Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 554
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5497 OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 9818/2017]
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
T HE A PPEAL
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2. This civil appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16
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November 2016 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
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Patna allowing the respondents’ intra-court appeal arising from a writ
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petition presented before the High Court by Maharana Pratap Singh .
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The judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 16 July, 2013 was
set aside and resultantly, the writ petition of the appellant stood
Signature Not Verified
1
impugned order
2
High Court
3
L.P.A. No. 516 of 2015
4
C.W.J.C. No. 471 of 2004
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appellant
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.04.23
17:40:10 IST
Reason:
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dismissed. The Single Judge had quashed the order dismissing the
appellant from service and directed that he be reinstated in service with
all consequential benefits from the date of the dismissal.
F ACTS
3. The appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the
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Crime Investigation Department in 1973. He proceeded on earned leave
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for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties on 8 August,
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1988. Incidentally, on 7 August 1988, a First Information Report was
8
registered on the complaint of one Prem Kumar Singh against unknown
persons, giving rise to Kotwali P.S. Case No. 882 of 1988 for offences
under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read with Section 34 of the
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Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The FIR included a request for the formation
of a raiding party to apprehend those who had extorted money from the
informant by blackmailing him. A raiding party was formed, which
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proceeded to raid the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna on 8 August, 1988. The
accused was expected to arrive there to collect ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty
thousand) from the informant. Meanwhile, the appellant was on his way
to the office to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when
the informant handed over the briefcase to the appellant. Subsequently,
the appellant was arrested and was brought to Kotwali Police Station.
6
CID
7
FIR
8
informant
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IPC
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On the same date, i.e., 08 August, 1988, the appellant was placed
under suspension by his superior authority.
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4. On 14 June, 1989, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
appellant by drawing up a memorandum of charges. The memorandum,
duly served on the appellant, levelled 4 (four) charges as detailed under:
i. Based on the written complaint of the informant, a case was
registered under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419, and 34 of the
IPC. In connection with this case, the appellant was arrested while
receiving ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from the informant,
in furtherance of an alleged act of cheating by impersonation and
extortion under duress, at gunpoint .
ii. On 30th June 1976, a case was registered against the appellant
for cheating the Manager of Elphinstone Cinema Hall by falsely
representing himself as a Sub-Inspector of the CID. The appellant
was found guilty of the offence and subsequently punished.
iii. After availing earned leave, the appellant failed to resume his duty
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on 08 August, 1988 without any information although
subsequently, he was arrested by personnel of Kotwali Police
Station on the same day.
iv. The appellant failed to inform the CID Headquarters about his
arrest on 8th August, 1988.
5. In response to the memorandum, the appellant submitted a prayer
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dated 15 March, 1990 requesting that the departmental proceedings
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Proceeding No. 9 of 1989
Page 3 of 30
be conducted only after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The
appellant expressed concern that if the departmental proceedings were
held first and should the appellant cross-examine the witnesses during
the departmental inquiry, his defence is bound to be disclosed; and this
would gravely prejudice him in the criminal proceedings.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s prayer, an inquiry ensued culminating in
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the Inquiry Officer submitting his report on 3 May, 1995 , finding the
appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him.
6. Later, the appellant was served with a second show cause notice by the
12 rd
Superintendent of Police, CID on 23 June, 1995 calling upon him to
show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Copy of the
report of the Inquiry Officer was furnished. The appellant replied to the
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second show cause notice on 11 March, 1996 seeking to point out the
illegalities committed by the Inquiry Officer in course of the inquiry
thereby vitiating the same. Nevertheless, the respondent no. 5 accepted
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the Inquiry Report and, by order dated 14 June, 1996 contained in
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Memo No. 1833 dated 21 June, 1996, dismissed the appellant from
service, with the additional direction that the appellant would not be
entitled to any payment for the period of suspension, except for the
amounts already disbursed to him.
7. Meanwhile, the appellant along with the co-accused was tried and
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convicted by the trial court on 26 April, 1994. The appellant was found
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Inquiry Report
12
respondent no. 5
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guilty of offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC and was
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year.
However, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392 and 419
of the IPC.
8. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence having been carried
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in an appeal by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI,
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Patna , on 16 February, 1996, set aside the judgment and order under
challenge. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, with the appellate
court holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.
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9. The appellant, aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 21 June, 1996
passed by the respondent no. 5, filed an appeal before the Deputy
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Inspector General of Police . However, by an order dated 14 July,
1997, the respondent no. 4 dismissed the appeal and upheld the
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dismissal order passed by the respondent no. 5 dated 21 June, 1996,
based on the report and the findings of the Inquiry Officer .
10. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision before the Director General-
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cum-Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. on 24 September, 1997,
seeking to challenge the appellate order. However, as the revision
17
remained undecided, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High
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Court. The said writ petition was disposed of on 13 May, 2002 with a
direction to the respondent no. 2 to decide the appellant's revision within
13
Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1994
14
sessions judge
15
respondent no. 4
16
respondent no. 2
17
C.W.J.C. No. 5946 of 2002
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two months from the date of the order. In compliance with the said
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direction, the respondent no. 5 on 06 August, 2003 dismissed the
revision, with the result that the dismissal order stood reaffirmed.
P ROCEEDINGS B EFORE T HE S INGLE J UDGE
11. Thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the revision, the appellant
laid a challenge to the revisional order (in which the appellate order and
the original order of dismissal had merged) in the writ petition out of
which this civil appeal arises. The appellant inter alia raised the following
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objections: (i) the Officer-in-Charge was neither examined in the
appellant's presence nor permitted to be cross-examined, rendering the
disciplinary proceedings vitiated; (ii) both the departmental and criminal
proceedings having stemmed from the same facts based on the
informant’s written complaint and identical charges being involved, after
the appellant’s exoneration in the criminal proceedings, rendered the
disciplinary proceedings untenable and should have been dropped; (iii)
the order of dismissal violated principles of natural justice; (iv) the
respondent no. 4 upheld the order of dismissal without affording the
appellant an opportunity to be heard; and (v) the respondent no.2
having a duty to set right the wrong, failed to discharge such duty.
Issuance of a writ of certiorari was sought by the appellant to quash the
impugned orders. Additionally, the appellant sought the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant him all
consequential benefits as if he had never been dismissed from service.
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PW-1
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12. The Single Judge observed, upon an examination of the allegations
made by the informant — who had also submitted a written statement
against the appellant in the department — that the narrative presented
by the informant lacked credibility due to several apparent
inconsistencies. Notably, the question that seemed to trouble the Single
Judge was why a person would enter a hotel room solely for the purpose
of having tea, and why an acquaintance would escort both the informant
19
and Devnath Pathak to the hotel room while leaving a young girl in the
attached toilet. The Single Judge opined that the Inquiry Officer's
reliance on the testimony of PW-1, who was not allowed to be cross-
examined, raised concerns of undue influence. PW-1 had a matrimonial
connection with the family of Virendra Singh, who allegedly had a
strained relationship with the appellant's family, suggesting a personal
motive to act against the appellant. However, the Inquiry Officer failed
to examine or address the appellant’s contention regarding this potential
conflict of interest. The Single Judge further observed that the
respondents' claim, asserting the absence of a written request from the
appellant to the Inquiry Officer for permission to cross-examine PW-1,
was neither legally valid nor proper. The appellant was not required to
submit such a request; rather, it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to
ensure that the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. As a result, testimony of PW-1 could not be relied upon in
the absence of such an opportunity being provided to the appellant.
