Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S.B. MATHUR AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI HIGH COURT,AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT31/08/1988
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
BENCH:
KANIA, M.H.
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 2073 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 772
1989 SCC Supl. (1) 34 JT 1988 (3) 507
1988 SCALE (2)615
ACT:
Delhi High Court Establishment (Appointment and
conditions of service) Rules, 1972-Delhi High Court Staff
{SEniority) Rules 1971-Superintendents of Delhi High Court
challenging the treatment of posts of Superintendents, Court
Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to Judges as
equal status posts, being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, and challenging joint seniority list of
Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries for
purposes of promotion to the post of Assistant Registrars
and claiming better rights of promotion.
HEADNOTE:
The Superintendents of the Delhi High Court by writ
petition claimed better rights of promotion, objected to
their being treated as on par with the Private Secretaries
to Judges and Court Masters, and being included in a joint
seniority list alongwith them, particularly as far as the
promotion to the next higher post of Assistant Registrar was
concerned.
The petitioners contended inter-alia that there was a
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution in treating the
posts of Superintendents, Court Masters or readers and
Private Secretaries to Judges as equal status posts; that
the sources of recruitment to these posts were not identical
and so also the qualifications required for appointments to
these posts; that the duties of the incumbents of these
posts were different; that in treating these posts as equal
status posts, unequals had been treated equally and the rule
of equality had been violated.
Dismissing the petition, the Court,
HELD: Where an employer has a large number of employees,
performing diverse duties, he must enjoy some discretion in
treating different categories of his employees as holding
equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of
promotion or transfer of employees inter se will necessarily
arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the
organisation. [781C-D)
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PG NO 773
There is nothing inherently wrong in an employer
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treating certain posts as equal posts or equal status posts,
provided that in doing so he exercises his discretion
reasonably and does not violate the principles of equality
enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [781D-
E]
For treating certain posts as equated posts or equal
status posts, it is not necessary that the holders of these
posts must perform the identical functions or that the
sources of recruitment to the posts must be the same, nor is
it essential that the qualifications for appointments to the
posts must be identical. But, there must not be such
difference in the pay-scales or qualifications of the
incumbents of the posts or in their duties or
responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that
it would be unjust to treat the posts alike and posts having
substantially higher pay-scales or status in service or
carrying substantially heavier responsibilities and duties
or otherwise distinctly superior, cannot be equated with the
posts carrying much lower pay-scales or substantially lower
responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in
service. [781E-G]
The petitioners could not challenge the aforesaid posts
being treated as equal status posts as that had been done in
accordance with the Seniority Rules of 1971 the vires of
which had not been challenged. [782B]
Neither the combined seniority list nor the treating of
the said posts as equal status posts could be said to be
arbitrary in the absence of any material, particularly in
view of the fact that the Chief justice and the Judges of
the High Court had taken the view that it was necessary in
order to provide adequate promotional opportunities to the
various sections of the employees. [784D]
The challenge to the said posts being treated as equal
status posts had come too late in 1970 to be entertained in
a writ petition, after the seniority Rules of 1971 became
effective. This challenge could be negatived on the ground
of delay or latches apart from other considerations. [784E-G]
There was nothing unreasonable in the restriction that
out of the total number of candidates who satisfied the
eligibility requirement, the zone of consideration would be
limited to a multiple of 3 to 5 times the number of
vacancies or in determining the persons to be considered on
the basis of their seniority in the combined seniority list.
It was open to the High Court to restrict the zone of
consideration in any reasonable manner, and limiting the
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zone of consideration to a multiple of the number of
vacancies and basing it on seniority according to the
combined seniority list cannot be regarded as arbitrary or
capricious or mala fide, nor can it be-said that such a
restriction violates the, principle of selection on because
even experience in service is a relevant consideration in
assessing merit. [791C-E]
It is not as if either Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules
of 1972 or Rule 5 of the seniority Rules of 1971 which
provides for a combined seniority list negatives the chance
of promotion to the posts of Assistant Registrars being
granted to the Superintendents. [794A-B]
So far as the zone of consideration is Limited by the
competent authority in a manner not inconsistent with the
Rules or in a manner not arbitrary or capricious or mala
fide, the validity of the decision to limit the zone of
consideration cannot be called in question on the ground
that the manner in which the zone was limited was not
uniform. [795D-E]
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V. T. Khanzode and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and
Anr., [1932] 3 S. C.R. 411 ; Guman Singh v. State of
Rajasthan und Ors., [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 900; Sant Ram
Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Anr., [19688] 1 S.C.R. III;
Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal and Ors., [1977] 1
S.C.R. 377; Ashok Kumur Yadav and Ors., etc. v. State of
Haryana and Ors., etc., [1985] Suppl. 1 .S.C.R. 657; V.J.
Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., l1985] Suppl.
S.C.C. 7; Madan Mohan Saran and Anr. v. Hon’ble the Chief
Justice and Ors., [1975] 2 S. C. R. 899 and Mahesh Prasad
Srivastava v. Abdul Khair, [1971] 1 S.C.R. 157, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 263 of
1979.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of lndia. )
D.D. Thakur, A. Minocha, Mrs. Veena Minocha, G. S.
Vashisht, T.R. Arti and B.S. Bali for the Petitioners.
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, C. M. Nayar
and C.V. Subba Rao for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, Ashok
Srivastava and Ms. A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 3.
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Ms. A. Subhashini Advocate for the Respondent No. 11.
A. k. Ganguli, A. Mariarputha and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for
the Respondents Nos. 6, 7, 4 and 10.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KANIA, J. This Writ Petition owes its origin to a
dispute between different groups of employees of the Delhi
High Court, claiming better rights of promotion for
themselves, a type of dispute too common in services these
days. The present Writ Petition has been filed by some
Superintendents in the Delhi High Court objecting to their
being treated on a par with the Private Secretaries to
learned judges and Court Masters and being included in a
joint seniority List along with them, particularly as far as
the promotion to the next higher post of Assistant Registrar
is concerned. In order to appreciate the controversy before
us, it is necessary to keep in mind the background in which
the dispute has originated.
Prior to the Constitution of the Delhi High Court in
1966, there was a Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court
sitting at Delhi. By Act 26 of 1966, Parliament established
an independent High Court for the Union Territory of Delhi.
