$~31, 34 & 35
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 06.12.2019
+ W.P.(C) 12857/2019
CONSORTIUM OF SIEMENS LTD. INDIA, SIEMENS SA SPAIN
AND SIEMENS AG GERMANY & ORS.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Dayan
Krishnan, Senior Advocate, Mr.
Susmit Pushkar, Advocate, Mr.
Gaurav Sharma, Advocate and
Ms. Bhavna Mishra, Advocate.
versus
DEDICATED FREIGHT CORRIDOR CORPORATION OF INDIA
LTD. & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG with
Mr. Jitender Kumar Singh,
Advocate, Mr. Sumit Teterwal,
Advocate and Ms. Saurabh
Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Jagjit Singh, Senior
Standing Counsel with Mr.
Preet Singh, Advocate and Ms.
Rachita Garg, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
+ W.P.(C) 12868/2019
CONSORTIUM OF SIEMENS LTD. INDIA, SIEMENS SA SPAIN
AND SIEMENS AG GERMANY & ORS.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Dayan
Krishnan, Senior Advocate, Mr.
Susmit Pushkar, Advocate, Mr.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 1 of 28
Gaurav Sharma, Advocate and
Ms. Bhavna Mishra, Advocate.
versus
DEDICATED FREIGHT CORRIDOR CORPORATION OF INDIA
LTD. & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG with
Mr. Jitender Kumar Singh,
Advocate, Mr. Sumit Teterwal,
Advocate and Ms. Saurabh
Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Jagjit Singh, Senior
Standing Counsel with Mr.
Preet Singh, Advocate and Ms.
Rachita Garg, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
+ W.P.(C) 12869/2019
CONSORTIUM OF SIEMENS LTD. INDIA, SIEMENS SA SPAIN
AND SIEMENS AG GERMANY & ORS.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Dayan
Krishnan, Senior Advocate, Mr.
Susmit Pushkar, Advocate, Mr.
Gaurav Sharma, Advocate and
Ms. Bhavna Mishra, Advocate.
versus
DEDICATED FREIGHT CORRIDOR CORPORATION OF INDIA
LTD. & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG with
Mr. Jitender Kumar Singh,
Advocate, Mr. Sumit Teterwal,
Advocate and Ms. Saurabh
Sharma, Advocate for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Jagjit Singh, Senior
Standing Counsel with Mr.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 2 of 28
Preet Singh, Advocate and Ms.
Rachita Garg, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
J U D G M E N T
G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
C.M. No.52539/2019 (exemption) in W.P.(C) No.12857/2019
C.M. No.52573/2019 (exemption) in W.P.(C) No.12868/2019
C.M. No.52575/2019 (exemption) in W.P.(C) No.12869/2019
Exemptions are allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Applications stand disposed of.
W.P.(C) No.12857/2019 and C.M. No.52538/2019
W.P.(C) No.12868/2019 and C.M. No.52572/2019
W.P.(C) No.12869/2019 and C.M. No.52574/2019
These three writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India pertain to three tenders for procurement of Design, Supply,
Construction, Installation, Testing and Commissioning of 2x25kV AC
Electrification, Signalling & Telecommunication, E&M and
Associated Works on Design-Build Lump Sum Basis. Although the
terms and conditions of these tenders are the same, the tenders were
issued and dealt with separately for the reason that the stretches of
road to which they pertain are different. The essential factual matrix in
these three petitions is essentially the same and the petitions involve
identical issues; hence these petitions are being decided by this
common judgment. For convenience, the facts of W.P.(C)
No.12857/2019 are being referred to for purposes of the present
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 3 of 28
judgment.
2. Petitioners are aggrieved by communication dated 26.11.2019
issued by the respondents, by which the technical bid of the petitioners
stand rejected.
3. With the consent of the parties, the writ petitions are set-down
for final hearing and disposal at the admission stage itself.
4. In the year 2015, respondent No.1 issued an invitation for pre-
qualification dated 22.12.2015 bearing ICB no. HQ/SYS/EC/D-
B/Dadri-Khurja for procurement of Design, Supply, Construction,
Installation, Testing and Commissioning of 2x25kV AC
Electrification, Signalling & Telecommunication, E&M and
Associated works on Design-Build Lump Sum Basis for Dadri-Khurja
section (approximately 47 Route Km of Double Line) of Eastern
Dedicated Freight Corridor ( ‘ project’ for short). For completeness it
may be noted that the length of the stretch of road in the other two
petitions is 175 km for Sahnewal-Pilkhani and 220 km for Khurja-
Pilkhani respectively.
5. Petitioner No.1 responded to this invitation on 25.05.2016. On
13.06.2017 the petitioner was informed that the consortium was pre-
qualified for the project. The tender process which commenced on
22.12.2015 continued between the period 2016 to 2019 and it is not
necessary to explain in detail the process, except to say that petitioner
No.4 addressed a communication to respondent No.1 on 05.06.2018,
which reads as under:-
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 4 of 28
th
“ Madrid, June 5 , 2018
Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India. Ltd.