19
PW-2
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20
13. The decision in Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan was relied on by
the Single Judge to hold that the charges were vague, indefinite and
lacking in material particulars.
14. The Single Judge further noted that the charges in the criminal
proceedings against the appellant and the evidence presented by the
prosecution to substantiate the same were largely identical to those in
the departmental proceedings. Placing reliance on the decision in G.M.
21
Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr. , the Single Judge concluded that
charge no. 1 could not have been held to be proved by the disciplinary
authority since the respondents 5, 4, and 2 failed to provide reasoning
distinct from that of the relevant sessions judge who had acquitted the
appellant of the charges. The Single Judge further observed that it was
not open to the respondents to reopen charge no. 2 in subsequent
departmental proceedings, as the matter had already been concluded in
1976 and the appellant visited with punishment. Regarding charges 3
and 4, the Single Judge found them self-explanatory, noting that the
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appellant's arrest on 8 August, 1988 and subsequent detention in the
police lock-up prevented him from resuming his duties and notifying the
CID, Headquarters, about his arrest.
15. In light of the aforementioned findings and conclusions, the Single Judge
found the charges against the appellant to be frivolous and unfounded,
with the Inquiry Officer failing to adhere to due process. Consequently,
20
AIR 1986 SC 995
21
AIR 2006 SC 2129
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by judgment and order dated 16 July 2013, the Single Judge quashed
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the dismissal order dated 21 June 1996 (upheld by the respondents 4
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and 2 on 14 July 1997 and 6 August 2003, respectively), and directed
the respondents to grant the appellant all consequential benefits from
the date of dismissal.
P ROCEEDINGS B EFORE T HE D IVISION B ENCH
16. The respondents, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single
Judge, appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court.
17. The Division Bench, relying on a series of precedents and quoting
therefrom extensively, observed that exercise of jurisdiction by the
Single Judge evinced exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the decision
of the departmental authorities, whereas judicial review of departmental
orders should focus solely on the decision-making process and not on
the merits or demerits of the findings. The Division Bench, relying on
22
Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , held that the Single Judge's re-
appreciation of evidence, which led to the conclusion of the appellant’s
innocence, was unsustainable due to the lack of a justifiable basis for
such an approach. It also emphasized that the strict rules of evidence
do not apply to departmental proceedings, as declared in T.N.C.S.
23
Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai . The Division Bench further
distinguished the decision in Sawai Singh (supra) relied on by the
Single Judge, based on differing factual circumstances. It concluded that
22
(2015) 2 SCC 610
23
(2006) 2 SCC 255
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the charges against the appellant were specific, and the procedural
requirements during the inquiry had been properly followed, with
sufficient opportunities provided to the appellant.
18. The Division Bench also referred to several decisions of this Court
regarding legal principles, including the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in departmental proceedings, rules of natural justice, the right
to cross-examine, opportunities to lead evidence, and the scope of
natural justice in disciplinary proceedings. Also, upon reviewing the
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proceedings file maintained by the department , the Division Bench
found the respondents' claims to be substantiated. It was concluded that
there was no procedural error or breach of natural justice during the
inquiry. Consequently, the Single Judge's interference with the order of
dismissal was not warranted.
19. Resting on such conclusions, the Division Bench set aside the judgment
and order of the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
C ONTENTIONS
20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant, while assailing the impugned
judgment, submitted that the following points merit consideration by
this Court:
A. First , in light of the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), the Division
Bench erred in failing to recognize that both the criminal and
disciplinary proceedings were based on the same allegations, the
same facts, the same evidence and the same witnesses. The
24
departmental file
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appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge on merits, and as such
he could not have been found guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.
B. Secondly , the appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge based
on a merits-based evaluation and not on technical grounds. This is
further substantiated by the informant’s failure to identify the
appellant in the criminal proceedings, who had not been made a
witness in the inquiry. Additionally, PW-2 denied the appellant's
involvement in both the inquiry and the criminal case, refusing to
identify him.
C. Thirdly , the findings in the Inquiry Report holding the appellant guilty
and which were upheld by the respondents 5, 4, and 2, lack
credibility. Consequently, these findings are not only perverse but
also influenced by extraneous factors and mala fide intentions.
D. Fourthly , PW-1 harboured a personal vendetta against the appellant,
a fact brought to the attention of the respondents. However, this
issue was neither examined nor considered by them, although the
same did deserve thorough examination and proper consideration
being fact finding authorities.
E. Fifthly , regarding charge no. 2, the appellant had already faced
disciplinary proceedings and been penalized; hence, proceeding
against him again for the same misconduct was barred on the ground
of double jeopardy. Furthermore, a review of the Inquiry Report
reveals a complete lack of evidence substantiating the said charge.
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F. Sixthly , charges 3 and 4 are derived from charge no. 1 and are driven
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by extraneous motives. Following his arrest on 8 August 1988, the
appellant’s repeated requests to the Officer-in-Charge to inform the
CID authorities were deliberately ignored. The Inquiry Report itself
acknowledges the lack of evidence for charge no. 4. Moreover, the
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appellant could only have been suspended on 8 August 1988 if the
authorities had not been informed of his arrest.
G. Seventhly, the procedure followed in the inquiry was neither fair nor
proper, as an interested witness (PW-1) was examined in the
appellant's absence, despite this being brought to the attention of
the Inquiry Officer and the respondents. Moreover, the appellant was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the said witness.
H. Eighthly , the charges framed against the appellant were utterly
vague and lacking in material particulars; hence, reliance was
correctly placed by the Single Judge on the decision in Sawai Singh
(supra).
I. Finally, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents erred in law by
recording findings against the appellant without any admissible
evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the
dismissal from service and denial of consequential benefits are
clearly erroneous and perverse.
21. Per contra , Mr. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
contented that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench suffers
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from no error or infirmity either of law or on facts, far less manifest error
or infirmity, and hence does not call for any interference. He sought
upholding of the impugned judgment asserting that there were no
procedural irregularities or violations of natural justice in the process of
inquiry.
22. The arguments of the appellant were sought to be strongly rebutted by
advancing the further following points:
A. First , PW-1 was examined in the appellant's presence, and despite
being given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the
appellant knowingly chose not to do so. The Inquiry Officer's
inference that PW-2, who refused to identify the appellant during
cross-examination, was likely to have been influenced by the
appellant because of the lapse of time since he was examined-in-
chief and cross-examined, and such inference being accurate did not
call for any interference.
B. Secondly , the charges in the disciplinary proceedings are distinct
from those in the criminal case. Charges 1 and 2 were sufficiently
substantiated, while charges 3 and 4 were not contested by the
appellant. Additionally, charge no. 2 does not constitute double
jeopardy, as it pertains to the appellant's prior conduct rather than
a separate offence.
C. Thirdly , the standards for establishing evidence of guilt in disciplinary
proceedings differ from those applied in criminal proceedings and
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that decisions are legion declaring the law that mere acquittal in
criminal proceedings does not result in automatic reversal of the
departmental decision of taking disciplinary action for proved
misconduct.
D. Fourthly, the Division Bench was absolutely right in observing that
the Single Judge had exceeded its writ jurisdiction as if it were sitting
in appeal on the administrative decisions of the respondents.
E. Fifthly, the appellant being the member of a disciplined force was
found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a police
officer and, therefore, the Division Bench was right in interfering with
the injudicious exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.
23. Mr. Khan, therefore, urged that the impugned order of the Division Bench
deserves affirmation and dismissal of the appeal ought to be ordered.
