Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. KASTURBAI WALCHAND TRUST, BOMBAY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
31/10/1966
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
BENCH:
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1967 AIR 844 1967 SCR (1) 7
ACT:
Income Tax Act 1922, s. 4(3)(i)-Income of trust property-
payable to beneficiary during her lifetime-Thereafter for
specified charitable purposes-Beneficiary executing
surrender of beneficial interest-Thereafter whether trust
property held wholly for charitable purposes and exempt from
tax-Whether income of trust property receivable by
beneficiary or by trust on behalf of beneficiary.
HEADNOTE:
By a deed executed in November 1946, the respondent and her
husband created a trust in respect of their properties. In
accordance with Clause 7 of the deed, the income of the
trust properties was to be paid to the respondent during her
lifetime and, by Clause 8 the trustees were directed to
apply the income, from and after the death of the
respondent, to certain charitable purposes enumerated in the
deed. On July 21, 1955, the respondent executed a deed of
surrender whereby she gave up her beneficial interest in the
income of the trust so that it may immediately vest in the
trustees and may be utilised for the charitable purposes
mentioned in the trust deed.
In the course of assessment to income tax in respect of the
income from the trust properties for the assessment years
1956-57 to 1959-60, it was claimed on behalf of the trust
that during the relevant previous years, the properties were
held under a trust wholly for charitable purposes, and
consequently, the income was exempt from income-tax under s.
4(3)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Income Tax Officer
rejected this claim on the view that the deed of surrender
executed by the respondent did not amount to renouncement of
her rights under the trust deed and that it really amounted
to a transfer of the income received by her for the use of
the trust; and since the income was receivable by the
respondent, the trust properties were not held wholly for
charitable purposes. However,. the: Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, on appeal held that the income from the trust
properties was exempt under s. 4(3)(i) and this view was
upheld by the Tribunal. The High Court, upon a reference,
also held in favour of the trust.
It was also contended on behalf of the department that as
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clause 8 of the trust deed executed in November 1946
provided that the income of the trust was to be applied for
charitable purposes "from and after the death" of the
respondent the trustees could not, during her life-time,
apply the income for any charitable purposes and therefore
no exemption could be claimed under s, 4(3) (i).
HELD:The income from the trust properties -after July
21, 1955 was exempt from tax under s. 4(3) (i). [ 1 3 B-C]
Whenever a valid trust is executed, the property vests in
the Trustees, and the income accruing from those properties
is the income of the trust and not of the beneficiaries.
For purposes of income-tax law, however, the income under s.
41(1) of the Act is treated as received by the Trustees on
behalf of the beneficiaries, but is to be taxed in the hands
of the Trustees as it would be in the hands of the
beneficary for whom it is
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received. In the present case, therefore, it would be wrong
to proceed on any assumption that the income of the trust
properties was received by the respondent. Once the
respondent renounced her interest by the deed of July 1955,
which was clearly valid in view of s. 58 of the Indian
Trusts Act, the entire properties were held by the Trustees
for the charitable purpose mentioned in clause 8, because
that was the only purpose of the trust which then remained.
The income which accrued thereafter was come which could be
applied or allowed to accumulate for application to the
charitable purposes mentioned in clause 8 and for no other
purpose. [10 E; 11 B-H]
Even if it were to be held that by virtue of clause 8 the
trustees could not apply the income for charitable purposes
so long as the respondent was alive, the only effect would
be that the income would accumulate. Such accumulations
would also be exempt from the liability to income-tax under
s. 4(3) (i) as soon as the rights of the respondent ceased
on the execution by her of the deed of surrender in July
1955. [12 F-]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 180 to 183
of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
September 27, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax
Reference No. 42 of 1961.
B. Sen, Gopal Singh and B. N. Sachthey, for the appellant
(in all the appeals).