By an order dated October 31, 1966, effective from October
31, 1966, the Government of lndia created a staff for the
said High Court. The letter of the Government of india,
which is Annexure-A to the Petition, shows that the
President of India sanctioned the creation of certain posts
for the Delhi High Court with effect from October 31, 1966
or from the date of setting up of the High Court, whichever
was later, upto February 28, 1967. Amongst these posts,
there was a post of an Assistant Registrar having a pay-
scale of Rs.500-30-800 plus (scales of pay and dearness
allowance as admissible in Punjab). Among the other posts
created were six posts of Private Secretaries to Hon’ble
Judges of the High Court in the pay-scale of Rs. 500-20-450-
25-475, six posts of Readers and seven posts of
Superintendents. The pay-scale of all these posts was the
same, namely, Rs.350-20-450-25-475. The Delhi High Court
started functioning with effect from October 31, 1966. The
staff of the Punjab and Haryana High Court working in Delhi
was, for the time being, treated as on deputation to the
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Delhi High Court till they were permanently absorbed in the
Delhi High Court. From the time of its formation till 1971,
the Delhi High Court had no rules of its own regarding
conditions of service or regarding the salary or seniority
in respect of its staff. Section 7 of the Delhi High Court
Act, 1966 (Act 26 of 1966), in brief, provided that,
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subject to the provisions of the said Act, the law in
force immediately before the Appointed Day (31.10.1966)
with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court of
Punjab shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in
relation to the Delhi High Court and conferred powers on the
High Court of Delhi to make rules and orders with respect to
its practice and procedure, such powers being the same as
exerciseable by the High Court of Punjab immediately before
the Appointed Day. There was a proviso which was to the
effect that any rules or orders which were in force
immediately before the Appointed Day with respect to
practice and procedure in the High Court of Punjab shall,
until varied or revoked by rules or orders made by the High
Court of Delhi, apply with the necessary modifications in
relation to practice and procedure in the High Court of
Delhi as if made by that High Court. The Delhi High Court
started in 1966 with four Hon’ble Judges including the Chief
Justice and among its staff inter alia were four
Superintendents, four Readers and three Private Secretaries
against the sanctioned strength. Under the powers conferred
by Article 229 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice of the
Delhi High Court framed the Delhi High Court Officers and
Servants (Salaries , leave, Allowances and Pension) Rules,
1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Salary Rules of 1970")
and the Delhi High Court Staff (Seniority) Rules, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as "the Seniority Rules of 1971").
Under the Salary Rules of 1970, the scale of Pay for
Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries was the
same, namely, Rs.350-20-475. With the increase of work and
the extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi
High Court, there was an increase in the number of Judges as
well as staff of the Court. According to the Petitioners, by
March 1979, there were 21 Private Secretaries, 21 Readers
and 13 Superintendents in the Delhi High Court. It appears
that because of the increase in the number of Judges, the
increase in the post of Private Secretaries and Readers was
at a somewhat higher rate than that in the posts of
Superintendents. We are informed that in March 1988, the
position was that there were 27 Private Secretaries, 30
Readers and 24 Superintendents in the same pay scale. We may
mention that Readers are now called Court Masters.
We may at this stage consider the Seniority Rules of
1971, Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that inter se
seniority of confirmed employees in any category of the High
Court staff shall be determined on the basis of the date of
confirmation. Rule 5 of the said rules runs as follows :
"Joint inter se seniority of confirmed employees in
categories of equal status posts shall be determined
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according to their dates of confirmation in any of those
categories."
Rule 9, with which we are not directly concerned, provides
that certain credit for purposes of seniority shall be
given to an employee who before his appointment as Assistant
in the High Court was working on any of the posts mentioned
in Clause IV of Schedule II. Rule 2 contains certain
definitions for purposes of the said Rules. Rule 2(ii) runs
as follows:
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"‘Equated post’ means any of the posts shown as equated
posts, from time to time, in Schedule I to these rules".
Clause (iii) of the said Rule runs as follows :
" ’Equal status posts’ means the posts shown to be of
equal status, from time to time, in Schedule II to these
rules".
Item (ii) of Schedule I under Rule 2 runs as follows:
"Equated Posts:
(i) x x x x x x
(ii) Judgment writers/Personal Assistant to Judges of
Punjab & Haryana High Court (from 7.11. 1964] and Private
Secretaries to Judges."
The relevant portion of Schedule II (See Rule 2) runs
thus:
"Equal Status Posts:
(i) x x x x
(ii) Superintendents, Court Masters, Private Secretaries
to Jugdes . . . . .".
(iii) x x x x
(iv) x x x x
(v) x x x x
In exercise of the powers vested in the Chief Justice of
the Delhi High Court, he framed certain rules which were
notified on 15th September, 1972, called Delhi High Court
Establishment (Appointment and conditions of Service) Rules,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Establishment Rules of
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1972"). Rule 7 of the said Rules runs as follows:
"7. Mode of Appointment.
Except for appointment on officiating, temporary or ad
hoc basis, the mode of and qualifications for appointment to
the posts specified in Schedule II to these rules shall be
as stated therein."
The material portion of Schedule II runs as follows:
Schedule-II (See Rule 7)
-----------------------------------------------------------
S.No. Category Minimum qualifi- Mode of
of post cations prescribed appointment
for appointment to
the posts
-----------------------------------------------------------
"1 x x x
1a x x x
2 x x x
3 Assistant Registrar - By selection on merit
(Selection post) from confirmed offi-
cers of categories 5
6 & 7 of Class IT
mentioned in
Schedule 1.
x x x x x x x"
-----------------------------------------------------------
We may mention that Schedule I framed under Rule-4
mentions the various categories of posts. Category of
comprises Assistant Registrars, Categories 5, 6 and 7 of
Class II are Superintendents, Court Masters and Private
Secretaries to Judges. respectively.
The above provisions make it clear that certain posts
were treated as equated posts under Schedule I and certain
posts were treated as equal status posts under Schedule I1
to the said Seniority Rules of 1971. It is clear that these
provisions were made with a view to provide transferability
among persons holding these posts and to provide for
channels of promotion to certain categories of employees who
did not enjoy a chance for promotion earlier with the result
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that there was stagnation and frustration in the categories
concerned. It may be noticed here that the posts of Judgment
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Writers, Personal Assistants to Judges and Private
Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equated posts and
the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters and Private
Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equal status
posts. Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of 1971 set out by us
earlier provides for a joint seniority list of confirmed
employees in categories of equal status posts presumably
with the same object as aforestated.
