Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2108 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19738/2017)
AKHILESH SINGH @ AKHILESHWAR SINGH …APPELLANT
VERSUS
LAL BABU SINGH & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This appeal has been filed against the judgment of
Patna High Court dated 08.03.2017 in First Appeal No.
704/1976 by which the First Appeal filed by defendants to
the suit has been allowed setting aside the judgment and
decree of the trial court decreeing the partition suit.
2. The brief facts of the case which need to be noted
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHWANI KUMAR
Date: 2018.02.21
17:00:38 IST
Reason:
for deciding this appeal are:-
Title Suit No. 406/1973 was filed by one Sheo
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Prasad Singh (Grandfather of appellant before us) and
th
his three sons seeking partition of their 1/4 share
in joint family properties described in Schedule B, C
and D of the plaint. In the plaint, it was pleaded
that plaintiffs and defendants are descendants of a
common ancestor. Kalpoo Singh had four sons.
Plaintiffs represented branch of Sheo Prasad Singh
whereas defendants represented other three branches.
It was pleaded that there was a disruption in the
joint family in or around 1963. Whereafter, all the
branches of Kalpoo Singh separated in their mess,
business and worship but cultureable land and
residential houses remained joint. Order passed by
Commissioner, Patna Division arising out of a
proceeding for mutation on respective land was also
in question. Trial court vide its judgment and
decree dated 10.08.1976 decreed the suit of the
th
plaintiff declaring 1/4 share of the plaintiff in
the properties described in Schedule B, C and D. The
defendants Lal Babu Singh & Ors. filed First Appeal
No. 704 of 1976 against the judgment and decree of
the trial court. During pendency of the First Appeal,
the defendants-respondents, who were appellant in
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First Appeal, filed various applications under Order
LXI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure for acceptance of
additional evidence in the First Appeal. The first
application under Order LXI Rule 27 was filed on
27.10.1997 for accepting a Sale Deed dated 27.08.1992
on the record. Other applications filed for
accepting additional evidence were I.A. No. 6457 of
1998, I.A. No. 3731 of 2011 and I.A. No. 5195 of
2016. High Court has passed an order on the I.A.s
that applications shall be heard at the time of
hearing of the appeal. The First Appeal came to be
heard by the High Court on 08.03.2017. At the time
of hearing, unfortunately, nobody appeared on behalf
of appellant, who was respondent in the First Appeal.
The High Court after hearing the learned counsel for
the defendants-respondents allowed I.A. No. 6457 of
1998, I.A. No. 3731 of 2011 and I.A. No. 5195 of 2016
by accepting the additional evidence, which was
sought to be brought on record. Simultaneously, the
High Court proceeded with the hearing of the appeal
and relying on additional evidence allowed the First
Appeal setting aside the judgment and decree of the
trial court. The appellant aggrieved by the judgment
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of the High court has come up in this appeal.
3.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in
event the High Court decided to admit the additional
evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the High Court
ought to have given opportunity to the
plaintiff-respondent to rebut the additional evidence
brought on record by the defendants. The High Court
having not given any such opportunity to plaintiff
has committed serious error of procedure, which has
caused great prejudice to present appellant vitiating
the entire judgment of the High Court. It is
submitted that the High Court in the additional
evidence has relied on certain admissions by the
appellant and other co-sharers whereas the appellant
was not given any opportunity by the Court to lead
evidence in rebuttal and explain the additional
evidence relied by defendants-respondents. Learned
counsel submits that the reliance on such additional
evidence without giving opportunity to lead evidence
in rebuttal had vitiated the entire procedure adopted
by the High Court, vitiating the judgment and decree
of the High Court.
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4.
Learned counsel for the respondents refuting the
submission of the counsel for appellant contends that
the High Court has rightly relied on the admissions
contained in the additional evidence, which was
admitted by the High Court since although respective
I.A.s were filed long before but neither any counter
affidavit to the I.A.s nor any explanations were
ever submitted by the plaintiff appellant. The High
Court thus has no choice except to proceed to decide
appeals relying on the additional evidence admitted
in the Court. It is submitted that the execution of
sale deeds which were relied, was never disputed nor
the statements contained in the sale deeds were even
disputed by plaintiff-appellant before the High
Court. Hence, no error has been committed by the High
Court in relying on the additional evidence. He
submits that the High Court itself has noticed in the
order that I.A.s filed by defendants-respondents for
accepting additional evidence were never objected by
filing a counter affidavit by the plaintiff.