(DFCC)
th
5 Floor, Pragati Maidan,
Metro Station Building Complex
New Dehll- 110001
Ref: Transfer of contracts from Siemens, S.A, to Siemens
Mobility, S.L.U
Dear Sir,
We make reference to the Public Tender for the "Design,
Supply, Construction, Installation, Testing and
Commissioning of 2x25kV AC Electrification, Signalling &
Telecommunication, E&M and Associated Works on
Design-Build Lump Sum Basis of Dadri- Khurja Section
(approximately 47 Route Km of double Line) of Eastern
Dedicated Freight Corridor", ICB No.: HQ/SYS/EC/D-B/
Dadri-Khurja, announced on June 14th, 2017.
On June 13th, 2017, the consortium comprised by Siemens
AG, Siemens, S.A. and Siemens, LTD, were prequalified.
By means of this letter, we would like to formally inform you
that Siemens is into a restructuring process as result of its
decision to combine the mobility business with Alstom
(subject to necessary approvals). Within the framework of
this global transaction, Siemens, S.A., incorporated in
Spain, has transferred its mobility business to Siemens
st
Mobility, S.L.U on June 1 , 2018, as it is reflected in the
public deed of the contract executed on April 23, 2018.
Please find attached as Exhibit 1 the incorporation public
deed of Siemens Mobility, S.L.U and its Bylaws, and as
Exhibit 2 , the extract of the public deed where it is
contained the mobility business transfer.
The transfer of Siemens, S.A. (Spain) mobility business to
Siemens Mobility, S.L.U includes all rights and obligations
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 5 of 28
regarding the bid process and contracts pertaining to
Siemens' mobility business, and therefore the corresponding
credentials. The Siemens Mobility, S.L.U. is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Siemens AG, one of the consortium members.
Counting on your support of the global transaction we
kindly ask you to please consent to the transfer and
assignment of the contractual relationships to Siemens
Mobility, S.L.U, by signing the acknowledgment below and
returning it to us, to the following address.
Siemens Mobility, S.L.U
For the attention Of: David Arenas
Ronda de Europa 5, 28760, Tres Cantos, Madrid
Phone:+346.70043578
E-Mail: david.arenasr@.siemens.com
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to
contact us.
Thank you in advance for your support and for your
cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
Siemens, S.A.
Name: Enrique Torres Verdasco
Attorney”
(Emphasis Supplied)
6. Accordingly, by the above communication respondent No.1 was
informed that Siemens, S.A. was in the process of restructuring to
combine the ‘mobility business’ with Alstom. Respondent No.1 was
also informed that Siemens, S.A. incorporated in Spain, had
transferred its mobility business to Siemens Mobility, S.L.U on
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 6 of 28
01.06.2018. It is common ground that the subject tender is related to
the ‘mobility business’ of the petitioners. Respondent No.1 was also
informed that Siemens Mobility, S.L.U is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Siemens A.G., one of the consortium members; and respondent
No.1’s consent was sought for transfer and assignment of the
contractual relationships in relation to the tender to Siemens Mobility
S.L.U. The consent sought was however declined, though with much
delay, by communication dated 26.11.2019, by which the petitioner’s
technical bid was also rejected, which we reproduce below:-
“No.: HQ/S&T/EC/DER-KRJ/Eval./91/Part-IV
Date. 26.11.2019
Consortium of Siemens Ltd. India, Siemens SA Spain
and Siemens AG Germany
Birla Aurora, Level 21, Plot no. 1080,
Dr. Annie Besant Road, Worli,
Mumbai 400030
(Kind Attention, Mr. Anupam Arora & Mr. Puneet
Mehra)
Sub: Design, Supply, Construction, Installation,
Testing and Commissioning of 2x25kV AC
Electrification, Signalling & Telecommunication, E&M
and Associated Works on Design-Build Lump Sum
basis for Dadri-Khura section (approximately 47 Route
km of double line) of Eastern Dedicated Freight
Corridor (CP 105).
Ref: 1) Your letter No.:MO-TPE-RE/D3526/ARA/CP-
105/Clarification-6, dated 16.11.19.
2) This office letter No.:HQ/S&T/EC/DER-
KRJ/Eval./91/Part-IV, dated 14.11.19.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 7 of 28
In reference to your letter at #1 above, It is
reiterated that the rejection of your technical proposal
submitted for subject work is due to failure of
consortium to meet the minimum qualification criteria
required under ITA 25.4 of PQ document.
Based on the documents submitted by the consortium, it
is established that the mobility business of SIEMENS
AG and SIEMENS SA (the original bidders) has been
transferred to wholly owned subsidiary of SIEMENS
AG namely Siemens Mobility SLU, Spain and Siemens
Mobility GmbH, Germany. These new entities are not
part of the bid. As a result of these changes, the
qualification of the original bidders is different from
the time they were qualified. As per ITA 25.4 of the PQ
document, only the qualification of the Applicant shall
be considered. In particular the Qualification of a
Parent or other Affiliated Company that is not party to
the applicant under a JV in accordance with ITA 4.2
(or participating as a sub-contractor as per ITA 25.2)
shall not be considered. The qualification of Siemens
Mobility SLU and Siemens Mobility GmbH cannot
therefore be considered.
