Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY A
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DR. HAKIMWADI TENANTS ASSOCIATION & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT24/11/1987
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
RAY, B.C. (J)
CITATION:
1988 AIR 233 1988 SCR (2) 21
1988 SCC Supl. 55 JT 1987 (4) 448
1987 SCALE (2)1133
ACT:
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966: s.
127-Limitation of six months-Failure to acquire land
reserved for town planning within statutory period of ten
years-Purchase notice served by owners-Limitation whether to
reckon from date of notice.
Practice and Procedure: Waiver-Requirements of-Where
there is no estoppel there is no waiver.
HEADNOTE:
%
Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 provides that if any land reserved under
the Act was not acquired by agreement within ten years from
the date on which a final regional plan or final development
plan came into force or if proceedings for the acquisition
of such land under that Act or under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 were not commenced within such period, the owner
or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the
appropriate authority to that effect and if within six
months from the date of the service of such notice, the land
was not acquired or no steps as aforesaid were commenced for
its acquisition, the reservation should be deemed to have
lapsed.
The Planning Authority, the Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay, published a draft development plan reserving
the land in dispute for a recreation ground. The said plan
was finalised and sanctioned by the State Government on
January 6, 1967. It came into effect from February 7, 1967
and thereunder the land was again reserved for recreation
ground. No action having been taken for acquisition of the
land, the trustees of the land served a notice dated July 1,
1977 on the Commissioner for Municipal Corporation either to
acquire the land or release it from acquisition. The same
was received by the latter on July 4, 1977.
On July 28, 1977 the Corporation’s Executive Engineer
asked for information regarding the ownership of the land
and the particulars of the tenants thereof from trustees-
respondents Nos. 4-7, and stated that the relevant date
under s. 127 cf the Act would be the date
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upon which this information was received. The trustees by
their lawyer’s letter dated August 3, 1977 conveyed that the
period of six months stipulated by s. 127 has to be computed
from the date of the receipt of the purchase notice by the
Corporation, i.e. July 4, 1977 and stated that the
Corporation had access to all the relevant records. The
requisite information was also provided therein. The
Executive Engineer wrote stating that the period of six
months allowed by s. 127 of the Act would commence on August
4, 1977, the date when the requisite information was
furnished. Thereafter the Executive Engineer by his letter
dated November 2, 1977 inquired of the trustees whether they
were prepared to sell the property in question to which the
trustees quoted an overall rate of Rs.650 per square metre
through their lawyer’s reply dated November 18, 1977. They
expressly stated that the offer was made without admitting
the power and authority of the appellant to acquire the land
or to initiate the proceedings for acquisition. Instead of
accepting the same, the Executive Engineer by his letter
dated January 11, 1978 asked the respondents to disclose the
basis for the rate of Rs.650 per sq. metre. The Corporation
had, in the meanwhile passed a resolution on January 10,
1978 for the acquisition of the land and made an application
to the State Government dated January 31, 1978 for taking
necessary steps. The State Government issued the requisite
notification dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act 1894 for acquisition of land.
On July 17, 1978, respondent No. 1, the tenants’
association, filed a petition in the High Court under Art.
226 of the Constitution for quashing the impugned
notification. The High Court held that the most crucial step
was the application to be made by the Corporation to the
State Government under s. 126(1) of the Act for acquisition
of the land within the period of six months commencing from
July 4, 1977, the date of service of the purchase notice,
and that upon the expiry of the said period on January 3,
1978, the reservation of the land had lapsed and it was
released from such reservation. It took the view that all
that was required was that the owner or the person
interested in the land must inform the Authority that the
land reserved for any plan under the Act had not been
acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on
which plan came into force and the proceedings for
acquisition of such land under the Land Acquisition Act had
not been commenced within that period. Consequently it
struck down the impugned notification as invalid, null and
void.
