Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5247-5248 of 1998
PETITIONER:
THE MYSORE PAPER MILLS LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE MYSORE PAPER MILLS OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2002
BENCH:
G.B. Pattanaik & Doraiswamy Raju
JUDGMENT:
RAJU, J.
The above appeals have been filed by the Mysore Paper Mills Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant-Company", against the judgment of a
Full Bench of the High Court of Karnataka dated 12.8.98 in W.A. Nos.1242-1243,
insofar as it was held therein that the appellant-company is "State" within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, though, their appeals against
the order of the Single Judge came to be allowed on the ground that impugned
order of transfer against the 2nd respondent was not shown to be vitiated by
malafides or by any extraneous considerations and that the respondents have no
legal right to challenge the said order of transfer made on administrative grounds,
when plea of alleged malafides and vindictiveness has not been substantiated.
The second respondent, said to be a Post-Graduate in Chemistry joined
the services of the appellant-company on 10.8.91 as Management Trainees and
after successive career prospects came to be promoted as senior
Superintendent (D.M.Plant) which came to be redesignated as Assistant
manager (D.M.Plant) on 7.9.91. By a memorandum bearing reference
No.FPA/TRF/97/384 dated 27.11.97 he was transferred to the regional office
Calcutta. The said order came to be challenged as vitiated by malafides and
illegality and one made with a view to victimize and prevent him from functioning
as an Executive Member of the M.P.M. Officers’ Association. Certain allegations
to support such a claim were also made, and it is not necessary to advert to all
those details, in view of certain subsequent developments and turn of events. In
the Writ Petition filed by the respondents, a learned Single Judge of the High
Court by an order dated 4.3.98 granted stay of the order of transfer dated
27.11.97 confirming thereby the ex-parte interim order of stay earlier granted on
24.2.98 and rejecting the application of the appellant company for vacating the
same. Before the Division Bench, at the time of initial hearing of the appeals the
two grounds of challenge urged were:
(i) The Writ Petitions filed were not maintainable against the appellant-company,
since it is not a ‘State or other authority ’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India and (ii) the order of transfer was quite in accordance with the
terms and conditions of contract of service as well as Officers Service Rules and
necessitated on account of the exigencies of work and the interests of business
of the appellant-company and therefore not vitiated due to any malafides or other
extraneous considerations, as alleged. Since, in certain earlier decisions of the
Division Bench, the appellant-company was held to be not "State" within the
meaning of Article 12 and it was considered to require reconsideration in the light
of certain decisions of this Court, the matter was referred to a Full Bench for
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consideration.
Before the Full Bench, the following questions were taken up for
consideration:
(1) Whether the Mysore Paper Mills which is a
company incorporated under the Companies Act,
1956, and which is a Government Company as
defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act falls
within the meaning of the word "State", as defined in
Article 12 of the Constitution of India?
(2) Whether the action taken by the appellant-
company transferring the 2nd respondent to Calcutta
under the memo bearing No. FPA/TRF/384 dated
27.11.97 is vitiated by malafides and whether it is
arbitrary and illegal?
On a review and consideration of the case law on the subject, the Full
Bench, in the judgment under challenge, noticed the various tests laid down by
this Court and proceeding to consider the status of the appellant-company in the
light of those tests and adverting as well to the memorandum of Association and
Articles of Association of the appellant-company and the day-to-day
administration of its affairs, held as hereunder:
"(a) That the appellant-company is a governmental
company as per Section 617 of the Companies Act,
1956.
(b) The declared objects of the company viz., 1, 1A, 3,
4, 4A, 5, 5A and 5B establish that the company has
been entrusted with an important function of public
interest closely related to governmental functions and
it enjoys monopoly status, which is state conferred.
(c) The functions entrusted to the appellant-company
go to show that the government operates behind a
corporate veil carrying out governmental functions of
vital importance and therefore, there is no difficulty in
identifying the appellant-company to be ’State" within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
(d) The summarized balance sheets for the years
1993-94, 1994-95, and 1995-96 disclosed that more
than 97% of the share capital has been contributed by
the State of Karnataka and the financial institutions
controlled and belonging to Government of India.
(e) The business of the company which has to be
managed by the Board of Directors (Article 114 of the
Articles of Association) shall have the Chairman of the
Board and Managing Director (Article 119) and four
Directors of whom one will be the Chairman will be
nominated by the Government of Karnataka who shall
not retire by rotation or be removed from office except
under the orders of the Government of Karnataka
(Article 94). The Directors to whom the Management
is entrusted shall not be more than 12 or less than 9,
inclusive of the Government nominees and nominees
of the Financial Institutions noticed under Article 94A
and not only such nominees of Financial Institutions
hold office so long as moneys remain owed to those
institutions or those institutions hold debentures in the
company as a result of direct subscription or private
placement, but the Board also has no powers to
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remove them during such period.