A NALYSIS AND R EASONS
24. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at length
and examined the materials on record.
25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the
appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service
is justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that have
unfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal
proceedings are substantially identical to those in the
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departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the
criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings vulnerable?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment, which allowed the appeal
of the respondents and dismissed the writ petition of the
appellant, deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to any relief, should the
aforesaid questions be answered in his favour?
26. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that considering the nature of
arguments advanced which required ascertaining facts by looking into
the records of inquiry, which are not on record, we had required the
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respondent-State of Bihar vide order dated 17 December, 2024 to
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submit scanned copy of the complete departmental file by 10 January,
2025.
27. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a party fails
to produce evidence that is within its control, it is presumed that the
withheld evidence would be unfavourable to it. Though reference to any
authority is not required, we may profitably refer to the decision in State
25
(Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri in this behalf.
28. We regretfully record that neither has the departmental file been
submitted for our perusal nor has the respondent-State of Bihar prayed
for any extension of time. The consequence of non-compliance of such
order is fatal, as would appear from our discussion hereafter.
25
(2006) 7 SCC 172
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29. The issues arising for decision are now taken up for consideration.
I SSUE N O . 1
30. The specific statutory rule in terms whereof the chargesheet against the
appellant was drawn up or the inquiry conducted, cannot be ascertained
as copy of the chargesheet in its entirety is not part of the paper book.
This is precisely the reason why we called for the departmental file
concerning the disciplinary proceedings which, unfortunately, has not
been provided to us. Nonetheless, and given the circumstance that the
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appellant was dismissed from service on 21 June, 1996, it is reasonable
to infer that the relevant rules in this case would likely be the Bihar and
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Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935
and/or the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
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1930 . These were adopted through Notification No. III/63-8051-A
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dated 3 July, 1963, and were subsequently repealed by the Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.
31. Our abovesaid inference is bolstered by Rule 824A (e) of the Bihar Police
Manual, 1978, which stipulates that for experts and other ranks officials
— i.e., barring members of the Indian Police Services, Deputy
Superintendents and their equivalent ranks, ministerial officers and
members of the Bihar Sashastra Police—the Rules of 1935 would be
applicable if the official is non-gazetted and the Rules of 1930 would be
applicable if gazetted. It is noteworthy that the post of Constable in the
26
Rules of 1935.
27
Rules of 1930.
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CID is a non-gazetted post and, hence, the Rules of 1935 provided the
source of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
by drawing a chargesheet.
32. Note 1 attached to Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935 underlines that the
procedure stipulated in Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 must be followed
prior to the issuance of a dismissal order against the charged official.
Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the proposed
disciplinary action must be clearly articulated in the form of specific
charges, accompanied by a detailed statement outlining the allegations
supporting each charge.
33. On perusal of whatever is available on record, it is found that allegations
had been levelled against the appellant under 4 (four) distinct charges.
A specific objection having been taken on behalf of the appellant that
the charges were vague, indefinite, not specific and lacking in material
particulars, we felt it all the more necessary to have a look at the nature
and wording of the chargesheet from the departmental file. However, in
view of withholding of the departmental file, the presumption that can
legitimately and validly be drawn and which we do hereby draw is that
the respondents did not deliberately produce the departmental file lest
the illegality in proceeding against the appellant from the inception is
exposed.
34. Based on the foregoing discussion, the version of the appellant that the
charges drawn up against him were vague, indefinite, unspecific and
lacked essential particulars has to be accepted. The decision of this Court
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in Sawai Singh (supra), thus, does apply on all fours in this case. This,
in turn, reinforces the finding that the chargesheet contravened Rule 55
of the Rules of 1930, as made applicable by Note 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules
of 1935.
35. If there is a flaw from the inception of the disciplinary proceedings, i.e.,
the charge-sheet is not issued conforming to the relevant rules and the
charged officer finds it difficult to meet the charges because it is vague,
indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars, the charge-
sheet itself becomes susceptible to vulnerability. We are reminded of the
decision of this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of
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West Bengal where this Court ruled that:
6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not
capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently
definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is
precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated
before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of
allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of
allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which
would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to
put up defence. … The entire proceedings show a complete disregard
of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory
terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of
allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was
denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by
reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the
statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars
not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above
reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.
(emphasis supplied)
28
(1970) 3 SCC 548
Page 18 of 30
36. Moving further, the appellant had raised an allegation that PW-1 was not
allowed to be cross-examined. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 provides
that the witnesses may be cross-examined by the charged individual.
Had the departmental file been placed on record, it would have
facilitated a more thorough analysis of this sub-issue. Nevertheless,
based on the available material, the question remains whether it can be
determined if the appellant was provided with a sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine PW-1, or if the appellant chose not to exercise that
opportunity.
37. The respondents' counsel contended before this Court that the appellant
deliberately chose not to cross-examine PW-1 and it is not their
contention that opportunity of cross-examination could not have been
given, particularly in light of the fact that PW-2 was made available for
cross-examination by the appellant. However, the Single Judge’s
observations reveal that the respondents claimed there was no record
of any request or indication from the appellant expressing an intent to
cross-examine the said witness. This demonstrates that the respondents
have altered their position on the issue of cross-examination of PW-1,
as reflected in their submissions both before the Single Judge and this
Court.
38. Furthermore, on perusal of the materials before this Court,
preponderance of probability favours the appellant for a finding to be
returned that he was denied his right to cross-examine PW-1. The
respondents' assertion that the appellant deliberately refrained from
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cross-examining PW-1, given his request to cross-examine PW-2, is
untenable for three reasons: first, the respondents have changed their
position on this issue; second, no reasonable person would voluntarily
forgo a right of cross-examination, particularly when PW-1 was one of
only two witnesses who testified from a list of seven, and there were
allegations of a personal vendetta against him; and third , the
respondents have never claimed that cross-examination was not part of
the prescribed inquiry procedure or that it was optional, or that the
appellant abandoned the enquiry or failed to appear on the relevant
date.
39. Next, the Inquiry Officer expressed disbelief at the version of PW-2 in
course of cross-examination when he unequivocally denied the
appellant's involvement in the alleged offences and failed to recall
whether the seizure list relating to ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand)
had been prepared in his presence. The Inquiry Officer suggested that
PW-2 might have been unduly influenced or persuaded by the appellant,
noting that the cross-examination occurred after a substantial delay of
nine (9) months from the date of PW-2's testimony in-chief, which had
previously affirmed hinted at the involvement of the appellant.
40. Before delving further into this sub-issue, it is once again essential to
fall back on withholding of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, thereby preventing an ascertainment of the
cause of the delay in production by the prosecution of PW-2 for cross-
examination by the appellant. In any event, can the appellant be held
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liable for such a prolonged gap? Likely not, as it is the responsibility of
the prosecution to produce the witness. Moreover, in the absence of the
departmental file, we cannot conclusively attribute the delay to the
appellant either. Consequently, the lapse, without anything more before
us, has to be attributed to the prosecution.
41. Nonetheless, we are of the view that dismissing PW-2’s cross-
examination as incredible, solely due to the delay in its conduct, would
not be a reasonable conclusion. PW-2 had also denied the appellant’s
involvement in the criminal proceedings and, during his cross-
examination in the inquiry, he explained that he had previously disclosed
the appellant’s name based on hearsay from individuals within the
department.
42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the approach
he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be returned by
him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the
basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking
through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C.
