Full Judgment Text
Reportable
2026 INSC 223
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No………of 2026
[@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 15378 of 2024]
Sanjay Kumar Sharma
...Appellant
Versus
State of Bihar & Ors.
...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. Vinod Chandran, J.
Leave granted.
2. Overzealous investigation is as fatal to prosecution as
are the lethargic and the tardy. Framing a case on public
perceptions and personal predilections ends up in a mess,
often putting to peril an innocent and always letting free the
perpetrator. Here, we have a case of gruesome death of a
couple when their house was gutted in a fire, with the son
and daughter-in-law accused of murder. The entire case is
founded on motive; the ill-will the son harbored against the
father for not having given him his due share in the ancestral
Signature Not Verified
property. The entire village was against the son and the
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2026.03.11
16:04:11 IST
Reason:
mishap ended in an investigation where truth was sacrificed
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at the altar of perceived vengeance, ably assisted by the
Investigating Officer’s selective but careless pursuits,
derailing the entire prosecution.
3. On the early hours of 23.11.2016, a shanty in which a
lawyer and his wife were residing was gutted in a fire,
killing the old man immediately and his wife after two days
in a hospital at Patna. It was alleged that the younger son and
daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous enmity
arising from land disputes, torched the hut with the intention
to murder the parents. In defense, as is permissible,
inconsistent stances were taken; of the neighbour, who was
managing the properties of the deceased, and the elder son
having colluded to murder the couple and an accidental
fire, by reason of the cooking gas cylinder bursting. The
Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court
acquitted him. We are faced with the divergent findings of
the Trial Court and the High Court; that of the High Court by
its order of acquittal having fortified the presumption of
innocence available to the accused.
4. Sri Smarhar Singh, Advocate-on-Record, appearing
for the petitioner, the elder son of the deceased, argued that
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the High Court has completely lost sight of the evidence in
the case and entered an acquittal totally ignoring the dying
declarations. In addition to the recorded dying declarations
as coming out from the First Information Statement (FIS) and
that recorded by PW8, a Block Development Officer (BDO),
PWs 1 to 3, 5 and 6 also spoke of the statement made by one
of the deceased pinning the dastardly act of setting ablaze
the hut and murdering the parents on the accused. There
was sufficient evidence to prove the motive, which together
with the dying declarations ought to have persuaded the
High Court to affirm the conviction ordered by the Trial
Court. The Doctor who carried out the post-mortem spoke
only of 60% burns and confirmed the mental status of the
deceased, who spoke about the cause of her death and that
of her husband. A number of decisions are placed before us
to put forth the contention that a dying declaration can be
solely relied on to enter a conviction. In the present case,
there was sufficient corroboration from the medical
evidence, the motive proved and the testimony of witnesses
who reached the crime spot immediately afterwards. The
High Court ought to have ensured that the parricide was not
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left unavenged, when egregiously the accused were
acquitted without a proper appreciation of the evidence.
5. Sri Amanullah, learned Counsel appearing for the
State sought to uphold the conviction of the Trial Court and
reverse the order of acquittal especially pointing out the
dastardly crime. The testimonies of the witnesses, the dying
declaration and the motive proved ought to have convinced
the High Court about the culpability of the accused is the
contention.
6. Sri Vipin Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the
accused pointed out the lapses in the investigation and the
concerted effort to somehow punish the accused, by
manufacturing evidence not only in the form of inconsistent
dying declarations but also by way of interested testimony
of the witnesses. There was a clear pick and choose
employed in bringing witnesses to the trial, all interested
and by their testimony validating the defense of a cooked-
up prosecution story. The learned counsel for the accused
also urged the laxity with which the Trial Court considered
the matter. None of the incriminating circumstances were
put to the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal
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1
Procedure, 1973 and the defense set up was given a
complete go by. The Trial Court proceeded on merely
surmises and conjectures without looking into the relevant
aspects in the testimony of the witnesses, which would
validate the defense of the accused, either of a motivated
accusation having been levelled or an accidental fire having
occurred, the defense being entitled to take different pleas.
7. In the context of the divergent findings and the
peculiar circumstance of a son (A1) and daughter-in-law
(A2) being accused of murdering A1’s parents we have
examined the records and the evidence with a hawk’s eye.
Since the learned counsel for the appellant had relied
primarily on the dying declarations, with reference to
various decisions we will have to first look at the decisions
2
placed before us. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra was a
Constitution Bench decision examining a reference based
on two conflicting decisions. The conflict was insofar as the
certification of the doctor regarding the condition of the
patient who makes the dying declaration. While one of the
decisions held that the certification should be to the effect
1
For brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’
2
(2002) 6 SCC 710
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that the person making that declaration is in a fit state of
mind, another coordinate Bench held that if the materials on
record indicate the deceased to be fully conscious, the
declaration made immediately prior to death cannot be
ignored, merely for reason of the absence of a certification
by a doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to
make such a declaration. The Constitution Bench without
relying on the moral premise that ‘ no man would like to meet
his maker with a lie in his mouth ’, based itself on more
practical grounds. Their Lordships relied on the juristic
theory of such declaration being made in extremity, at the
time of imminent death, when every hope in life is gone,
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the only
inducement is the desire to speak truth. However, it was
observed that great caution has to be exercised in
considering the weight to be given to this species of
evidence on account of existence of many circumstances
which may affect the truthfulness and correctness of a
statement made, the author of which cannot be cross-
examined. There is always the possibility of tutoring or
prompting or a product of imagination, which the Court
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should be satisfied, does not exist. The Court also should be
satisfied as to the situation the injured is placed in to take
stock of the incident and identify the assailant as also the
fitness of mind & body to subsequently speak about it.
Normally, Courts look for medical evidence to assess the
mental condition of the deceased while making a dying
declaration, but it is not a rigid rule. Where, from the
attendant circumstances, as spoken of by the witnesses and
brought out by valid evidence if the Court is able to satisfy
itself that the declaration was made in a fit and conscious
state, then a contrary medical opinion cannot prevail and
even its total absence would be inconsequential. The
declaration made by a three Judge Bench that in the
absence of medical certification that the injured was in a fit
state of mind, it would be risky to accept the subjective
satisfaction of a Magistrate as to the state of mind was held
to be too broadly stated and not the correct enunciation of
law; deprecated as a hyper-technical view especially in that
case where there was available, certification of the doctor to
the effect that the patient was conscious, but without the
injured being expressly stated to be in a fit state of mind.
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8. The law as elaborated in the Constitution Bench
decision would be sufficient to evaluate the dying
declaration in the present case. However, on the insistence
made by the appellant, who had lost both his parents in a
fire, an alleged murder which the Trial Court found
established and the High Court reversed on reasonable
doubt expressed, we would look at the other decisions also.
3
9. Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab was a case
of bride-burning with multiple dying declarations, the first
exonerating the accused, and then more, in one voice
implicating them. The first dying declaration recorded by a
police officer was in the presence of the mother-in-law,
which was resiled from in the declaration recorded by the
Executive Magistrate after two days. The earlier statement
was stated to be due to a threat that she would not be taken
to the hospital unless she spoke of an accidental fire. This
was repeated in the subsequent oral dying declarations, to
her uncle, and a Sub-Inspector which were believed by this
Court.
3
(2008) 4 SCC 265
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4
10. Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi was a murder
by a lady and her son of the second wife and two children.
The conviction was on the sole basis of the dying declaration
made by the stepdaughter who was admitted to the hospital
with grievous injuries in the nature of stab wounds. On an
analysis of various decisions of this Court, the principles
were encapsulated in paragraph 22 which reads as under:
“22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly
shows that:
(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of
conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the
court.
(ii) The court should be satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of
making the statement and that it was not the result
of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the
declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration.
(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of
law that the dying declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.
