N. JAYASREE vs. CHOLAMANDALAM MS GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6451 OF 2021 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C.) No. 14558 of 2019) N. JAYASREE & ORS.     …APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS CHOLAMANDALAM MS GENERAL  INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.        …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T S. ABDUL NAZEER, J. Leave granted. 2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   judgment   dated 09.08.2017 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in MACA No. 1560 of 2013.   Through the impugned judgment, the High Court scaled down the amount of compensation payable to Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2021.10.25 17:08:20 IST Reason: the   present   appellants   and   thereby   modified   the   award   dated 1 26.04.2013   passed   by   the   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal, Kottayam (for short ‘MACT’) in OP(MV) No.843 of 2011. 3.  The appellants filed the aforesaid claim petition before the MACT   seeking   compensation   on   account   of   the   death   of   N. Venugopalan Nair in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 20.06.2011.  Appellant no.1 is the wife of the deceased, appellant nos.   2   and   3   are   his   daughters   and   appellant   no.4   is   his mother­in­law.  4. There is no dispute as to the occurrence of the accident and the liability of the respondent­insurer to pay the compensation. In view of this admitted position, it is unnecessary to narrate the factual aspects of the accident.   5. The deceased was aged 52 years at the time of the accident. The MACT took the annual salary of the deceased as Rs.8,87,148. To   this,   the   MACT   applied   a   multiplier   of   ‘11’   and   deducted th one­fourth (1/4 ) of the income towards his personal expenses for the purpose of calculation of the compensation under the head of loss   of   dependency.   A   total   sum   of   Rs.73,18,971/­   (Rupees seventy­three lakhs eighteen thousand nine hundred seventy­one only) was awarded towards loss of dependency. The MACT awarded 2 a   total   sum   of   Rs.74,50,971/­   (Rupees   seventy­four   lakhs   fifty thousand nine hundred seventy­one only) towards compensation with interest @ 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of realization.  Thus, the amount awarded to the appellants is as under: 

3 6. However, the High Court held that appellant no.4 was not a legal representative of the deceased. Further, the High Court held that   the   MACT   ought   to   have   applied   split   multiplier   for   the assessment   of   the   dependency   compensation.     The   High   Court fixed monthly income of the deceased as Rs.40,000/­ (Rupees forty rd thousand   only)   and   deducted   one­third   (1/3 )   of   the   income towards   his   personal   expenses.   It   applied   multiplier   ‘7’   for calculating   dependency   compensation  for   the   post­retiral  period and, for the pre­retirement period, a multiplier of ‘4’ was applied. Accordingly,   the   High   Court   awarded   compensation   of Rs.23,65,728/­   (Rupees   twenty­three   lakhs   sixty­five   thousand seven hundred twenty­eight only), towards loss of dependency for pre­retiral period and a sum of Rs.22,40,000/­ (Rupees twenty­two lakhs   forty   thousand   only)   towards   loss   of   dependency   for post­retiral period.  A sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ (Rupees one lakh only) was   awarded   towards   loss   of   consortium,   Rs.25,000/­   (Rupees twenty­five   thousand   only)   towards   funeral   expenses,   and Rs.80,000/­ (Rupees eighty thousand only) towards loss of love and affection. In total, a sum of Rs.48,39,728/­ (Rupees forty­eight 4 lakhs thirty­nine thousand seven hundred twenty­eight only) was awarded as compensation by the High Court. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the High Court was not justified precluding appellant no.4 as legal representative of the deceased.  She is the mother­in­law of the deceased and was living with the deceased and his family members. Therefore, she was entitled to be treated as a legal representative for the purpose of th determination of compensation.  Accordingly, 1/4  of the income of the   deceased   should   have   been   deducted   towards   his   personal expenses. Further, it was contended that the High Court was not justified   in   applying   a   split   multiplier   having   regard   to   the judgment of this Court in  Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors.  vs.  Delhi 1   and   the   subsequent Transport   Corporation   and   Anr. Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in  National Insurance 2 Company   Limited   vs.   Pranay   Sethi   and   Ors . .     It   was   also argued that the deceased was a meritorious person who possessed the   qualification   of   M.Sc.   M.Phil.     