KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION vs. SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2643    OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 6885 of 2021] KALYAN DOMBIVALI MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION        ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS SANJAY GAJANAN GHARAT  AND ANOTHER    ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2644  OF 2022 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 6968 of 2021] J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions. 2. Kalyan   Dombivali   Municipal   Corporation   (hereinafter referred   to   as   the   “KDM   Corporation”)   and   the   State   of 1 Maharashtra,   by   way   of   the   present   appeals,   challenge   the th correctness of the judgment dated 6  April 2021, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of 2020 , thereby holding that the KDM Corporation was not the competent authority to suspend respondent  No.1­Sanjay  Gajanan Gharat.    By  the impugned judgment, the High Court had also quashed the departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent No.1 and directed the KDM   Corporation   to   reinstate   him   forthwith   to   the   post   of Additional Municipal Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as “AMC”) of the KDM Corporation.  3. The facts are not in dispute.   The respondent No.1 was initially appointed as an Assistant Municipal Commissioner of the KDM Corporation in the year 1995.  The said appointment st was approved by the State Government on 1   February 1997 under Section 45 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “the MMC Act”). The KDM Corporation thereafter recommended the respondent No.1 to be promoted   as   Deputy   Municipal   Commissioner   of   the   KDM 2 th Corporation   on   9   May   2003.     This   was   done   after   the Departmental Promotion Committee of the KDM Corporation found   respondent   No.1   suitable   for   such   promotion.   The General Body of the KDM Corporation also approved the said th recommendation in its meeting held on 18   July 2003.   The rd State   Government,   vide   notification   dated   23   July   2005, granted   approval   to   the   promotion   of   respondent   No.1   as th Deputy Municipal Commissioner with effect from 9  May 2003. 4. Vide Maharashtra Act No.32 of 2011, which came into th effect   from   25   September   2011,   various   amendments   were effected into the MMC Act.  Vide the said amendment, Section 39A was brought in the statute, which provided for creation of one   or   more   posts   of   AMCs   and   appointment   of   suitable persons on such posts. 5. In pursuance of the amendment effected in the year 2011, the   State   Government   issued   a   Government   Resolution th (hereinafter referred to as “G.R.”) on 11  November 2011. Vide the   said   G.R.,   one   post   of   AMC   was   created   for   the   KDM Corporation.     Consequent   to   the   upgradation   of   the   KDM 3 Corporation from Class ‘D’ to Class ‘C’, one additional post of th AMC came to be created vide G.R. dated 6  January 2015.  The said G.R. also laid down the procedure for carrying out the selection   process   for   the   post   of   AMCs.   Undisputedly,   the Selection   Committee,   which   considered   the   proposal   of   the Commissioner of the KDM Corporation, for a suitable person to th be appointed as AMC, in its meeting held on 5   May 2015, found   respondent   No.1   most   suitable   for   the   same   and accordingly,   his   name   came   to   be   recommended   by   the Selection   Committee   to   the   State   of   Maharashtra   for appointment to the post of AMC of the KDM Corporation.  The respondent No.1 came to be appointed as AMC of the KDM nd Corporation by the State of Maharashtra on 2   June 2015. Pursuant to his appointment, the respondent No.1 joined his service as AMC of the KDM Corporation in the same month. th 6. On 14   June 2018, an FIR No.34 of 2018 came to be registered   against   the   respondent   No.1   for   the   offences punishable  under  Sections   7,   8,   13(1)(d)  along  with  Section 13(2)   of   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1988.     The 4 respondent No.1 was arrested on the same date and continued th to be in custody till 17   June 2018, on which date, he was released on bail. The Commissioner of the KDM Corporation purportedly, in 7. exercise of the powers under Section 56(1)(b) of the MMC Act and Rule 4(1) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “MCS Rules”), on th 18   June 2018, issued an order suspending respondent No.1 from service.  The General Body of the KDM Corporation, in its th meeting   held   on   7   July   2018,   ratified   the   suspension   of th respondent No.1. On 20  June 2019, the General Body of the KDM Corporation also accorded sanction to hold departmental inquiry   against   respondent   No.1.   Accordingly,   the th Commissioner of the KDM Corporation issued a notice dated 7 August   2019   to   respondent   No.1   with   regard   to   holding   of departmental   inquiry   against   him   and   called   upon   him   to appear   before   the   Inquiry   Officer   appointed   by   the   KDM th Corporation.   The respondent No.1, vide his letter dated 16 August   2019   addressed   to   the   Commissioner,   KDM 5 Corporation, objected to the said departmental inquiry on the ground of jurisdiction. th 8. Again,   the   KDM   Corporation   issued   a   notice   dated   5 December 2019, to respondent No.1 calling upon him to remain th present for the preliminary inquiry to be held on 26  December 2019.  However, the respondent No.1 chose not to participate in the departmental inquiry and filed a writ petition being Writ Petition   (ST.)   