The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule
of prudence.
4
(2010) 9 SCC 1
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(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative
evidence.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from
infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious
and could never make any statement cannot form
the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is
not to be rejected.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded.
(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the
deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to
make the dying declaration, medical opinion
cannot prevail.
(x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied
that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
deceased to make a false statement and if it is
coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal
impediment to make it the basis of conviction,
even if there is no corroboration.”
Therein the dying declaration, which was the FIS was
recorded by an Inspector in the presence of a doctor and
then registered as an FIR, signed also by the doctor
certifying her fit mental state.
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5
11. Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
was again concerned whether a death by burning in the
marital house, was accidental or homicidal. After the dying
declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate within
two hours of the incident, an affidavit was sworn to by the
deceased exonerating the in-laws. Death having occurred a
month after the incident, the first declaration was held
truthful, which stood corroborated by PW2 and PW3 who
took the deceased with 60% burns to the hospital. The dying
declaration by the injured; burnt at only the lower part of
the body was found to be reliable since it gave a cogent and
possible scenario of the occurrence further corroborated by
stab wounds.
6
12. Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra dealt with four
dying declarations which consistently spoke about the role
played by the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law in
torching the injured. The mere fact that in one of the
statements, two others were implicated was found to be not
sufficient to discard the role of the in-laws. Satish Chandra
5
(2012) 4 SCC 327
6
(2013) 2 SCC 224
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7
v. State of M.P. dealt with a suicide in which the dying
declaration was made as a continuous narrative. It was held
that though this Court had found that statements in the form
of question and answer would be more appropriate, a
credible declaration should not be eschewed on the
grounds of existence of more details or presence of family
members, when there is no indication of tutoring by the
8
family. Amol Singh v. State of M.P. and Lakhan v. State of
9
M.P. clarified that it is not the plurality of dying
declarations that matter, but the reliability, which is the
significant aspect. Any inconsistency would only compel the
Court to examine it carefully, as to whether those are
material or not.
13. From a conspectus of the above decisions, it is clear:
That, a dying declaration is a very important species of
evidence capable of proving the crime proper and
identifying the accused, an exception to hearsay having
been provided by Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
That, a dying declaration, for reliance should inspire
7
(2014) 6 SCC 723
8
(2008) 5 SCC 468
9
(2010) 8 SCC 514
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confidence in the Court as to its credibility. That, the Court
should be satisfied it is made by the deceased without any
prompting or tutoring or coercion or is a mere figment of
imagination. That, then conviction can be based solely on
the dying declaration and there is no requirement of any
corroboration. That, it can be reduced to writing or can be
oral, as testified by reliable witnesses. That, it can be one or
numerous and if more than one; exculpatory and
inculpatory, it is for the Court to find out which is believable.
That, it can be a lengthy one or a short one, so far as the
crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator
comes through. That, it can be a single narrative or in a
question and answer form. That, it can either have a history
of the rancour between the perpetrator and the victim or can
be merely the brief statement of the incident. That, the
capacity of the injured to make the statement, both physical
and mental, need not be necessarily certified by a doctor
and would rest again on the satisfaction of the Court on an
analysis of the testimony of the various witnesses and the
other evidence coming forth in trial. That, if the Court is
satisfied of the fit state of mind of the injured from the
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evidence on record, a contrary medical opinion or an
absence of it will be inconsequential. That, it can be made
before a Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, a Doctor, a Police
Officer, a relative or a third party whose presence is not
doubtful. That, the desire of the declarant to live, through
the truth despite fear of imminent death cannot be easily
brushed aside. The decisions also caution us that if the
statement is doubtful then one or more of the above aspects
could result in the dying declaration being eschewed
completely; based on the facts of each case.
14. As a corollary, it also has to observed: That, if there is
an iota of suspicion the Court has to look for corroboration.
That, the medical certification as to the physical and mental
state always aids in arriving at a satisfaction. That, in the
wake of multiple grievous injuries or a higher percentage of
burns, the declaration could be in question and answer
form, lending more credence as actually spoken of by the
injured as opposed to a long drawn out narrative, which
could be mistook as supplied by interested related parties.
That, a dying declaration recorded by the Judicial
Magistrate, adds credence since they are trained to record
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such declarations. That, as far as possible, the recording is
to be done in the presence of the Doctor and definitely not
in the presence of numerous bystanders; which could lead
to a defence being raised of prompting and tutoring. That,
the veracity of the declaration has to come forth from the
attendant circumstances as brought out in evidence.
15. We cannot but notice that in the present case, there is
a plethora of dying declarations which we will examine one
by one. There are two dying declarations reduced to writing
and quite a few oral ones, testified by the witnesses, the
written ones being examined first. The FIS itself is by the
victim recorded by PW7, PSI of the jurisdictional Police
Station, in the presence of PW1, the witness who came to the
crime scene on hearing a shout and saw the villagers trying
to put out the fire. The evidence of PW7 indicates that he was
informed of the fire in the village Mahadeopur by the SHO
of Banmankhi Police Station. PW7 immediately rushed to the
crime scene with the SHO and a Sub-Inspector and found the
house of the deceased completely gutted. The body of
Sarangdhar Singh was found burnt and his wife, Kamala
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Devi, as informed by the villagers, was taken to the hospital
for treatment.
16. Neither is evidence led of a diary entry made in the
police station, of the phone call to the SHO nor is the SHO
examined to speak on the phone call received. Strangely,
despite the SHO, the Sub-Inspector and the PSI; PW7, having
reached the scene there is no FIS recorded from any of the
persons who were at the spot, including the witnesses
paraded before Court, PW2, PW4 and PW5 who had not
accompanied the injured lady to the hospital. PW1 is said to
have taken the injured lady to the hospital along with his
brother Nirmal, Nirdhan and Ajay Yadav. PW7 deposed that
he went to the hospital, after carrying out the inquest of
Sarangdhar Singh, where the FIS was recorded as the
statement of the injured victim, Kamla Devi. The FIR narrates
about the details of her family, the enmity with the younger
son, and the crime, alleged on the younger son and the
daughter-in-law at 1.30 am. PW7, Investigating Officer (I.O)
took the thumb impression of PW1 and the deceased in the
FIS.
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17. Interestingly, the FIR was registered at 9.00 am on
23.11.2016 while the police party had been to the scene of
occurrence where the villagers including the close relatives
of the deceased were gathered, when the fire was raging.
Even at the hospital where Kamala Devi was under
treatment the villagers and relatives had gathered and there
was no valid cause to record an FIS from the victim, who was
grievously scorched. If it had to be done, then it was
expedient that a medical certification was taken. The FIS has
a long narrative of the history of the family dispute, highly
improbable from a lady burned seriously. The FIS was
admittedly recorded when the villagers and relatives of the
deceased were standing around. These aspects considered
in the given circumstances puts to peril the veracity of the
FIS. Admittedly the deceased were inside the house and
presumably sleeping, given the time of the incident. There
is little possibility of the inmates of the house having seen
the crime proper and the possibility is more that the
villagers who gathered there could present a better picture,
especially the woman whose shouts woke the neighbours.
The attempt of the prosecution to give the FIS an elevated
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status of a dying declaration hence falls flat on that count too
as it does not inspire confidence.
18. We then come to the statement recorded by the BDO,
PW8 at 11.30 am on the same day at Sadar Hospital, Araria.