In the appeal to this Court by special leave it was
contended that there was waiver or abandonment of right by
respondents Nos. 4-7,
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the trustees, to question the validity of the acquisition
proceedings, and that there was inordinate delay or laches
on the part of respondent No. 1 which disentitled it to
grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal,
^
HELD: 1. Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and
Town Planning Act, 1966 is a fetter upon the power of
eminent domain. By enacting it the legislature has struck a
balance between the competing claims of the interests of the
general public as regards the rights of an individual. [30B-
C]
2. The condition pre-requisite for the running of time
under 127 of the Act is the service of a valid purchase
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notice. In the instant case, the purchase notice dated July
1, 1977 was a valid notice. The appellant having failed to
take any steps for acquisition of the land within a period
of six months therefrom the reservation of the land in the
development plan for a public purpose lapsed and
consequently the impugned notification dated April 7, 1978
issued by the State Government under s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act must be struck down as a nullity. [29A-B;
31D-F]
3.1 The question whether the reservation has lapsed due
to the failure of the planning authority to take any steps
within a period of six months of the date of service of the
notice of purchase as stipulated by s. 127 is a mixed
question of fact and law. A rule of universal application
cannot, therefore, be laid down. [28G-H]
In the instant case the High Court found that the
planning authority had failed to acquire the land reserved
for the plan under the Act by agreement within ten years
from the date on which the plan came into force and
proceedings for acquisition of the land under the Land
Acquisition Act had not been commenced within the period of
six months from the receipt of notice from respondents Nos.
4 to 7, the trustees. The Municipal Corporation had been
assessing the trust properties to property tax and issuing
periodic bills and receipts therefor and obviously could not
question the title or ownership of the trust. Accordingly,
it struck down the impugned notification under s. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act and declared that the reservation of
the land under the development plan had lapsed. [28E, 29F,
28B]
3.2 There was no question of the period of six months
being
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reckoned from the date of receipt from respondents of the
information requisitioned. Section 127 of the Act does not
contemplate an investigation into the title by the officers
of the Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the
running of time if there is a valid notice. The Executive
Engineer of the appellant Corporation was not justified in
addressing the letter dated July 28, 1977 calling upon
respondents 13 Nos. 4-7, the trustees, to furnish
information regarding their title and ownership, and also to
furnish particulars of the tenants, the nature of user of
the tenements and the total area occupied by them. The
Corporation had the requisite information in their records.
The Planning Authority was the Municipal Corporation. The
said letter was, therefore, just an attempt to prevent the
running of time and was of little or no consequence.[29A, B-
E]
4. In order to constitute waiver, there must be
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The
essence of a waiver is an estoppel and where there is no
estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are
questions of conduct and must necessarily be determined on
the facts of each case. [34B]
In the instant case, respondents Nos. 4-7 had without
admitting that the appellant had the authority or power to
initiate the proceedings for acquisition, signified their
willingness to sell the property subject to certain terms.
But the appellant did not accept the offer. On the contrary,
the appellant took further steps for the acquisition of the
land by moving the State Government under s. 126(1) of the
Act to initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a
notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It
cannot, therefore, be said that the conduct of respondents
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Nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference of relinquishment
of a known existing legal right. [34B-D]
5. The tenants were not parties to the earlier
proceedings. They were, therefore, not disentitled from
maintaining the writ petition. The objection that there was
undue delay in moving the High Court cannot prevail. [34E-F]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4139 of
1986.
From the Judgment and order dated 18.6.1986 of the
Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 874 of 1983.
R.P. Bhatt and D.N. Misra for the Appellant.