No.3599   of   2020   before   the   High   Court   of st Judicature at Bombay on 21  February 2020.  In the said writ petition, he sought the following reliefs: “a) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ in the nature   of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate Direction   or   Order   thereby   directing   Respondent No.1 Corporation and its Municipal Commissioner to forthwith withdraw and/or cancel ­ I) the impugned Suspension Order dated 18th   June,   2018,   being   Exhibit­U hereto;  II) the impugned General Body Resolution dated 7th July, 2018, being Exhibit­V hereto;  III) the Impugned General Body Resolution No.6   dated   20th   June,   2019   being Exhibit­Y hereto; and  6 IV) the Impugned Notice of Departmental inquiry dated 7th August, 2019 being Exhibit­Z to this petition;  b) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ in the   nature   of  Certiorari  or  any  other  appropriate Direction or Order thereby quashing and/or setting aside – I)  the Impugned Suspension Order dated 18th   June,   2018,   passed   by   the Municipal   Commissioner   of Respondent   No.1   being   Exhibit   ­U hereto;  II)  the Impugned General Body Resolution dated   7th   July,   2018   of   Respondent No.1, being Exhibit­V hereto;  III)  the Impugned General Body Resolution No.6   dated   20th   June,   2019   or Respondent   No.1,   being   Exhibit   ­Y hereto; and  IV) the   Impugned   Notice   of   193 Departmental   Inquiry   dated   7th August   2019   issued   by   the commissioner   of   Respondent   No.1 being Exhibit­Z to this petition;  c) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to Issue Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ in the nature   of   Mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate Direction   or   Order   thereby   directing   Respondent No.1 Corporation and its Municipal Commissioner to forthwith re­Instate the Petitioner in the post of Additional   Municipal   Commissioner   of   the   1st Respondent Corporations;” 7 th 9. By the impugned judgment dated 6  April 2021, the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 came to be allowed in terms   of   the   prayers   (a)   to   (c),   which   are   reproduced hereinabove.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   both,   the   KDM Corporation   and   the   State   of   Maharashtra  have   approached this Court. 10. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing   on   behalf   of   the   KDM   Corporation,   Shri   Rahul Chitnis, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1. 11. Shri Patwalia submitted that the High Court has grossly erred in holding that the respondent No.1 was an employee of the   State   Government   and   therefore,   it   was   only   the   State Government, who had powers to suspend him.  He submitted that   though   under   Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act,   the   State Government was an authority competent to create a post and appoint a suitable person on that post, such a post was created 8 specifically for the KDM Corporation and once a suitable person was appointed by the State Government on the said post, he became an employee of the KDM Corporation.   He submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 56 of the MMC Act, it was   only   the   KDM   Corporation,   which   was   competent   to suspend such an employee on the grounds as are available under   the   said   provision,   and   also   to   initiate   departmental proceedings.   He submitted that the High Court has grossly erred in not considering the said aspect and referring to Section 16 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act, 1904 (hereinafter referred to as “GC Act”).   He submitted that when there is a specific   provision   in   the   MMC   Act,   which   empowers   the Commissioner   to   suspend   an   employee   and   to   initiate departmental proceedings against him, recourse to GC Act is not warranted.   He submitted that since the respondent No.1 was   arrested   and   was   detained   in   custody   for   a   period exceeding 48 hours, in view of sub­rule (2) of Rule 4 of the MCS Rules, his suspension was a deemed one.  The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the impugned judgment has the effect 9 of leading to a consequence that the respondent No.1, who has been caught red­handed in a trap case, will be left scot­free.  12. The State Government has also supported the contentions as raised by the KDM Corporation.  It is submitted that though the post was created by the State Government for the KDM Corporation and though the respondent No.1 was selected and appointed   by   the   State   Government   in   accordance   with   the th procedure prescribed in the G.R. dated 6   January 2015, the appointment was, as an AMC of the KDM Corporation and as such, the KDM Corporation was well within its powers under Section 56 of the MMC Act to suspend him. 13. Shri Anupam Lal Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1, on the contrary, would submit that the respondent No.1 was appointed by the State Government under Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act   and   the   post   of   AMC   is   pari materia  with that of the Commissioner, who is appointed under Section 36 of the MMC Act.  He submitted that under Section 39A(2)   of   the   MMC   Act,   an   AMC   is   subject   to   the   same 10 liabilities, restrictions and terms and conditions of service, to which the Commissioner is subjected to as per the provisions of the   MMC   Act.     He   further   submitted   that   the   posts   of   the Commissioner and the AMC find place in Chapter II of the MMC Act, whereas Section 56 finds place in Chapter IV of the MMC Act.  