5.
Learned counsel further submits that there being
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clear admissions in the sale deeds, which were
brought on the record that there has been partition
in the family, suit of the plaintiff for partition
has rightly been dismissed.
6. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
7.
The submission which has been pressed before us by
the learned counsel for the appellant that the High
Court ought to have granted opportunity to the
plaintiffs-appellants, who were respondents in the
First Appeal before the High Court after accepting
the additional evidence as prayed by
defendant-appellant in the First Appeal; we thus
confine our consideration to this issue alone.
8. The record reveals that additional evidence, which
was sought to be taken on record by the defendants,
who were appellants before the High Court were all
the evidences, which came into existence after the
decree of the trial court. The applications filed
under Order
LXI Rule 27 CPC have been considered by the High
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Court in Paragraphs 22 to 25 of its judgment. The
application dated 27.10.1997 having been rejected by
the High Court, no further comment is needed. After
referring to the other I.A.s in Paragraphs 23, 24 and
25 of the judgment, the High Court allowed the three
I.A.s, namely, I.A. No. 6457 of 1998, I.A. No. 3731
of 2011 and I.A. No. 5195 of 2016 and relying on the
additional evidence, brought on the record and
referring to admissions in the said documents, the
High Court has allowed the First Appeal by setting
aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. In
Para 26, 30 and 31, following has been stated:-
“26. It may be mentioned here that all these
documents were not available during the trial
and moreover, these documents are the
documents of the plaintiffs-respondents and
the appellants had no knowledge earlier.
During the pendency of this appeal, these
documents have been executed by the
plaintiffs-respondents wherein they clearly
admitted the previous partition between four
branches i.e. sons of Kalpoo Singh and even
they admitted inter se partition between
themselves. It is not their statement in the
sale deeds or the plaint or the application
that partition is effected after disposal of
partition suit. In all the sale deeds, the
application, the plaintiffs themselves
admitted previous partition between the
parties i.e. prior to institution of the suit
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for partition. The appellants claimed previous
partition in the year 1958-59 whereas the
plaintiffs admitted in the plaint filed by
them for inter se partition that there had
already been partition between four brothers
in 1965. Now, therefore, only dispute between
the parties is in which year partition took
place. It may be mentioned here that this
partition suit is of the year 1973. Therefore,
whether partition took place in 1958-59 or in
the year 1965, it is irrelevant because prior
to the present partition suit the parties have
already partitioned the suit property.
30. In view of my above discussion, the three
I.As. filed by the appellants are hereby
allowed and on the basis of the evidences
discussed above, I come to the conclusion that
the appellants have been able to prove that
there had already been partition as claimed by
the defendants-appellants. There is no unity
of title and possession between the parties.
It appears that the court below has not
properly appreciated the evidences as
discussed above and moreover, the documentary
evidences produced by the appellants by way of
additional evidences were not available during
trial. Thus, the finding of the learned trial
court is hereby reversed.
31. In the result, this First Appeal is
allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are
set aside. The plaintiffs-respondent's suit
for partition is hereby dismissed.”
9.
It is also relevant to note that the High Court in
its judgment in Para 11 has stated that applications
were directed to be heard at the time of hearing and
although the I.A.s had been filed long ago nor any
counter-affidavit or any reply has been filed and
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nobody appeared to controvert the case of the
appellant.
10.
As noticed above, the High Court while allowing the
I.A.s and accepting the additional evidence on record
proceeded to pronounce the judgment simultaneously.
The question to be answered in this appeal is as to
whether the High Court ought to have granted an
opportunity to the defendant-appellant, who was
respondent in the First Appeal to lead evidence in
rebuttal or to give an opportunity to explain the
alleged admissions, which were relied by the
defendant-appellant before the High Court.
11.