Hence, after transfer of mobility business, which is the
scope of this tender, the claim by Siemens AG,
Germany and Siemens SA, Spain to continue to meet
the requirement of ITA 25.4 is not established.
(Satish Kumar)
GGM (S&T)/EC-l/DFCCIL”
(Emphasis Supplied)
7. In response to the aforesaid communication, the petitioner
responded on 27.11.2019 protesting the rejection of technical bid,
which has subsequently led to filing of the present writ petition.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 8 of 28
8. Mr. Rajiv Nayar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners has placed reliance upon clause No. 4.2 of tender
conditions, which we reproduce below:-
“4.2 An Applicant may be a firm that is a private
entity, a government-owned entity- subject to ITA 4.9-
or a combination of such entities in the form of a joint
venture (“JV“) under an existing agreement or with
the intent to enter into such an agreement supported by
a letter of intent. In the case of a JV, all members shall
be jointly and severally liable for the execution of the
Contract in accordance with the Contract terms. The
JV shall nominate an authorized representative who
shall have the authority to conduct all business for and
on behalf of any and all the members of the JV during
the prequalification process, bidding (in the event the
JV submits a bid) and during contract execution (in the
event the JV is awarded the Contract). Unless
specifice in the PDS, there is no limit on the number of
members in a JV.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. Mr. Nayar submits that as per the aforementioned tender
condition, an applicant is permitted to include a combination of
various entities in the form of a Joint Venture under an existing
agreement or with the intent to enter into such an agreement supported
by a letter of intent. He submits that a reading of this clause would
show the flexibility available to a bidder. He submits that as the
petitioners’ case stands, the petitioners stand on a better footing since
the mobility business has been hived-off to entities that are wholly
owned subsidiaries and therefore continue to remain under the
umbrella and control of one of the consortium members i.e. Siemens
A.G.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 9 of 28
10. The second submission of learned senior counsel for the
petitioners is that clause No. 25.4 read alongwith clause No. 30.1 of
the tender conditions in fact contemplate change in corporate
structures, subject only to formal approval from the respondents,
which the petitioners had sought and which was unfairly denied.
Clause Nos. 25.4 and 30.1 are reproduced below:-
“ 25.4 Only the qualifications of the Applicant shall
be considered. In particular, the qualifications of a
parent or other affiliated company that is not party to the
Applicant under a JV in accordance with ITA 4.2 (or
participating as a sub-contractor as per ITA 25.2) shall
not be considered.
“30.1 Any change in the structure or formation of
an Applicant after being prequalified in accordance with
ITA 27 and invited to bid (including, in the case of a JV,
any change in the structure or formation of any member
thereto) shall be subject to the written approval of the
Employer prior to the deadline for submission of bids.
Such approval shall be denied if (i) a prequalified
applicant proposes to associate with a disqualified
applicant or in case of a disqualified joint venture, any of
its members; (ii) as a consequence of the change, the
Applicant no longer substantially meets the qualification
criteria set forth in Section III, Qualification Criteria and
Requirements; or (iii) in the opinion of the Employer, the
change may result in a substantial reduction in
competition. Any such change should be submitted to the
Employer not later than fourteen (14) days after the date
of the Invitation for Bids.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. It is further submitted by learned senior counsel for the
petitioners that global restructuring has not impacted the experience of
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 10 of 28
the bidder, as required under the tender conditions since the wholly
owned subsidiaries remain within the umbrella and control of the
consortium, which comprises three companies viz M/s Siemens
Limited, M/s Siemens, S.A. and M/s Siemens A.G. Senior counsel
submits that the approach of the respondents is hypertechnical and
unreasonable for the reason that in letter dated 27.11.2019, the
petitioners had categorically asserted that there had been no change in
the consortium of Siemens despite carving-out of the mobility
business; and that Siemens A.G. was part of the consortium and also
the parent company of the carved-out entities i.e. Siemens Mobility
S.L.U, Spain and Siemens Mobility GmbH, Germany. It is reiterated
that the carved-out entities are 100% subsidiaries of Siemens A.G. and
are fully controlled by Siemens A.G. ; and further that the ultimate
responsibility for execution of the contract would lie with Siemens
A.G./consortium, which is the original bidder. It is the stand of the
petitioners that the consortium remains unchanged and unaffected by
hiving-off of these businesses; and hence it is not in violation of clause
Nos. 25.4 or 30.1 of the tender conditions. Accordingly, the petitioners
contend that they continue to retain the tender qualifications. On these
lines the petitioners have addressed not one, but three communications
dated 02.08.2018, 06.10.2018 and 07.11.2018 to the respondents.