25
L.C. Chogale, M.N. Shroff, K.M.M. Khan, R.F. Nariman,
R. Karanjawala, Hardeep Singh, Mrs. Manek Karanjawala, S.V.
Deshpande, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khanwilkar for the
Responlents .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. By s. 127 the Maharashtra Regional & Town
Planning Act, 1966 enacts:
" 127. If any land reserved, allotted or
designated for any purpose specified in any plan
under this Act is not acquired by agreement within
ten years from the date on which a final Regional
plan, or final Development plan comes into force
or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land
under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, are not commenced within such period, the
owner or any person interested in the land may
serve notice on the Planning Authority,
Development Authority or as the case may be,
Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if
within six months from the date of the service of
such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps
as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition,
the reservation, allotment or designation shall be
deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land
shall be deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation and shall
become available to the owner for the purpose of
development or otherwise, permissible in the case
of adjacent land under the relevant plan."
The short point involved in this appeal by special
leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court dated June 18, 1986, is whether the period of six
months specified in s. 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from
the date of service of the purchase notice dated July 1,
1977 by the owner on the Planning Authority i.e. the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here, or the date on
which the requisite information of particulars furnished by
the owner.
The late Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim was the former
owner of a double-storeyed building situate on land
admeasuring 3645.26 square metres bearing the cadastral
survey no. 176 of Tardeo, Bombay known as Dr. Hakimwadi. The
property is located at the junction of Falkland Road and
Eruchshaw Hakim Road. It
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consists of several structures housing 24 small-scale
industries, 13 shops on the ground floor and 26 residential
tenements on the first floor, facing the Falkland Road. On
the rear side of this building, there are several structures
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housing about 24 small-scale industries. The said Dr.
Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim created a trust in respect of the
properties and respondents nos. 6-9 i.e. respondents nos. 4-
7 in the High Court, herein described as such are the
present trustees appointed under the deed. The Planning
Authority published a draft Development Plan in respect of
’D’ ward where the property in dispute is situate. In the
Development Plan property of Dr. Eruchshaw Jamshedji Hakim
was reserved for a recreation ground. The Development Plan
was finalised and sanctioned by the State Government on
January 6, 1967. The final development scheme came into
effect from February 7, 1967 and thereunder the land was
again reserved for recreation ground. No action having been
taken for acquisition of the land until January 1, 1977, the
owners thereof i.e. the trustees served a purchase notice
dated July, 1, 1977 on the Commissioner for Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay either to acquire the same or
release it from acquisition, and the same was received on
July 4, 1977. On July 28, 1977 the Corporation’s Executive
Engineer wrote to respondents nos. 4-7 and asked for
information regarding the ownership of the land and the
particulars of the tenants thereof. The letter stated that
the relevant date under s. 127 of the Act would be the date
upon which this information was received. The trustees for
the time being the landlords of the property known as
Hakimwadi by their lawyer’s letter dated August 3, 1977
conveyed that the date of six months stipulated by s. 127 of
the Act has to be computed from the date of the receipt from
them of the information required. Further, they stated that
as the Planning Authority for Greater Bombay was the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, it had p access to
all the relevant records including the records pertaining to
cadastral survey no. 176. It was also appointed out that the
Corporation had been assessing them to property tax in
respect of the said property and issuing bills and receipts
therefor and could not now question their title to ownership
of the property.
It was further said that as regards the number of
tenants, the inspection registers maintained by the
Corporation’s Assessment Department, upon which the
assessment of the rateable value of the various tenements
was based, bear ample testimony. It was next stated that the
property was partly residential, partly commercial and
partly meant for storage. The trustees went on to say that
they were not aware of any rule framed under the Act whereby
the Planning
27
Authority could make an inquiry at that stage without taking
a decision on the material question and thereby attempt to
extend the time limit of six months stipulated in s. 127.
The said letter was received by the Executive Engineer on
August 16, 1977 and presumably the information required was
furnished on August 16, 1977. The Executive Engineer wrote
to respondents nos. 4-7 stating that the period of six
months allowed by s. 127 of the Act would accordingly
commence on August 4, 1977, the date when the requisite
information was furnished. Next, the Executive Engineer by
his letter dated November 2, 1977 intimated respondents nos.
