sale deed dated 14.08.2003 and the
mutation order dated 24.11.1999. In the suit, reference of will forged by
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the respondent nos. 1 to 4 has been made. The said suit has been
transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge, Panna and bears Civil
Suit No. 10A of 2006. The respondent nos. 1 to 4, who are defendants in
the suit, have filed their written statement on 19.06.2006. The trial court
has framed issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties on
21.09.2007. On 21.04.2008, the defendants (respondent nos. 1 to 4
herein) filed an application under Section 10 read with Section 151, CPC
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for staying the proceedings in the civil suit during the pendency of above-
referred criminal case.
5. The Additional District Judge, Panna, by his order dated
| application | for stay |
|---|
suit.
6. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein challenged the order of the
Additional District Judge in the High Court in a writ petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court by the impugned order has set aside the order of the
Additional District Judge and, as noted above, has stayed the
proceedings in Civil Suit till the decision of criminal case. It is from this
order that the present civil appeal, by special leave, has arisen.
7. We have heard Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel for
the appellant, and Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1
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to 4.
8. A Constitution Bench of this Court in M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v.
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State of Madras & Ors. has considered the question of simultaneous
prosecution of the criminal proceedings with the civil suit. In paragraphs
14,15 and 16 (Pg. 399) of the Report, this Court stated as follows:
“14. . . . . . . . It was said that the simultaneous
prosecution of these matters will embarrass the accused.
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AIR 1954 SC 397
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. . . . but we can see that the simultaneous prosecution of
the present criminal proceedings out of which this appeal
| en the civil<br>pinion that t<br>ce. There is | and the cr<br>he criminal<br>some diffe |
|---|
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9. The ratio of the decision in M.S. Sheriff is that no hard and
fast rule can be laid down as to which of the proceedings – civil or criminal
– must be stayed. It was held that possibility of conflicting decisions in the
civil and criminal courts cannot be considered as a relevant consideration
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for stay of the proceedings as law envisaged such an eventuality.
Embarrassment was considered to be a relevant aspect and having regard
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to certain factors, this Court found expedient in M.S. Sheriff to stay the
| rt made it | very clear |
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hard and fast rule; special considerations obtaining in any particular case
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might make some other course more expedient and just. M.S. Sheriff
does not lay down an invariable rule that simultaneous prosecution of
criminal proceedings and civil suit will embarrass the accused or that
invariably the proceedings in the civil suit should be stayed until disposal of
criminal case.
10. In M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Another etc. v.
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Union of India and Others , this Court in paragraph 4 of the Report
(Pg. 695) made the following general observations, “it is a well established
principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
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criminal courts. The converse is not true.” This statement has been held to
be confined to the facts of that case in a later decision in K.G.
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Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and Another , to which we shall refer to
a little later.
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11. In V.M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another , while
dealing with the question whether the conviction under Section 630 of the
2
1970 (3) SCC 694
3
(2002) 8 SCC 87
4
(1995) 5 SCC 767
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Companies Act was sustainable, this Court, while noticing the decision in
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M.S. Sheriff in para 11 (pg. 770) of the Report, held as under:
| ding that th<br>ugh the C<br>rom the pri | e appellant<br>ompany bu<br>ncipal landl |
|---|
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been expressly held to be not a good law in K.G. Premshanker .
13. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries
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Ltd. and Others , this Court made the following statement in paragraph 3
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(pgs. 87-88):
“3. It is settled law that pendency of the criminal matters
would not be an impediment to proceed with the civil
suits. The criminal court would deal with the offence
punishable under the Act. On the other hand, the courts
rarely stay the criminal cases and only when the
compelling circumstances require the exercise of their
power. We have never come across stay of any civil suits
by the courts so far. The High Court of Rajasthan is only
an exception to pass such orders. The High Court
proceeded on a wrong premise that the accused would
be expected to disclose their defence in the criminal case
by asking them to proceed with the trial of the suit. It is
not a correct principle of law. Even otherwise, it no longer
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(1996) 3 SCC 87
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subsists, since many of them have filed their defences in
the civil suit. On principle of law, we hold that the
approach adopted by the High Court is not correct. But
since the defence has already been filed nothing survives
in this matter.”
| refer to a | three-Jud |
|---|
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Court in K.G. Premshanker . The three-Judge Bench took into
consideration Sections 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and
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also the decision of this Court in M.S. Sheriff and observed in paragraph
32 of the Report that the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in
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M.S. Sheriff case would be binding wherein it has been specifically held
that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of
conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant
consideration.
15. Section 40 of the Evidence Act makes it plain that the
existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any
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Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact
when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such
suit, or to hold such trial.
16. Section 41 provides for relevancy of judgments passed in the
exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction by the
Competent Court. It reads as follows :
“S. 41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc.,
jurisdiction.—A final judgment, order or decree of a
competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial
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| person to a<br>order or de | ny such thi<br>cree is con |
|---|
that any legal character, to which it declares any
such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the
time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to
have accrued to that person;
that any legal character which it takes away from
any such person ceased at the time from which such
judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or
should cease;
and that anything to which it declares any person
to be so entitled was the property of that person at the
time from which such judgment, order or decree declares
that it had been or should be his property.”
17. Section 42 deals with relevancy and effect of judgments,
orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 41. It reads as
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under:
“S.42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or
decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41.—
Judgments, orders or decrees other than those
mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to
matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but
such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive
proof of that which they state.”
18. Section 43 provides that the judgments, orders or decrees
other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant unless
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the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is
relevant under some other provisions of the Evidence Act.
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19. In K.G. Premshanker , the effect of the above provisions
| vidence Ac | t) has bee |
|---|
criminal case and civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of
the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43
are satisfied but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive
except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment
would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein. Moreover, the
judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil proceedings, if relevant,
as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence
Act then in each case the Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or
conclusive with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every
case the first question which would require consideration is, whether
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judgment, order or decree is relevant; if relevant, its effect. This would
depend upon the facts of each case.
20 In light of the above legal position, it may be immediately
observed that the High Court was not at all justified in staying the
proceedings in the civil suit till the decision of criminal case. Firstly,
because even if there is possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and
criminal courts, such an eventuality cannot be taken as a relevant
consideration. Secondly, in the facts of the present case there is no
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likelihood of any embarrassment to the defendants (respondent nos. 1 to 4
herein) as they had already filed the written statement in the civil suit and
based on the pleadings of the parties the issues have been framed. In this
| come and/ | or findings |
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the civil court will not at all prejudice the defence(s) of the respondent nos.
1 to 4 in the criminal proceedings.
21. For the above reasons, appeal is allowed. The impugned
order dated 24.11.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court is set aside. The proceedings in the civil suit shall now
proceed further in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own
costs.
……………………….J.
(R.M. Lodha)
JUDGMENT
..…..………………...J.
(Sharad Arvind Bobde)
NEW DELHI
MAY 1, 2013.
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