Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1776 of 2008
PETITIONER:
Subodh Kumar Jaiswal and Ors
RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/03/2008
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1776 OF 2008
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.12364/2006)
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1777 OF 2008
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1178/2007)
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court allowing the writ
petitions filed by Gulabrao Dharmu Pol, respondent No.4 in
appeal relating to SLP ( C ) No.12364/2006 and Mr. Suresh A.
Kakkar, respondent No.4 in appeal relating to SLP (C)
No.1178/2007.
3. A brief reference to the factual position would suffice.
The position as obtaining in the appeal relating to S.L.P.(C)
No.12364/2006 is noted as the factual scenario is common to
both the appeals.
On 18.4.1979, respondent No.4 was appointed as trainee
Deputy Superintendent of Police by the Government of
Maharashtra subject to completion of training, practical
training and passing of tests in certain subjects. According to
the appellants, only if these conditions are fulfilled, he was to
be appointed on regular basis to a cadre post in the cadre of
Dy.SP/ACP. In other words, it is stated that on completion of
the probation satisfactorily, respondent No.4 was appointed to
the cadre post and started officiating as Dy.SP/ACP on regular
basis w.e.f. 3.8.1981 in terms of the Home Department,
Government of Maharashtra Order dated 1.2.1982. The
appellants were directly recruited to the Indian Police Service
(in short ’IPS’) and allocated to the State of Maharashtra with
the allotment year as 1985. By order dated 13.4.1989,
respondent No.4 was confirmed as DSP w.e.f. 31.12.1987.
According to the appellants, there was no challenge to the
delay, if any, in his confirmation. On 3.8.1989, in terms of the
third proviso to Regulation 5(2) of the applicable Regulations,
i.e. Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion)
Regulations, 1955 (in short ’Regulation’) he became eligible for
consideration for promotion to the IPS on completion of eight
years of continuous service in the post of DSP in the State
cadre. On 26.2.1990, the Selection Committee met and
considered the candidates who were substantive Dy.SPs who
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were eligible as on 1.1.1990 including respondent No.4. On
8.3.1991, respondent No.4 was promoted to IPS along with
seven others, including Shri S.A. Khopde. They all became
juniors to the appellants who were appointed at least six years
earlier. Respondent No.4 did not press his claim for
consideration for promotion in the year 1988 itself. On
9.2.1993, he and other promotees of his batch were confirmed
in the IPS w.e.f. 8.3.1992. They were given 1987 as the year of
allotment in the IPS. On 27.7.1994, a representation was
made by respondent No.4 to treat 1984 as the year of
allotment by treating him as having been appointed in the year
1988 iteself. Subsequently, another representation was made
in January, 1995. O.A.No.807/1996 was filed before the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (in short, the
Tribunal) praying for appropriate year of allotment in the IPS
on the ground that though he was eligible, he was not
considered for the vacancies of 1988. The Union of India and
the Union Public Service Commission (in short, ’UPSC’)
resisted the claim of respondent No.4. The Tribunal dismissed
the O.A. inter-alia holding that the O.A. was barred by time
and suffered from delay and laches as the respondent No.4
made a representation for the first time on 27.7.1994, much
after his alleged claim for the year of allotment being 1988. It
was held that if his claims were to be allowed, it would
unsettle the settled position for about eight years. The review
petition filed by respondent No.4 was also dismissed. A writ
petition was filed by respondent No.4 challenging the
judgments of the Tribunal. The same was allowed by
condoning the delay in approaching the Tribunal and it was
directed that the official respondents were to redetermine his
year of allotment as 1987 (which was later corrected to be
1988). It was also held that if respondent No.4 was eligible for
being considered for the vacancies in 1988, his seniority shall
be determined treating him as entitled to be promoted in the
year 1988 and his year of allotment should be determined
accordingly. A contempt petition (C.P.No.10/2006) was filed
by respondent No.4 and the Union of India implemented the
judgment of the High Court without preparing any seniority
list for the year 1988 by changing his year of allotment from
1987 to 1984 and placing him above the appellants who were
direct recruits of the year 1985. This was done under threat of
contempt. The High Court disposed of the contempt petition
as not pressed since the judgment had been complied with.
As the appellants were not parties before the High Court, after
obtaining permission to file S.L.P., the Special Leave Petitions
were filed.
4. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants,
primarily challenged the judgment of the High Court on the
ground that the appellants who would be directly affected by
the order of the High Court were not parties before the High
Court. In any event, there was not even an application for
condonation of delay in moving the Tribunal. A stale claim
purportedly relating to 1988 was raised for the first time in
1994. The High Court could not have directed that the official
respondents were to determine the seniority of respondent
No.4 treating his year of allotment as 1988 and he was entitled
to be promoted in the vacancies occurring in the year 1988. It
was further submitted that had the appellants been impleaded
as parties, they could have pointed out the fallacy in the claim
of respondent No.4 and as to how he was not entitled to be
considered for promotion. Learned counsel for respondent
No.4, however, submitted that no direct relief was claimed
against the appellants and, therefore, there was no need to
implead them as parties. Additionally, it is submitted that
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when respondent No.4 noticed that his claim has been
bypassed without any legitimate reason, he made the
representation. From the stand of the Union of India, it
appears that the proper course was to prepare three separate
lists, which is the normal procedure, for the years in question
if for any year the selection was not held. But that apparently
was not done in view of the High Court’s direction. The writ
petition before the High Court related to both eligibility and
promotion.
5. As has been pointed out by learned counsel for the
appellants, there are two channels for appointment to the IPS,
one is by promotion from the service candidates and the other
is by direct recruitment. The direction of the High Court is
some-what confusing. The same reads as follows:
"13. Under the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, especially in the light of the
above two Supreme Court Judgments, in
Union of India and Others V/s. Vipinchandra
Hiralal Shah \026 (1997) Supreme Court Cases (L
& S) 41, and Devendra Narayan Singh and
Others V/s. State of Bihar and Others \026 AIR
1997 SC 595, we set aside both the aforesaid
orders of Central Administrative Tribunal and
we hold that in the case of the petitioner, the
year of allotment would be 1987 and he is
eligible for being considered for promotion in
the vacancies occurring in the year 1988. Our
view that in the case of the petitioner, the year
of allotment would be 1987 is reiterated by the
Government of India’s communication to the
Petitioner dated 26th May, 1994. In the light of
the above, the Respondents shall determined
the Petitioner’s seniority treating his year of
allotment as 1987 and that the Petitioner was
entitled to be promoted in the vacancies
occurring in the year 1988 itself. Rule is
accordingly made absolute with costs."
Subsequently, para 13 was corrected to read as follows:
"Now the corrected Paragraph 13 in our
aforesaid judgment and order will read as
under:
"Under the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, especially in the light
of the above two supreme Judgments,
in Union of India and Others V/s.
Vipinchandra Hiralal Shah \026 (1997)
Supreme Court Cases (L&S) 41, and
Devendra Narayan Singh and Others
V/s. State of Bihar and Others \026 AIR
1997 SC 595, we set aside both the
aforesaid orders of Central
Administrative Tribunal and we hold
that in the case of the petitioner, he is
eligible for being considered for
promotion in the vacancies occurring
in the year 1988. In the light of the
above, the Respondents shall
determine the Petitioners seniority
treating the Petitioners as entitled to
be promoted in the vacancies
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occurring in the year 1988 itself and
his year of allotment/seniority should
be determined accordingly. Rule is
accordingly made absolute with costs."
6. Somewhat inconsistent directions were given; first was to
consider the year of allotment to be 1987 and consider
respondent No.4’s case. Subsequent part was the conclusion
that respondent No.4 was entitled to promotion. It is pointed
out by learned counsel for the Union of India and the State of
Maharashtra that if all eligible persons are to be impleaded,
that would be impossible because it is not known how many
persons all over the country would be affected. We find that
nobody else has moved this Court. Therefore, that question
may not strictly arise for consideration in the present case.
Additionally, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the
appellants, there was practically no explanation for the belated
approach to the Tribunal, and the normal procedure of
preparing year-wise seniority list was given a go bye because
of High Court ’s direction.
7. Be that as it may, in our view, the judgment of the High
Court is clearly inconsistent and is set aside. We direct the
Central Government to draw up year-wise lists for the
concerned years, determine the eligibility of respondent No.4
and take a decision in that regard within a period of two
months from today. Needless to say that the Central
Government, while undertaking the exercise, shall not be
influenced by any observations made by the High Court or by
us in the present judgment. It shall be open to the parties, if
any or all of them affected by the decision, to avail such
remedies as are available in law. We express no opinion in
that regard.
8. By order dated 17.9.2007, a Bench of this Court passed
the following order:
"Government would be entitled to fill in the
vacancies subject to the result of the special
leave petition."
9. If any action has been taken pursuant to the said order,
it shall continue to be operative until fresh decision is taken
by the Central Government. It needs no reiteration that by
giving this protection, we have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the case.
10. The appeals are accordingly disposed of without any
order as to costs.