His   monthly   salary   was 1 (2009) 6 SCC 121 2 (2017) 16 SCC 680 5 Rs.83,831/­ which is evident from the materials on record. The High   Court   took   his   monthly   income   as   Rs.40,000/­   for   the purpose   of   calculation   of   loss   of   dependency   without   any justification.  In view of the above, the High Court was not justified in   scaling   down   the   amount   of   compensation   awarded   by   the MACT.  8. On   the   other   hand,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent submits that the deceased was aged 52 years at the time of the accident.   He would not have earned the same monthly income after his retirement. In view of the same, the High Court applied a split multiplier for calculating the loss of dependency. It was also argued   that   appellant   no.4,   who   is   the   mother­in­law   of   the deceased, cannot be treated as his legal representative. Further, it was contended that the High Court was justified in taking the rd monthly salary of the deceased as Rs.40,000/­ and deducting 1/3 of the income towards the personal expenses, fair compensation has been awarded towards loss of dependency.   9. In view of the above, the questions for consideration before us are: (I) whether  the  High Court was  justified  in  precluding  the mother­in­law   of   the   deceased   (appellant   no.4)   as   his   legal 6 representative?   (II)   whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in applying   a   split   multiplier?   (III)   based   on   the   findings   on   the preceding   questions,   what   is   the   amount   of   compensation   that should be awarded to the appellants?  (I)   whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in   precluding   the mother­in­law   of   the   deceased   (appellant   no.4)   as   his   legal representative? 10. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, “MV Act”) gives paramount importance to the concept of ‘just and fair’ compensation.  It is a beneficial legislation which has been framed with the object of providing relief to the victims or their families. Section   168   of   the   MV   Act   deals   with   the   concept   of   ‘just compensation’ which ought to be determined on the foundation of fairness,   reasonableness   and   equitability.   Although   such determination   can   never   be   arithmetically   exact   or   perfect,   an endeavor  should  be  made by the  Court to award just  and fair compensation   irrespective   of   the   amount   claimed   by   the 1 applicant/s. In  , this Court has laid down as under: Sarla Verma “16.   ...“Just   compensation”   is   adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on 7 the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well­settled principles relating to award of compensation.   It   is   not   intended   to   be   a bonanza, largesse or source of profit.”  1 11. In   it was further held that where the deceased Sarla Verma was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses rd of the deceased should be one­third (1/3 ) where the number of th dependent family members is between 2 and 3, one­fourth (1/4 ) where the number of dependent family members is between 4 and th 6,   and   one­fifth   (1/5 )   where   the   number   of   dependent   family members exceeds six.  12. In the instant case, the appellants have contended that the mother­in­law of the deceased was staying with the deceased and his family members since a long time. Taking into consideration the   number   of   dependents   of   the   deceased   including   his mother­in­law   (four   in   number),   the   MACT   had   deducted   one th fourth   (1/4 )   of   the   income   towards   his   personal   expenses. However, the High Court has held that appellant no.4 being the mother­in­law of the deceased, cannot be reckoned as a dependent 8 of the deceased. The High Court, therefore, determined the number rd of dependents as 3 and accordingly deducted one­third (1/3 ) of the income of the deceased towards his personal expenses.  13.  Section 166 of the MV Act provides for filing of an application for compensation. The relevant portion of the said Section is as under:

9 14. The MV Act does not define the term ‘legal representative’. Generally,   ‘legal   representative’   means   a   person   who   in   law represents  the   estate  of   the   deceased  person and   includes  any person or persons in whom legal right to receive compensatory benefit vests.  A ‘legal representative’ may also include any person who  intermeddles  with the estate of the deceased.   Such person does not necessarily have to be a legal heir.   Legal heirs are the persons   who   are   entitled   to   inherit   the   surviving   estate   of   the deceased.  A legal heir may also be a legal representative.     15. Indicatively for the present inquiry, the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, defines the term ‘legal representative’ as under: “Legal Representative” means a person who in law   is   entitled   to   inherit   the   estate   of   the deceased if he had left any estate at the time of his death and also includes any legal heir of the   deceased   and   the   executor   or administrator of the estate of the deceased.”  