He submitted that various other sections in Chapter IV of the   MMC   Act   provide   for   appointment   of   various   municipal officers and servants other than AMC and Commissioner and therefore,   the   term   “competent   authority”   will   have   to   be construed to be only such authorities, who were competent to make appointments to the posts found in Chapter IV of the MMC Act.     He submitted that in any case, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of  Ajay Kumar Choudhary 1 , v.   Union   of   India   through   its   Secretary   and   Another continued suspension of respondent No.1 was not warranted. He submitted that even the charge­sheet was not submitted within 90 days and as such, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. 1 (2015) 7 SCC 291 11 14. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has held that since the appointment of respondent No.1 was made by the State Government in view of Section 36 of the MMC Act, it is only the State Government, who was competent to suspend and initiate departmental inquiry against him.   It was, therefore, held that the suspension order issued by the Commissioner and ratified by the KDM Corporation, and the departmental inquiry initiated by the Commissioner with the approval of the KDM Corporation was beyond their powers.   We will have to examine the correctness of these findings. 15. Section 39A of the MMC Act reads thus: “ 39A.   Appointment   of   Additional   Municipal Commissioners . —(1)   The   State   Government   may create one or more posts of Additional Municipal Commissioners   in   the   Corporation   and   appoint suitable persons on such posts, who shall, subject to the control of the Commissioner, exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner. (2)   Every   person   so   appointed   as   the   Additional Municipal   Commissioner   shall   be   subject   to   the same   liabilities,   restrictions   and   terms   and conditions of service, to which the Commissioner is subjected to as per the provisions of this Act. 12 16. The perusal of sub­section (1) of Section 39A of the MMC Act would reveal that the State Government is empowered to create one or more posts of AMCs.   However, such a post is created in the particular Corporation.  The State Government is also entitled to appoint suitable persons on such posts.   It is further clear that the AMCs so appointed, though shall exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner, the same shall be subject to the control of the Commissioner.  Sub­section (2) of Section 39A of the MMC Act provides that every person so appointed as the AMC shall be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions and terms and conditions of service, to which the Commissioner is subjected to as per the provisions of MMC Act. th 17. It is not in dispute that vide G.R. dated 6  January 2015, for the KDM Corporation, which was promoted from Class ‘D’ to Class ‘C’, one new post of AMC was created.  It is also not in dispute that there was already one post of AMC existing in the KDM Corporation. The perusal of the said G.R. would reveal 13 that one post of AMC, which was newly created, was to be filled in from the officers of the State Cadre in the KDM Corporation. It would further reveal that the second post of the AMC was to be   filled   in   from   the   officers   working   in   the   respective Corporation by way of selection.  It further clarified that in the event, the suitable person is not available for selection to the said post, the same shall be filled in from the officers of the State Government Cadre. 18. From the perusal of the record, it could be seen that the State   Government   had   called   for   the   names   of   suitable candidates from the Commissioner of the KDM Corporatoin. th The   Commissioner,   vide   his   communication   dated   4   April 2015, proposed three names.  The said names were considered by a Committee consisting of the following authorities: (i) Commissioner/Director,   Directorate   of   Municipal Administration; (ii) Additional   Commissioner,   Mumbai   Municipal Corporation; 14 (iii) Commissioner, KDM Corporation;  (iv) Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra; and Under Secretary, Govt. of Maharashtra. (v) 19. A perusal of the Minutes of the said Meeting would reveal that though the Commissioner of the KDM Corporation stated that none of the candidates including the respondent No.1 were eligible for the post of AMC, the Committee, in its meeting held th on 5   May 2015, after considering the confidential reports of the three candidates, resolved to recommend respondent No.1 for appointment to the post of AMC of the KDM Corporation. The   said   recommendation   was   approved   by   the   State Government   and   accordingly,   respondent   No.1   came   to   be nd appointed as AMC of the KDM Corporation vide G.R. dated 2 June 2015.  The said G.R. would clearly reveal that respondent No.1   had   been   appointed   specifically   as   AMC   of   the   KDM Corporation.  It could thus clearly be seen from the record that though the respondent No.1 was selected and appointed by the 15 State   Government,   his   appointment   was   specifically   for   the KDM Corporation.   20. Therefore, the question that we will have to consider is as to whether the  respondent No.1 though  an  employee of the KDM   Corporation,   can   neither   be   suspended   nor   any departmental proceedings can be initiated against him by the KDM   Corporation,   since   his   selection   and   appointment   was done by the State Government.   For considering the rival submissions, it will be relevant to 21. refer   to   some   of   the   provisions   of   the   MMC   Act.     We   have already reproduced Section 39A of the MMC Act hereinabove. The other two provisions that require consideration are sub­ section (9) of Section 2 and Section 56 of the MMC Act, which read thus: “ 2. Definitions.­   …..