It may be noticed that prior to October 31, 1966 the
position relating to pay-scales was as follows:
1. Superintendent 50-20-500-30-650 Gazetted
Post
2. Reader 250-20-450 Non-Gazetted
Post
3. P.S. (Private Secretary) 150-10-300 Non-Gazetted
Post.
Later on, there was a revision of scales of pay of these
posts. It is not necessary to consider all these revisions,
but it may be noticed that at the relevant time and
thereafter under the Salary Rules of 1970 the Scales of Pay
of the said three posts are the same, namely, Rs.350-25-575.
The said Rules have been framed as early as 1970 and the
same have not been challenged before us. It was under the
Seniority Rules of 1971 that the said posts were treated as
equal status posts and Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the
Petitioners made it clear that he was not challenging this
portion of the Rules. ln fact, in his opening he made it
clear that he would not challenge any of the aforesaid Rules
set out earlier. However, we must mention that in the
rejoinder an attempt was made to challenge the joint
seniority list which would imply a challenge to Rule 5 of
the said Seniority Rules of 1971.
A joint seniority list of Superintendents. Readers and
Private Secretaries was framed on May 8, 1972 but it was
quashed on February 24th, 1975 when the seniority list of
Readers was challenged. The seniority list of Readers was
quashed on October 10, 1975. A direction was given in both
the cases when the said joint seniority list was quashed
that a fresh list should be prepared in accordance with the
observations made in the judgment whereby the said list was
quashed. Accordingly, fresh lists were made after hearing
objections thereto and were finalized in December, 1976.
Occasions then arose for temporary appointments to the posts
of Assistant Registrars. That the appointments to be made
were temporary is not or much consequence as later the
confirmations were made in that very order. Under Rule 7 of
the Establishment Rules of 1972 appointments to the post of
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Assistant Registrar are to be made by selection on merit
from the three categories, Superintendents, Readers and
Private Secretaries. It appears that it was felt that it
would not be feasible to consider all the incumbents of the
posts in the said three categories because a proper
selection among such a large group would be impracticable
and extremely difficult. This appears to be the basis
underlying the decision of the Administrative Judges at
Annexure XVI to the Petition. For delimiting the zone of
consideration or field of choice in making the appointments
which had to be made by selection on merits, after
considering various modes for delimiting the zones of
consideration, it was decided at the meeting of the
Administrative Committee of the Judges of the Delhi High
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Court held on February 3, 1977 that the zone of
consideration or field of choice should be limited to the
first five names in the finalized joint seniority list of
Superintendents, Readers and Private Secretaries, that is,
for each post of Assistant Registrar to be filled in by
selection on merits, five persons from the finalized joint
seniority list had to be considered in order of seniority,
and the selection between them made on merits. In other
words, if appointments were to be made to two posts of
Assistant Registrars, the first ten employees in the joint
seniority list would be included in the zone of
consideration. It was further decided that no written test
or interview was to be held for the purposes of selection.
We are not referring here to any individual promotion made
on this basis because the grievance made is against this
mode of selection itself and not against any particular
promotion. We may mention here that, as set out earlier,
when the Delhi High Court started functioning, the
authorised strength in the relevant categories was six
Private Secretaries to the Judges, six Readers (same as
Court Masters) and seven Superintendents. With the passage
of time the number of posts in three categories has risen
fairly sharply. As aforestated by March 1979, according to
the Petitioners, there were 21 Private Secretaries, 21
Readers and 13 Superintendents and by March 1988 there were
37 Private Secretaries to Judges, 30 Readers or Court
Masters and 33 Superintendents. Although there is a little
controversy regarding these figures, it is not of any
consequence in the case before us. All that need be noticed
is that the increase in the number of Readers and Private
Secretaries has been higher percentagewise than that in the
case of Superintendents because with increasing work and
increase in the number of Judges, the number of Private
Secretaries and Readers had necessarily to rise in
proportion whereas the number of Superintendents had not
gone up quite in the same proportion. lt may be mentioned
that there was some grievance made regarding differences in
the method of selection employed on different occasions when
vacancies arose of requiring
PG NO 781
temporary appointments to the posts of Assistant Registrars.
There is, however, not much substance in that grievance as
we shall point out later.
The first submission of Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for
the petitioners is that there is a violation of Article 14
of the Constitution in treating the posts of
Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private
Secretaries to the Judges as equal status posts. It was
urged by him that the sources of recruitment to these posts
were not identical and so also the qualifications required
for appointments to these posts. He also pointed out that
the duties of the incumbents of these posts were different.
It was submitted by him that in treating these posts as
equal status posts unequals were treated equally and hence
the rule of equality was violated. In appreciating this
submission, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted
principle that where there is an employer who has a large
number of employees in his service performing diverse
duties, he must enjoy a certain measure of discretion in
treating different categories of his employees as holding
equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of
promotion or transfer of employees inter so will necessarily
arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the
organisation. There is, therefore, nothing inherently wrong
in an employer treating certain posts as equated posts or
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equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises
his reasonably and does not violate the principles of
equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. it is also clear that for treating certain
posts as equated posts or equal status posted, it is not
necessary that the holders of these posts must perform
completely the same functions or that the sources of
recruitment to the posts must be the same nor is it
essential that qualifications for appointments to the posts
must be identical. All that is reasonable required is that
there must not be such difference in the pay-scales or
qualifications of the incumbents of the posts concerned or
in their duties or responsibilities or regarding any other
relevant factor that it would but unjust to treat the posts
alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially
higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying
substantially higher responsibilities and duties or
otherwise distinctly superior are not equated with posts
carrying much lower pay--scales or substantially lower
responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in
service.
As far as the case before us is concerned, although Mr.
Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that
aforesaid posts, namely, Superintendents, Private
Secretaries and Readers could not be treated as equated
PG NO 782
posts or equal status posts, he was unable to point out to
us specifically any such difference in respect of the
requisite qualifications of the holders of different
categories of these posts or regarding the duties and
responsibilities carried by these posts as were so marked or
significant that it would be unfair or violative of the rule
of equality to treat these posts as equal status posts. In
fact, it may be mentioned that at one stage in his opening,
Mr. Thakur specifically stated that he did not challenge the
vires of any of the said Seniority Rules of 1971.If that is
so, we fail to see how he can challenge the aforesaid posts
being treated as equal status posts as that has been done
under the said Seniority Rules of 1971 which have been
framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers
conferred upon him under Article 224 of the Constitution of
India. Even if one is to examine the contention on merits,
we are afraid, it must fail. A perusal of items 5, 6 and 7
of Schedule I to the said Salary Rules of 1970 shows that
under the said Rules which were framed as early as 1970, the
salary scale of Superintendents, Court Masters (Readers) and
Private Secretaries is the same, viz., Rs.350-25-575. There
is, therefore, no difference in the scales of salary. As far
as the qualifications for appointment are concerned, under
rule 7 it is provided that these qualifications are as
specified in Schedule 11. items 4, 5 and 6 of the said
Schedule inter alia provide for the qualifications for
appointments to the said posts and it is undoubtedly true
that the qualifications required for appointment to these
posts are not identical. In the case of Superintendents, it
appears, very briefly stated, that appointments to 25 per
cent of these posts are to be made on the basis of
seniority-cum-suitability from the joint seniority list of
categories 9, 10,11, 13, 14 and 15 of Class 111 mentioned in
Schedule 1 and 75 per cent of the posts are to be filled by
selection on merit from the same categories. The categories
of posts from which promotions of selections can be made to
the posts of Court Masters are substantially the same. As
far as the Private Secretaries are concerned, the mode of
appointment is by selection and the qualifications
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prescribed are that a graduate degree is required for
appointment of the said post and a further requirement is a
speed of not less than 120 words per minute in shorthand and
45 words per minute in type writing. A perusal of the said
provisions shows that the qualifications required for
appointment to the post of a Private Secretary are certainly
higher than the qualifications required for appointment to
the post of a Superintendent or a Court Master although from
the latter two categories, probably, more experience would
be required. Thus, one fails to see how any grievance can be
made by the Superintendents on this score. As far as the
duties these posts carry are concerned, undoubtedly they are
not the Same. But Rule 8(c) of the Establishment Rules of
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1972 provides that any person appointed to the post in one
category may be transferred to other category. The validity
of this Rule has not been challenged before us. This would
show tat even if the duties and responsibilities attached to
these posts are not the same, they were not so materially
different as to render it inequitable that these posts
should be treated on the same footing for the purposes of
promotion and transfer. It may be that because of the
requirement that a Court Master must be a graduate and
having a certain typing speed, Superintendents could not be
generally transferred to the posts of Private Secretaries.
But one fails to see how any grievance can be made on that
score by the Superintendents.
The view which we ave taken, as set out earlier, finds
support from the decision of this Court in V.T. Khanzode &
ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Anr., [1982] 3 S.C.R. 4111
rendered by a Bench comprising three learned Judges of this
Court. In that case, by Administrative Circular No. 8 dated
Administrative Circular No. 8 dated January 7,1978 the
Reserve Bank of India stated that it had decided to combine
the seniority list of all officers on the basis of their
total length of service (including officiating service ) in
Group I (Section A), Group II and Group 111. The seniority
of all officers in each of the three Groups was to be
combined with effect from May 22, 1974 on the basis of their
total length of service, including officiating service, in
the grade in which they were then posted on a regular
basis. The Circular introduced combined seniority with
retrospective effect from May 22, 1974 (the date of an
earlier Administrative Circular No. 15) as it was "fair and
equitable to the officers as a class". The effect of this
decision was that the group wise system of seniority which
was in existence in the bank for more than 27 years stood
substituted by a combined seniority for officers in the
aforesaid grades with retrospective effect. This adversely
affected the existing seniority of many officers,
particularly those in Group I. The validity of this
Administrative Circular was challenged. This Court held that
the said Administrative Circular No. 8 and the draft
combined seniority list prepared pursuant to it did not
violate the rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution whether there should be a combined
seniority in different cadres or groups is a matter of
policy which does not attract the applicability of groups is
am pointed out that the past events showed the equality
clause. The Court pointed out that the past events sowed
that the various Departments of the Reserve Bank of India
were grouped and regrouped from time to time. Such
adjustments in the administrative affairs of the Bank were a
necessary sequel to the growings of new situations which are
bound to arise in any developing economy. The Court pointed
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PG NO 784
out further that no scheme governing service matters can be
fool-proof and some section or the other of employees is
bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectations
being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled. Arbitrariness,
irrationality, perversity and mala fides will of course
render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the
scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employees
is not evidence of these. This decision clearly leads to a
conclusion that grouping and regrouping of different
categories of employees is inevitable in a large
organisation with a view of meeting changing situations and
needs of a live organisation. Merely because the chances of
promotion of some employees are adversely affected by such
grouping or regrouping, that does not lead to a conclusion
that it is against the law. We may point out that in the
case before us, there is no contention urged before us that
the equating of posts or the combined seniority list was
promoted by any mala fides. We fail to see how the combined
seniority list or the treating of the said posts as equal
status posts can be said to be arbitrary in the absence of
any material and, particularly, in view of the fact that the
learned Chief Justice and the learned Judges of the Delhi
High Court considered the facts and took the view that it
was necessary in order to provide for transfers from one
department to another and to provide adeq uate promotional
opportunities to various sections of the employees of the
Delhi High Court.
Apart from this, it must be observed that the challenge
to the said posts being treated as equal status posts comes
much too late to the entertained in the writ petition. These
posts were treated as equal status posts under Rule 2 read
with the Schedules to the said Seniority Rules of 1971 and
certain promotions have also been made under the said Rules.
These Rules became effective in 1971 at is much to late to
seek to challenge them in 1979, long after Rule have been
given effect to. It may be mentioned that, although they did
make representations, the petitioners chose to file the Writ
Petition only as late as in 1979. In our view, the challenge
to the Rules providing for the said posts being posts being
treated as equated posts or equal status posts can be
negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other
considerations.