29
Goel pointed out that in carrying out the purpose of rooting out
corruption, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of
proof even in domestic enquiries. Although technical rules which govern
criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary
proceedings, nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty
scrupulous care should be taken to see that the innocent is not punished,
29
AIR 1964 SC 364
Page 21 of 30
applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held
under statutory rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled position of
law for decades and bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to
hold that the reason for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of
PW-2 in his cross-examination was not available to be assigned without
first returning a finding attributing the fault for the delay to the
appellant .
43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the chargesheet
against the appellant was issued based on the written complaint of the
informant. Law is again clear to the effect that mere production of a
document does not constitute proof. If chargesheet is issued on the basis
of a written complaint, the author/complainant has to be produced. The
decision of this Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs.
30
Workmen & Ors. is an authority for this proposition. Notably, in the
instant case, the informant/complainant had not been examined. This,
we hold is one other glaring error in the decision-making process.
44. Upon reviewing the materials at our disposal and considering the
aforementioned anomalies in the issuance of the chargesheet and the
procedural lapses, none of which can be attributed to the appellant, and
in light of the absence of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, we are compelled to conclude beyond any cavil
of doubt that due process was not followed in dismissing the appellant
from service, rendering the dismissal unjustified.
30
(1971) 2 SCC 617
Page 22 of 30
45. While we agree with the Division Bench that the Single Judge, to a large
extent, exercised appellate jurisdiction, on its part, the Division Bench
failed to take into account the aforementioned vices that infected the
decision-making process. One could call it an inadvertent slip or
oversight; but, whatever be it, in our opinion, such slip or oversight
resulted in a failure of justice.
I SSUE N O . 2
46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the
respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect of this
issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same.
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the
accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that
when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the
departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such
cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be
unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision
in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in
31
Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan .
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal
proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before
31
(2024) 1 SCC 175
Page 23 of 30
the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of
the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available on
record only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely resembled
the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary
proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint of the
informant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution
"miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the
informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This
discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere
technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like
"benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as
formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the
judgment, rather than the terminology used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also
declined to identify the appellant during cross-examination, and the
informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings.
This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both the
criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the principle of adverse
inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents
deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which
was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence,
Page 24 of 30
and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental proceedings
were substantially similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the
potential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that is
available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being
guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the
criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar
or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.
I SSUE N O . 3
54. The Division Bench and the Single Judge differed in their views on the
appellant's dismissal following disciplinary proceedings. Whereas the
Single Judge found the inquiry report flawed due to unlawful procedures
and untenable findings, the Division Bench, upon reviewing the "original
file of the departmental proceedings," concluded that there was no
procedural irregularity or breach of natural justice; and, therefore, held
that the Single Judge's interference with the inquiry officer's findings—
particularly by evaluating the merits of those findings in its writ
jurisdiction—was unwarranted.
55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are
available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that
falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of
law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest
miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law
Page 25 of 30
is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in
disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal
proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental authorities
are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and
what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the
facts and circumstances of each case, as has been laid down in State
32
of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur .
56. It is well-established that any action resulting in penal or adverse
consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice.
To sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of
opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation must
show that prejudice was caused, as affirmed by this Court in L.K.
33
Tripathi v. State Bank of India .
57. Upon perusal of the decisions of this Court in the preceding paragraphs,
it is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine PW-1 caused
prejudice to the appellant, who should have been afforded the
opportunity for cross-examination for three reasons: first, had PW-1
been cross-examined, particularly regarding the appellant’s claim of
personal animosity, it is plausible that such examination could have
influenced the Inquiry Officer’s findings, potentially leading to a different
conclusion; second, the Inquiry Officer placed significant reliance on
PW1's testimony to substantiate proof of the charges against the
32
AIR 1963 SC 375
33
AIR 1984 SC 273
Page 26 of 30
appellant which could have been demolished had a chance of cross-
examination been extended; and third, PW-2, the only other witness,
refused to identify the appellant during cross-examination.
58. Further, we observe that the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4,
and 2 have compromised their ability to reach a fair conclusion by
considering factors extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case,
viz., the fact that charge 2 was made part of the charge-sheet although
the appellant had been punished therefor previously.
59. Also, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have
disregarded that the informant, whose complaint initiated the
disciplinary proceedings, was not made a witness. The testimonies of
PW-1 and PW-2 reflect a failed attempt to establish the contents of the
informant’s written complaint, as the former was not cross-examined,
and the latter failed to identify the appellant during cross-examination.
Additionally, the potential bias of PW-1 as an interested witness, was not
given proper consideration or weight.
60. Regarding charge no. 2, while a previous finding in respect of a guilt can
form part of a subsequent charge-sheet to award enhanced punishment,
the law requires the disciplinary authority to give sufficient notice to the
charged employee of such intention to take the same into consideration
for deciding the question of punishment. Useful reference could be made
34
to the decisions in State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda and
34
AIR 1964 SC 506
Page 27 of 30
35
Nicholas Piramal India Limited v. Harisingh . The argument of the
appellant to the contrary is overruled. Since, however, the disciplinary
proceedings have been found to be suffering from incurable defects,
assessment of the appellant’s conduct for deciding on the punishment
does not really survive.
61. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant
th
was arrested on 8 August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that
the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after his
earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have not
raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant's arrest.
62. Finally, what remains is charge no. 4. Having been arrested, the
appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact of
his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed that
he requested PW-1 to notify the CID authorities of his arrest, but PW-1
failed to do so due to personal animosity. This appears to be probable,
in the absence of any contra-material on record.
63. Accordingly, this Court concludes based on the materials available on
record that the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against
the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice
which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned order, thus, is
unsustainable.
35
(2015) 8 SCC 272
Page 28 of 30
Issue No.4
64. Now, we need to consider the relief that ought to be granted to the
appellant.
th
65. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16
st
November, 2016 is set aside together with the orders dated 21 June,
th th
1996, 14 July, 1997, and 6 August, 2003, issued by the respondents
5, 4, and 2, respectively.
th
66. The order passed by the Single Judge dated 16 July, 2013 is partly
upheld. The direction for release of full back wages is, however, set
aside.
67. Before granting further relief, it is pertinent to note that the date of the
th
alleged incident giving rise to the charge-sheet is 7 August, 1988, and
st
the appellant was dismissed from service on 21 June, 1996. Based on
the records available, the appellant was 53 years old when he
approached the Single Judge in 2004. Therefore, he would be
approximately 74 years old in 2025 and around 45 years old in 1996,
evincing that he had nearly 14/15 (fourteen/fifteen) years of service
remaining at the time of his dismissal. The relief of reinstatement in
service cannot be granted now. We are left to consider the quantum of
monetary relief that would meet the ends of justice.
68. Having bestowed serious consideration, we are of the clear opinion that
ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment of a
lumpsum compensation of ₹ 30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the appellant
Page 29 of 30
inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents within 3
(three) months from date. Ordered accordingly.
CONCLUSION
69. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of.
70. The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at ₹ 5 lakh (Rupees five
lakh) , to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.
…………………………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
………..…………………………....J.
[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
NEW DELHI;
April 23, 2025.