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17 Provided that, such suspension of an officer or servant pending inquiry into the allegations against such officer or servant shall not be deemed to be a penalty.]” 22. It could thus be seen that under Section 39A of the MMC Act, though the AMC will exercise all or any of the powers and perform   all   or   any   of   the   duties   and   functions   of   the Commissioner, the same shall be subject to the control of the Commissioner.  No doubt, that the AMC would be subject to the same   liabilities,   restrictions   and   terms   and   conditions   of service,   to   which   the   Commissioner   of   the   Corporation   is subjected.     However,   the   legislative   intent   is   clear   that   the powers to be exercised by AMCs would be subject to the control of the Commissioner.   23. The legislative intent would also be gathered from sub­ section (9) of Section 2 of the MMC Act.  It could be seen that in the   definition   of   the   “Commissioner”,   though   an   acting Commissioner appointed under Section 39 of the MMC Act has been included, an AMC appointed under Section 39A of the 18 MMC Act has not been included.  We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of respondent No.1 that the post of AMC is  pari materia  with that of the Commissioner.  The legislative intent is clear that though the AMC exercises all or any of the powers and performs all or any of the duties and functions of the Commissioner, he would be subject to the control of the Commissioner, and as such, subordinate to him.   Under sub­section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act, a 24. competent authority, subject to the provisions of the said Act, is entitled to impose any of the penalties specified in sub­section (2) of Section 56 of the MMC Act on a municipal officer or servant if such authority is satisfied that such officer or servant is guilty  of   breach  of  departmental rules  or  discipline  or  of carelessness,   neglect   of   duty   or   other   misconduct   or   is incompetent.   Clause (a) of the proviso to sub­section (1) of Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act,   however,   provides   that   no municipal officer or servant holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of the Assistant Commissioner, 19 shall be dismissed by the Commissioner without the previous approval of the Corporation.  It can be seen that the words used are “post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of the Assistant Commissioner”.  It will also be relevant to note that Section 56 of the MMC Act has also been amended by the same Amending Act i.e. Maharashtra Act No. 32 of 2011, by which Section 39A was brought in the statute.   Earlier, the words used in clause (a) of sub­section (1) of Section 56 were “whose monthly salary, exclusive of allowances exceeds one thousand rupees”.     The   said   words   were   substituted   by   the   words “holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of   the   Assistant   Commissioner”.     It   can   thus   be   seen   that though   the   “competent   authority”   is   entitled   to   impose   the penalty as specified in sub­section (2) of Section 56 of the MMC Act on a municipal officer or servant; in case of an officer, who is equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of Assistant Commissioner, the power of dismissal can be exercised by the “Commissioner”   only   with   the   previous   approval   of   the Corporation.  20 25. It can further be seen that clause (b) of the proviso to sub­ section   (1)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act   enables   the Commissioner   to   suspend   any   officer   or   servant,   whether appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority, except   Transport   Manager   being   a   Government   Officer   on deputation,   pending   an   order   of   the   Corporation.   It   further provides   that   when   the   officer   suspended   is   a   Transport Manager or an officer appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act, such suspension with reasons thereof, shall, forthwith be reported by the Commissioner to the Corporation.   