There, the narration about the history/motive was far lesser
but as earlier, the crime proper is said to have been
perpetrated by the younger son who came along with his
wife and two other unknown persons and set fire to the
residential house. PW7, I.O in his testimony before Court,
on questioning by the Court, stated that the dying
declaration is in his handwriting and the BDO signed it. PW7
& PW8, the BDO, an Executive Magistrate spoke of the
villagers and relatives of the injured being present when the
statement was recorded and that PW8 read over the
statement to the persons present. No invalidity perse comes
forth from that, but it raises questions, with reference to the
overall circumstances and the lurking suspicion of a false
accusation in the form of a declaration made by another
person or through prompting. The BDO also spoke of having
taken down the statement himself quite contrary to the
statement of the IO. It was deposed that a doctor was taking
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care of the injured in which circumstance a certification
could have been obtained about the fit state or at least the
consciousness of the injured. Neither was such a medical
certification taken nor does PW8 speak of the doctor having
informed him about the physical and mental condition of the
injured. The circumstances as coming out from the
testimony of PW7 and PW8 persuade us to disbelieve the
second dying declaration also for that too inspires no
confidence.
19. Now, we come to the testimonies of the witnesses as to
the incident itself. PW1 testified that he came out of his
house on hearing the shouts of the wife of Vido Yadav, at his
door steps and saw the house burning down. The husband
had died and the wife, Kamla Devi was alive but “burnt
little” . The dying declaration made by Kamla Devi to PW1
was that Soni, her daughter-in-law had poured hot water on
her body and A1 having put their house on fire. PW2 testifies
that he woke up on hearing Anmol Yadav’s wife shout and
on coming out of his house witnessed the burning down of
the house. It was his deposition that Kamla Devi was inside
the house and he along with PW1 and Ajay Kumar tore the
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window and took Kamla Devi out, not spoken of by PW1.
PW2’s deposition is that Kamla Devi told them that “ you
people should immediately go and save Dadaji, Mukul and his
wife will kill him” (sic-as available from the translation from
the records). PW1 and PW2 testified that they along with
Ajay took Kamla Devi to the hospital in a tempo. PW3 spoke
of coming out of the house when Munnar Yadav’s daughter-
in-law started shouting. His testimony was that “the old lady
said that Mukul and his wife set the house on fire” (sic
deposition of PW3).
20. PW4 came out of his house on hearing a commotion
and tried to douse the fire. He spoke of many villagers
having gathered at the scene. He also spoke of Kamla Devi
having been burnt badly and found mumbling in a weak
state. Contrary to his statement under Section 161, Cr. PC,
he denied Kamla Devi having made a dying declaration.
PW5 was the brother of Sarangdhar Singh, who spoke of
Kamla Devi having come out after breaking the latch, with
the help of the villagers. He also spoke of a dying
declaration made by the injured, that Saurabh Kumar alias
Mukul and his wife Soni burned herself and her husband.
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PW6, the elder son of the deceased also deposed that when
he saw his mother at the hospital she made a statement
about the culpability of his brother and sister-in-law. PW7,
I.O however stated that no such statement was recorded
from PW6 under Section 161, in his cross-examination.
21. We would not discard the oral dying declarations for
reason of the inconsistency in narration. There cannot be
any insistence that the exact words of the victim should
come out from the witnesses. What has been narrated
conveys the culpability, if it can be believed. That being
said we cannot but notice that all the witnesses arrayed
before the Trial Court spoke of the villagers having reached
the spot before them. Three witnesses specifically spoke of
the shouts of a lady having woken them up. They described
the lady, differently, as Vido Yadav’s wife, Anmol Yadav’s
wife and the daughter-in-law of Munnar Yadav, from which
we can infer that there were at least two persons who saw
the fire, before the witnesses paraded before Court. Even
if it is assumed that the lady spoken of by the three witnesses
was the very same person, she was the best witness who
could have been examined with respect to the first
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indication of the crime. In fact, PW2 and PW3 specifically
speak of that lady having been engaged in threshing paddy.
There was every possibility of her having witnessed the fire
breaking out and could have better explained the causation.
The non examination of the crucial witness, spoken of by the
witnesses who reached the place later, on hearing her
shouts, is a very serious lacuna in prosecution.
22. In this context, we have to specifically notice the
defence; that PW1, who was managing the properties of the
deceased had an eye on it and he, in collusion with PW6 had
connived to exclude A1 from his due share. PW5, the
brother of the deceased husband also is alleged to have
aligned with the other son to exclude A1 from his
inheritance. PW1, PW5 & PW6, hence, according to the
accused are interested witnesses. PW2 is the nephew of
PW1 and PW3 is the brother of PW1 again disclosing an
interest against the accused . PW4, the grandnephew of the
deceased husband spoke only of having witnessed the fire
and the death of his granduncle and denied the dying
declaration, quite contrary to the version of the other
witnesses. All the witnesses spoke of a motive of the
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accused which was the exclusion of due share in the
properties of the deceased. PW6, the other son of the
deceased in answer to a question put by the Court
categorically stated that he and his brother will have 50%
share in the property and that he is willing to give the due
share of the property to the accused, which he had obtained
through a partition suit; thus demolishing the motive
projected by the prosecution. In the totality of the
circumstances, we are unable to find that the dying
declarations alleged to have been made to the witnesses are
credible or even probable, especially considering the fact
that the deceased is alleged to have made the statement
immediately after sustaining grievous burn injuries.
23. The postmortem report of the deceased husband
indicates that he sustained 100% burns. The degree of the
burn injuries suffered by the deceased wife is not
mentioned in the report prepared by PW10, the doctor who
carried out the postmortem. However, he stated that she
had sustained 60% injuries, which is stated for the first time
before Court and without the same being recorded in the
report. Surprisingly, PW10 also stated, on a specific query
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made by the Court that looking at the postmortem report,
the victim would have been in a fit state of mind to make the
dying declaration. We are unable to find any credence to
the said certification which a pathologist cannot discern by
merely looking at the postmortem report. The burn injuries,
pertinently are not confined to the lower body. The injuries
interalia are stated to be:
“Epidermal to Dermo Epidermal burn injury over both
lower thigh and lower limb upto ankle, both upper limb,
back of chest, abdomen, part of pelvis, right side face
and neck with line of redness, hyperemia and areas of
hyper coagulated tissues and blister formation at
place.”
The injuries thus were not confined to the lower body and
even a medical expert examining the cadaver cannot come
to the conclusion that, when alive the deceased was in a fit
state of mind to give a dying declaration.
24. PW6 attempted to establish the enmity between his
father and brother by production of Exhibit P4 to P10,
complaints made by his deceased father and mother against
his brother. Exhibit P4 to P9 which were partially burnt
were said to have been obtained from the crime scene. It is
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pertinent here to notice that PW7, the I.O. did not think it fit
to even draw up a scene mahazar of the crime scene. From
the evidence, it is clear that the house was thatched and had
bamboo doors, good tinder for fire. The witnesses had
spoken of a gas connection in the house and the defence was
also that the fire was caused when the gas cylinder burst.
There was no investigation on that count and the I.O. did not
even carry out a forensic examination of the site to find out
the cause of fire, whether it was arson or accidental. In fact
the I.O in his evidence as PW7 stated that there were no half-
burnt items found in the crime scene which he had visited
four times. PW5, the brother of the deceased husband had
also stated in response to the query made by Court that the
entire goods of the house were burnt. It was stated that the
police had made a list of the goods that were saved from
burning and that the list was prepared in his presence. The
witness also deposed that since the goods were burnt, the
police had left them as such.
25. Exhibit P4 to P9, partially burnt complaints, according
to PW6 were recovered from the crime scene which he did
not think fit to handover to the I.O. The reliance placed by
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the trial court on the documents produced by PW6 cannot
be accepted, for its genuineness being suspect and the
same having been not produced before Court as required
in a criminal trial, after drawing up a seizure mahazar, as
recovered from the crime scene or even handed over by
one of the witnesses and the same being made a part of the
record of incriminating documents handed over to the
accused.