16. In our view, the term ‘legal representative’ should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of MV Act and it should  not   be   confined   only   to   mean   the   spouse,   parents   and children of the deceased. As noticed above, MV Act is a benevolent legislation enacted for the object of providing monetary relief to the 10 victims or their families. Therefore, the MV Act calls for a liberal and wider interpretation to serve the real purpose underlying the enactment and fulfil its legislative intent.  We are also of the view that in order to maintain a claim petition, it is sufficient for the claimant to establish his loss of dependency.   Section 166 of the MV Act makes it clear that every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realization of compensation.   17. It is settled that percentage of deduction for personal expenses cannot   be   governed   by   a   rigid   rule   or   formula   of   universal application.  It also does not depend upon the basis of relationship of the claimant with the deceased.  In some cases, the father may have   his   own   income   and   thus   will   not   be   considered   as dependent.  Sometimes, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependents because they may either be independent or earning or   married   or   be   dependent   on   the   father.     The   percentage   of deduction for personal expenditure, thus, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  18. In the instant case, the question for consideration is whether the   fourth   appellant   would   fall   under   the   expression   ‘legal 11 representative’   for   the   purpose   of   claiming   compensation.     In Gujarat   State   Road   Transport   Corporation,   Ahmedabad   vs. 3 .   this Court while considering Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr the entitlement of the brother of a deceased who died in a motor vehicle accident to maintain a claim petition under the provisions of the MV Act, held as under: “13.   We   feel   that   the   view   taken   by   the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of   the   Indian   society.   Every   legal representative   who   suffers   on   account   of the   death   of   a   person   due   to   a   motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation   of   compensation   and   that   is provided by Sections 110­A to 110­F of the Act . These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must   have   a   remedy.   It   is   for   the   Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110­B of the Act and to specify   the   person   or   persons   to   whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of   the   compensation   payable   and   its apportionment as required by Section 110­B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose   benefit   an   application   may   be   filed under Section 110­A of the Act have to be done in   accordance   with   well­known   principles   of 3 3 (1987) 3 SCC 234 12 law.  We should remember that in an Indian family   brothers,   sisters   and   brothers’ children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the bread­winner   of   the   family   and   if   the bread­winner   is   killed   on   account   of   a motor   vehicle   accident,   there   is   no justification   to   deny   them   compensation relying   upon   the   provisions   of   the   Fatal Accidents   Act,   1855   which   as   we   have already held has been substantially modified by   the   provisions   contained   in   the   Act   in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicles accidents.   We   express   our   approval   of   the decision   in   Megjibhai   Khimji   Vira   v. 4     and   hold   that Chaturbhai   Taljabhagujri the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle   accident   is   entitled   to   maintain   a petition under Section 110­A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.” 5 19. In  Hafizun Begum (Mrs)  vs.  Mohd. Ikram Heque and Ors . it was held that: “ 12 .   As   observed   by   this   Court   in 7.  … Custodian of Branches of Banco National 6 Ultramarino   v.   Nalini   Bai   Naique   the definition   contained   in   Section   2(11)  CPC   is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only.  Instead, it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir, competent to inherit the 4 AIR 1977 Guj 195 5 (2007) 10 SCC 715 6 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 13 property of the deceased, can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate   even   without   title   either   as executors   or   administrators   in   possession of   the   estate   of   the   deceased .   All   such persons would be covered by the expression ‘legal representative’. As observed in   Gujarat 3   v.     a   legal SRTC Ramanbhai   Prabhatbhai representative is one who suffers on account of death   of   a   person   due   to   a   motor   vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.” 