It further provides that such a suspension shall come to an end if not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of such suspension.  26. It   is   thus   clear   that   whereas,   the   Commissioner   is empowered   to   suspend   any   officer   or   servant,   whether appointed by the Corporation or any other competent authority, in case of a Transport Manager being a Government Officer on deputation or any officer appointed under Section 45 of the 21 MMC   Act,   the   Commissioner   is   required   to   report   such   a suspension with reasons thereof, to the Corporation.  It further provides   that  such  suspension   shall  come   to   an  end   if  not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of such suspension. 27. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the MMC Act   would   reveal   that   though   a   competent   authority   may impose any of the penalties on a municipal officer or servant, no municipal officer or servant holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of an Assistant Commissioner, shall be dismissed by the Commissioner without the previous approval of the Corporation.   28. It   could   be   seen   that   the   legislature   has   created   two classes of the municipal officers and servants.  One class is of the   municipal   officers   and   servants,   other   than   the   ones holding the post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of an   Assistant   Commissioner.     In   this   category,   a   competent authority   may   impose   the   penalties   as   provided   under   the 22 provisions   of   the   MMC   Act.     The   other   class   of   municipal officers   is   of   the   persons   holding   the   post   equivalent   to   or higher in rank than the post of Assistant Commissioner.  The officers   in   such   a   class   can   be   dismissed   only   by   the Commissioner and that too with the previous approval of the Corporation.   29. As already discussed hereinabove, clause (a) of the proviso to   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   56   of   the   MMC   Act   has   been amended   simultaneously   by   an   amendment,   which   brought Section 39A into the statute.  As such, we are of the view that the term “post equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of Assistant   Commissioner”   cannot   be   construed   in   a   narrow compass.  We are therefore of the view that clause (a) of sub­ section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act would also include the post   of   AMC.     As   such,   the   Commissioner   would   be   a “competent authority” insofar as the post of AMC is concerned. Likewise, though the powers of the Commissioner to suspend any   officer   or   servant   except   a   Transport   Manager   being   a 23 Government   Officer   on   deputation   or   the   officers   appointed under Section 45 of the MMC Act are without any restriction, when such suspension is with regard to a Transport Manager or   an   officer   appointed   under   Section   45   of   the   MMC   Act, though the Commissioner is empowered to suspend them, such a suspension has to be reported to the Corporation along with the reasons thereof.  Such a suspension shall come to an end, if   not   confirmed   by   the   Corporation   within   a   period   of   six months from the date of such suspension.  30. For   appreciation   of   the   rival   contentions,   it   will   be apposite to seek certain guidance from some precedents of this Court.  31. In   the   case   of   Philips   India   Ltd.   v.   Labour   Court, 2 , this Court had an occasion to decide the Madras and Others rate of overtime wages as mentioned in Section 31 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947.  This Court found that   for   finding   the   minimum   rate   of   overtime   wages   as mentioned in Section 31 of  the  said  Act, it  will have  to be 2 (1985) 3 SCC 103 24 interpreted in the light of the provisions contained in Section 14(1) read with proviso to Section 31 of the said Act.  Coming to this conclusion, this Court observed thus:

32. It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the Statute must be read as a whole.   It has been held that this rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as “elementary rule”.  It has been held that for 25 finding   out   the   true   meaning   of   one   part   of   a   statute,   a reference will have to be made to another part of the statute and that will best express meaning of the makers.   3 In the case of  , this 33. Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain Court   was   considering   the   question   regarding   the   conflict between Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Order XXI Rule 2 thereof.   This Court held that applying the rule of harmonious construction, the so­called conflict between the said two provisions had been dispelled.  Observing so, this Court   reiterated   the   following   well­settled   principles   of interpretation of statutes:

3 (1997) 1 SCC 373 26

27 other,   they   should   be   so   interpreted   that,   if   possible,   effect should   be   given   to   both.   It   has   further   been   held   that   an interpretation, which reduces one of the provisions as a “dead letter” or “useless lumber”, should be avoided. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   35. Jagdish   Singh   v.   Lt. 4 Governor, Delhi and Others ,   while considering the conflict between Rules 25(2) and 28 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973, observed thus:

4 (1997) 4 SCC 435 28

36. In   the   case   of   Commissioner   of   Income   Tax   v. 5 , though in Sections 245­D(4) and Hindustan Bulk Carriers 245­D(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the terminus point for charging   interest   was   not   specifically   provided,   this   Court, applying   the   principle   of   harmonious   and   contextual construction, held that they have to be charged in the spirit of Sections 234­A, 234­B and 234­C of the said Act.  Holding this, this Court observed thus: “ 16.  The courts will have to reject that construction which   will   defeat   the   plain   intention   of   the legislature   even   though   there   may   be   some inexactitude   in   the   language   used. (See  Salmon  v.  Duncombe  [ Salmon  v.  Duncombe , (1886) LR 11 AC 627 (PC) : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446] , AC at. 634,  Curtis  v.  Stovin  [ Curtis  v.  Stovin , (1889) LR 22 QBD 513 (CA) : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772] referred to in   [  v.  S. Teja Singh case CIT S. Teja Singh , AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .) 17.  If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose   of   the   legislation,   we   should   avoid   a construction which would reduce the legislation to 5 (2003) 3 SCC 57 29 futility,   and   should   rather   accept   the   bolder construction,   based   on   the   view   that   Parliament would   legislate   only   for   the   purpose   of   bringing about   an   effective   result.   (See  Nokes  v.  Doncaster Amalgamated   Collieries   Ltd.  [ Nokes  v.  Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. , 1940 AC 1014 : (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL) : 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343] referred   to   in   v.  Pye Minister   for   Lands   for   New South   Wales  [ Pye  v.  Minister   for   Lands   for   New South Wales , (1954) 1 WLR 1410 : (1954) 3 All ER 514   (PC)]   .)   The   principles   indicated   in   the   said cases were reiterated by this Court in  Mohan Kumar Singhania  v.  Union   of   India  [ Mohan   Kumar Singhania  v.  Union   of   India ,   1992   Supp   (1)   SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455] . 18.   The statute must be read as a whole and one provision   of   the   Act   should   be   construed   with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to   make   a   consistent   enactment   of   the   whole statute. 19.   The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the   clauses   to   be   construed   but   to   the   entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See  R.S. Raghunath  v.  State of Karnataka  [ R.S.   Raghunath  v.  State   of   Karnataka , (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286] .) Such a construction   has   the   merit   of   avoiding   any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head­on clash between two sections of the same Act.   (See  Sultana   Begum  v.  Prem   Chand Jain  [ Sultana Begum  v.  Prem Chand Jain , (1997) 1 SCC 373] .) 30 20.  Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so   that   they   harmonise.   It   should   not   be   lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other. 21.   The   provisions   of   one   section   of   the   statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus   a   construction   that   reduces   one   of   the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.” It could thus be seen that it is more than well­settled that 37. the court has to avoid the interpretation which will result in head­on  clash  between  two   sections   of   the   Act.     When one section of an Act is not in a position to bring out the legislative intent, recourse will have to be made to other sections of the statute for gathering the legislative intent.  An attempt should be made to see to it that the effect must be given to parts of the statute   even   if   they   may,   on   first   blush,   appear   to   be conflicting.  One provision of the Act has to be construed with reference   to   other   provisions   in   the   Act,   so   as   to   make   a consistent enactment of the whole statute. An attempt should 31 be made of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections. 38. It has further been held that if the court has a choice between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve   the   manifest   purpose   of   the   legislation,   such   an interpretation will have to be avoided.  The court should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility. A broader   interpretation   which   would   bring   about   an   effective result, will have to be preferred.  Applying this principle, we are of   the   considered   view   that   sub­section   (9)   of   Section   2, Sections 39A and 56 of the MMC Act will have to be read in reference to each other.  They cannot be read in isolation. 39. Therefore, we are of the view that the finding of the High Court   that   in   view   of   Section   39A   of   the   MMC   Act,   the Commissioner   or   the   Corporation   will   not   have   power   to suspend or initiate departmental inquiry against the AMC, is in ignorance of the provisions of Section 56 and sub­section (9) of Section 2 of the MMC Act.   32 40. We find that the view taken by the High Court is also not acceptable   in   view   of   another   principle   of   statutory interpretation.  In the case of  Mahadeo Prasad Bais (Dead) v. 6 Income­Tax Officer ‘A’ Ward, Gorakhpur and Another , this Court held that an interpretation, which will result in anomaly or absurdity, should be avoided.  It has been held that at times, the circumstances justify a slight straining of the language of the clause so as to avoid a meaningless anomaly. 41. It   will   further   be   relevant   to   refer   to   the   following observations   of   this  Court  in  the   case  of   K.P.  Varghese  v. 7 Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another : 