26. In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from
the evidence, we are convinced that the High Court was
perfectly correct in acquitting the accused. Rather than
providing a complete chain of circumstances, with the
connecting links establishing the guilt of the accused and
bringing forth no hypothesis other than the guilt of the
accused, here the circumstances bring out a conscious
effort to nail the accused with the crime of arson and pre-
meditated murder. Except PW4, the other witnesses spoke
of bitterness between the father and the son due to property
disputes. PW6, the son of the deceased and the brother of
A1 though spoke of the bitterness between his father and
brother, in the same breath deposed that he was willing to
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give 50% share of the properties to his brother; in which
event, there is no cause for enmity between the father and
the son. The testimonies of the witnesses paraded before
Court was that the entire village was against the conduct of
the younger son of the deceased. However, this was spoken
of by the interested witnesses as alleged by the defence.
PW1 was alleged to be interested in the properties of the
deceased and PW1, PW2 and PW3 were closely related.
PW5 is said to have aligned himself with PW6, the other son
of the deceased. PW4, another close relative did not speak
of enmity between the father and the son of such a gravity to
motivate the son to kill his father.
27. Further, PW1 himself stated that the second accused
and the children stayed at the house of the deceased for 20
days before the incident. It is also deposed that 17 days
prior to the incident the police took the deceased husband
and his son to the police station for counselling, not spoken
of by the I.O who was a PSI in the jurisdictional Police
Station. Pertinent is the fact that none of the witness spoke of
the presence of the accused in the village at any time
contemporaneous to the incident, especially when
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admittedly the accused along with their children were
staying at a different location. The memo of arrest is not
available in the records and the I.O makes a casual
reference to the arrest having been made on the road going
from Purnia to Banmankhi, near village Dhima. The accused
were alleged to have resided in the house of one Lali @
Lalwa, two weeks back when they came to the village, who
was not examined by the police or arrayed as a witness in
the prosecution launched.
28. The entire village had gathered at the scene of
occurrence and the witnesses paraded were not the persons
who reached there first. The lady spoken of by PW1 to PW3
whose shouts woke them up, had not been examined. PW2,
PW4 and PW5 also spoke of the deceased Kamla Devi
having been removed to the hospital by PW1 along with one
Nirdhan Yadav and Ajay Yadav, both of whom were not
examined before Court. There was a concerted effort by the
I.O not to bring any independent witnesses to the stand. The
investigation, according to us was a sham and was pre-
meditated, throwing to the winds every tenet of criminal
jurisprudence informed by due procedure. The
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prosecution, hence, was a farce, parading witnesses whose
testimonies fell flat. The investigation and the prosecution
was premised on the motive alleged and nothing more.
29. We would also notice with some anguish the manner
in which the trial court examined the accused under Section
313, Cr. PC. There were only four questions put to both the
accused. Question No.1 was with respect to the allegation
that on 23.11.2006 at around 1:30 in the night, the accused
together went to the house of the father of the first accused
with common intention and killed them by putting the house
to fire. The second question was about the allegation of the
house of Sarangdhar Singh having been torched and the
dying declaration made by Kamla Devi that the accused,
together with two unknown persons put the house on fire
and thus murdered Sarangdhar Singh. Question No.3 was
with respect to the allegation that 15 days before the
incident, the accused had gone to Mahadeopur village and
stayed in the house of Lali @ Lalwa and that four days before
the incident they went to their parents’ house. Question
No.4 was as to the defence. Both the accused replied in the
negative to the first three questions and the first accused in
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defence stated that PW1, the one who managed his father’s
properties, his elder brother PW6 and his uncle PW5, were
attempting to grab his property after excluding him from the
same.
30. We cannot but notice that none of the incriminating
circumstances including that of the motive, the complaints
filed by the deceased against A1, the various dying
declarations and the medical evidence were put to the
accused. We had, in the very same context in Criminal
Appeal No.860 of 2026, Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar
& Ors. dated 12.02.2026 (authored by one of us, Sanjay
Kumar, J.) with respect to the scanty questioning under
Section 313, Cr. PC without putting all the incriminating
circumstances to the accused, held as under:-
“Needless to state, the afore stated casual
examination of the accused falls woefully short of the
required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court
has emphasized this point, time and again. We may
refer to the recent judgment of this Court on this point
in “Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” (2025) 2 SCC
385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the
trial court in recording the statement of the accused
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under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to
put any material circumstances brought on record
against the accused, the public prosecutor must
bring it to the notice of the court while the
examination of the accused is being recorded; he
must assist the court in framing the questions to be
put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the
commission of offence must be punished, it is also his
duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the
conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the
accused.
We may also note the earlier decision of
another 3-Judge Bench of this Court in “Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra” (1973) 2
SCC 793 , wherein the in pari materia provision in the
erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was
observed that great care is expected of Sessions
Judges, who try grave cases to collect every
incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused
even though at the end of the long trial, the judge
may be a little fagged out.
In the light of the aforestated settled legal
principle, we are of the opinion that incurable
injustice was done to the appellants in the course of
their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as
no specific questions were put to them apropos each
piece of incriminating evidence adduced against
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them. The judgments of the trial court based on such
inadequate examination of the accused, therefore,
cannot be sustained.
In the cited case, we had remanded the matter and restored
it to the files for resuming the trial from the stage of
questioning under Section 313, Cr.P.C. However, in this
case, we do not think such a measure is warranted,
especially when the evidence falls short of the standard
required in a criminal trial which is not a mere suspicion, a
‘maybe true’ but a ‘must be true’, evidently a long distance
to travel, the whole of this distance being paved with legal,
reliable and unimpeachable evidence resulting in a finding
of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, as held in Sarwan
10
Singh v. State of Punjab .
31. We have found that the investigation carried out is
grossly deficient. The scene mahazar was not drawn up, no
forensic examination was carried out at the scene of crime
and no independent witnesses were arrayed. The causation
of fire not investigated, the presence of the accused in the
vicinity of the crime scene not established. The delay in
10
AIR 1957 SC 637
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registration of FIR despite the information having been
received at the police station earlier, and the police
personnel including the I.O having visited the scene of
occurrence where a number of villagers were present was
a serious lapse. The delay caused and the manner in which
the FIS was recorded in the present case throws suspicion
on the very conduct of the I.O. The dying declarations
should have been recorded with more caution and when
taken inside the hospital it should have ideally been
recorded in the presence of a Doctor, whose certification
also ought to have been obtained. The incriminating
circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to the
accused in its entirety, a solemn duty enjoined both on the
Court and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire
prosecution may fail for that sole reason. We reiterate these
aspects only to point out the lapses in investigation, which
could have been avoided, to provide some guidance at least
in the future.
32. A couple, at the fag end of their lives were burnt to
death and the cause, whether it’s a homicide or accidental
death, eludes civil society and throws a pall of suspicion on
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their own son and his family, who will always carry the yoke
of dishonour. The son and daughter-in-law were accused of
parricide and were convicted by the trial court, later
acquitted by the High Court, which acquittal is now affirmed
by us. The trauma of arrest, incarceration and trial will
always scar the couple and more so their children who were
left orphaned, during the time when their parents were
imprisoned. We cannot but caution the investigators and the
Courts to strive to do better and follow accepted practises
and procedural rules to the hilt, when lives are lost or taken
and there is a possibility of false accusations being made,
putting to peril the reputations of the living.
33. The appeal is dismissed.
34. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……...…….……………………. J.
(SANJAY KUMAR)
...………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 11, 2026.
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2026 INSC 223
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No………of 2026
[@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 15378 of 2024]
Sanjay Kumar Sharma
...Appellant
Versus
State of Bihar & Ors.
...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. Vinod Chandran, J.
Leave granted.