20. In   Montford Brothers of St. Gabriel and Anr.   vs.   United 7 .  this Court was considering the claim India Insurance and Anr petition   of   a   charitable   society   for   award   of   compensation   on account of the death of its member. The appellant­society therein was   a   registered   charitable   society   and   was   running   various institutions as a constituent unit of Catholic church.  Its members, after joining the appellant­society, renounced the world and were known as ‘brother’.  In this case, a ‘brother’ died in a motor vehicle accident.  The claim petition filed by the appellant­society seeking compensation on account of the death of aforesaid ‘brother’ was rejected by the High Court on the ground of its maintainability. 7 (2014) 3 SCC 394 14 This Court after examining various provisions of the MV Act held that   the   appellant­society   was   the   legal   representative   of   the deceased   ‘brother’.     While   allowing   the   claim   petition   it   was observed as under: “17.   A perusal of the judgment and order of the Tribunal discloses that although Issue 1 was not pressed and hence decided in favour of the appellant claimants, while considering the   quantum   of   compensation   for   the claimants,   the   Tribunal   adopted   a   very cautious approach and framed a question for itself as  to  what  should  be  the  criterion  for assessing   compensation   in   such   case   where the deceased was a Roman Catholic and joined the   church   services   after   denouncing   his family,   and   as   such   having   no   actual dependents   or   earning?   For   answering   this issue,   the   Tribunal   relied   not   only   upon judgments   of   American   and   English   Courts but also upon Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even a religious order or an organisation may suffer considerable loss due to the death of a voluntary worker. The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be 15 entitled   for   compensation   as   legal representative   of   the   deceased   and   for   that purpose   it   relied   upon   the   Full   Bench judgment   of   Patna   High   Court   in   Sudama 8 Devi   v.   Jogendra   Choudhary ,   which   held that   the   term   “legal   representative”   is   wide enough to include  even “intermeddlers” with the   estate   of   a   deceased.   The   Tribunal   also referred to some Indian judgments in which it was   held   that   successors   to   the   trusteeship and   trust   property   are   legal   representatives within   the   meaning   of   Section   2(11)   of   the Code of Civil Procedure.” 21. Coming to the facts of the present case, the fourth appellant was the mother­in­law of the deceased.  Materials on record clearly establish that she was residing with the deceased and his family members.   She   was   dependent   on   him   for   her   shelter   and maintenance.    It   is   not   uncommon   in   Indian   Society   for   the mother­in­law to live with her daughter and son­in­law during her old   age   and   be   dependent   upon   her   son­in­law   for   her maintenance.  Appellant no.4 herein may not be a legal heir of the 8 AIR 1987 Pat 239 16 deceased,   but   she   certainly   suffered   on   account   of   his   death. Therefore,   we   have   no   hesitation   to   hold   that   she   is   a   “legal representative” under Section 166 of the MV Act and is entitled to maintain a claim petition.   (II)   Whether the High Court was justified in applying a split multiplier? 22. The deceased was aged 52 years at the time of the accident. He was working as an Assistant Professor and getting a monthly salary of Rs.83,831/­ (Rupees eighty­three thousand eight hundred thirty­one only).   The evidence on record shows that he was a meritorious man having the qualifications of M.Sc, M.Phil.  He was a first­class holder in M.Sc.  He was a Selection Grade Lecturer in Mathematics and was a subject expert.   He was also included in the panel of Mahatma Gandhi University and was appointed as Examiner in the Board of Examiners for CBCCSS Programme in Mathematics.     Subsequently,   he   was   appointed   as   Deputy Chairman of the Examiners Board.  Evidence on record also shows that   there   is   acute   shortage   of   lecturers   in   Mathematics   for appointment in colleges and retired Mathematics Professors are 17 appointed in so many colleges. It is common knowledge that the teachers, especially Mathematics teachers, are employed even after their retirement in coaching centers.  They may also hold private tuition classes.   This would increase their income manifold after retirement. 1 23. In  ,  this Court has held that while calculating Sarla Verma the compensation, the courts should take into consideration not only the actual income at the time of the death but should also make additions by taking note of future prospects.  