Page 30 of 30
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 554
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5497 OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 9818/2017]
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
T HE A PPEAL
th
2. This civil appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16
1
November 2016 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at
2 3
Patna allowing the respondents’ intra-court appeal arising from a writ
4 5
petition presented before the High Court by Maharana Pratap Singh .
th
The judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 16 July, 2013 was
set aside and resultantly, the writ petition of the appellant stood
Signature Not Verified
1
impugned order
2
High Court
3
L.P.A. No. 516 of 2015
4
C.W.J.C. No. 471 of 2004
5
appellant
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant
Date: 2025.04.23
17:40:10 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 30
dismissed. The Single Judge had quashed the order dismissing the
appellant from service and directed that he be reinstated in service with
all consequential benefits from the date of the dismissal.
F ACTS
3. The appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the
6
Crime Investigation Department in 1973. He proceeded on earned leave
th
for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties on 8 August,
th 7
1988. Incidentally, on 7 August 1988, a First Information Report was
8
registered on the complaint of one Prem Kumar Singh against unknown
persons, giving rise to Kotwali P.S. Case No. 882 of 1988 for offences
under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read with Section 34 of the
9
Indian Penal Code, 1860 . The FIR included a request for the formation
of a raiding party to apprehend those who had extorted money from the
informant by blackmailing him. A raiding party was formed, which
th
proceeded to raid the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna on 8 August, 1988. The
accused was expected to arrive there to collect ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty
thousand) from the informant. Meanwhile, the appellant was on his way
to the office to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when
the informant handed over the briefcase to the appellant. Subsequently,
the appellant was arrested and was brought to Kotwali Police Station.
6
CID
7
FIR
8
informant
9
IPC
Page 2 of 30
th
On the same date, i.e., 08 August, 1988, the appellant was placed
under suspension by his superior authority.
th 10
4. On 14 June, 1989, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
appellant by drawing up a memorandum of charges. The memorandum,
duly served on the appellant, levelled 4 (four) charges as detailed under:
i. Based on the written complaint of the informant, a case was
registered under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419, and 34 of the
IPC. In connection with this case, the appellant was arrested while
receiving ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from the informant,
in furtherance of an alleged act of cheating by impersonation and
extortion under duress, at gunpoint .
ii. On 30th June 1976, a case was registered against the appellant
for cheating the Manager of Elphinstone Cinema Hall by falsely
representing himself as a Sub-Inspector of the CID. The appellant
was found guilty of the offence and subsequently punished.
iii. After availing earned leave, the appellant failed to resume his duty
th
on 08 August, 1988 without any information although
subsequently, he was arrested by personnel of Kotwali Police
Station on the same day.
iv. The appellant failed to inform the CID Headquarters about his
arrest on 8th August, 1988.
5. In response to the memorandum, the appellant submitted a prayer
th
dated 15 March, 1990 requesting that the departmental proceedings
10
Proceeding No. 9 of 1989
Page 3 of 30
be conducted only after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The
appellant expressed concern that if the departmental proceedings were
held first and should the appellant cross-examine the witnesses during
the departmental inquiry, his defence is bound to be disclosed; and this
would gravely prejudice him in the criminal proceedings.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s prayer, an inquiry ensued culminating in
rd 11
the Inquiry Officer submitting his report on 3 May, 1995 , finding the
appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him.
6. Later, the appellant was served with a second show cause notice by the
12 rd
Superintendent of Police, CID on 23 June, 1995 calling upon him to
show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Copy of the
report of the Inquiry Officer was furnished. The appellant replied to the
th
second show cause notice on 11 March, 1996 seeking to point out the
illegalities committed by the Inquiry Officer in course of the inquiry
thereby vitiating the same. Nevertheless, the respondent no. 5 accepted
th
the Inquiry Report and, by order dated 14 June, 1996 contained in
st
Memo No. 1833 dated 21 June, 1996, dismissed the appellant from
service, with the additional direction that the appellant would not be
entitled to any payment for the period of suspension, except for the
amounts already disbursed to him.
7. Meanwhile, the appellant along with the co-accused was tried and
th
convicted by the trial court on 26 April, 1994. The appellant was found
11
Inquiry Report
12
respondent no. 5
Page 4 of 30
guilty of offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC and was
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year.
However, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392 and 419
of the IPC.
8. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence having been carried
13
in an appeal by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI,
14 th
Patna , on 16 February, 1996, set aside the judgment and order under
challenge. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, with the appellate
court holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.
st
9. The appellant, aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 21 June, 1996
passed by the respondent no. 5, filed an appeal before the Deputy
15 th
Inspector General of Police . However, by an order dated 14 July,
1997, the respondent no. 4 dismissed the appeal and upheld the
st
dismissal order passed by the respondent no. 5 dated 21 June, 1996,
based on the report and the findings of the Inquiry Officer .
10. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision before the Director General-
16 th
cum-Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. on 24 September, 1997,
seeking to challenge the appellate order. However, as the revision
17
remained undecided, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High
th
Court. The said writ petition was disposed of on 13 May, 2002 with a
direction to the respondent no. 2 to decide the appellant's revision within
13
Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1994
14
sessions judge
15
respondent no. 4
16
respondent no. 2
17
C.W.J.C. No. 5946 of 2002
Page 5 of 30
two months from the date of the order. In compliance with the said
th
direction, the respondent no. 5 on 06 August, 2003 dismissed the
revision, with the result that the dismissal order stood reaffirmed.
P ROCEEDINGS B EFORE T HE S INGLE J UDGE
11. Thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the revision, the appellant
laid a challenge to the revisional order (in which the appellate order and
the original order of dismissal had merged) in the writ petition out of
which this civil appeal arises. The appellant inter alia raised the following
18
objections: (i) the Officer-in-Charge was neither examined in the
appellant's presence nor permitted to be cross-examined, rendering the
disciplinary proceedings vitiated; (ii) both the departmental and criminal
proceedings having stemmed from the same facts based on the
informant’s written complaint and identical charges being involved, after
the appellant’s exoneration in the criminal proceedings, rendered the
disciplinary proceedings untenable and should have been dropped; (iii)
the order of dismissal violated principles of natural justice; (iv) the
respondent no. 4 upheld the order of dismissal without affording the
appellant an opportunity to be heard; and (v) the respondent no.2
having a duty to set right the wrong, failed to discharge such duty.
Issuance of a writ of certiorari was sought by the appellant to quash the
impugned orders. Additionally, the appellant sought the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant him all
consequential benefits as if he had never been dismissed from service.
18
PW-1
Page 6 of 30
12. The Single Judge observed, upon an examination of the allegations
made by the informant — who had also submitted a written statement
against the appellant in the department — that the narrative presented
by the informant lacked credibility due to several apparent
inconsistencies. Notably, the question that seemed to trouble the Single
Judge was why a person would enter a hotel room solely for the purpose
of having tea, and why an acquaintance would escort both the informant
19
and Devnath Pathak to the hotel room while leaving a young girl in the
attached toilet. The Single Judge opined that the Inquiry Officer's
reliance on the testimony of PW-1, who was not allowed to be cross-
examined, raised concerns of undue influence. PW-1 had a matrimonial
connection with the family of Virendra Singh, who allegedly had a
strained relationship with the appellant's family, suggesting a personal
motive to act against the appellant. However, the Inquiry Officer failed
to examine or address the appellant’s contention regarding this potential
conflict of interest. The Single Judge further observed that the
respondents' claim, asserting the absence of a written request from the
appellant to the Inquiry Officer for permission to cross-examine PW-1,
was neither legally valid nor proper. The appellant was not required to
submit such a request; rather, it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to
ensure that the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. As a result, testimony of PW-1 could not be relied upon in
the absence of such an opportunity being provided to the appellant.