The next submission of learned Counsel, Mr. Thakur,
which he stated was his main submission, is that under the
relevant Rules an appointment to the post of Assistant
Registrar has to be made by selection from Superintendents.
Private Secretaries and Readers or Court Masters and hence
all employees holding these posts in a permanent capacity
PG NO 785
must be considered to be eligible and within the zone of
consideration for selection to these posts. It was not open
to the learned Chief Justice, Respondent no. 1 herein, to
limit that zone of consideration in any manner. He drew our
attention to the Establishment (Appointment and Conditions
of Service) Rules of 1972 and in particular Item No. 3 of
Schedule II thereof framed under Rule 7 of the said Rules.
He pointed out that under the said item, the appointment to
the post of Assistant Registrar, which is a selection post
is to be made by selection on merit from categories of
officers of categories 5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in
Schedule, namely, Superintendents. Court Masters (Readers)
and Private Secretaries. It was submitted by him that this
Rule excluded any reference to seniority and even if it was
open to the appointing authority to limit or restrict the
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zone of consideration it could not be limited with reference
to seniority.
It was urged by Mr. Thakur that the rule that the
promotion was to be made on the basis of selection on merit
prescribed by the Chief Justice in conscious exercise of his
powers conferred under Article 229 of the Constitution the
decision to restrict the zone of consideration to four or
five times the number of posts available on the basis of
seniority under the combined seniority list was a mere
administrative instruction or decision. It was submitted by
him that the said instruction or decision is in conflict
with that rules prescribing the method of selection by merit
and hence it is bad in law. We propose to proceed on the
assumption that Mr. Thakur may be right in his contention
that mere administrative instructions cannot override rules
framed in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 229
of the Constitution although the person issuing the
administrative instruction may be that same person who
prescribed the rules as in the case before us. Even then, It
has to be considered whether the said administrative
instructions or decision in any way conflicts with the
rules. In this connection Mr. Thakur drew our attention to
that decision of this Court in the case of Guman Singh v.
State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1471] Suppl. S.C.R. 900. The
few facts which need to be noticed in connection with this
case are that in 1965 the State of Rajasthan decided to
introduce the system of making promotions to the service on
the basis of merit alone in addition to the existing system
of making promotions on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. On
December 14, 1965, Rule 28B was incorporated into Rajasthan
Administrative Service Rules, 1954, providing for
appointment by promotion to posts In the service on the
basis of merit and on the basis of’ seniority-cum-merit in
the proportion of 50:50 and prescribing that the number of
eligible candidates to be considered for promotion was to be
10 times the total number of vacancies to be filled up on
PG NO 786
the basis of merit as well as seniority-cum-merit. Prior to
August 26, 1966, Rule 28B was amended but we are not
concerned with such amendments. On that date, Rule 28B
was further amended by providing that the proportion of
promotion to be made by selection on the basis of merit and
seniority-cum-merit was to be 1:2 instead of 50:50. On the
same date, a proviso was also added to sub-rule (2) of Rule
28B providing that only officers who have been in service
for not less than 6 years in the lower grade of the cadre
will be eligible for being considered for the first
promotion in the cadre. There was, however, a circular
issued subsequently, that is after the said Rules were
framed which provided that 50 marks were to be given for the
record of 5 years prior to the period of 5 years preceding
the selection; and for the five years preceding the
selection the marking of 25 was to be given on the basis of
confidential rolls. The validity of this Circular was
challenged on various grounds. This Court took the view that
from the Circular it was clear that an officer who has
rendered less than five years of service will not be
eligible to get a single mark out of 50 which is provided
for the record for the period preceding five years far the
simple reason that he will have no such record. An officer
who has put in less than five years of service has been
straightway denied 50 marks out of 75 marks and he has to
establish his worth within the small range of 25 marks on
the basis of his confidential rolls which will be available
for a period of less than five years. It was held that this
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formula which was prescribed in the circular was opposed to
Rule 28B and Rule 32 which ensured that merit and merit
alone was to form the basis of promotion as against the
quota fixed for merit. in contradistinction to seniority-
cum-merit. It may be pointed out that in that case the
circular question stated that the instructions contained
therein should be strictly kept in view when persons are
being considered for promotion. In view of this the Circular
was held to be invalid. In our view. this. decision does not
lend support to the submission of learned Counsel. Mr.
Thakur. This Court pointed out that Rule 28B of the
Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954, in brief,
provided for two methods of section one based on merit and
the other based on seniority-cum-merit. In other words the
rule provides that the promotion based on seniority-cum-
merit for 50 per cent the posts in contradistinction to that
based on seniority-cum-merit prescribed for the other 50 per
cent of the posts. and that the selection on merit shall be
strictly on the basis of merit. Rule 32 was similar Rule
28B. It was pointed out that by this Court he word merit is
not capable of easy definition. but it can be safely said
that merit is the sum total of various qualities and
attributes of an employee such as his academic
qualifications, his distinction in the University, his
PG NO 787
character, integrity, devotion to duty and the manner in
which he discharges his duties. Allied to this may be other
matters or factors such as his punctuality in work, the
quality and out-turn of work done by him and the manner of
his dealing with his superiors and subordinate officers and
the general public and his rank in the service. Rule 32 in
essence adopts what is stated in Rule 28B. It was held that
the restriction contained in the proviso to sub-rule (2) of
Rule 28B providing that before an officer in the junior
scale could be considered fit for promotion to the senior
scale, he should have worked on post in the service at least
for some period of time, was quite reasonable. The
provisions contained in sub-rule (2) confining the selection
to senior most officers not exceeding 10 times the number of
total vacancies was also held to be reasonable. Such a
provision would encourage the members of the service
aspiring for promotion to make themselves eligible by
increasing their efficiency in the discharge of their
duties. However, the impugned Circular was bad in law as it
left no discretion to the Selection or Promotion Committee
to adopt any method other than that indicated in the
Circular in making selections for promotion and the method
prescribed was so rigid and so worded as to impede the
selection being made on merit. It was held that the Circular
was violative of the rule prescribing selection on merit. We
may point out that this decision does not take the view that
where selection is to be on merit, seniority cannot be taken
as a relevant factor for limiting the zone of consideration
provided of course, that this is not done so rigidly as to
exclude a proper selection on merit being made. In fact, it
runs to the contrary effect. We may refer. In this
connection, to the case of Sant Ram Sharma v. State of
Rajasthan und Anr., [1968] 1 S.C.R. 111 where it was inter
alia contended on behalf of the petitioners that in the
absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to
selection grade posts, the Government cannot issue
administrative instructions and such instructions cannot
impose any restriction not found in the rules already
framed. A Bench comprising five learned Judges of this Court
dealt with the contention as follows (p. 119):
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"We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr. N.C.
Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules
governing promotions to selection grade posts the Government
cannot issue administrative instructions and such
administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions
not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to
accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no
specific provision in the Rules laying down the principle of
promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection
PG NO 788
grade posts. But that does not mean that the statutory rules
are framed in this behalf the Government cannot issue
administrative instructions regarding the principle to be
followed in promotions of the officers concerned to the
selection grade posts. It is true that Government cannot
amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative
instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular
point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the
rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules
already framed."
We may also refer, in this connection to the decision of
this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal & Ors.,
1977] 1 S.C.R. 377 which was cited before us although the
decision is not directly relevant to the case before us. In
that case a challenge was made to the combined seniority
scheme adopted by the Reserve Bank of India. The High Court
had taken the view that the scheme adopted by the Reserve
Bank was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
inter alia on the ground that the said combined seniority
list framed persuant to the scheme had the effect of
prejudicing the promotional opportunities assured to the
petitioners under the Optee Scheme which had previously been
adopted by the Bank and it discriminated against the
petitioners in relation to the clerical staff in the General
Department who either did not exercise the option under the
Optee Scheme or having exercised the option were not
selected. It was observed by this Court (p. 393) that there
can be no doubt that it is open to the State to lay down any
rule which it thinks appropriate for determining seniority
in the service and it is not competent to the Court to
strike down such rule on the ground that in its opinion
another rule would have been better or more appropriate. The
only enquiry which the Court can make is whether’ the rule
laid down by the State is arbitrary and irrational so that
it results in inequality of opportunity amongst employees
belonging to the same class. the Court pointed out that in
the case before it, the employees from the non-clerical
cadres merit being absorbed in the clerical cadre and
therefore, a rule for determining their seniority vis-a-vis
those already in the clerical cadre had to be devised. If
the non-clerical service rendered by the employees from non-
clerical cadres were wholly ignored, it would be unjust to
them. Equally, it would have been unjust to employees in
that clerical cadre, if the entire non-clerical service of
those coming from non-clerical cadres was taken into account
for non-clerical service cannot be equated with clerical
service and the two cannot be treated on the same footing.
The Reserve Bank, therefore, decided that one-third of the
PG NO 789
non-clerical service rendered by employees coming from non-
clerical cadres should be taken into account for the purpose
of determining seniority. It was held that this rule
attempted to strike a Just balance between the conflicting
claims of non-clerical and clerical staff and it cannot be
condemned as arbitrary or discriminatory.
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We may also refer here to the decision of a Bench
comprising four learned Judges of this Court in Ashok Kumar
Yadav & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors. etc. etc.,
[1985] Suppl. I.S.C.R. 657. Rule B clause (1) of the Punjab
Civil Service (Executive Branch), Rules, 1930 prescribes a
competitive examination for recruitment to posts in Haryana
Civil Service (Executive) and other allied services. The
relevant regulation (Regulation 5) lays down that the
compulsory subjects carry in the aggregate 400 marks and
there is also viva-voce examination which is compulsory and
which carries 200 marks and each optional subject carries
100 marks. Thus, the written examination carries an
aggregate of 700 marks for candidates in general and for ex-
servicemen it carries an aggregate of 400 marks as they were
exempted from appearing in optional papers and the viva-voce
test carries 200 marks. Regulation 3 provides that no
candidate shall be eligible to appear in the viva-voce test
unless he obtains 45 per cent marks in the aggregate of all
subjects. In the written examination held by Haryana Public
Service Commission for recruitment to 61 post in the Haryana
Civil Service (Executive) and other allied Services over
1300 candidates obtained more than 45 per cent marks and
thus qualified for being called for interview for viva-voce
examination. The Haryana Public Service Commission invited
all that said candidates for the viva-voce examination with
the result the interviews lasted for about half a year. In
the meantime, further vacancies arose as 191 posts became
available far being filled and, on the basis of total marks
obtained in the written examination as well as viva-voce
test, 119 candidates were selected and recommended by the
Haryana Public Service Commission to the State Government.
The petitioners before the High Court failed to get selected
on account of poor marks obtained by them in the vive-voce
test, although they had obtained high marks in the written
examination. They made several allegations regarding the
competence of the members of the Public Service Commission
as well as regarding favoritism and sc on. The contention
with which we are concerned is the contention urged by the
petitioners that the number of candidates called for the
interview was almost 20 times the number of vacancies and
this widened the scope: for arbitrainess in selection by
making it possible for the Haryana Public Service Commission
PG NO 790
to boost up or deflate the total marks which might be
obtained by candidates and this invalidated the selection
made. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the
selection made by the Haryana Public Service Commission was
bad in law and decided in favour of the petitioners. On an
appeal by special leave to Supreme Court, the Division Bench
of the Supreme Court observed as follows (p. 690) :
"We must admit that the Haryana Public Service
Commission was not right in calling for interview all the
1300 and odd candidates who secured 45 per cent or more
marks in the written examination. The respondents sought to
justify the action of the Haryana Public Service Commission
by relying on regulation 3 of the Regulations contained in
Appendix 1 of the Punjab Civil Service (Executive Branch)
Rule, 1930 which were applicable in the State of Haryana and
contended that on a true interpretation of that Regulation,
the Haryana Public Service Commission was bound to call for
interview all the candidates who secured a minimum of 45 per
cent marks in the aggregate at the written examination. We
do not think this contention is well founded. A plain
reading of Regulation 3 will show that it is wholly
unjustified. We have already referred to Regulation 3 in a˜n
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earlier part of the judgment and we need not reproduce it
again. It is clear on a plain natural construction of
Regulation 3 that what is prescribed is merely a minimum
qualification for eligibility for appearing at the vive-
voce test must obtain at least 45 per cent marks in the
aggregate in the written examination. But obtaining of
minimum 45 percent marks does not by itself entitle a
candidate to insist that he should be called for the viva-
voce test. There is no obligation on the Haryana Public
Service Commission to call of the viva-voce test all
candidates who satisfy the minimum eligibility requirement.