4-7 that the Municipal Corporation had accorded sanction to
initiate acquisition proceedings in respect of the property
in question under the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, the
Corporation passed a resolution dated January 10, 1978 for
the acquisition of the land and made an application to the
State Government dated January 31, 1978 for taking necessary
steps. The State Government being satisfied that the land
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was required for a public purpose issued the requisite
notification dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the land. On July
17, 1978 respondent no. 1 Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants Association
filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for quashing the impugned notification.
A learned Single Judge (Pendse, J.) by his judgment
dated September 21, 1983 allowed the writ petition on the
ground that the Planning Authority having taken no steps for
acquisition of land under s. 126(1) of the Act read with s.
6 of the Land Acquisition Act within 10 years from the date
on which the final Development Plan came into force, the
acquisition proceedings commenced by the State Government
under sub-s. (2) of s. 126 at the instance of the Planning
Authority were not valid inasmuch as the issuance of the
impugned notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
for the reservation of the property under the final
Development Plan for a recreation ground was not within the
period of six months as-required under s. 127. According to
the learned Single Judge, the period of six months
prescribed under s. 127 of the Act begin to run on the date
of service of the purchase notice on the Corporation and
therefore the Corporation had to take steps to acquire the
property before January 4, 1978. The Corporation not having
taken any steps till the expiry of the period of six months,
the resolution dated January 10, 1978 passed to acquire the
property and the consequent notification dated April 7, 1978
were invalid and of no legal consequence In other words, he
held that the commencement of the statutory period of six
months was not dependent upon the directions issued by the
officers
28
of the Planning Authority, nor could the officers extend the
period fixed under s. 127. As regards the practice prevalent
in the Corporation to compute the period of six months from
the date of receipt of the information sought, he held that
it was wholly unwarranted and entirely illegal. He
accordingly struck down the impugned notification under s. 6
of the Land Acquisition Act and declared that the
reservation of the land under the Development Plan had
lapsed and it was open to the tenants of the property to
claim that due to the lapse of reservation, the Planning
Authority and the State Government had no jurisdiction to
acquire the land in exercise of the powers under s.126 of
the Act.
Aggrieved, the appellant carried an appeal to a
Division Bench under s. 15 of the Letters Patent. Bharucha,
J. speaking for himself and Desai, J. upheld the view of the
learned Single Judge and held that the most crucial step was
the application to be made by the Corporation to the State
Government under s. 126(1) of the Act for acquisition of the
land, it ought to have been taken within the period of six
months commencing from July 4, 1977, the date of service of
the purchase notice. That decision proceeds upon the view
that the details of ownership or particulars of tenants are
not required to be furnished in the purchase notice served
by the owner or any person interested in the land. All that
is required is that the owner or the person interested in
the land must inform the authority that the land reserved
for any plan under the Act had not been acquired by
agreement within 10 years from the date on which the plan
came into force and that proceedings for acquisition of such
land under the Land Acquisition Act had not been commenced
within that period. It was accordingly held that the
purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 served by respondents
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nos. 4-7, the trustees, was a valid notice under s. 127 of
the Act and therefore the period of six months specified in
s. 127 commenced running from July 4, 1977, the date of
service, and came to an end on January 4, 1978. That being
so, it was held that upon the expiry of the period of six
months on January 3, 1978, the reservation of the land for
recreation ground lapsed and it was released from such
reservation.
According to the plain reading of s. 127 of the Act, it
is manifest that the question whether the reservation has
lapsed due to the failure of the Planning Authority to take
any steps within a period of six months of the date of
service of the notice of purchase as stipulated by s. 126,
is a mixed question of fact and law. It would therefore be
difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a rule
29
of universal application. It cannot be posited that the
period of six months would necessarily begin to run from the
date of service of a purchase notice under s. 127 of the
Act. The condition pre-requisite for the running of time
under s. 127 is the service of a valid purchase notice. It
is needless to stress that the Corporation must prima facie
be satisfied that the notice served was by the owner of the
affected land or any person interested in the land. But, at
the same time, s. 127 of the Act does not contemplate an
investigation into title by the officers of the Planning
Authority, nor can the officers prevent the running of time
if there is a valid notice. Viewed in that perspective, the
High Court rightly held that the Executive Engineer of the
Municipal Corporation was not justified in addressing the
letter dated July 29, 1977 by which he required respondents
nos. 4-7, the trustees, to furnish information regarding
their title and ownership, and also to furnish particulars
of the tenants, the nature and user of the tenements and the
total area occupied by them at present. The Corporation had
the requisite information in their records. The High Court
was therefore right in reaching the conclusion that it did.