S. T. Desai and Ravinder Narain, for the respondent (in
all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhargava, J. Seth Walchand Hirachand and his wife, Dai
Kasturbai, owned certain shares, had several insurance
policies, owned house property and also held lease lands.
The two of them together joined in executing an indenture on
25th November, 1946, by which they created a trust. The
trustees were both of them themselves and three brothers of
Seth Walchand. The provisions of the trust, with which we
are concerned, laid down that, after defraying the expenses
for management of the trust properties and certain other
expenses, such as, rents, rates, etc.,, the trustees were to
pay to Bai Kasturbai, during her lifetime, the income
arising from the trust funds and properties. Further, Seth
Walchand himself and Bai Kasturbai, during their life-time,
had the right of residence in some of the house property,
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free of rent and without any obligation for payment of any
out goings or moneys in respect thereof. These provisions
were contained in clause 7 of the deed of trust. The next
provision contained in clause 8 of the deed was that, from
and after the death of Bai Kasturbai, the trustees were
directed to apply the net rents, profits and income of the
properties and trust funds, at their discretion, on
charitable purposes enumerated in the deed of trust. It is
not disputed that all the charitable purposes mentioned in
the trust constituted public charities. Seth
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Walchand died and, thereafter, Bai Kasturbai, on 21 st July,
1955, executed a deed in which the relevant clause runs as
follows:-
"Bai Kasturbai Walchand both hereby surrender,
release, quit claim, transfer and assign unto
the Trustees all the income to arise as from
the 21st day of July one thousand nine hundred
and fifty-five from the Trust funds of the
investments for the time being representing
the same and her beneficial life interest and
all her rights, claims and demands under the
said Indenture of Settlement including the
liberty to occupy and enjoy rent free of the
lands, hereditaments, messages and premises
described in the First and Second Schedules
hereto the intent that her beneficial interest
may be determined as aforesaid and that the
same may be immediately vested in the Trustees
and that the Trustees may utilise the same for
charitable purposes mentioned in the said
Indenture of Settlement."
Subsequent to the execution of this deed, the question arose
of assessment to income-tax of the income from the trust
properties for the assessment years 1956-57, 1957-58, 1958-
59 and 1959-60. The corresponding previous years were the
financial years ending on 31st March in the years 1956 to
1959. It was claimed by the Trust that, during these
previous years, these properties were held under a trust
wholly for charitable purposes, and consequently, the income
was exempt from income-tax under s. 4(3)(i) of the income-
tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The In-
,come-tax Officer, however, held that the deed executed by
Bai Kasturbai did not amount to a renouncement of her rights
under the trust deed, and that it really amounted to a
transfer of the income received by her for purposes of the
use of the trust. Since the income of the trust was
receivable by Bai Kasturbai, it could not be held that the
trust properties were held wholly for charitable purposes.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner ,disagreed
with the Income-tax Officer and accepted the submission made
by the respondent, holding that the income received by the
Trust, after the execution of the deed of surrender by Bai
Kasturbai, was exempt from tax under s. 4(3)(i) of the Act
in view of the applicability of s. 9 of the Indian Trusts
Act, 1882. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, on further
appeal, upheld the same decision, but on a slightly
different ground. The Tribunal’s view was that the
surrender by Bai Kasturbai was valid under s. 58 of the
Indian Trusts Act, and consequently, after that deed was
executed, the properties were held wholly for charitable
purposes and the income was exempt from tax under s. 4(3)(i)
of the Act. Thereupon, at the request of the Commissioner
of Income-tax, the following question was referred for the
opinion of the High Court of Bombay:
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M19Sup.CI/66-2
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"Whether clause 8 of the trust, settlement made on the 25th
November, 1946, came into operation immediately following
the declaration made by Bai Kasturbai on the 21st July,
1955, and as such the income that accrued or arose to the
trustees from the trust property from 21st July, 1955,
onwards was exempt under s’ 4(3)(i) of the Act?"