2. Overzealous investigation is as fatal to prosecution as
are the lethargic and the tardy. Framing a case on public
perceptions and personal predilections ends up in a mess,
often putting to peril an innocent and always letting free the
perpetrator. Here, we have a case of gruesome death of a
couple when their house was gutted in a fire, with the son
and daughter-in-law accused of murder. The entire case is
founded on motive; the ill-will the son harbored against the
father for not having given him his due share in the ancestral
Signature Not Verified
property. The entire village was against the son and the
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2026.03.11
16:04:11 IST
Reason:
mishap ended in an investigation where truth was sacrificed
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at the altar of perceived vengeance, ably assisted by the
Investigating Officer’s selective but careless pursuits,
derailing the entire prosecution.
3. On the early hours of 23.11.2016, a shanty in which a
lawyer and his wife were residing was gutted in a fire,
killing the old man immediately and his wife after two days
in a hospital at Patna. It was alleged that the younger son and
daughter-in-law of the couple, due to previous enmity
arising from land disputes, torched the hut with the intention
to murder the parents. In defense, as is permissible,
inconsistent stances were taken; of the neighbour, who was
managing the properties of the deceased, and the elder son
having colluded to murder the couple and an accidental
fire, by reason of the cooking gas cylinder bursting. The
Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court
acquitted him. We are faced with the divergent findings of
the Trial Court and the High Court; that of the High Court by
its order of acquittal having fortified the presumption of
innocence available to the accused.
4. Sri Smarhar Singh, Advocate-on-Record, appearing
for the petitioner, the elder son of the deceased, argued that
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the High Court has completely lost sight of the evidence in
the case and entered an acquittal totally ignoring the dying
declarations. In addition to the recorded dying declarations
as coming out from the First Information Statement (FIS) and
that recorded by PW8, a Block Development Officer (BDO),
PWs 1 to 3, 5 and 6 also spoke of the statement made by one
of the deceased pinning the dastardly act of setting ablaze
the hut and murdering the parents on the accused. There
was sufficient evidence to prove the motive, which together
with the dying declarations ought to have persuaded the
High Court to affirm the conviction ordered by the Trial
Court. The Doctor who carried out the post-mortem spoke
only of 60% burns and confirmed the mental status of the
deceased, who spoke about the cause of her death and that
of her husband. A number of decisions are placed before us
to put forth the contention that a dying declaration can be
solely relied on to enter a conviction. In the present case,
there was sufficient corroboration from the medical
evidence, the motive proved and the testimony of witnesses
who reached the crime spot immediately afterwards. The
High Court ought to have ensured that the parricide was not
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left unavenged, when egregiously the accused were
acquitted without a proper appreciation of the evidence.
5. Sri Amanullah, learned Counsel appearing for the
State sought to uphold the conviction of the Trial Court and
reverse the order of acquittal especially pointing out the
dastardly crime. The testimonies of the witnesses, the dying
declaration and the motive proved ought to have convinced
the High Court about the culpability of the accused is the
contention.
6. Sri Vipin Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the
accused pointed out the lapses in the investigation and the
concerted effort to somehow punish the accused, by
manufacturing evidence not only in the form of inconsistent
dying declarations but also by way of interested testimony
of the witnesses. There was a clear pick and choose
employed in bringing witnesses to the trial, all interested
and by their testimony validating the defense of a cooked-
up prosecution story. The learned counsel for the accused
also urged the laxity with which the Trial Court considered
the matter. None of the incriminating circumstances were
put to the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal
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1
Procedure, 1973 and the defense set up was given a
complete go by. The Trial Court proceeded on merely
surmises and conjectures without looking into the relevant
aspects in the testimony of the witnesses, which would
validate the defense of the accused, either of a motivated
accusation having been levelled or an accidental fire having
occurred, the defense being entitled to take different pleas.
7. In the context of the divergent findings and the
peculiar circumstance of a son (A1) and daughter-in-law
(A2) being accused of murdering A1’s parents we have
examined the records and the evidence with a hawk’s eye.
Since the learned counsel for the appellant had relied
primarily on the dying declarations, with reference to
various decisions we will have to first look at the decisions
2
placed before us. Laxman v. State of Maharashtra was a
Constitution Bench decision examining a reference based
on two conflicting decisions. The conflict was insofar as the
certification of the doctor regarding the condition of the
patient who makes the dying declaration. While one of the
decisions held that the certification should be to the effect
1
For brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C.’
2
(2002) 6 SCC 710
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that the person making that declaration is in a fit state of
mind, another coordinate Bench held that if the materials on
record indicate the deceased to be fully conscious, the
declaration made immediately prior to death cannot be
ignored, merely for reason of the absence of a certification
by a doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to
make such a declaration. The Constitution Bench without
relying on the moral premise that ‘ no man would like to meet
his maker with a lie in his mouth ’, based itself on more
practical grounds. Their Lordships relied on the juristic
theory of such declaration being made in extremity, at the
time of imminent death, when every hope in life is gone,
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the only
inducement is the desire to speak truth. However, it was
observed that great caution has to be exercised in
considering the weight to be given to this species of
evidence on account of existence of many circumstances
which may affect the truthfulness and correctness of a
statement made, the author of which cannot be cross-
examined. There is always the possibility of tutoring or
prompting or a product of imagination, which the Court
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should be satisfied, does not exist. The Court also should be
satisfied as to the situation the injured is placed in to take
stock of the incident and identify the assailant as also the
fitness of mind & body to subsequently speak about it.
Normally, Courts look for medical evidence to assess the
mental condition of the deceased while making a dying
declaration, but it is not a rigid rule. Where, from the
attendant circumstances, as spoken of by the witnesses and
brought out by valid evidence if the Court is able to satisfy
itself that the declaration was made in a fit and conscious
state, then a contrary medical opinion cannot prevail and
even its total absence would be inconsequential. The
declaration made by a three Judge Bench that in the
absence of medical certification that the injured was in a fit
state of mind, it would be risky to accept the subjective
satisfaction of a Magistrate as to the state of mind was held
to be too broadly stated and not the correct enunciation of
law; deprecated as a hyper-technical view especially in that
case where there was available, certification of the doctor to
the effect that the patient was conscious, but without the
injured being expressly stated to be in a fit state of mind.
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8. The law as elaborated in the Constitution Bench
decision would be sufficient to evaluate the dying
declaration in the present case. However, on the insistence
made by the appellant, who had lost both his parents in a
fire, an alleged murder which the Trial Court found
established and the High Court reversed on reasonable
doubt expressed, we would look at the other decisions also.
3
9. Sher Singh and Another v. State of Punjab was a case
of bride-burning with multiple dying declarations, the first
exonerating the accused, and then more, in one voice
implicating them. The first dying declaration recorded by a
police officer was in the presence of the mother-in-law,
which was resiled from in the declaration recorded by the
Executive Magistrate after two days. The earlier statement
was stated to be due to a threat that she would not be taken
to the hospital unless she spoke of an accidental fire. This
was repeated in the subsequent oral dying declarations, to
her uncle, and a Sub-Inspector which were believed by this
Court.
3
(2008) 4 SCC 265
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4
10. Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi was a murder
by a lady and her son of the second wife and two children.
The conviction was on the sole basis of the dying declaration
made by the stepdaughter who was admitted to the hospital
with grievous injuries in the nature of stab wounds. On an
analysis of various decisions of this Court, the principles
were encapsulated in paragraph 22 which reads as under:
“22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly
shows that:
(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of
conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the
court.
(ii) The court should be satisfied that the
deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of
making the statement and that it was not the result
of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the
declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration.
(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of
law that the dying declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.
The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule
of prudence.
4
(2010) 9 SCC 1
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(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative
evidence.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from
infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious
and could never make any statement cannot form
the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not
contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is
not to be rejected.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be
discarded.