In the present case, the Planning Authority was the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. It cannot be
doubted that the Municipal Corporation has access to all
land records including the records pertaining to cadastral
survey no. 176 of Tardeo. We are inclined to the view that
the aforesaid letter dated July 28, 1977 addressed by the
Executive Engineer was just as attempt to prevent the
running of time and was of little or no consequence. As was
rightly pointed out by respondents nos. 4-7 in their reply
dated August 3, 1977, there was no question of the period of
six months being reckoned from the date of the receipt from
them of the information requisitioned. The Municipal
Corporation had been assessing the trust properties to
property tax and issuing periodic bills and receipts
therefor and obviously could not question the title or
ownership of the trust. We are informed that the building
being situate on Falkland Road, the occupants are mostly
dancing girls and this is in the knowledge of the
Corporation authorities. The rateable value of each tenement
would also be known by an inspection of the assessment
registers. We must accordingly uphold the finding arrived at
by the High Court that the appellant having failed to take
any steps, namely, of making an application to the State
Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition
Act within a period of six months from the date of service
of the purchase notice, the impugned notification issued by
the State Government under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
making the requisite declaration that such land was required
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for a public purpose i.e. for a recreation ground was
invalid, null and void.
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While the contention of learned counsel appearing for
the appellant that the words ’six months from the date of
service of such notice’ in s. 127 of the Act were not
susceptible of a literal construction, must be accepted, it
must be borne in mind that the period of six months provided
by s. 127 upon the expiry of which the reservation of the
land under a Development Plan lapses, is a valuable
safeguard to the citizen against arbitrary and irrational
executive action. Section 127 of the Act is a fetter upon
the power of eminent domain. By enacting s. 127 the
legislature has struck a balance between the competing
claims of the interests of the general public as regards the
rights of an individual. An analysis of s. 126 would reveal
that after publication of a draft regional plan, a
development or any other plan or town planning scheme, any
land is required or reserved for any of the public purposes
specified therein, the Planning Authority, Development
Authority or as the case may be, any Appropriate Authority
may, except as provided in s. 113A, at any time acquire the
land either by agreement or make an application to the State
Government for acquisition of such land under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the
State Government may on receipt of the applications
contemplated by s. 126(1) or if the Government (except in
cases falling under s. 49 and except as provided in s.
113A) is itself of opinion that any land included in any
such plan is needed for any public purpose, it may make a
declaration to that effect in the final gazette, in the
manner provided in s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in
respect of the said land. The rule is subject to an
exception. Proviso to s. 126(2) interdicts that no such
declaration shall be made after the expiry of three years
from the date of publication of the draft regional plan,
development plan or any other plan. Sub-s. (3) deals with
the procedure to be followed for acquisition of the land
covered by a declaration under s. 6 of the p Land
Acquisition Act. Sub-s. (4) is of some relevance and reads
as follows:
"(4). If a declaration is not made within the
period referred to in sub-section (2) or having
been made, the aforesaid period expired on the
commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning (Amendment) Act, 1970, the State
Government may make a fresh declaration for
acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, in the manner provided by sub-sections (2)
and (3) of this section, subject to the
modification that the market value of the land
shall be market value at the date of declaration
in the official Gazette made for acquiring the
land afresh."
31
The conjoint effect of sub-ss. ( 1), (2) and (4) of s.