The High Court answered the question in favour of the Trust,
which is the respondent in these appeals before us, and
consequently, the Commissioner of Income-tax has come up to
this Court in these appeals by special leave.
It appears that, in this case, the question that was framed
by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and referred to the
High Court was not happily worded, so that it will need a
slight amendment which we shall indicate later. The real
question under dispute was whether, after the. execution of
the deed of surrender on 21st July, 1955, the income from
the trust properties was exempt from income-tax under S.
4(3)(i) of the Act or not. In dealing with this question,
it has to be kept in view that, even under the deed of trust
as originally executed on 25th November, 1946, the income
from the trust properties was not the income of Bai
Kasturbai. Whenever a valid trust is executed, the property
vests in the Trustees, and the income accruing from those
properties is the income of the trust and not of the
beneficiaries. For purposes of income-tax law, however, the
income under s. 41(1) of the Act is treated as received by
the Trustees on behalf of the beneficiaries, but is to be
taxed in the hands of the Trustees in the like manner and to
the same amount as it would be leviable upon the person on
whose behalf such income is receivable. The liability of
the income to tax is, therefore, independent of the income
actually being received by the beneficiaries and may be
subjected to tax as soon as it is earned by the trust. The
exception is that, where the trust properties are held
wholly for charitable or religious purpose in so far as such
income is. applied or accumulated for application to such
religious or charitable purposes, it is exempt from, income-
tax. In the present case, therefore, in dealing with the
question referred to the High Court, any assumption that the
income of the trust properties was received by Bai Kasturbai
will not be correct. The income during her life-time was
clearly taxable as income in the hands of the trustees
received by them on behalf of Bai Kasturbai.
Subsequently, when Bai Kasturbai executed the deed of
surrender on 21st July, 1955, she made a declaration that
she was giving up all her rights to the income. In clear
words, she stated in the deed that she was surrendering,
releasing, transferring and assigning unto the trustees all
the income which Was to arise after that date from the trust
properties, and that she was also surrendering all her
rights, claims and demands under the deed of trust,
including
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her right to occupy and enjoy rent-free lands,
hereditaments, messuages and premises described in the
trust-deed. It was further stated by her that the deed was
executed with the intent that her beneficial interest may be
determined and the same may be immediately vested in the
Trustees and that the Trustees may utilise the same for
charitable purposes mentioned in the deed of trust. This
deed executed by Bai Kasturbai was clearly valid in view of
the provision contained in s. 58 of the Indian Trusts Act
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(No. 2 of 1882) which provides that "the beneficiary, if
competent to contract, may transfer his interest but subject
to the law for the time being in force as to the
circumstances and extent in and to, which he may dispose of
such interest." Bai Kasturbai was quite competent to
contract so as to transfer her interest under the deed of
trust, and by executing the deed dated 21st July, 1955, she
surrendered all her rights. The right which had accrued to
her under clause 7 of the deed of’ trust was the right to
use certain immovable properties and to receive the net
income arising from trust properties. The right to receive
the income arose because of the obligation laid on the
Trustees to pay the net income to her during her life-time.
That was clearly the right as a beneficiary under the trust,
and when she executed the indenture dated 21 st July, 1955,
she surrendered that right in favour of the trust for
charitable purposes, so that her right became extinguished.
It may be mentioned that, at one stage, an attempt was made
on behalf of the Commissioner of Income-tax to raise the
question about the validity of this deed of surrender, but,
when the Commissioner asked the Tribunal to refer a question
about the competence of Bai Kasturbai to renounce her
beneficial interest under the Trust, Settlement, that
request was refused by the Tribunal. The Commissioner did
not, thereafter, move the High Court to obtain a statement
of the case from the Tribunal on that question, so that, in
these appeals, it is no longer open to the Commissioner to
contend that Bai Kasturbai was not competent to renounce her
beneficial interest. Once she renounced her interest, the
direction contained in the deed of trust to the Trustees to
pay to her the net income of the trust properties ceased,
though the Trustees continued to hold the property under the
trust. At the same time, the right of Bai Kasturbai to use
the immovable properties also ceased to exist. Thereafter,
clearly, the entire properties were held by the Trustees,
for the charitable purposes mentioned in clause 8, because
that was the only purpose of the trust which remained after
this deed of surrender had been executed by Bai Kasturbai.