(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the
deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to
make the dying declaration, medical opinion
cannot prevail.
(x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied
that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
deceased to make a false statement and if it is
coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal
impediment to make it the basis of conviction,
even if there is no corroboration.”
Therein the dying declaration, which was the FIS was
recorded by an Inspector in the presence of a doctor and
then registered as an FIR, signed also by the doctor
certifying her fit mental state.
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5
11. Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
was again concerned whether a death by burning in the
marital house, was accidental or homicidal. After the dying
declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate within
two hours of the incident, an affidavit was sworn to by the
deceased exonerating the in-laws. Death having occurred a
month after the incident, the first declaration was held
truthful, which stood corroborated by PW2 and PW3 who
took the deceased with 60% burns to the hospital. The dying
declaration by the injured; burnt at only the lower part of
the body was found to be reliable since it gave a cogent and
possible scenario of the occurrence further corroborated by
stab wounds.
6
12. Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra dealt with four
dying declarations which consistently spoke about the role
played by the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law in
torching the injured. The mere fact that in one of the
statements, two others were implicated was found to be not
sufficient to discard the role of the in-laws. Satish Chandra
5
(2012) 4 SCC 327
6
(2013) 2 SCC 224
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7
v. State of M.P. dealt with a suicide in which the dying
declaration was made as a continuous narrative. It was held
that though this Court had found that statements in the form
of question and answer would be more appropriate, a
credible declaration should not be eschewed on the
grounds of existence of more details or presence of family
members, when there is no indication of tutoring by the
8
family. Amol Singh v. State of M.P. and Lakhan v. State of
9
M.P. clarified that it is not the plurality of dying
declarations that matter, but the reliability, which is the
significant aspect. Any inconsistency would only compel the
Court to examine it carefully, as to whether those are
material or not.
13. From a conspectus of the above decisions, it is clear:
That, a dying declaration is a very important species of
evidence capable of proving the crime proper and
identifying the accused, an exception to hearsay having
been provided by Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
That, a dying declaration, for reliance should inspire
7
(2014) 6 SCC 723
8
(2008) 5 SCC 468
9
(2010) 8 SCC 514
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confidence in the Court as to its credibility. That, the Court
should be satisfied it is made by the deceased without any
prompting or tutoring or coercion or is a mere figment of
imagination. That, then conviction can be based solely on
the dying declaration and there is no requirement of any
corroboration. That, it can be reduced to writing or can be
oral, as testified by reliable witnesses. That, it can be one or
numerous and if more than one; exculpatory and
inculpatory, it is for the Court to find out which is believable.
That, it can be a lengthy one or a short one, so far as the
crime is spoken of and identification of the perpetrator
comes through. That, it can be a single narrative or in a
question and answer form. That, it can either have a history
of the rancour between the perpetrator and the victim or can
be merely the brief statement of the incident. That, the
capacity of the injured to make the statement, both physical
and mental, need not be necessarily certified by a doctor
and would rest again on the satisfaction of the Court on an
analysis of the testimony of the various witnesses and the
other evidence coming forth in trial. That, if the Court is
satisfied of the fit state of mind of the injured from the
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evidence on record, a contrary medical opinion or an
absence of it will be inconsequential. That, it can be made
before a Magistrate; Executive or Judicial, a Doctor, a Police
Officer, a relative or a third party whose presence is not
doubtful. That, the desire of the declarant to live, through
the truth despite fear of imminent death cannot be easily
brushed aside. The decisions also caution us that if the
statement is doubtful then one or more of the above aspects
could result in the dying declaration being eschewed
completely; based on the facts of each case.
14. As a corollary, it also has to observed: That, if there is
an iota of suspicion the Court has to look for corroboration.
That, the medical certification as to the physical and mental
state always aids in arriving at a satisfaction. That, in the
wake of multiple grievous injuries or a higher percentage of
burns, the declaration could be in question and answer
form, lending more credence as actually spoken of by the
injured as opposed to a long drawn out narrative, which
could be mistook as supplied by interested related parties.
That, a dying declaration recorded by the Judicial
Magistrate, adds credence since they are trained to record
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such declarations. That, as far as possible, the recording is
to be done in the presence of the Doctor and definitely not
in the presence of numerous bystanders; which could lead
to a defence being raised of prompting and tutoring. That,
the veracity of the declaration has to come forth from the
attendant circumstances as brought out in evidence.
15. We cannot but notice that in the present case, there is
a plethora of dying declarations which we will examine one
by one. There are two dying declarations reduced to writing
and quite a few oral ones, testified by the witnesses, the
written ones being examined first. The FIS itself is by the
victim recorded by PW7, PSI of the jurisdictional Police
Station, in the presence of PW1, the witness who came to the
crime scene on hearing a shout and saw the villagers trying
to put out the fire. The evidence of PW7 indicates that he was
informed of the fire in the village Mahadeopur by the SHO
of Banmankhi Police Station. PW7 immediately rushed to the
crime scene with the SHO and a Sub-Inspector and found the
house of the deceased completely gutted. The body of
Sarangdhar Singh was found burnt and his wife, Kamala
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Devi, as informed by the villagers, was taken to the hospital
for treatment.
16. Neither is evidence led of a diary entry made in the
police station, of the phone call to the SHO nor is the SHO
examined to speak on the phone call received. Strangely,
despite the SHO, the Sub-Inspector and the PSI; PW7, having
reached the scene there is no FIS recorded from any of the
persons who were at the spot, including the witnesses
paraded before Court, PW2, PW4 and PW5 who had not
accompanied the injured lady to the hospital. PW1 is said to
have taken the injured lady to the hospital along with his
brother Nirmal, Nirdhan and Ajay Yadav. PW7 deposed that
he went to the hospital, after carrying out the inquest of
Sarangdhar Singh, where the FIS was recorded as the
statement of the injured victim, Kamla Devi. The FIR narrates
about the details of her family, the enmity with the younger
son, and the crime, alleged on the younger son and the
daughter-in-law at 1.30 am. PW7, Investigating Officer (I.O)
took the thumb impression of PW1 and the deceased in the
FIS.
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17. Interestingly, the FIR was registered at 9.00 am on
23.11.2016 while the police party had been to the scene of
occurrence where the villagers including the close relatives
of the deceased were gathered, when the fire was raging.
Even at the hospital where Kamala Devi was under
treatment the villagers and relatives had gathered and there
was no valid cause to record an FIS from the victim, who was
grievously scorched. If it had to be done, then it was
expedient that a medical certification was taken. The FIS has
a long narrative of the history of the family dispute, highly
improbable from a lady burned seriously. The FIS was
admittedly recorded when the villagers and relatives of the
deceased were standing around. These aspects considered
in the given circumstances puts to peril the veracity of the
FIS. Admittedly the deceased were inside the house and
presumably sleeping, given the time of the incident. There
is little possibility of the inmates of the house having seen
the crime proper and the possibility is more that the
villagers who gathered there could present a better picture,
especially the woman whose shouts woke the neighbours.
The attempt of the prosecution to give the FIS an elevated
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status of a dying declaration hence falls flat on that count too
as it does not inspire confidence.
18. We then come to the statement recorded by the BDO,
PW8 at 11.30 am on the same day at Sadar Hospital, Araria.