Order LXI Rule 27 of the CPC, which deals with the
provision of additional evidence in Appellate Court
provides for the grounds and circumstances on which
the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or
documents or witnesses to be examined. Order LXI
Rule 27 sub-rule(2) further provides that wherever
additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an
Appellate Court, the court shall record a reason for
its admission. Order LXI Rule 27 is silent as to the
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procedure to be adopted by the High court after
admission of additional evidence. Whether after
admission of additional evidence, it is necessary for
the Appellate Court to grant opportunity to the other
party to lead evidence in rebuttal or to give any
opportunity is not expressly provided in Order LXI
Rule 27.
12.
One provision, which is part of Order LXI, which also
needs to be noted is Order LXI Rule 2, which is as
follows:-
| 2. Grounds which may be taken in ap-<br>peal.- The appellant shall not, ex-<br>cept by leave of the court, urge or<br>be heard in support of any ground of<br>objection not set forth in the memo-<br>randum of appeal; but the appellate<br>court, in deciding the appeal, shall<br>not be confined to the grounds of ob-<br>jections set forth in the memorandum<br>of appeal or taken by leave of the<br>court under this rule:<br>Provided that the Court shall not<br>rest its decision on any other ground<br>unless the party who may be affected<br>thereby has had a sufficient opportu-<br>nity of contesting the case on that<br>ground. |
|---|
13. Order LXI Rule 2 provides that the appellant shall
not, except by leave of the court, be allowed to urge
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any ground in the appeal, which is not set forth in
the memorandum of appeal. The proviso to Order LXI
Rule 2 engrafts a rule, which obliged the Court to
grant a sufficient opportunity to the contesting
party, if any new ground is allowed to be urged by
another party, which may affect the contesting party.
The provision engrafts rule of natural justice and
fair play that contesting party should be given
opportunity to meet any new ground sought to be
urged. When Appellate Court admits the additional
evidence under Order LXI Rule 27, we fail to see any
reason for not following the same course of granting
an opportunity to the contesting party, which may be
affected by acceptance of additional evidence. In the
present case, additional evidence, which were brought
on the record were registered sale deeds, which were
executed by present appellant and his other
co-sharers and what was relied before the High Court
was that the appellant admitted in the sale deeds
that the partition has been taken place in the
family. The main issue in the First Appeal before
the High Court was as to whether the finding of the
trial court that no partition by metes and bounds
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taken place in the family is correct or not. The
additional evidence which was admitted has been
relied by the High Court while allowing the appeal.
It was in the interest of justice that High Court
ought to have allowed opportunity to the plaintiffs,
who were respondents to the First Appeal to either
lead an evidence in rebuttal or to explain the
alleged admissions as relied by the defendants. The
mere fact that no counter affidavit was filed to the
I.A.s was not decisive. Since I.A.s having not been
admitted, occasion for counter affidavit did not
arise at any earlier point of time. The High Court on
the same day, i.e. 08.03.2017 has allowed the I.A.s
as well as the First Appeal. The fact that
contesting respondents to the First Appeal, who are
appellant before us were not represented at the time
of hearing of the First Appeal, was not a reason for
not giving opportunity to them to lead evidence in
rebuttal.
14. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Land
Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board
Vs. H. Narayanaiah & Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 9 had
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occasion to consider Order LXI Rule 27 in context of
admission of additional evidence by Appellate Court.
This Court had observed that in event the High Court
admits an additional evidence, an opportunity should
have been given to the other party to rebut any
inference arising from its existence by leading
evidence. In Para 28 of the judgment, following has
been laid down:-
“ 28. The Karnataka High Court had, however,
not complied with provisions of Order 41 Rule
27 of the CPC which require that an appellate
court should be satisfied that the additional
evidence is required to enable it either to
pronounce judgment or for any other substan-
tial cause. It had recorded no reasons to show
that it had considered the requirements of
Rule 27 Order 41 of the CPC We are of opinion
that the High Court should have recorded its
reasons to show why it found the admission of
such evidence to be necessary for some sub-
stantial reason. And if it found it necessary
to admit it, an opportunity should have been
given to the appellant to rebut any inference
arising from its existence by leading other
evidence.”