126 is that if no declaration is made within the period
referred to in sub-s. (2), that is to say, before the expiry
of three years from the date of publication of the draft
regional plan, development plan or any other plan, the
compensation payable to the owner of the land for such
acquisition, in that event, shall be the market value on the
date of the fresh declaration under s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act i.e. the market value not at the date of the
notification under s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act but
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the market value at the date of declaration under s. 6. That
is one of the safeguards provided under the Act.
Another safeguard provided is the one under s. 127 of
the Act. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition
that the period of six months would always begin to run from
the date of service of notice. The Corporation is entitled
to be satisfied that the purchase notice under s. 127 of the
Act has been served by the owner or any person interested in
the land. If there is no such notice by the owner or any
person, there is no question of the reservation, allotment
or designation of the land under a development plan of
having lapsed. It a fortiori follows that in the absence of
a valid notice under s. 127, there is no question of the
land becoming available to the owner for the purpose of
development or otherwise. In the present case, these
considerations do not arise. We must hold in agreement with
the High Court that the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977
served by respondents nos. 4-7 was valid notice and
therefore the failure of the appellant to take any steps for
the acquisition of the land within the period of six months
therefrom, the reservation of the land in the Development
Plan for a recreation ground lapsed and consequently, the
impugned notification dated April 7, 1978 under s. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act issued by the State Government must be
struck down as a nullity.
Section 127 of the Act is a part of the law for
acquisition of lands required for public purposes, namely,
for implementation of schemes of town planning. The
statutory bar created by s. 127 providing that reservation
of land under a development scheme shall lapse if no steps
are taken for acquisition of land within a period of six
months from the date of service of the purchase notice, is
an integral part of the machinery created by which
acquisition of land takes place. The word ’aforesaid’ in the
collocation of the words ’no steps as aforesaid are
commenced for its acquisition’ obviously refer to the steps
contemplated by s. 126(1). The effect of a declaration by
the State Government under sub-s. (2) thereof, if it is
satisfied that the
32
land is required for the implementation of a regional plan,
development plan or any other town planning scheme, followed
by the requisite declaration to that effect in the official
gazette, in the manner provided by s. 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, is to freeze the prices of the lands
affected. The Act lays down the principles of fixation by
providing firstly, by the proviso to s. 126(2) that no such
declaration under sub-s. (2) shall be made after the expiry
of three years from the date of publication of the draft
regional plan, development plan or any other plan, secondly,
by enacting sub-s. (4) of s. 126 that if a declaration is
not made within the period referred to in sub-s. (2), the
State Government may make a fresh declaration but, in that
event, the market value of the land shall be the market
value at the date of the declaration under s. 6 and not the
market value at the date of the notification under s. 4, and
thirdly, by s. 127 that if any land reserved, allotted or
designated for any purpose in any development plan is not
acquired by agreement within 10 years from the date on which
a final regional plan or development plan comes into force
or if proceedings for the acquisition of such land under the
Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such period,
such land shall be deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation and become available
to the owner for the purpose of development on the failure
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of the Appropriate Authority to initiate any steps for its
acquisition within a period of six months from the date of
service of a notice by the owner or any person interested in
the land. It cannot be doubted that a period of 10 years is
long enough. The Development or the Planning Authority must
take recourse to acquisition with some amount of promptitude
in order that the compensation paid to the expropriated
owner bears a just relation to the real value of the land as
otherwise, the compensation paid for the acquisition would
be wholly illusory. Such fetter on statutory powers is in
the interest of the general public and the conditions
subject to which they can be exercised must be strictly
followed.
There still remain the other two points raised, namely,
(i) There was waiver or abandonment of right by respondents
nos. 4-7, the trustees, to question the validity of the
acquisition proceedings; and (ii) There was inordinate delay
or laches on the part of respondent no. 1 which disentitled
it to grant of relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We
find it difficult to give effect to these contentions.