There, the narration about the history/motive was far lesser
but as earlier, the crime proper is said to have been
perpetrated by the younger son who came along with his
wife and two other unknown persons and set fire to the
residential house. PW7, I.O in his testimony before Court,
on questioning by the Court, stated that the dying
declaration is in his handwriting and the BDO signed it. PW7
& PW8, the BDO, an Executive Magistrate spoke of the
villagers and relatives of the injured being present when the
statement was recorded and that PW8 read over the
statement to the persons present. No invalidity perse comes
forth from that, but it raises questions, with reference to the
overall circumstances and the lurking suspicion of a false
accusation in the form of a declaration made by another
person or through prompting. The BDO also spoke of having
taken down the statement himself quite contrary to the
statement of the IO. It was deposed that a doctor was taking
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care of the injured in which circumstance a certification
could have been obtained about the fit state or at least the
consciousness of the injured. Neither was such a medical
certification taken nor does PW8 speak of the doctor having
informed him about the physical and mental condition of the
injured. The circumstances as coming out from the
testimony of PW7 and PW8 persuade us to disbelieve the
second dying declaration also for that too inspires no
confidence.
19. Now, we come to the testimonies of the witnesses as to
the incident itself. PW1 testified that he came out of his
house on hearing the shouts of the wife of Vido Yadav, at his
door steps and saw the house burning down. The husband
had died and the wife, Kamla Devi was alive but “burnt
little” . The dying declaration made by Kamla Devi to PW1
was that Soni, her daughter-in-law had poured hot water on
her body and A1 having put their house on fire. PW2 testifies
that he woke up on hearing Anmol Yadav’s wife shout and
on coming out of his house witnessed the burning down of
the house. It was his deposition that Kamla Devi was inside
the house and he along with PW1 and Ajay Kumar tore the
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window and took Kamla Devi out, not spoken of by PW1.
PW2’s deposition is that Kamla Devi told them that “ you
people should immediately go and save Dadaji, Mukul and his
wife will kill him” (sic-as available from the translation from
the records). PW1 and PW2 testified that they along with
Ajay took Kamla Devi to the hospital in a tempo. PW3 spoke
of coming out of the house when Munnar Yadav’s daughter-
in-law started shouting. His testimony was that “the old lady
said that Mukul and his wife set the house on fire” (sic
deposition of PW3).
20. PW4 came out of his house on hearing a commotion
and tried to douse the fire. He spoke of many villagers
having gathered at the scene. He also spoke of Kamla Devi
having been burnt badly and found mumbling in a weak
state. Contrary to his statement under Section 161, Cr. PC,
he denied Kamla Devi having made a dying declaration.
PW5 was the brother of Sarangdhar Singh, who spoke of
Kamla Devi having come out after breaking the latch, with
the help of the villagers. He also spoke of a dying
declaration made by the injured, that Saurabh Kumar alias
Mukul and his wife Soni burned herself and her husband.
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PW6, the elder son of the deceased also deposed that when
he saw his mother at the hospital she made a statement
about the culpability of his brother and sister-in-law. PW7,
I.O however stated that no such statement was recorded
from PW6 under Section 161, in his cross-examination.
21. We would not discard the oral dying declarations for
reason of the inconsistency in narration. There cannot be
any insistence that the exact words of the victim should
come out from the witnesses. What has been narrated
conveys the culpability, if it can be believed. That being
said we cannot but notice that all the witnesses arrayed
before the Trial Court spoke of the villagers having reached
the spot before them. Three witnesses specifically spoke of
the shouts of a lady having woken them up. They described
the lady, differently, as Vido Yadav’s wife, Anmol Yadav’s
wife and the daughter-in-law of Munnar Yadav, from which
we can infer that there were at least two persons who saw
the fire, before the witnesses paraded before Court. Even
if it is assumed that the lady spoken of by the three witnesses
was the very same person, she was the best witness who
could have been examined with respect to the first
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indication of the crime. In fact, PW2 and PW3 specifically
speak of that lady having been engaged in threshing paddy.
There was every possibility of her having witnessed the fire
breaking out and could have better explained the causation.
The non examination of the crucial witness, spoken of by the
witnesses who reached the place later, on hearing her
shouts, is a very serious lacuna in prosecution.
22. In this context, we have to specifically notice the
defence; that PW1, who was managing the properties of the
deceased had an eye on it and he, in collusion with PW6 had
connived to exclude A1 from his due share. PW5, the
brother of the deceased husband also is alleged to have
aligned with the other son to exclude A1 from his
inheritance. PW1, PW5 & PW6, hence, according to the
accused are interested witnesses. PW2 is the nephew of
PW1 and PW3 is the brother of PW1 again disclosing an
interest against the accused . PW4, the grandnephew of the
deceased husband spoke only of having witnessed the fire
and the death of his granduncle and denied the dying
declaration, quite contrary to the version of the other
witnesses. All the witnesses spoke of a motive of the
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accused which was the exclusion of due share in the
properties of the deceased. PW6, the other son of the
deceased in answer to a question put by the Court
categorically stated that he and his brother will have 50%
share in the property and that he is willing to give the due
share of the property to the accused, which he had obtained
through a partition suit; thus demolishing the motive
projected by the prosecution. In the totality of the
circumstances, we are unable to find that the dying
declarations alleged to have been made to the witnesses are
credible or even probable, especially considering the fact
that the deceased is alleged to have made the statement
immediately after sustaining grievous burn injuries.
23. The postmortem report of the deceased husband
indicates that he sustained 100% burns. The degree of the
burn injuries suffered by the deceased wife is not
mentioned in the report prepared by PW10, the doctor who
carried out the postmortem. However, he stated that she
had sustained 60% injuries, which is stated for the first time
before Court and without the same being recorded in the
report. Surprisingly, PW10 also stated, on a specific query
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made by the Court that looking at the postmortem report,
the victim would have been in a fit state of mind to make the
dying declaration. We are unable to find any credence to
the said certification which a pathologist cannot discern by
merely looking at the postmortem report. The burn injuries,
pertinently are not confined to the lower body. The injuries
interalia are stated to be:
“Epidermal to Dermo Epidermal burn injury over both
lower thigh and lower limb upto ankle, both upper limb,
back of chest, abdomen, part of pelvis, right side face
and neck with line of redness, hyperemia and areas of
hyper coagulated tissues and blister formation at
place.”
The injuries thus were not confined to the lower body and
even a medical expert examining the cadaver cannot come
to the conclusion that, when alive the deceased was in a fit
state of mind to give a dying declaration.
24. PW6 attempted to establish the enmity between his
father and brother by production of Exhibit P4 to P10,
complaints made by his deceased father and mother against
his brother. Exhibit P4 to P9 which were partially burnt
were said to have been obtained from the crime scene. It is
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pertinent here to notice that PW7, the I.O. did not think it fit
to even draw up a scene mahazar of the crime scene. From
the evidence, it is clear that the house was thatched and had
bamboo doors, good tinder for fire. The witnesses had
spoken of a gas connection in the house and the defence was
also that the fire was caused when the gas cylinder burst.
There was no investigation on that count and the I.O. did not
even carry out a forensic examination of the site to find out
the cause of fire, whether it was arson or accidental. In fact
the I.O in his evidence as PW7 stated that there were no half-
burnt items found in the crime scene which he had visited
four times. PW5, the brother of the deceased husband had
also stated in response to the query made by Court that the
entire goods of the house were burnt. It was stated that the
police had made a list of the goods that were saved from
burning and that the list was prepared in his presence. The
witness also deposed that since the goods were burnt, the
police had left them as such.
25. Exhibit P4 to P9, partially burnt complaints, according
to PW6 were recovered from the crime scene which he did
not think fit to handover to the I.O. The reliance placed by
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the trial court on the documents produced by PW6 cannot
be accepted, for its genuineness being suspect and the
same having been not produced before Court as required
in a criminal trial, after drawing up a seizure mahazar, as
recovered from the crime scene or even handed over by
one of the witnesses and the same being made a part of the
record of incriminating documents handed over to the
accused.