(f) The appellant-company is found to be under the
control of the Government of Karnataka sometimes
directly and sometimes through the machinery of
Karnataka State Bureau of Public Enterprises in
respect of matters entrusted to it: as disclosed from
the book published by the Department of Personnel
and Administration Reforms of the Government of
Karnataka.
(g) Apart from the Directors who are nominees of the
government and the Financial Institutions controlled
by the Central Government even the elected Directors
were also to be nominated by the Government of
Karnataka and one cannot become a Director of the
appellant-company without the concurrence or
nomination by the Government.
(h) Appointment of several officers, playing vital role
in the day-to-day administration of the company can
be done only with the prior permission or approval of
the Government of Karnataka. The General Manager
also may be appointed on such terms and
remunerations as may be fixed, only subject to the
approval of the Government of Karnataka.
(i) For any investment or expenditure above 25 lakhs
the approval of Government of Karnataka is required.
Any revision of Pay Scales and allowances of
employees and officers also have to be done only
with the approval of the KSBPE. Recruitments to
posts carrying Pay Scales above Rs.4700/- can only
be with the permission of the Government and
reservation policies under Article 16(4) of the
Constitution are also applicable to recruitments by the
company. Deputation to Govt. and vice versa are
also permitted. All foreign tours of officers have to be
approved by the Government.
(j) All loans taken by the appellant-company are
guaranteed by the Government of Karnataka.
(k) The Company Secretary of the appellant-company
has in his communication annexure "GGG" declared
that the same is an undertaking under the control of
the Government of Karnataka. "
On the basis of the above facts found and several other documents
produced reflecting the conditions and terms subject to which the affairs of the
company were found actually carried on (noticed in para 12 of the judgment of
the High Court) the full Bench came to the inevitable conclusion that the entire
company is run as part or an enterprise of the State Government and that
everyone of the schemes of the company are also to be approved by the
Government. Total financial control of the company by the Government has also
been found. The fact that the State Government has notified the premises of the
company at Bhadravathi as "public premises" under the provisions of the
Karnataka public premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1974, and
appointment of five of its officers as competent officers for the purpose of the Act,
has been also taken due note and consideration to come to the ultimate
conclusion that the company is an authority and instrumentality or agency of the
State, so as to attract Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Heard, the learned senior counsel, appearing on either side who tried to
reiterate the very stand taken before the High Court relying upon one or the other
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of the decisions noticed by the High Court and some subsequent decisions, to
which a reference will be made hereinafter. We have carefully considered the
submissions on either side in the light of the principles laid down by this Court
and the factual details found on the basis of the materials placed at the time of
hearing before the High Court. Except taking exception to the finding that the
company’s business in the manufacture of news printing papers no monopoly of
State is enjoyed and that the said assumption was wrong, none of the other
factual findings were ever shown to be incorrect or unwarranted and without
basis. Even this grievance is sought to be made on the basis of national level
factual assumption and not by producing any material to disprove the statement
recorded in the judgment that no other company than the appellant is allowed to
produce newsprint in State of Karnataka, which alone being relevant for the
purpose.
In Praga Tools Corporation vs C.A.Imanual & Ors. [1969(1) SCC 585],
this court declared that the person or authority on whom the statutory duty is
imposed need not be a public official or an official body and further held that a
mandamus can be issued to a society to compel it to carry out the terms of the
statute to which it owe its Constitution as well as to companies or corporations to
carry out their duties enjoined by the statutes, authorising their undertakings. In
Andi Mukta S.S.M. V.S.S. J.M.S. Trust vs V.R. Rudani [1989(2) SCC 691], this
court held that the words "any person or authority" used in Article 12 of the
Constitution of India are not to be confined to only statutory authorities and
instrumentalities of the State and that they may cover any other person or body
performing public duties and the form of the body concerned is not very much
relevant. The nature of duty imposed on the body to be adjudged in the light of
positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, would be
determinative of the question of issue of a writ of mandamus to compel its
performance. While dealing with the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary
Studies, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, this Court in
Tekraj Vasandi @ K.L. Basandhi vs Union of India & Others [1988(1) SCC
236], observed that there cannot be any strait-jacket formula for adjudging
whether any person or authority answers the description of ’State’ within the
meaning of Article 12, and it would be necessary to look into the Constitution of
the body, the purpose for which it has been constituted, the manner of its
functioning including the mode of its funding and the broad features which have
been found by this Court to be relevant for such purpose though it is not
necessary that all those tests should be satisfied in every case to arrive at a
conclusion either way.