19
PW-2
Page 7 of 30
20
13. The decision in Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan was relied on by
the Single Judge to hold that the charges were vague, indefinite and
lacking in material particulars.
14. The Single Judge further noted that the charges in the criminal
proceedings against the appellant and the evidence presented by the
prosecution to substantiate the same were largely identical to those in
the departmental proceedings. Placing reliance on the decision in G.M.
21
Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr. , the Single Judge concluded that
charge no. 1 could not have been held to be proved by the disciplinary
authority since the respondents 5, 4, and 2 failed to provide reasoning
distinct from that of the relevant sessions judge who had acquitted the
appellant of the charges. The Single Judge further observed that it was
not open to the respondents to reopen charge no. 2 in subsequent
departmental proceedings, as the matter had already been concluded in
1976 and the appellant visited with punishment. Regarding charges 3
and 4, the Single Judge found them self-explanatory, noting that the
th
appellant's arrest on 8 August, 1988 and subsequent detention in the
police lock-up prevented him from resuming his duties and notifying the
CID, Headquarters, about his arrest.
15. In light of the aforementioned findings and conclusions, the Single Judge
found the charges against the appellant to be frivolous and unfounded,
with the Inquiry Officer failing to adhere to due process. Consequently,
20
AIR 1986 SC 995
21
AIR 2006 SC 2129
Page 8 of 30
th
by judgment and order dated 16 July 2013, the Single Judge quashed
st
the dismissal order dated 21 June 1996 (upheld by the respondents 4
th th
and 2 on 14 July 1997 and 6 August 2003, respectively), and directed
the respondents to grant the appellant all consequential benefits from
the date of dismissal.
P ROCEEDINGS B EFORE T HE D IVISION B ENCH
16. The respondents, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single
Judge, appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court.
17. The Division Bench, relying on a series of precedents and quoting
therefrom extensively, observed that exercise of jurisdiction by the
Single Judge evinced exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the decision
of the departmental authorities, whereas judicial review of departmental
orders should focus solely on the decision-making process and not on
the merits or demerits of the findings. The Division Bench, relying on
22
Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran , held that the Single Judge's re-
appreciation of evidence, which led to the conclusion of the appellant’s
innocence, was unsustainable due to the lack of a justifiable basis for
such an approach. It also emphasized that the strict rules of evidence
do not apply to departmental proceedings, as declared in T.N.C.S.
23
Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai . The Division Bench further
distinguished the decision in Sawai Singh (supra) relied on by the
Single Judge, based on differing factual circumstances. It concluded that
22
(2015) 2 SCC 610
23
(2006) 2 SCC 255
Page 9 of 30
the charges against the appellant were specific, and the procedural
requirements during the inquiry had been properly followed, with
sufficient opportunities provided to the appellant.
18. The Division Bench also referred to several decisions of this Court
regarding legal principles, including the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in departmental proceedings, rules of natural justice, the right
to cross-examine, opportunities to lead evidence, and the scope of
natural justice in disciplinary proceedings. Also, upon reviewing the
24
proceedings file maintained by the department , the Division Bench
found the respondents' claims to be substantiated. It was concluded that
there was no procedural error or breach of natural justice during the
inquiry. Consequently, the Single Judge's interference with the order of
dismissal was not warranted.
19. Resting on such conclusions, the Division Bench set aside the judgment
and order of the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
C ONTENTIONS
20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant, while assailing the impugned
judgment, submitted that the following points merit consideration by
this Court:
A. First , in light of the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), the Division
Bench erred in failing to recognize that both the criminal and
disciplinary proceedings were based on the same allegations, the
same facts, the same evidence and the same witnesses. The
24
departmental file
Page 10 of 30
appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge on merits, and as such
he could not have been found guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.
B. Secondly , the appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge based
on a merits-based evaluation and not on technical grounds. This is
further substantiated by the informant’s failure to identify the
appellant in the criminal proceedings, who had not been made a
witness in the inquiry. Additionally, PW-2 denied the appellant's
involvement in both the inquiry and the criminal case, refusing to
identify him.
C. Thirdly , the findings in the Inquiry Report holding the appellant guilty
and which were upheld by the respondents 5, 4, and 2, lack
credibility. Consequently, these findings are not only perverse but
also influenced by extraneous factors and mala fide intentions.
D. Fourthly , PW-1 harboured a personal vendetta against the appellant,
a fact brought to the attention of the respondents. However, this
issue was neither examined nor considered by them, although the
same did deserve thorough examination and proper consideration
being fact finding authorities.
E. Fifthly , regarding charge no. 2, the appellant had already faced
disciplinary proceedings and been penalized; hence, proceeding
against him again for the same misconduct was barred on the ground
of double jeopardy. Furthermore, a review of the Inquiry Report
reveals a complete lack of evidence substantiating the said charge.
Page 11 of 30
F. Sixthly , charges 3 and 4 are derived from charge no. 1 and are driven
th
by extraneous motives. Following his arrest on 8 August 1988, the
appellant’s repeated requests to the Officer-in-Charge to inform the
CID authorities were deliberately ignored. The Inquiry Report itself
acknowledges the lack of evidence for charge no. 4. Moreover, the
th
appellant could only have been suspended on 8 August 1988 if the
authorities had not been informed of his arrest.
G. Seventhly, the procedure followed in the inquiry was neither fair nor
proper, as an interested witness (PW-1) was examined in the
appellant's absence, despite this being brought to the attention of
the Inquiry Officer and the respondents. Moreover, the appellant was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine the said witness.
H. Eighthly , the charges framed against the appellant were utterly
vague and lacking in material particulars; hence, reliance was
correctly placed by the Single Judge on the decision in Sawai Singh
(supra).
I. Finally, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents erred in law by
recording findings against the appellant without any admissible
evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the
dismissal from service and denial of consequential benefits are
clearly erroneous and perverse.
21. Per contra , Mr. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
contented that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench suffers
Page 12 of 30
from no error or infirmity either of law or on facts, far less manifest error
or infirmity, and hence does not call for any interference. He sought
upholding of the impugned judgment asserting that there were no
procedural irregularities or violations of natural justice in the process of
inquiry.
22. The arguments of the appellant were sought to be strongly rebutted by
advancing the further following points:
A. First , PW-1 was examined in the appellant's presence, and despite
being given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the
appellant knowingly chose not to do so. The Inquiry Officer's
inference that PW-2, who refused to identify the appellant during
cross-examination, was likely to have been influenced by the
appellant because of the lapse of time since he was examined-in-
chief and cross-examined, and such inference being accurate did not
call for any interference.
B. Secondly , the charges in the disciplinary proceedings are distinct
from those in the criminal case. Charges 1 and 2 were sufficiently
substantiated, while charges 3 and 4 were not contested by the
appellant. Additionally, charge no. 2 does not constitute double
jeopardy, as it pertains to the appellant's prior conduct rather than
a separate offence.
C. Thirdly , the standards for establishing evidence of guilt in disciplinary
proceedings differ from those applied in criminal proceedings and
Page 13 of 30
that decisions are legion declaring the law that mere acquittal in
criminal proceedings does not result in automatic reversal of the
departmental decision of taking disciplinary action for proved
misconduct.
D. Fourthly, the Division Bench was absolutely right in observing that
the Single Judge had exceeded its writ jurisdiction as if it were sitting
in appeal on the administrative decisions of the respondents.
E. Fifthly, the appellant being the member of a disciplined force was
found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a police
officer and, therefore, the Division Bench was right in interfering with
the injudicious exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.