6 (1991) 4 SCC 560 7 (1981) 4 SCC 173 33

8 : v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd.

8 (1986) 3 SCC 91 34

court   should   not   always   cling   to   literal   interpretation   and should endeavor to avoid an unjust or absurd result.  The court 35 should not permit a mockery of legislation.   It has been held that   to   make   sense   out   of   an   unhappily   worded   provision, where   the   purpose   is   apparent   to   the   judicial   eye,   ‘some’ violence to language is also permissible.

accepted, it will lead to an absurd and anomalous situation wherein on one hand, the respondent No.1, who was selected and   appointed   by   the   State   Government   for   the   KDM Corporation,   though   would   be   an   employee   of   the   KDM Corporation, the KDM Corporation would not be in a position to initiate   departmental  proceedings   against  him,   even   if  he  is found to have indulged into serious misconduct.  On the other hand, since the respondent No.1 is not an employee of the State Government,   the   State   Government   also   would   not   be   in   a position to initiate any departmental proceedings against him. 

legislature would not have been to lead to such an absurd and anomalous situation.  A legislative intent cannot be to leave an 36 employee   scot­free   though   he   has   indulged   into   serious misconduct.  We are therefore of the considered view that on a harmonious   construction   of   sub­section   (9)   of   Section   2, Sections 39A and 56 of the MMC Act, the Commissioner of the Municipal   Corporation   will   have   the   power   to   suspend   or initiate departmental proceedings against an AMC, who is an officer,   superior   in   rank   to   the   Assistant   Commissioner. However, in case of suspension of such an officer, the only requirement   would   be   to   report   to   the   Corporation,   with reasons thereof, and if such a suspension is not confirmed by the Corporation within a period of six months from the date of such   suspension,   the   same   shall   come   to   an   end.     In   our considered   view,   any   other   interpretation   would   lead   to absurdity and anomaly, and therefore will have to be avoided.

rule of interpretation, that the statute has to be interpreted in such a manner that it preserves its workability.  Recently, this