12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance
upon a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this court in the case
of Consortium of Alstom Transport India Ltd. & Alstom Transport
S.A. & Anr. vs. Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India
Ltd. & Anr. reported as 2017 SCC Online Del 10132. Para Nos. 4, 16,
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 11 of 28
18, 20, 25 and 28 of this judgment are relied upon and these paras read
as under:-
“4. The facts are that both the Petitioners formed a
consortium. Alstom Transport (India) Ltd was
incorporated on 21.04.1997. In the year 2002, due to
restructuring in the Alstom Group, another Alstom Group
Company, namely Alstom Power India Ltd (incorporated
in 1992) filed a petition before this Court for
amalgamation of Alstom Transport (India) Ltd, Alstom
Systems Ltd and Alstom Power Boilers Ltd with Alstom
Power Ltd., which was allowed by the Court by its order,
dated 31.10.2002.Thereafter, Alstom Power India Ltd
changed its name to Alstom Projects India Ltd ("APIL"),
which was recorded by the Registrar of Companies, and
a fresh certificate of incorporation was issued on
11.11.2002. In 2012, APIL further changed its name to
Alstom India Limited ("AIL") vide fresh Certificate of
Incorporation dated 06.06.2012, which was issued
consequent upon the change of name of the company. It is
stated that in 2011, the Alstom Group, as a business
decision, decided to have a separate company to carry
out its transportation business and also set up a Rolling
Stock Manufacturing Unit at Sri City, Andhra Pradesh to
manufacture Metro Cars for the Chennai Metro and
consequently incorporated a new company in the name of
Alstom Transport India Limited i.e. the second petitioner
(“ATIL”) on19.01.2011.”
XXXXX
“16. The Respondents contend in their response to the
Petitioners’ letters that they clarified that the ATIL had
submitted a statement jointly signed by the Managing
Director of ATIL & AIL stating that AIL has sold and
transferred the Transport Business of AIL to ATIL on
Slump Sale Basis, and the transaction was completed on
31.03.2014. Since the Transport Division/Undertaking of
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 12 of 28
AIL purchased by ATIL is not a legal entity, credit for-
the experience for the works executed by APIL/AIL before
01.04.2014 cannot be given to ATIL. It is submitted that
the Petitioners were inherently ineligible to participate in
view of Clause 25.4 of the Pre-Qualification document,
which is as under:
"Only the qualifications of the Applicant shall be
considered. In particular, the qualifications of a
parent or other affiliated company that is not
party to the Applicant under a JV in accordance
with ITA 4.2 (or participating as a sub-contractor
as per ITA 25.2) shall not be considered."
XXXXX
“18. In 2011, the Alstom Group took a business decision
to have a separate company to carry out its
transportation business and also set up a Rolling Stock
Manufacturing Unit at Sri City, Andhra Pradesh to
manufacture Metro Cars for the Chennai Metro and
consequently incorporated a new company in the name of
Alstom Transport India Limited i.e. Petitioner No.2 on
19.01.2011. During, 2013-14, Alstom Group as part of its
global business restructuring strategy consolidated the
business sectors worldwide into four sectors namely
Power, Transport, Renewable and Grid. As part of the
restructuring, the Transport business was to be
streamlined and consolidated under one legal entity in
the country and, therefore, Alstom India Ltd ("AIL") by
board resolution dated15.01.2014 and with shareholders'
consent approved the sale and transfer of the transport
undertaking/business to ATIL as a going concern on a
slump sale basis for a lump sum consideration without
any values being assigned to individual assets and
liabilities vide Agreement to Sell Business dated
06.03.2014 (ASB).”
XXXXX
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 13 of 28
“20. The corporate genealogy of the Consortium and
ATIL is relevant in the context of the dispute in this case.
Alstom Transport SA is the other joint venture partner of
ATIL, in the first petitioner Consortium. Alstom
Transport India Ltd was incorporated in 1997; before
that one Alstom Power Ltd was incorporated in India, in
1992. This Court, on 31.10.2002, approved a scheme of
amalgamation of Alstom Transport India Ltd, Alstom
Systems Ltd and Alstom Power Boilers Ltd with Alstom
Power Ltd. This composite new entity (Alstom Power
Ltd.) changed its name to Alstom Projects India Ltd on
11.11.2012. It changed its name further to Alstom India
Ltd (AIL) in 2012 and a certificate was issued by the
Registrar, in that regard, on 06.06.2012. In 2012, ATIL
was set up for the purpose of transportation business and
rolling stock manufacture. In the meanwhile, the Alstom
group went a restructuring, resulting in organization of
its ventures into four broad commercial lines/“verticals”;
the transport business of AIL was transferred to ATIL, on
slump sales basis.”