In Ajay Hasia & Others vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Others [1981(1)
SCC 722], this Court while approving the tests laid down in Ramana Dayaram
Shetty vs International Airport Authority of India [1979(3) SCC 489] as to
when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of
Government observed as hereunder:
"9. The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said
to be an instrumentality or agency of government may now be
culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority
case. These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are
merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and
caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning
to be placed on the expression "other authorities", it must be
realized that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every
autonomous body which has some nexus with the government
within the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the
meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may
summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the
Internal Airport Authority case as follows:
(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of
the corporation is held by Government, it would go a
long way towards indicating that the corporation is an
instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p.
507, para 14)
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(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so
much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the
corporation, it would afford some indication of the
corporation being impregnated with governmental
character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(3) It may also be a relevant factor whether the
corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State
conferred or State protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control
may afford an indication that the corporation is a State
agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public
importance and closely related to governmental
functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying
the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of
Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)
(6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is
transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong
factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation
being an instrumentality or agency of Government.
(SCC p. 510, para 18)
If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the
corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government, it would,
as pointed out in the International Airport Authority case, be an
’authority’ and, therefore, ’State’ within the meaning of the
expression in Article 12."
In Chander Mohan Khanna vs NCERT [1991(4) SCC 578], this Court
while observing that there are only general principles but not exhaustive tests to
determine whether a body is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and
those which are not, emphasized that the powers, functions, finances and control
of the Government are some of the indicating factors to answer such questions.
The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the
management and policies of the body and rendering of an important public
service were considered vital to point out that the body is "State". Due caution
was also administered that the wide enlargement of the meaning must be
tempered by wise limitation and mere State control, however vast and pervasive
is not by itself determinative and the financial contribution by the State is also not
conclusive. In VST Industries Ltd. vs VST Industries Workers’ Union &
Another [2001(1) SCC 298], this Court was only concerned with the question as
to whether, a canteen run in the factory of the company concerned pursuant to
an obligation cast under Section 46 of the Industrial Disputes Act, can be said to
constitute a person or authority to attract judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in respect of its action/activities and the answer was that the
company concerned therein manufacturing and selling cigarettes or running the
canteen for the welfare of workmen was not performing any public activity,
function or duty so as to render it amenable to Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. This, in our view, does not in any manner help to support the stand of the
appellant before us.
Instead of multiplying reference to several authorities of decided cases, it
would be useful to advert to a latest decision of this Court rendered by a
Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Others vs National Union
Waterfront Workers & Others [2001(7) SCC 1], wherein while dealing with a
claim, whether all Central Government undertakings which fall within the
meaning of "other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution of India are agents
or instrumentalities of the State functioning under the "authority" of the Central
Government to constitute such Government to be the "appropriate Government"
for purposes of Section 2(1)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
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Act, 1970 and Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, this Court
adverted to the relevant decisions and after an analytical consideration of the
principles therein observed as follows:
"31. In interpreting the said phrase, support is sought
to be drawn by the learned counsel for the contract
labour from the cases laying down the principles as to
under what circumstances a government company or
undertaking will fall within the meaning of "State or
other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution. We
shall preface our discussion of those cases by
indicating that for purposes of enforcement of
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution the question whether a government
company or undertaking is "State" within the meaning
of Article 12 is germane. It is important to notice that
in these cases the pertinent question is
appropriateness of the Government which is the
appropriate Government within the meaning of the
CLRA Act; whether the Central or the State
Government is the appropriate Government in regard
to the industry carried on by the Central/State
Government company or any undertaking and not
whether such Central/State Government company or
undertaking comes within the meaning of Article 12.
The word "State" is defined in Article 12 which is
quoted in the footnote.
32. In Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagatram Sardar Singh
Raghuvanshi this Court, in the context whether
service regulations framed by statutory corporations
have the force of law, by majority, held that the
statutory corporations like ONGC, IFFCO, LIC
established under different statutes fell under "other
authorities" and were, therefore, "State" within the
meaning of that term in Article 12 of the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the following
factors, (a) they were owned, managed and could
also be dissolved by the Central Government; (b) they
were completely under the control of the Central
Government; and (c) they were performing public or
statutory duties for the benefit of the public and not for
private profit; and concluded that they were in effect
acting as the agencies of the Central Government and
the service regulations made by them had the force of
law, which would be enforced by the Court by
declaring that the dismissal of an employee of the
corporation in violation of the regulations, was void.
33. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs International
Airport of India a three-Judge Bench of this Court laid
down that corporations created by the Government for
setting up and management of public enterprises and
carrying out public functions, act as instrumentalities
of the Government; they would be subject to the same
limitations in the field of constitutional and
administrative laws as the Government itself, though
in the eye of the law they would be distinct and
independent legal entities. There, this Court was
enforcing the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution
against the respondent a Central Government
corporation.
34. Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corpn. vs
Vijay Narayan Vajpayee dealt with a case of dismissal
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of the respondent employee of the appellant
Corporation in violation of the principles of natural
justice. There also the Court held the Corporation to
be an instrumentality of the State and extended
protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to
the employee taking the view that when the
Government is bound to observe the equality clause
in the matter of employment the corporations set up
and owned by the Government are equally bound by
the same discipline.
35. In Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi the
question decided by a Constitution Bench of this
Court was: whether Jammu and Kashmir Regional
Engineering College, Srinagar, registered as a society
under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of
Societies Act, 1898, was "State" within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution so as to be amenable to
writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Having examined
the memorandum of association and the Rules of the
Society, the Court decided that the control of the
State and the Central Government was deep and
pervasive and the Society was a mere projection of
the State and the Central Government and it was,
therefore, an instrumentality or agency of the State
and the Central Government and as such an
authority-State within the meaning of Article 12.
36. The principle laid down in the aforementioned
cases that if the Government acting through its
officers was subject to certain constitutional
limitations, a fortiori the Government acting through
the instrumentality or agency of a corporation should
equally be subject to the same limitations, was
approved by the Constitution Bench and it was
pointed out that otherwise it would lead to
considerable erosion of the efficiency of the
fundamental rights, for in that event the Government
would be enabled to override the fundamental rights
by adopting the stratagem of carrying out its function
through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation
while retaining control over it. That principle has been
consistently followed and reiterated in all subsequent
cases see Delhi Transport Corpn. vs D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress, Som Prakash Rekhi vs Union of
India, Manmohan Singh Jaitla vs Commr., Union
Territory of Chandigarh, P.K. Ramachandra Iyer vs
Union of India, A.L. Kalra vs Project and Equipment
Corpn. of India Ltd., Central Inland Water Transport
Corpn. Ltd. vs Brojo Nath Ganguly, C.V. Raman vs
Bank of India, Lucknow Development Authority vs
M.K. Gupta, Star Enterprises vs City and Industrial
Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd., LIC of India
vs Consumer Education & Research Centre and G.B.
Mahajan vs Jalgaon Municipal Council. We do not
propose to burden this judgment by adding to the list
and referring to each case separately.
37. We wish to clear the air that the principle, while
discharging public functions and duties the
government companies/corporations/societies which
are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
must be subjected to the same limitations in the field
of public law constitutional or administrative law
as the Government itself, does not lead to the
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inference that they become agents of the
Centre/State Government for all purposes so as to
bind such Government for all their acts, liabilities and
obligations under various Central and/or State Acts or
under private law."
A careful consideration of the principles of law noticed supra and the
factual details not only found illustrated from the memorandum as well as Articles
of Association of the appellant but enumerated from the day-to-day running of the
business and administration of the company leave no room for any doubt as to
the identity of the appellant-company being "other authority" and consequently
"the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The said
definition has a specific purpose and that is part III of the Constitution, and not for
making it a Government or department of the Government itself. This is the
inevitable consequence of the "other authorities" being entities with independent
status distinct from the state and this fact alone does not militate against such
entities or institutions being agencies or instrumentalities to come under the net
of Article 12 of the Constitution. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the
Government is not to be confined to entities created under or which owes its
origin toany particular statute or order but would really depend upon a
combination of one or more of relevant factors, depending upon the essentiality
and overwhelming nature of such factors in identifying the real source of
governing power, if need be, by piercing the corporate veil of the entity
concerned.
The indisputable fact that the appellant-company is a Government
company as envisaged in Section 617 attracting Section 619 of the Companies
Act, that more than 97% of the share capital has been contributed by the State
Government and the financial institutions controlled and belonging to the
Government of India on the security and undertaking of the State Government,
that the amendments introduced to the Memorandum of Association in the year
1994 introducing Articles 5A and 5B, entrusts the appellant-company with
important public duties obligating to undertake, permit, sponsor rural
development and for social and economic welfare of the people in rural areas by
undertaking programmes to assist and promote activities for the growth of
national economy which are akin and related to the public duties of the State,
that out of 12 directors 5 are Government and departmental persons, besides
other elected directors also are to be with the concurrence and nomination of the
Government and the various other form of supervision and control, as
enumerated supra, will go to show that the State Government has deep and
pervasive control of the appellant company and its day-to-day administration, and
consequently confirm the position that the appellant-company is nothing but an
instrumentality and agency of the State Government and the physical form of
company is merely a cloak or cover for the Government. Despite best and
serious efforts made on behalf of the appellant, the decision under challenge has
not been shown to suffer any infirmity whatsoever to call for interference in our
hands.
The appeals, therefore, fail and shall stand dismissed. No costs.
J.
(G.B. Pattanaik)
J.
(Doraiswamy Raju)
January 8, 2002.