It is open to the Haryana Public Service Commission to say
that out of the candidates who satisfy to eligibility
critarion of minimum 45 per cent marks in the written
examination, only a limited number of candidates at the top
of the list shall be called for interview."
The Bench, however, went on to hold that. in its view,
merely because the Haryana Public Service Commission had
called all the 1300 candidates who obtained 45 per cent or
PG NO 791
more marks in the written examination to appear in the
interview that did not invalidate the selection made. This
decision points out that the minimum eligibility
qualification has to be kept distinct from the zone of
consideration and even if there are a large number of
candidates who satisfy the minimum eligibility requirement
it is not always required that they should be included in
the zone of consideration, it being open to the authority
concerned to restrict the zone of consideration amongst the
eligible candidates in any reasonable manner.
In the case before us, zone has been restricted by
prescribing that out of the total number of candidates who
satisfy the eligibility requirement, the zone of
consideration will be limited to a multiple of 3 to 5 times
of the number of vacancies and the persons to be considered
will be determined on the basis of their seniority in the
combined seniority list. It appears to us that there is
nothing unreasonable in this restriction. It was open to the
Delhi High Court to restrict the zone of consideration in
any reasonable manner and limiting the zone of consideration
to a multiple of the number of vacancies and basing it on
seniority according to the combined seniority list, in our
view, it cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious or
mala fide. Nor can it be said that such restriction violates
the principle of selection on merit because even experience
in service is a relevant consideration in assessing merit.
We may also refer in this connection, to the decision of
this Court in V.J. Thomas and Ors. v. Union of India, &
Ors., [1985] Suppl. S.C.C.7 where it has been pointed out
that even though minimum eligibility criterion as fixed for
enabling one to take the one to take can be confined on a
rational basis examination, yet the examination to recruits
up to a certain number of years. in adopting such a policy
which underlay the Note to clause (4) of Appendix 1 to the
new Rules in question, there is nothing which is arbitrary
or amounting to denial of equal opportunity in the matter of
promotion. It had the desired effect of not having a glut
of Junior Engineers taking examination compared to fewer
number of vacancies. Length and experience were given
recognition by the Note. The promotion can be thus by stages
exposing the promotional avenue gradually to persons having
longer experience. This seems to be the policy underlying
the Note and there was nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional
in it Such a limitation caters to a well-known situation in
service jurisprudence that there must be some ratio of
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candidates to vacancies. If for taking an examination this
aspect of classification is introduced, it is based an
rational and intelligible differential which has a nexus to
the object sought to be achieved (see p. 13). In view of
what we have pointed out above, the submission of Mr. Thakur
in this connection must also be rejected.
PG NO 792
In fairness to learned Counsel for the petitioners, we
must at this stage refer to the decision of the Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Madan Mohan Saran &
Anr. v. Honble the Chief Justice and Ors.,[1975] 2 S.L.R.
889 on which strong reliance was placed by learned Counsel.
In that case, the petitioner before the Allahabad High Court
challenged 3 orders passed by the Chief Justice containing
general principles for fixation of seniority of the staff
holding posts in various grades in the Establishment of the
High Court and the Gradation List of 1951, the Draft
Gradation List of 1967 & the Final Gradation List of 1969 in
so far as certain respondents were shown as senior to the
petitioners. We are not concerned with the other reliefs
prayed for by the petitioners in that case. One of the
contentions of the petitioner (see paragraph 31 of the
report) was that before making a promotion to the post of
Assistant Superintendent or a Superintendent, the entire
field of eligibility had to be considered and an omission on
the part of respondents nos. 1 and 2 to do so rendered the
promotion made invalid and that this was what happened when
certain respondents were promoted. The Division Bench
pointed out that there was no allegation in the counter-
affidavit that a serutiny of the entire field of eligibility
was made before the respondents were appointed. Rule 9 of
the Allahabad High Court (Conditions of Service of Staff)
Rules, 1946 being the relevant rule found place under the
heading promotion to the posts of responsibility etc." Posts
of Assistant Superintendents and Superintendent were posts
of responsibility and trust and were covered by Rule 9. The
said rule provided that promotion to such posts of
responsibility or trust or which require special
qualifications "shall be made by section irrespective of
seniority". Relying upon the interpretation given to the
expression "selection irrespective of seniority" in Mahesh
Prasad Srivastavaa c. Abdul Khair, [1971] 1 S.C..R 157 the
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Madan Mohan
Saran cuse (supra) held that"The use of the words
‘selection, irrespective of seniority’ shows that the field
of eligibility takes within its embrace even the Juniormost
member of each department. Being a selection post, promotion
has not to be confined to the members of the particular
department in which the vacancy has occurred; and the Rule
requires respondents Nos 1 and 2 to take into consideration
members of the entire Establishment. irrespective of
seniority, in making their choice for promotion- - - - - - -
- - - - - The question of merit enters primarily in the
reckoning. In our view, the petitioner is right in his
contention that the ranking or position in the Gradation
List does not confer any right on the respondents to be
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promoted and that it is a well established rule that
promotion to such posts is to be based primarily on merit
and not seniority alone". In our view, this decision has no
application to the case before us because the words
"irrespective of merit" which were used in Rule 9 of the
Rules in question are nowhere to be found in the relevant
Rules or Schedules before us. In fact, if it was the
intention of the rule-making authority that all the persons
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eligible. for the post should be considered in making the
selection on merit, expression like irrespective of
seniority" or without regard to seniority" or on merit
alone" could have been used in the Rules or the Schedule. We
do not find any such words in Rule 5 of the said seniority
Rules, 1971 or in Rule 7 or Item 3 of Schedule II of the
said Establishment Rules of 1972. The mode of appointment to
the post of Assistant Registrar, set out in the said Item 3
of Schedule 11, merely states that the appointment will be
no selection on merits from confirmed officers of categories
5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule I and the said
Item contains no such expression as we have set out earlier
or any other equivalent expression.