XXXXX
“25. DFCC, no doubt, argues that the AIL’s Transport
Division, was not a legal entity and, therefore, the
experience of the joint-venture, cannot be assimilated
from either of the undertakings. This defence is wrong in
fact and in law. Clause 4.1, this Court notices, does not
specify that the Transport Division had to be a separate
entity, and since it was one of the divisions of the
undertakings, this submission is insubstantial. The
Petitioners have the same parent company Alstom, and
through a process of restructuring, and slump sale, have
formed a joint-venture. The assets and liabilities of the
transport business have been transferred to ATIL. The
Petitioners submit that this sale includes the transfer of
the professional expertise, credentials and market share
to ATIL. This Court has to consider, the application by
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 14 of 28
adopting a flexible and commercial approach, and
analyze whether the applicants/Petitioners would have
the General Construction Experience in fact or just on
paper. It has been admitted that the entity Alstom India
Ltd., formerly Alstom Projects India Ltd., has General
Construction Experience whereby contracts before the
ASB in 2014, have been changed in favor of ATIL.
Therefore, lifting the corporate veil would show that the
ASB along with the assigning of AIL’s contracts to ATIL,
prove that the joint venture was in fact, and not just on
paper, an undertaking whereby the experience of AIL
could be associated with the consortium as a whole.”
XXXXX
“28. In the present case, in this Court’s opinion, the
Petitioners have established that the consortium is a
joint-venture in the strictest sense. The ratio of New
Horizons (supra) clearly visualizes that the experience of
one of the members of a joint-venture can be associated
to the consortium and in that regard the Petitioners
together do qualify the General Construction Experience
Clause as stated above and the petitions are admitted.
The respondents’ approach is not driven by commercial
logic, but appears to be technical and semantic. An
enterprise, as the kind which DFCC wished to bid for its
contract, clearly is one that depends on technical
knowledge, a fund of experience and human ingenuity of
its thought leaders and employees. Once that asset, which
is part of the undertaking is transferred (with the
attendant right to claim past experience of the previous
owner) to another enterprise or undertaking, it becomes
the inheritors of that technical knowledge, wealth of
experience and human ingenuity. Realistically, this asset
is far more valuable that any tangible asset, unless it has
intrinsic value other than those who use it. Therefore, the
narrow construction or interpretation of the tender
condition that led to the rejection of the Petitioners’ bid
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 15 of 28
cannot be sustained. The letters dated 02.06.2017 and
06.06.2017 in reference to the first tender, and the letter
dated 14.06.2017 are to be quashed and are hereby
quashed. The respondents are directed to proceed and
evaluate the Petitioners’ tender and process it further in
accordance with the terms of the NIT. The writ petitions
are allowed in the above terms, without any order as to
costs.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
13. Learned senior counsel submits that the present case would be
fully covered by the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this
court in the afore-cited case; and is also a fit case where this court
must lift the corporate veil and satisfy itself that carving-out two
companies would have no implication or impact on the constitution of
the members of consortium.
14. Reliance is also placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in
Consortium of Titagarh firema Alder S.P.A. vs. Nagpur Metro Rail
Corporation Limited & Anr. reported as (2017) 7 SCC 486 to
buttress the petitioners’ submissions that commerical wisdom should
be applied while interpreting clause No. 25.4. Paras 35 and 38 of this
judgment, which are relied upon, read as under:-
“35 . Respondent 2, as is evident, is a company owned
by the People's Republic of China and, therefore, it
comes within the ambit of Clause 4.1 of the bid document
as a government-owned entity. We have already
reproduced the said clause in earlier part of the
judgment. As perceived by the 1st respondent, a single
entity can bid for itself and it can consist of its
constituents which are wholly-owned subsidiaries and
they may have experience in relation to the project. That
apart, as is understood by the said respondent, where the
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 16 of 28
singular or unified entity claims that as a consequence of
merger, all the subsidiaries form a homogenous pool
under its immediate control in respect of rights,
liabilities, assets and obligations, the integrity of the
singular entity as owning such rights, assets and
liabilities cannot be ignored and must be given effect.
While judging the eligibility criteria of the second
respondent, the 1st respondent has scanned Article 164 of
the Articles of Association of Respondent 2 which are
submitted along with the bid from which it is evincible
that the Board of Directors of the Respondent 2 has been
entrusted with the authority and responsibility to
discharge all necessary and essential decisions and
functions for the subsidiaries as well. According to the
1st respondent, the term "government-owned entity"
would include a government owned entity and its
subsidiaries and there can be no matter of doubt that the
identity of the entities as belonging to the government
when established can be treated as a government-owned
entity and the experience claimed by the parent of the
subsidiaries can be taken into consideration. ”
XXXXXX
“38. As is noticeable, there is material on record that
the Respondent 2, a government company, is the owner of
the subsidiary companies and subsidiary companies have
experience. The 1st respondent, as it appears, has applied
its commercial wisdom in the understanding and
interpretation which has been given the concurrence by
the Committee concerned and the financing bank. We are
disposed to think that the concept of "government-owned
entity" cannot be conferred a narrow construction. It
would include its subsidiaries subject to the satisfaction
of the owner. There need not be a formation of a joint
venture or a consortium. In the obtaining fact situation,
the interpretation placed by the 1st Respondent in the
absence of any kind of perversity, bias or mala fide
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 17 of 28
should not be interfered with in exercise of power of
judicial review. Decision taken by the 1st respondent, as
is perceptible, is keeping in view the commercial wisdom
and the expertise and it is no way against the public
interest. Therefore, we concur with the view expressed by
the High Court.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
Relying upon the above judgment, it is argued that the
petitioners expertise and experience must be taken to include that of
the hived-off mobility business of their wholly owned subsidiaries.
15. Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General who
appears for respondent No.1 on the other hand submits that the law
with regard to dealing with matters arising out of tenders is well-
settled. The scope of interference is narrow. The court in judicial
review is not concerned with the decision but only with the decision-
making process. The learned ASG contends that nothing has been
placed on record to show that the decision taken by the respondents is
either mala fide , unreasonable, arbitrary or unjustifiable. She submits
that the tender conditions are to be applied strictly and no part of the
tender conditions can be termed as superfluous. Neither can the courts
substitute their own view nor can they interpret the tender conditions
contrary to their plain meaning. She has placed strong reliance on
clause No.25.4 which, she states, is clear and unambiguous, viz. that
only the qualifications of the applicants/bidders, which in this case are
Consortium of Siemens Ltd. India, Siemens SA Spain and Siemens
AG Germany, are to be considered; and not those of their subsidiaries.
She submits that at the time of the bid, the mobility business, which is
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 18 of 28
the real heart of the tender and the contract, was being carried-out by
the bidders. Two divisions/businesses of Siemens A.G. have since
been hived-off and two new companies viz. Siemens Mobility SLU,
Spain and Siemens Mobility GmbH, Germany have been formed. The
mobility business being the most central of the qualifications, the
respondents have rightly rejected the technical bid for good reason;
and this would require no interference in the proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. She also places reliance upon clause
No. 30.1, which she states, in fact supports the case of the respondents
and not the petitioners. She submits that this clause cautions the
bidders that any change in structure or formation by an
applicant/bidder after being pre-qualified would be subject to written
approval of the employer, namely the respondents, prior to the
deadline for submission of bid. She further submits that on
18.01.2016 a pre-bid meeting had taken place, where a somewhat
similar issue had arisen when a request was made that while
computing the technical and financial capacity of an applicant, the
technical and financial capacity of their associates should also be
considered. This request was however not accepted. This meeting,
held on 18.01.2016; and the relevant part of the minutes of the
meeting dated 18.01.2016 is extracted below:-
“
| S.No. | Referecne to PQ<br>Document | Clarification<br>Sought by the<br>Applicant | DFCC’s<br>Response |
| Xxx | Xxx | Xxx | Xxx |
| 2. | Section 1: Instruction to<br>Applicants Sub Clause 25. | Request you that<br>while computing | Request not<br>accepted. |
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 19 of 28
| Evaluation of applicants<br>Sub clause 25.4<br>Only the qualifications of<br>the Applicant shall be<br>considered. In particular,<br>the Qualifications of a<br>parent or other affiliated<br>company that is not party<br>to the Applicant under a<br>JV in accordance with ITA<br>4.2 (or participating as a<br>sub-contractor as per ITA<br>25.2) shall not be<br>considered | the technical and<br>financial capacity<br>of the applicant,<br>the Technical and<br>financial capacity<br>of their associate<br>should also be<br>eligible.<br>Definition of<br>associate with<br>respect to the<br>applicant: is one<br>who<br>directly/indirectly<br>controls, or are<br>controlled by, or<br>are under<br>common control | Provision(s) of<br>PQ Document<br>shall prevail. |
|---|
”
16. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have given
our thoughtful consideration to the matter. It is no longer res integra
that the court while dealing with issues regarding tenders is to
examine only the decision making process and not the decision.
17. The law on the scope of judicial review in tender matters is
well-settled. A brief reference to some judicial precedents may not be
out of place. In the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India reported as
(1994) 6 SCC 651, the Supreme Court held as under:
"70. ...the principles of judicial review would apply to the
exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in
order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it
must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in
exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the
guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 20 of 28
| protect the financial interest of the State. The right to refuse | |
|---|
| the lowest or any other tender is always available to the | |
| Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of | |
| the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or | |
| refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement | |
| of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person | |
| or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be | |
| considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said | |
| power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of | |
| that power will be struck down." | |
xxx xxx xxx
{{
" 94. The principles deducible from the above are:
(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action.
(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely
reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the
administrative decision. If a review of the administrative
decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision,
without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.
(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the
realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept
the tender or award the contract is reached by process of
negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such
decisions are made qualitatively by experts.