26. In the totality of the circumstances as coming out from
the evidence, we are convinced that the High Court was
perfectly correct in acquitting the accused. Rather than
providing a complete chain of circumstances, with the
connecting links establishing the guilt of the accused and
bringing forth no hypothesis other than the guilt of the
accused, here the circumstances bring out a conscious
effort to nail the accused with the crime of arson and pre-
meditated murder. Except PW4, the other witnesses spoke
of bitterness between the father and the son due to property
disputes. PW6, the son of the deceased and the brother of
A1 though spoke of the bitterness between his father and
brother, in the same breath deposed that he was willing to
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give 50% share of the properties to his brother; in which
event, there is no cause for enmity between the father and
the son. The testimonies of the witnesses paraded before
Court was that the entire village was against the conduct of
the younger son of the deceased. However, this was spoken
of by the interested witnesses as alleged by the defence.
PW1 was alleged to be interested in the properties of the
deceased and PW1, PW2 and PW3 were closely related.
PW5 is said to have aligned himself with PW6, the other son
of the deceased. PW4, another close relative did not speak
of enmity between the father and the son of such a gravity to
motivate the son to kill his father.
27. Further, PW1 himself stated that the second accused
and the children stayed at the house of the deceased for 20
days before the incident. It is also deposed that 17 days
prior to the incident the police took the deceased husband
and his son to the police station for counselling, not spoken
of by the I.O who was a PSI in the jurisdictional Police
Station. Pertinent is the fact that none of the witness spoke of
the presence of the accused in the village at any time
contemporaneous to the incident, especially when
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admittedly the accused along with their children were
staying at a different location. The memo of arrest is not
available in the records and the I.O makes a casual
reference to the arrest having been made on the road going
from Purnia to Banmankhi, near village Dhima. The accused
were alleged to have resided in the house of one Lali @
Lalwa, two weeks back when they came to the village, who
was not examined by the police or arrayed as a witness in
the prosecution launched.
28. The entire village had gathered at the scene of
occurrence and the witnesses paraded were not the persons
who reached there first. The lady spoken of by PW1 to PW3
whose shouts woke them up, had not been examined. PW2,
PW4 and PW5 also spoke of the deceased Kamla Devi
having been removed to the hospital by PW1 along with one
Nirdhan Yadav and Ajay Yadav, both of whom were not
examined before Court. There was a concerted effort by the
I.O not to bring any independent witnesses to the stand. The
investigation, according to us was a sham and was pre-
meditated, throwing to the winds every tenet of criminal
jurisprudence informed by due procedure. The
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prosecution, hence, was a farce, parading witnesses whose
testimonies fell flat. The investigation and the prosecution
was premised on the motive alleged and nothing more.
29. We would also notice with some anguish the manner
in which the trial court examined the accused under Section
313, Cr. PC. There were only four questions put to both the
accused. Question No.1 was with respect to the allegation
that on 23.11.2006 at around 1:30 in the night, the accused
together went to the house of the father of the first accused
with common intention and killed them by putting the house
to fire. The second question was about the allegation of the
house of Sarangdhar Singh having been torched and the
dying declaration made by Kamla Devi that the accused,
together with two unknown persons put the house on fire
and thus murdered Sarangdhar Singh. Question No.3 was
with respect to the allegation that 15 days before the
incident, the accused had gone to Mahadeopur village and
stayed in the house of Lali @ Lalwa and that four days before
the incident they went to their parents’ house. Question
No.4 was as to the defence. Both the accused replied in the
negative to the first three questions and the first accused in
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defence stated that PW1, the one who managed his father’s
properties, his elder brother PW6 and his uncle PW5, were
attempting to grab his property after excluding him from the
same.
30. We cannot but notice that none of the incriminating
circumstances including that of the motive, the complaints
filed by the deceased against A1, the various dying
declarations and the medical evidence were put to the
accused. We had, in the very same context in Criminal
Appeal No.860 of 2026, Sanjay Kumar & Anr. v. State of Bihar
& Ors. dated 12.02.2026 (authored by one of us, Sanjay
Kumar, J.) with respect to the scanty questioning under
Section 313, Cr. PC without putting all the incriminating
circumstances to the accused, held as under:-
“Needless to state, the afore stated casual
examination of the accused falls woefully short of the
required standard, as stipulated by law. This Court
has emphasized this point, time and again. We may
refer to the recent judgment of this Court on this point
in “Ashok vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” (2025) 2 SCC
385. Therein, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to assist the
trial court in recording the statement of the accused
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under Section 313 of the Code; if the court omits to
put any material circumstances brought on record
against the accused, the public prosecutor must
bring it to the notice of the court while the
examination of the accused is being recorded; he
must assist the court in framing the questions to be
put to the accused; and as it is the duty of the public
prosecutor to ensure that those who are guilty of the
commission of offence must be punished, it is also his
duty to ensure that there are no infirmities in the
conduct of the trial, which will cause prejudice to the
accused.
We may also note the earlier decision of
another 3-Judge Bench of this Court in “Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra” (1973) 2
SCC 793 , wherein the in pari materia provision in the
erstwhile Code was under consideration and it was
observed that great care is expected of Sessions
Judges, who try grave cases to collect every
incriminating circumstance and put it to the accused
even though at the end of the long trial, the judge
may be a little fagged out.
In the light of the aforestated settled legal
principle, we are of the opinion that incurable
injustice was done to the appellants in the course of
their examination under Sections 313 of the Code, as
no specific questions were put to them apropos each
piece of incriminating evidence adduced against
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them. The judgments of the trial court based on such
inadequate examination of the accused, therefore,
cannot be sustained.
In the cited case, we had remanded the matter and restored
it to the files for resuming the trial from the stage of
questioning under Section 313, Cr.P.C. However, in this
case, we do not think such a measure is warranted,
especially when the evidence falls short of the standard
required in a criminal trial which is not a mere suspicion, a
‘maybe true’ but a ‘must be true’, evidently a long distance
to travel, the whole of this distance being paved with legal,
reliable and unimpeachable evidence resulting in a finding
of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, as held in Sarwan
10
Singh v. State of Punjab .
31. We have found that the investigation carried out is
grossly deficient. The scene mahazar was not drawn up, no
forensic examination was carried out at the scene of crime
and no independent witnesses were arrayed. The causation
of fire not investigated, the presence of the accused in the
vicinity of the crime scene not established. The delay in
10
AIR 1957 SC 637
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registration of FIR despite the information having been
received at the police station earlier, and the police
personnel including the I.O having visited the scene of
occurrence where a number of villagers were present was
a serious lapse. The delay caused and the manner in which
the FIS was recorded in the present case throws suspicion
on the very conduct of the I.O. The dying declarations
should have been recorded with more caution and when
taken inside the hospital it should have ideally been
recorded in the presence of a Doctor, whose certification
also ought to have been obtained. The incriminating
circumstances that come out in a trial are to be put to the
accused in its entirety, a solemn duty enjoined both on the
Court and the Prosecutor equally, failing which the entire
prosecution may fail for that sole reason. We reiterate these
aspects only to point out the lapses in investigation, which
could have been avoided, to provide some guidance at least
in the future.
32. A couple, at the fag end of their lives were burnt to
death and the cause, whether it’s a homicide or accidental
death, eludes civil society and throws a pall of suspicion on
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their own son and his family, who will always carry the yoke
of dishonour. The son and daughter-in-law were accused of
parricide and were convicted by the trial court, later
acquitted by the High Court, which acquittal is now affirmed
by us. The trauma of arrest, incarceration and trial will
always scar the couple and more so their children who were
left orphaned, during the time when their parents were
imprisoned. We cannot but caution the investigators and the
Courts to strive to do better and follow accepted practises
and procedural rules to the hilt, when lives are lost or taken
and there is a possibility of false accusations being made,
putting to peril the reputations of the living.
33. The appeal is dismissed.
34. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……...…….……………………. J.
(SANJAY KUMAR)
...………….……………………. J.
(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 11, 2026.
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