(emphasis supplied by us)
15. To the same effect is another judgment of this Court
in the case of Shalimar Chemical Works Limited Vs.
Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) & Ors.,
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(2010) 8 SCC 423. In this case also, the Court had
occasion to consider Order LXI Rule 27, this Court
has again laid down that when documents are taken in
additional evidence, an opportunity ought to have
been given to other party to lead evidence in
rebuttal. In the above case also, the High Court
simultaneously proceeded to decide the appeal
alongwith admitting additional evidence on record.
In Paragraphs 16 to 18 following has been laid down:-
“ 16. The learned Single Judge rightly allowed
the appellant’s plea for production of the
original certificates of registration of trade
mark as additional evidence because that was
simply in the interest of justice and there
was sufficient statutory basis for that under
clause (b) of Order 41 Rule 27. But then the
Single Judge seriously erred in proceeding si-
multaneously to allow the appeal and not giv-
ing the respondent-defendants an opportunity
to lead evidence in rebuttal of the documents
taken in as additional evidence.
17. The Division Bench was again wrong in tak-
ing the view that in the facts of the case,
the production of additional evidence was not
permissible under Order 41 Rule 27. As shown
above, the additional documents produced by
the appellant were liable to be taken on
record as provided under Order 41 Rule 27(b)
in the interest of justice. But it was cer-
tainly right in holding that the way the
learned Single Judge disposed of the appeal
caused serious prejudice to the respondent-de-
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fendants. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, therefore, the proper course for the
Division Bench was to set aside the order of
the learned Single Judge without disturbing it
insofar as it took the originals of the cer-
tificates of registration produced by the ap-
pellant on record and to remand the matter to
give opportunity to the respondent-defendants
to produce evidence in rebuttal if they so de-
sired. We, accordingly, proceed to do so.
18. The judgment and order dated 25-4-2003
passed by the Division Bench is set aside and
the matter is remitted to the learned Single
Judge to proceed in the appeal from the stage
the originals of the registration certificates
were taken on record as additional evidence.
The learned Single Judge may allow the respon-
dent-defendants to lead any rebuttal evidence
or make a limited remand as provided under Or-
der 41 Rule 28.”
16. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents that execution of sale deeds was never
denied by the present appellant before the High
Court, hence no error has been committed by the High
Court in relying on the contents in the sale deed
cannot be accepted. Even if, execution of sale deeds
was not denied, the Appellate Court before which any
statement in sale deeds is relied ought to have given
an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal or to
explain the admission. Opportunity to explain the
admission contained in the sale deeds was necessary
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to be given to the contesting party in the facts of
the present case. We thus are of the opinion that
the High Court erred in simultaneously proceeding
with the hearing of the appeal after admitting
additional evidence on record. The High Court ought
to have given opportunity to contesting respondents
in the First Appeal to lead evidence in rebuttal or
to explain the alleged admission as contained in the
sale deed, which having not been done, the order and
judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
The High Court may now proceed to decide the appeal
afresh after giving an opportunity to the present
appellant to lead evidence in rebuttal. The appeal
before the High Court being pending since 1976, we
expect that the High Court should conclude the entire
process expeditiously preferably within a period of
six months from the date of production of this
judgment before the High Court. We make it clear
that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of
the case and it is for the High Court to consider the
First Appeal on merits afresh and take a decision in
accordance with law. In result, this appeal is
allowed, judgment and decree of the High Court is set
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aside. The First Appeal be decided by the High Court
afresh as observed above. Parties shall bear their
own costs.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 21, 2018.
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ITEM NO.1503 COURT NO.6 SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 2108/2018
AKHILESH SINGH @ AKHILESHWAR SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
LAL BABU SINGH & ORS. Respondent(s)
(HEARD BY: HON. A.K.SIKRI AND HON. ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ. )
Date : 21-02-2018 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Bipin Bihari Singh, Adv.
Moni Cinmoy, Adv.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Somanatha Padhan, Adv.
Mr. Ashok Anand, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Suhaas Ratna Joshi, AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan pronounced the judgment of
the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri and His
Lordship.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of
accordingly.
(Ashwani Thakur) (Mala Kumari Sharma)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)