It was further held that though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid disparate   yardsticks   being   applied   or   disparate   methods   of calculation being adopted. 9 24. In   Reshma Kumari & Ors.   vs.   Madan Mohan & Anr . , a three­Judge Bench of this Court has approved the judgment in 1 . Sarla Verma 9 (2013) 9 SCC 65 18 2 25. In   Pranay   Sethi ,   this   Court   has   not   only   approved   the 1 aforesaid observations made in     but also held as Sarla Verma under: “ 59.3.   While   determining   the   income,   an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of   the   deceased   towards   future   prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was   below   the   age   of   40   years,   should   be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to   60   years,   the   addition   should   be   15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.  In case the deceased was self­employed 59.4. or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established   income   should   be   the   warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary   method   of   computation.   The established income means the income minus the tax component.” 26. In  vs. K.R. Madhusudhan and Ors.   Administrative Officer 10 and Anr . , this Court was  considering a  case  where  the High Court had applied split multiplier for the purpose of calculation of compensation towards loss of dependency and held as under: 10 (2011) 4 SCC 689 19 1 “ 8.   In  Sarla Verma   judgment the Court has held   that   there   should   be   no   addition   to income for future prospects where the age of the   deceased   is   more   than   50   years.   The learned Bench called it a rule of thumb and it was developed so as to avoid uncertainties in the outcomes of litigation. However, the Bench held that a departure can be made in rare and exceptional   cases   involving   special circumstances.  We are of the opinion that the rule of thumb 9. 1 evolved in     is to be applied to Sarla Verma those   cases   where   there   was   no   concrete evidence on record of definite rise in income due to future prospects. Obviously, the said rule was based on assumption and to avoid uncertainties   and   inconsistencies   in   the interpretation   of   different   courts,   and   to overcome the same.” 27. In   vs. Puttamma   and   Ors.     K.L.   Narayana   Reddy   and 11 Anr . ,   this   Court   was   again   considering   a   case   where   split multiplier   for   the   purpose   of   calculation   of   dependency compensation was applied.  It was held thus:  “ 32.   For   determination   of   compensation   in motor accident claims under Section 166 this Court  always   followed   multiplier   method.   As there were inconsistencies in the selection of a 1 multiplier,   this   Court   in   Sarla   Verma 11 (2013) 15 SCC 45 20 prepared   a   table   for   the   selection   of   a multiplier   based   on   the   age   group   of   the deceased/victim.   The   1988   Act,   does   not envisage application of a split multiplier. 33.  In  K.R. Madhusudhan  v.  Administrative 10   this Court held as follows: (SCC p. Officer 692, paras 14­15) “ 14 . In the appeal which was filed by the appellants   before   the   High   Court,   the   High Court  instead   of   maintaining   the   amount   of compensation   granted   by   the   Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had   not   given   any   reason.   The   High   Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed   from   the   multiplier   used   by   the Tribunal   without   disclosing   any   reason therefor.   The   High   Court   has   also   not considered   the   clear   and   corroborative evidence   about   the   prospect   of   future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased   is   between   51   and   55   years   the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the 2nd column in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles   Act,   and   the   Tribunal   has   not committed   any   error   by   accepting   the   said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why   the   High   Court   chose   to   apply   the multiplier of 6. 15 . We are, thus, of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside for it is perverse and clearly contrary to the   evidence   on   record,   for   having   not considered   the   future   prospects   of   the deceased   and   also   for   adopting   a   split multiplier method. 21 34.  We, therefore, hold that in absence of any specific   reason   and   evidence   on   record   the tribunal  or  the   court  should   not  apply   split multiplier in routine course and should apply multiplier   as   per   decision   of   this   Court   in 1 Sarla   Verma   as   affirmed   in   Reshma 9 Kumari . ” 28. From   the   above   discussion   it   is   clear   that   at   the   time   of calculation of the income, the Court has to consider the actual income of the deceased and addition should be made to take into account future prospects. Further, while the evidence in a given case   may   indicate   a   different   percentage   of   increase, standardization   of   the   addition   for   future   prospects   should   be made   to   avoid   different   yardsticks   being   applied   or   different 2 methods   of   calculation   being   adopted.     