(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other
words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant
for an administrative body functioning in an administrative
sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 21 of 28
| decision must not only be tested by the application of<br>Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other<br>facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness<br>not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.<br>(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative<br>burden on the administration and lead to increased and<br>unbudgeted expenditure." | | | decision must not only be tested by the application of |
|---|
| | | Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other |
| | | facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness |
| | | not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. |
| | | |
| 18. Further in the case of Afcons Infrastructure Limited v. | | Further in the case of Afcons Infrastructure Limited v. | |
| Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited and Another reported as | | | |
| | | |
| (2016) 16 SCC 818, the Supreme Court held as under: | | | |
| "11. Recently, in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint | |
| Venture Consortium) [Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML | |
| (Joint Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622 : (2016) 4 | |
| SCC (Civ) 106 : (2016) 8 Scale 99] it was held by this | |
| Court, relying on a host of decisions that the decision- | |
| making process of the employer or owner of the project in | |
| accepting or rejecting the bid of a tenderer should not be | |
| interfered with. Interference is permissible only if the | |
| decision-making process is mala fide or is intended to | |
| favour someone. Similarly, the decision should not be | |
| interfered with unless the decision is so arbitrary or | |
| irrational that the Court could say that the decision is one | |
| which no responsible authority acting reasonably and in | |
| accordance with law could have reached. In other words, | |
| the decision-making process or the decision should be | |
| perverse and not merely faulty or incorrect or erroneous. | |
| No such extreme case was made out by GYT-TPL JV in the | |
| High Court or before us." | |
xxx xxx xxx
"13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision-
making process or the decision of the administrative
authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere.
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 22 of 28
| The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or<br>arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before<br>the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making<br>process or the decision." | The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or | | |
|---|
| arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before | | |
| the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making | | |
| process or the decision." | | |
| | | |
| 19. Following the principles of Tata Cellular (supra) and Afcons | | | |
| | | |
| Infrastructure Limited (supra) the Supreme Court in Municipal | | | |
| | | |
| Corporation, Ujjain and Another v. BVG India Limited and Others | | | |
| | | |
| reported as (2018) 5 SCC 462, has further held as under: | | | |
| 20.<br>"64. Thus, the questions to be decided in this appeal are<br>answered as follows:<br>64.1. Under the scope of judicial review, the High Court<br>could not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of the<br>expert consultant on the issues of technical qualifications of<br>a bidder when the consultant takes into consideration<br>various factors including the basis of non-performance of<br>the bidder;<br>64.2. ...<br>64.3. It is not open to the court to independently evaluate<br>the technical bids and financial bids of the parties as an<br>appellate authority for coming to its conclusion inasmuch as<br>unless the thresholds of mala fides, intention to favour<br>someone or bias, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity<br>are met, where a decision is taken purely on public interest,<br>the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint." | 20. | | | | | | |
| | | "64. Thus, the questions to be decided in this appeal are | | | | |
| | | answered as follows: | | | | |
| | | 64.1. Under the scope of judicial review, the High Court | | | | |
| | | could not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of the | | | | |
| | | expert consultant on the issues of technical qualifications of | | | | |
| | | a bidder when the consultant takes into consideration | | | | |
| | | various factors including the basis of non-performance of | | | | |
| | | the bidder; | | | | |
| | | 64.2. ... | | | | |
| | | 64.3. It is not open to the court to independently evaluate | | | | |
| | | the technical bids and financial bids of the parties as an | | | | |
| | | appellate authority for coming to its conclusion inasmuch as | | | | |
| | | unless the thresholds of mala fides, intention to favour | | | | |
| | | someone or bias, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity | | | | |
| | | are met, where a decision is taken purely on public interest, | | | | |
| | | the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint." | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 20. Also, in Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India | | Also, in Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India | | | | | |
| and Another reported as 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1133, the Supreme | and Another reported as 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1133, the Supreme | | | | | | |
| Court has held as under: | | | | | | | |
| 21. | | | | | | | |
| | | "19. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is | | | | |
| | | duty bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, | | | | |
| | | irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court in all | | | | |
| | | the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time and again that | | | | |
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 23 of 28
courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising
their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial
matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in
contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness
or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must
remember that today many public sector undertakings
compete with the private industry. The contracts entered
into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny
under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are
bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction
of superior courts but this discretionary power must be
exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The
Courts must realise their limitations and the havoc which
needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In
contracts involving technical issues the courts should be
even more reluctant because most of us in judges' robes do
not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon
technical issues beyond our domain. As laid down in the
judgments cited above the courts should not use a
magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every
small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts
must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and
public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts
must also not interfere where such interference will cause
unnecessary loss to the public exchequer.
22.
"20. The essence of the law laid down in the judgments
referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution;
the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial
intervention in matters of contract involving the state
instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion
of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or
unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal
over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that
the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its
requirements and, therefore, the court's interference should
be minimal. The authority which floats the contract or
tender, and has authored the tender documents is the best
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 24 of 28
| judge as to how the documents have to be interpreted. If two | |
|---|
| interpretations are possible then the interpretation of the | |
| author must be accepted. The courts will only interfere to | |
| prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or | |
| perversity. With this approach in mind we shall deal with | |
| the present case." | |
21. Considering the matter within the afore-cited contours of
settled-law, we find that the real dispute between the parties revolves
around clause Nos. 25.4 and 30.1 of the tender conditions, which we
have extracted in the foregoing paras. The question which arises for
our consideration is as to the effect of two new entities having been
created by the petitioners after being pre-qualified and after placing
their technical bid. The request of the petitioners to the respondents to
grant consent to the transfer and assignment of the contractual
relationships to their subsidiaries was rejected for the reason that the
business that has been hived-off to the two new companies was the
real ‘heart and soul’ of the subject matter of the tender relating to the
‘mobility business’. As the names of these subsidiary companies, viz.