23. Mr. Khan, therefore, urged that the impugned order of the Division Bench
deserves affirmation and dismissal of the appeal ought to be ordered.
A NALYSIS AND R EASONS
24. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at length
and examined the materials on record.
25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the
appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service
is justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that have
unfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal
proceedings are substantially identical to those in the
Page 14 of 30
departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the
criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings vulnerable?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment, which allowed the appeal
of the respondents and dismissed the writ petition of the
appellant, deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to any relief, should the
aforesaid questions be answered in his favour?
26. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that considering the nature of
arguments advanced which required ascertaining facts by looking into
the records of inquiry, which are not on record, we had required the
th
respondent-State of Bihar vide order dated 17 December, 2024 to
th
submit scanned copy of the complete departmental file by 10 January,
2025.
27. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a party fails
to produce evidence that is within its control, it is presumed that the
withheld evidence would be unfavourable to it. Though reference to any
authority is not required, we may profitably refer to the decision in State
25
(Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri in this behalf.
28. We regretfully record that neither has the departmental file been
submitted for our perusal nor has the respondent-State of Bihar prayed
for any extension of time. The consequence of non-compliance of such
order is fatal, as would appear from our discussion hereafter.
25
(2006) 7 SCC 172
Page 15 of 30
29. The issues arising for decision are now taken up for consideration.
I SSUE N O . 1
30. The specific statutory rule in terms whereof the chargesheet against the
appellant was drawn up or the inquiry conducted, cannot be ascertained
as copy of the chargesheet in its entirety is not part of the paper book.
This is precisely the reason why we called for the departmental file
concerning the disciplinary proceedings which, unfortunately, has not
been provided to us. Nonetheless, and given the circumstance that the
st
appellant was dismissed from service on 21 June, 1996, it is reasonable
to infer that the relevant rules in this case would likely be the Bihar and
26
Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935
and/or the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
27
1930 . These were adopted through Notification No. III/63-8051-A
rd
dated 3 July, 1963, and were subsequently repealed by the Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.
31. Our abovesaid inference is bolstered by Rule 824A (e) of the Bihar Police
Manual, 1978, which stipulates that for experts and other ranks officials
— i.e., barring members of the Indian Police Services, Deputy
Superintendents and their equivalent ranks, ministerial officers and
members of the Bihar Sashastra Police—the Rules of 1935 would be
applicable if the official is non-gazetted and the Rules of 1930 would be
applicable if gazetted. It is noteworthy that the post of Constable in the
26
Rules of 1935.
27
Rules of 1930.
Page 16 of 30
CID is a non-gazetted post and, hence, the Rules of 1935 provided the
source of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
by drawing a chargesheet.
32. Note 1 attached to Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935 underlines that the
procedure stipulated in Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 must be followed
prior to the issuance of a dismissal order against the charged official.
Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the proposed
disciplinary action must be clearly articulated in the form of specific
charges, accompanied by a detailed statement outlining the allegations
supporting each charge.
33. On perusal of whatever is available on record, it is found that allegations
had been levelled against the appellant under 4 (four) distinct charges.
A specific objection having been taken on behalf of the appellant that
the charges were vague, indefinite, not specific and lacking in material
particulars, we felt it all the more necessary to have a look at the nature
and wording of the chargesheet from the departmental file. However, in
view of withholding of the departmental file, the presumption that can
legitimately and validly be drawn and which we do hereby draw is that
the respondents did not deliberately produce the departmental file lest
the illegality in proceeding against the appellant from the inception is
exposed.
34. Based on the foregoing discussion, the version of the appellant that the
charges drawn up against him were vague, indefinite, unspecific and
lacked essential particulars has to be accepted. The decision of this Court
Page 17 of 30
in Sawai Singh (supra), thus, does apply on all fours in this case. This,
in turn, reinforces the finding that the chargesheet contravened Rule 55
of the Rules of 1930, as made applicable by Note 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules
of 1935.
35. If there is a flaw from the inception of the disciplinary proceedings, i.e.,
the charge-sheet is not issued conforming to the relevant rules and the
charged officer finds it difficult to meet the charges because it is vague,
indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars, the charge-
sheet itself becomes susceptible to vulnerability. We are reminded of the
decision of this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of
28
West Bengal where this Court ruled that:
6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not
capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently
definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is
precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated
before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of
allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of
allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which
would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to
put up defence. … The entire proceedings show a complete disregard
of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory
terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of
allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was
denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by
reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the
statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars
not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above
reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.
(emphasis supplied)
28
(1970) 3 SCC 548
Page 18 of 30
36. Moving further, the appellant had raised an allegation that PW-1 was not
allowed to be cross-examined. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 provides
that the witnesses may be cross-examined by the charged individual.
Had the departmental file been placed on record, it would have
facilitated a more thorough analysis of this sub-issue. Nevertheless,
based on the available material, the question remains whether it can be
determined if the appellant was provided with a sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine PW-1, or if the appellant chose not to exercise that
opportunity.
37. The respondents' counsel contended before this Court that the appellant
deliberately chose not to cross-examine PW-1 and it is not their
contention that opportunity of cross-examination could not have been
given, particularly in light of the fact that PW-2 was made available for
cross-examination by the appellant. However, the Single Judge’s
observations reveal that the respondents claimed there was no record
of any request or indication from the appellant expressing an intent to
cross-examine the said witness. This demonstrates that the respondents
have altered their position on the issue of cross-examination of PW-1,
as reflected in their submissions both before the Single Judge and this
Court.
38. Furthermore, on perusal of the materials before this Court,
preponderance of probability favours the appellant for a finding to be
returned that he was denied his right to cross-examine PW-1. The
respondents' assertion that the appellant deliberately refrained from
Page 19 of 30
cross-examining PW-1, given his request to cross-examine PW-2, is
untenable for three reasons: first, the respondents have changed their
position on this issue; second, no reasonable person would voluntarily
forgo a right of cross-examination, particularly when PW-1 was one of
only two witnesses who testified from a list of seven, and there were
allegations of a personal vendetta against him; and third , the
respondents have never claimed that cross-examination was not part of
the prescribed inquiry procedure or that it was optional, or that the
appellant abandoned the enquiry or failed to appear on the relevant
date.
39. Next, the Inquiry Officer expressed disbelief at the version of PW-2 in
course of cross-examination when he unequivocally denied the
appellant's involvement in the alleged offences and failed to recall
whether the seizure list relating to ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand)
had been prepared in his presence. The Inquiry Officer suggested that
PW-2 might have been unduly influenced or persuaded by the appellant,
noting that the cross-examination occurred after a substantial delay of
nine (9) months from the date of PW-2's testimony in-chief, which had
previously affirmed hinted at the involvement of the appellant.
40. Before delving further into this sub-issue, it is once again essential to
fall back on withholding of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, thereby preventing an ascertainment of the
cause of the delay in production by the prosecution of PW-2 for cross-
examination by the appellant. In any event, can the appellant be held
Page 20 of 30
liable for such a prolonged gap? Likely not, as it is the responsibility of
the prosecution to produce the witness. Moreover, in the absence of the
departmental file, we cannot conclusively attribute the delay to the
appellant either. Consequently, the lapse, without anything more before
us, has to be attributed to the prosecution.
41. Nonetheless, we are of the view that dismissing PW-2’s cross-
examination as incredible, solely due to the delay in its conduct, would
not be a reasonable conclusion. PW-2 had also denied the appellant’s
involvement in the criminal proceedings and, during his cross-
examination in the inquiry, he explained that he had previously disclosed
the appellant’s name based on hearsay from individuals within the
department.