In   ,   the Pranay   Sethi Constitution Bench has directed addition of 15% of the salary in case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years as a thumb rule, where a deceased had a permanent job. In view of the above, the High Court was not justified in applying split multiplier in the instant case.   (III)     What   is   the   amount   of   compensation   that   should   be awarded to the appellants? 22 29. That takes us to the award of compensation.  We have already noticed that the deceased was working as Assistant Professor at Devaswom Board Pampa College, Paruamala, and was drawing a monthly   income   of   Rs.83,381/­   which   is   clear   from   his   salary certificate   (Ex.A­5)   issued   by   the   Principal   of   Devaswom   Board Pampa   College,   Paruamala.     The   salary   slip   received   by   the deceased for the month of May 2011 (Ex.A­6) also shows that his monthly   salary   was   Rs.83,381/­.     These   documents   have   been marked in evidence through the Principal of the said College who was   examined   as   PW­1.   Thus,   annual   income   of   the   deceased 1 comes to Rs.10,00,572/­.  This Court in  Sarla Verma  has made it clear that the Annual Income of the deceased minus the income tax should be  taken  into account  at the   time  of   his  death  for the purpose of calculation of loss of dependency. The deceased had to pay Rs.1,13,424/­ towards income tax per annum.  After deducting the   said   amount   the   actual   income   of   the   deceased   comes   to Rs.8,87,148/­.     23 30. The deceased was aged 52 years at the time of his death and had a permanent job.   Having regard to the judgment in   Pranay 2 , an addition of 15% of his actual salary should be added Sethi towards   future   prospectus.   Therefore,   15%   of   his   actual   salary comes to Rs.1,33,072/­ 31. Since the deceased was 52 years at the time of his death, the applicable multiplier is ‘11’.  As we have held that appellant no.4, the mother­in­law of the deceased is also a dependent and a “legal representative” under Section 166 of the MV Act, the total number th of dependents left behind by the deceased is four.  Hence, 1/4  of the income (actual salary + future prospects) should be deducted towards   his   personal   expenses.   Thus,   the   total   compensation payable towards loss of dependency is as under:

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2 32. In   , this Court has awarded a total sum of Pranay Sethi Rs.70,000/­ (Rupees seventy thousand only) under conventional heads,   namely,   loss   of   estate,   loss   of   consortium   and   funeral expenses.  It was held that the said sum should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.  It was held thus: “ 59.8.   Reasonable   figures   on   conventional heads,   namely,   loss   of   estate,   loss   of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.” 2 33. The judgment in     was rendered in the year Pranay Sethi 2017.  Therefore, the claimants are entitled for 10% enhancement. Thus, a sum of Rs.16,500/­ each is awarded towards loss of estate and funeral expenses.  34. A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   United   India Insurance Co. Ltd.   vs . Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur and 12 2 Ors ,   after   considering   Pranay   Sethi ,   has   awarded   spousal 12 (2020) SCC Online SC 410 : AIR 2020 SC 3076 25 consortium at the rate of Rs.40,000/­ (Rupees forty thousand only) and towards loss of parental consortium to each child at the rate of Rs.40,000/­   (Rupees   forty   thousand   only).     The   compensation under these heads also needs to be increased by 10%.  Thus, the spousal   consortium   is   awarded   at   Rs.44,000/­   (Forty­four thousand only), and towards parental consortium at the rate of Rs.44,000/­   each   (Total   Rs.88,000/­)   is   awarded   to   the   two children. 35. Thus, the appellants are entitled to compensation as under:

36. The appellants are also entitled to interest on the said amount at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till   the   date   of   its   realization.     The   respondent   is   accordingly directed to deposit the above amount with accrued interest thereon 26 at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of claim petition till the date of deposit, after deducting amounts, if any, deposited by the respondent, within eight weeks from today. 37. Resultantly,   the   appeal   is   allowed   in   the   aforesaid   terms. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs. 38. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of. ……………………………………J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER) ……………………………………J. (KRISHNA MURARI) New Delhi; October 25, 2021. 27