Coming to the next submission of Mr. Thakur, it was
submitted by him that the interpretation placed by the Chief
Justice and the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court on
Rule 7 of the said Appointment and Conditions of Service
Rules, 1972 was incorrect. It was urged by him that, even if
the Combined Seniority List is valid, it could not be
applied for the purpose of promotion. In dealing with this
argument, we may again briefly refer to Rule 5 of the said
Seniority Rules of 1971 which clearly provides that joint
inter se seniority of confirmed employees in categories of
equal status posts shall be determined according to their
dates of confirmation in any of these categories. The posts
of Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries to
the Honble Judges are treated as equal status posts under
Schedule I to the said Seniority Rules, 1971, framed under
Rule 2 thereof. Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972
merely states that, except for appointment on officiating,
temporary or ad hoc basis, the mode of and qualifications
for appointment to the posts specified in Schedule 1I to the
said Seniority Rules of 1971 shall be stated the rein and
Item 3 of the said Schedule II to which we have already
referred earlier shows that the appointment of Assistant
Registrar is to be made on selection on merits from
confirmed officers in categories 5, 6 & 7 of Class II
mentioned in Schedule I. The only ground on which the
validity of the said Rule 7 is challenged is that if it is
applied and the zone of consideration restricted on the
basis of the said Combined Seniority List, the prospects of
promotion which the Superintendents enjoyed would be
PG NO 794
reduced. We find ourselves totally unable to appreciate this
argument. In the first place, it is not as if either the
said Rule 7 of the Establishment Rules of 1972 or Rule 5 of
the Seniority Rules of 1971 which provides for a Combined or
Joint Seniority List negatives the chance of any promotion
to the posts of Assistant Registrars being granted to the
Superintendents. In fact, several Superintendents have been
promoted to the posts of Assistant Registrars after the said
Rules became effective. All that could be pointed out by Mr.
Thakur was that under the Combined Seniority list, for some
time, relatively fewer Superintendents will be within the
zone of consideration for the posts of Assistant Registrars
as compared to Private Secretaries to the Honble Judges and
Court Masters. We fail to see how any of the said Rules or
the said Combined or Joint Seniority List can be struck down
on the basis of such a consequence. In the first place, it
is well settled that no employee has a right to promotion as
such. As we have already pointed out the Rule does not
exclude the possibility of Superintendents getting promoted
to the posts of Assistant Registrars. It may happen that for
an year or two, the number of Superintendents in the zone of
consideration might be fewer compared to the number of Court
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Masters and Private Secretaries within the zone. But that
situation might well be reversed a few years later and it is
impossible to hold that any of the said provisions is bad in
law on that ground. It was next submitted il, this
connection that in the mode of appointment set out in Item 3
of Schedule II to the Establishment Rules of 1972 it is
stated that for the posts of Assistant Registrars, selection
on merits had to be made from confirmed officers of
categories 5, 6 & 7 of Class II mentioned in Schedule I. It
was urged that the reference to categories 5, 6 & 7 without
reference to the Combined or Joint Seniority List indicated
that even if the zone of consideration was to be restricted
on the basis of seniority this could be done only according
to separate seniority lists for each of these three
categories and that the Combined Seniority List was not to
be used for the purposes of limiting the zone of
consideration. According to learned Counsel, the Combined
Seniority List was applicable only for the purpose of
transfers. In our view, this argument is unsound and cannot
be accepted. The reference to categories 5, 6 & 7 in Item 3
of Schedule II to the said Establishment Rules of 1972 is
merely made with a view to set out the categories from which
promotion or selection has to be made to the posts of
Assistant Registrars. The language of Item 3 nowhere
indicates that there was any idea to create anything like a
quota for each of the said three categories and in fact
reading fairly the relevant Rules and Item in the Schedule,
it appears to us that the intention is to treat all these
categories as forming a single class or category for
PG NO 795
purposes of promotion to the posts of the Assistant
Registrars. There is no warrant for limiting the use of the
Combined Seniority List merely to purpose of transfers. In
fact, it appears to us that Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of
1971 and the Combined Seniority List framed pursuant thereto
were intended to provide for a combined seniority for
purposes of transfer as well as for purposes of promotion.
Finally, it was pointed out by learned Counsel for the
Petitioners that no uniform policy has been followed in the
past regarding the limitation of zone of consideration as
far as the selection to the posts of Assistant Registrars is
concerned. This may be so. But, we are afraid, by itself
that circumstance cannot lead to a conclusion that
promotions are made arbitrarily because the failure to
follow one uniform policy in respect of limiting the zone of
consideration would not, by Itself, necessarily render the
limitation of the zone of consideration invalid on the
ground of arbitrariness. So long as the zone of
consideration is limited by the competent authority in a
manner not inconsistent with the Rules or in a manner which
is not arbitrary or capricious or mala fide, the validity of
the decision to limit the zone of consideration cannot be
successfully called in question on the ground that the
manner in which the zone of consideration was limited was
not uniform. The zone might have been limited on each
occasion keeping in view the relevant circumstances
including the number of posts vacant and on a basis having
nexus to the purpose of selection. Although, the main
grievance of the Petitioners as disclosed in the oral
arguments is regarding the limitation of the zone of
consideration to 3 times the number of vacancies that
grievance is not reflected in the prayer sought and the
prayer to the petition only relates to the decision of the
Administrative Committee of the learned judges of the Delhi
High Court arrived at on 3.2. 1977 to fill in the vacancy in
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the post of Assistant Registrar by selection from the five
seniormost persons from the joint seniority list of
Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries which
list was finalised under the said Seniority Rules of 1971
read with the Establishment Rules of 1972. This decision is
at annexure 16 to the petition and it has been arrived at by
a Committee of Administrative Judges comprising the then
learned Chief Justice and four other learned Judges of the
Delhi High Court. Nothing has been shown to us to indicate
that this decision of the Committee was in any manner
capricious, arbitrary or mala fide. The only contention is,
as we have already pointed out, that it was not open to the
Committee to limit the zone of consideration at all and
secondly, that this could not be done with reference to the
joint seniority list both of which contentions we have
PG NO 797
already rejected earlier. In view of this, the challenge to
this decision must fail.
In the result, the petition fails and must be dismissed.
However, looking to all the facts and circumstances of the
case, it appears that the parties should bear their own
costs. Hence, the petition is dismissed and rule discharged
with no order as to costs.
S.L. Petition dismissed.