On these facts, it is clear that the income, which accrued
from the trust properties thereafter, was income which could
be applied or allowed to accumulate for application to the
charitable purposes mentioned in clause 8 and for no other
purpose.
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High Court and the Tribunal as to whether clause 8 of the
deed of trust could come into effect so as to permit the
Trustees to apply the income of the trust properties for the
charitable purposes mentioned in that clause even before the
death of Bai Kasturbai. That clause, in clear words says
that the Trustees shall apply the -said net rents, profits
and income, etc. in all or any of the charitable purposes
mentioned therein "from and after the death of Bai
Kasturbai". Relying on this last expression, it was urged
that unless Bai Kasturbai died, the Trustees were not
permitted to apply the income for the charitable purposes
mentioned in clause 8. It seems to us that, in this case, it
was quite unnecessary to go into this question for the
purpose of deciding whether the income of the trust
properties, after the deed of surrender by Bai Kasturbai
executed on 21st July, 1955, was exempt from income-tax
under s. 4(3)(i) of the Act. Under that provision, the
income from trust properties, held wholly for charitable or
religious purposes, is exempt from tax under two
circumstances. The first is when that income is actually
applied for such religious or charitable purposes, and the
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second is when it is accumulated for application to such
religious or charitable purposes. In this case, as we have
indicated above, as soon as Bai Kasturbai executed the deed
of surrender, her rights under clause 7 completely ceased
and all the income from the trust properties remained with
the Trustees to be applied in accordance with other terms of
the deed of trust. If it could be held that clause 8 came
into operation and permitted the application of that income
to the charitable purposes mentioned in it as soon as Bai
Kasturbai’s rights ceased, even though she remained alive,
there would be no difficulty in holding that s. 4(3)(i)
would have exempted the income from income-tax. In fact,
this ,view was accepted by all the income-tax authorities.
However, ,even if it be held that clause 8 did not come into
operation and the ’Trustees were incompetent to apply the
income of the trust properties for the purposes mentioned in
it so long as Bai Kasturbai was alive, the only effect would
be that that income would accumulate and that accumulation
would continue during the life-time of Bai Kasturbai. On
her death, the accumulated income would have to be applied
by the Trustees for the charitable purposes mentioned in
clause 8. Consequently, the income of the trust properties
became exempt from liability to income-tax as soon as the
rights of Bai Kasturbai ceased on execution by her of the
,deed of surrender dated 21st July, 1955, even though it may
not be held that clause 8 came into operation from that very
date. It is in these circumstances that we consider that,
in framing the question, the Tribunal committed an error.
The exemption of the income of the trust properties from
liability to income-tax was not dependent entirely on coming
into operation of clause 8. and
we, therefore, think that the question framed should have
been broken up into two parts as follows:-
" (1) Whether clause 8 of the Trust Settlement
made on 25th November, 1946, came into
operation immediately following the
declaration made by Bai Kasturbai on 21st
July, 1955, and
(2)Whether, in the circumstances of this
case, the income that accrued or arose to the
Trustees from the trust properties from 21st
July, 1955, onwards was exempt under section
4(3)(i) of the Act."
If the question is so broken up, the first question becomes
unnecessary, and the second question has to be answered in
favour of the respondent. The answer to the second question
is the only one that is material for purposes of determining
the liability of the income of the Trust to tax. That
question has been answered by the High Court in favour of
the respondent. The appeals, therefore, fail and are
dismissed with costs. There will be one bearing fee.
R.K.P,S. Appeals
dismissed.
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