42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the approach
he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be returned by
him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the
basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking
through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C.
29
Goel pointed out that in carrying out the purpose of rooting out
corruption, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of
proof even in domestic enquiries. Although technical rules which govern
criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary
proceedings, nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty
scrupulous care should be taken to see that the innocent is not punished,
29
AIR 1964 SC 364
Page 21 of 30
applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held
under statutory rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled position of
law for decades and bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to
hold that the reason for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of
PW-2 in his cross-examination was not available to be assigned without
first returning a finding attributing the fault for the delay to the
appellant .
43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the chargesheet
against the appellant was issued based on the written complaint of the
informant. Law is again clear to the effect that mere production of a
document does not constitute proof. If chargesheet is issued on the basis
of a written complaint, the author/complainant has to be produced. The
decision of this Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs.
30
Workmen & Ors. is an authority for this proposition. Notably, in the
instant case, the informant/complainant had not been examined. This,
we hold is one other glaring error in the decision-making process.
44. Upon reviewing the materials at our disposal and considering the
aforementioned anomalies in the issuance of the chargesheet and the
procedural lapses, none of which can be attributed to the appellant, and
in light of the absence of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, we are compelled to conclude beyond any cavil
of doubt that due process was not followed in dismissing the appellant
from service, rendering the dismissal unjustified.
30
(1971) 2 SCC 617
Page 22 of 30
45. While we agree with the Division Bench that the Single Judge, to a large
extent, exercised appellate jurisdiction, on its part, the Division Bench
failed to take into account the aforementioned vices that infected the
decision-making process. One could call it an inadvertent slip or
oversight; but, whatever be it, in our opinion, such slip or oversight
resulted in a failure of justice.
I SSUE N O . 2
46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the
respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect of this
issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same.
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the
accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that
when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the
departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such
cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be
unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision
in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in
31
Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan .
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal
proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before
31
(2024) 1 SCC 175
Page 23 of 30
the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of
the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available on
record only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely resembled
the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary
proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint of the
informant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution
"miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the
informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This
discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere
technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like
"benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as
formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the
judgment, rather than the terminology used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also
declined to identify the appellant during cross-examination, and the
informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings.
This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both the
criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the principle of adverse
inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents
deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which
was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence,
Page 24 of 30
and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental proceedings
were substantially similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the
potential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that is
available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being
guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the
criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar
or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.
I SSUE N O . 3
54. The Division Bench and the Single Judge differed in their views on the
appellant's dismissal following disciplinary proceedings. Whereas the
Single Judge found the inquiry report flawed due to unlawful procedures
and untenable findings, the Division Bench, upon reviewing the "original
file of the departmental proceedings," concluded that there was no
procedural irregularity or breach of natural justice; and, therefore, held
that the Single Judge's interference with the inquiry officer's findings—
particularly by evaluating the merits of those findings in its writ
jurisdiction—was unwarranted.
55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are
available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that
falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of
law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest
miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law
Page 25 of 30
is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in
disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal
proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental authorities
are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and
what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the
facts and circumstances of each case, as has been laid down in State
32
of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur .
56. It is well-established that any action resulting in penal or adverse
consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice.
To sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of
opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation must
show that prejudice was caused, as affirmed by this Court in L.K.
33
Tripathi v. State Bank of India .
57. Upon perusal of the decisions of this Court in the preceding paragraphs,
it is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine PW-1 caused
prejudice to the appellant, who should have been afforded the
opportunity for cross-examination for three reasons: first, had PW-1
been cross-examined, particularly regarding the appellant’s claim of
personal animosity, it is plausible that such examination could have
influenced the Inquiry Officer’s findings, potentially leading to a different
conclusion; second, the Inquiry Officer placed significant reliance on
PW1's testimony to substantiate proof of the charges against the
32
AIR 1963 SC 375
33
AIR 1984 SC 273
Page 26 of 30
appellant which could have been demolished had a chance of cross-
examination been extended; and third, PW-2, the only other witness,
refused to identify the appellant during cross-examination.
58. Further, we observe that the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4,
and 2 have compromised their ability to reach a fair conclusion by
considering factors extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case,
viz., the fact that charge 2 was made part of the charge-sheet although
the appellant had been punished therefor previously.
59. Also, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have
disregarded that the informant, whose complaint initiated the
disciplinary proceedings, was not made a witness. The testimonies of
PW-1 and PW-2 reflect a failed attempt to establish the contents of the
informant’s written complaint, as the former was not cross-examined,
and the latter failed to identify the appellant during cross-examination.
Additionally, the potential bias of PW-1 as an interested witness, was not
given proper consideration or weight.
60. Regarding charge no. 2, while a previous finding in respect of a guilt can
form part of a subsequent charge-sheet to award enhanced punishment,
the law requires the disciplinary authority to give sufficient notice to the
charged employee of such intention to take the same into consideration
for deciding the question of punishment. Useful reference could be made
34
to the decisions in State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda and
34
AIR 1964 SC 506
Page 27 of 30
35
Nicholas Piramal India Limited v. Harisingh . The argument of the
appellant to the contrary is overruled. Since, however, the disciplinary
proceedings have been found to be suffering from incurable defects,
assessment of the appellant’s conduct for deciding on the punishment
does not really survive.
61. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant
th
was arrested on 8 August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that
the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after his
earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have not
raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant's arrest.
62. Finally, what remains is charge no. 4. Having been arrested, the
appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact of
his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed that
he requested PW-1 to notify the CID authorities of his arrest, but PW-1
failed to do so due to personal animosity. This appears to be probable,
in the absence of any contra-material on record.
63. Accordingly, this Court concludes based on the materials available on
record that the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against
the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice
which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned order, thus, is
unsustainable.
35
(2015) 8 SCC 272
Page 28 of 30
Issue No.4
64. Now, we need to consider the relief that ought to be granted to the
appellant.
th
65. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16
st
November, 2016 is set aside together with the orders dated 21 June,
th th
1996, 14 July, 1997, and 6 August, 2003, issued by the respondents
5, 4, and 2, respectively.
th
66. The order passed by the Single Judge dated 16 July, 2013 is partly
upheld. The direction for release of full back wages is, however, set
aside.
67. Before granting further relief, it is pertinent to note that the date of the
th
alleged incident giving rise to the charge-sheet is 7 August, 1988, and
st
the appellant was dismissed from service on 21 June, 1996. Based on
the records available, the appellant was 53 years old when he
approached the Single Judge in 2004. Therefore, he would be
approximately 74 years old in 2025 and around 45 years old in 1996,
evincing that he had nearly 14/15 (fourteen/fifteen) years of service
remaining at the time of his dismissal. The relief of reinstatement in
service cannot be granted now. We are left to consider the quantum of
monetary relief that would meet the ends of justice.
68. Having bestowed serious consideration, we are of the clear opinion that
ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment of a
lumpsum compensation of ₹ 30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the appellant
Page 29 of 30
inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents within 3
(three) months from date. Ordered accordingly.
CONCLUSION
69. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of.
70. The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at ₹ 5 lakh (Rupees five
lakh) , to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.
…………………………….J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
………..…………………………....J.
[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
NEW DELHI;
April 23, 2025.
Page 30 of 30