Siemens Mobility S.L.U, Spain and Siemens Mobility GmbH,
Germany suggest, the entire mobility business of Siemens A.G. has
been transferred-out of the parent company; and according to the
respondents, it is these two new companies which now carry with
them all necessary experience, expertise and the human, and
technological resources required as per the eligibility criteria of the
tender.
22. Upon a conspectus of the submissions made by the parties, we
are of the view that evidently the tender in question was in relation to
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 25 of 28
the ‘mobility business’ of the bidder-consortium, of which Siemens
A.G. was one of the members. Accordingly, at the stage of pre-
qualification, as well as at the stage of evaluating the technical bid of
the petitioners, the respondents evaluated and assessed the experience,
expertise, availability of trained manpower and other resources, both
human and infrastructural, available with the consortium including
those available with Siemens A.G. in relation to the mobility business.
23. However, admittedly the entire mobility business of Siemens
A.G. has now been transferred to Siemens Mobility S.L.U. and
Siemens Mobility GmbH by way of the global restructuring exercise
conducted. Evidently therefore, all the experience, expertise, human,
technological and infrastructural resources that were available with
Siemens A.G. have now been transferred to the said two entities. The
said two entities however are not part of the consortium, nor are the
bidders in their own right. To say that the said two entities are wholly
owned subsidiaries of Siemens A.G. is not a full answer since each of
these companies is a separate and distinct incorporated entity, which
are now independently engaged in the mobility business. In this view
of the matter, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that by
way of global restructuring exercise ‘nothing has changed’ is
unacceptable since a global restructuring exercise would not have
been conducted if nothing was to change.
24. Insofar as reliance placed by the petitioners on decisions in
Nagpur Rail Corporation Limited & Anr. (supra) and Alstom
Transport India Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the said two cases are
clearly distinguishable inasmuch as both these cases concern a
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 26 of 28
situation of ‘amalgamation’ and ‘merger’ of businesses into the bidder
company, by reason of which the core business for which the tender
was floated, alongwith all experience, expertise, human, technological
and infrastructural resources, was being transferred into the bidder
company and not out of it. It was in these circumstances that the
Supreme Court and Division Bench of the High Court in those cases
decided that the bidder would not suffer any disqualification. What is
more, is that in the present case, a conjoint reading of clause Nos. 25.4
and 30.1 of the tender conditions makes it clear that the respondents
had, in its discretion, decided that the qualification of a parent or other
affiliated company, which is not a bidder or party to a bidder-
consortium, shall not be considered when assessing the qualification
of the bidder ; and further that if, after being pre-qualified, there is any
change in the structure of the bidder company, such change ‘shall be
subject to written approval of the employer prior to the deadline for
submission of the bid’, thereby conveying the unequivocal intention
not to permit inter alia restructuring of bidder corporations without the
respondents’ written approval ; and that too, prior to the bid
submission deadline. In fact in clause No. 30.1, the respondents
clearly specified that one of the grounds for not according approval for
restructuring is that as a consequence of the change, the bidder may no
longer substantially meet the qualification criteria for the tender.
25. In view of the above discussion, firstly, we find that the terms
and conditions of the tender insofar as they relate to restructuring of a
bidder corporation are clear and unambiguous ; and secondly, we find
that such terms and conditions are reasonable, rational and bear a
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 27 of 28
meaningful connection with the contract for which the tender was
issued. Besides, we are also of the view that hiving-off the mobility
business by one of the consortium members namely Siemens AG into
two separate and distinct, though wholly owned subsidiary companies,
had the effect of ousting the experience, expertise, human and
infrastructural resources from Siemens A.G. and thereby from the
bidder consortium ; and this was certainly a valid and justifiable
reason for the respondents to reject the technical bid of the petitioners
by reason of changed circumstances after their pre-qualification. For
completeness we may observe that no mala fides have been alleged on
the respondents part; nor are any discernible from the turn of events.
26. In the above view of the matter, we find no infirmity in the
decision taken by the respondents in rejecting the technical bid of the
petitioners; and accordingly, there is no reason why we should
interfere in such decision in exercise of our powers of judicial review
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
27. The writ petition alongwith the pending application, if any, are
accordingly dismissed ; without however, any order as to costs.
Dasti under signatures of the Court Master.
G.S.SISTANI, J.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.
DECEMBER 06, 2019/ Ne
WPC12857/2019, 12868/2019 & 12869/2019 page 28 of 28