In order to deal with these questions, a few facts are
to be stated. The Executive Engineer of the Municipal
Corporation by his letter dated November 2, 1977 addressed
to the lawyer acting on be-
33
half of respondents nos. 4-7, the trustees, to inquire
whether they were prepared to sell the property in question
situate at Cadastral Survey no. 176 of Taradeo. In response
thereto, respondents nos. 4-7 through their lawyer’s reply
dated November 18, 1977 intimated that they were prepared to
consider the sale of the property in its existing condition
with all the structures tenanted or otherwise at an overall
rate of Rs.650 per square metre. This response was without
prejudice and they expressly stated that the offer was made
without admitting the power and authority of the appellant
to acquire the land or to initiate the proceedings for
acquisition. Instead of accepting the same, the Executive
Engineer by his letter dated January 11, 1978 wanted
respondents nos. 4-7 to disclose the basis upon which they
claimed price at the rate of Rs.650 per square metre. While
keeping respondents nos. 4-7 in suspense, the Municipal
Corporation had in the meanwhile on January 10, 1978 passed
a Resolution that necessary steps be taken to move the State
Government for acquisition of the land and thereafter
actually moved the Government by their letter dated January
31, 1978 to make the requisite declaration under s. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 i.e. the property in question was
needed for, public purpose viz. a recreation ground under
the Development Plan. The State Government accordingly on
April 7, 1978 on being satisfied that the property was
needed issued the requisite impugned notification under s. 6
of the Act. Thereafter, the Special Land Acquisition officer
on January 18, 1979 issued a general notice under s. 9 of
the Land Acquisition Act and the same was published at the
site and also issued individual notices to the persons
interested. The hearing was fixed for February 26, 1979. On
February 22, 1979 i.e. four days before the hearing some of
the tenants approached the Special Land Acquisition officer
and applied for three months’ adjournment and accordingly
the bearing was adjourned to April 24, 1979. However, no
claims for compensation were filed. Nobody remained present
at the hearing. Accordingly, the Special Land Acquisition
officer was constrained to issue fresh notices under s. 9 on
May 25, 1981. Thereafter, the Municipal Corporation on the
date fixed applied to the Special Land Acquisition officer
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to keep the proceedings in abeyance at the behest of some of
the tenants who had applied to the Corporation for three
months’ time. In the circumstances, respondents nos. 4-7
moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for
a writ in the nature of mandamus requiring the Special Land
Acquisition officer to make an award. On January 20, 1981,
the learned Government Advocate gave an undertaking before
the High Court that the Special Land Acquisition officer
would declare the award within a period of six months
34
and make payment of compensation within eight months. In
view of this, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as
not pressed.
On these facts, it cannot be said that there was any
waiver or abandonment of rights by respondents nos. 4-7. In
order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a
waiver is an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there
is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of conduct
and must necessarily be determined on the facts of each
case. In the present case, respondents nos. 4-7 had without
admitting that the appellant had the authority or power to
initiate the proceedings for acquisition, signified their
willingness to sell the property subject to certain terms.
But the appellant did not accept the offer. On the contrary,
the appellant took further steps for the acquisition of the
land by moving the State Government under s. 126(1) of the
Act to initiate acquisition proceedings by the issuance of a
notification under s. 6 of the land Acquisition Act. In view
of this, it cannot be said that the conduct of respondents
nos. 4-7 was such as warrants an inference of relinquishment
by a known existing legal right.
There is no question of estoppel, waiver or
abandonment. There is no specific plea of waiver,
acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of
right. That apart, the question of waiver really does not
arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties
to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question
of waiver of rights by respondents nos. 4-7 not would this
disentitle the tenants from maintaining the writ petition.
The objection that there was undue delay in moving the High
Court cannot prevail. The reservation has lapsed,
acquisition upon such reservation is bad and the delay in
filing the petition, such as it is, can make no difference
to this position in law.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.
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