37 9 Others , has referred to the earlier judgments of this Court and observed thus:

9 (2021) 10 SCC 306 38 38.  In  Balram   Kumawat  v.  Union   of   India  [ Balram Kumawat  v.  Union of India , (2003) 7 SCC 628] , this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 636­37, paras 25­ 26) “ 25 . A statute must be construed as a workable instrument.  Ut res magis valeat quam pereat  is a well­known principle of law.   In  Tinsukhia   Electric   Supply   Co. Ltd.  v.  State of Assam  [ Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd.  v.  State of Assam , (1989) 3   SCC   709]   this   Court   stated   the   law thus : (SCC p. 754, paras 118­20) ‘ 118 .   The   courts   strongly   lean against   any   construction   which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle “ ut res magis valeat quam pereat ”. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely   vague   and   its   language wholly   intractable   and   absolutely meaningless,   the   statute   could   be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the law   for   arbitrariness   or unreasonableness under Article 14; but   what   a   court   of   construction, dealing   with   the   language   of   a statute,  does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning   and   purpose   which   the 39

40 120 . It is, therefore, the court's duty to make what it can of the statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to  be  operative  and  not  inept and that   nothing   short   of   impossibility should   allow   a   court   to   declare   a statute   unworkable. In  Whitney  v.  IRC  [ Whitney  v.  IRC , 1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 (HL) : 95   LJKB   165   :   134   LT   98]   Lord Dunedin said : (AC p. 52) “A   statute   is   designed   to   be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.” ’ 26 . The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there   may   be   some   inexactitude   in   the language   used. [See  Salmon  v.  Duncombe  [ Salmon  v.  Dun combe , (1886) LR 11 AC 627 (PC) : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446] (AC at p. 634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to,   the   courts   would   accept   the   bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.” 41 39.  It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer   an   interpretation   which   makes   the   statute workable. The interpretation which gives effect to the   intention   of   the   legislature,   will   have   to   be preferred. The interpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have to be preferred than the one   which   defeats   the   purpose   of   the enactment……”

not have intended a situation, wherein though the post of AMC is created by the State Government and a suitable person is appointed by it and though a person appointed on the said post becomes an employee of the Corporation, there would be no provision in the statute to initiate departmental proceedings against him.   If such an interpretation is accepted, it would lead to absurdity and create a vacuum. In our opinion, in order to avoid such a situation, the interpretation as placed by us on the   aforesaid   provisions   of   the   MMC   Act   will   have   to   be preferred. 

No.1   that   the   term   “competent   authority”   as   used   in   sub­ 42 section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act will have to be read as a “competent authority” in respect of appointments to be made for the posts in Chapter IV is concerned, we are unable to accept the said contention.  Such a restrictive meaning would render the legislation otiose.     In any event, it is to be noted that though a Transport Manager is appointed under Section 40 of the MMC Act, which is a part of Chapter II, a Transport Manager is specifically referred to in clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act which is a part of Chapter IV and   empowers   the   Commissioner   to   suspend   his   services, however, with a requirement of reporting the same with reasons to the Corporation.  It is thus clear that if the legislative intent was   to   give   a   narrower   meaning   to   the   term   “competent authority”, only to mean such authorities who were found in Chapter IV, then there would have been no reference in sub­ section (1) of Section 56 of the MMC Act to Transport Manager, who   is   appointed   under   Chapter   II   of   the   MMC   Act.     We therefore find that the contention in that regard needs to be rejected. 43

Court has totally erred in setting aside the suspension and the departmental   proceedings   initiated   against   respondent   No.1. The effect of the impugned judgment is that the respondent No.

misconduct, has been left scot­free without requiring to face any departmental proceedings and directed to be reinstated in services. 

No.1   is   concerned,   the   respondent   No.1   has   relied   on   the

Secretary to Government (Home) v. Promod Kumar, IPS and 10 Another .  Insofar as the judgment of this Court in the case of

Court has deprecated the protracted period of suspension and repeated renewal thereof, in the facts of the said case, this 10 (2018) 17 SCC 677 44 Court found that since the appellant therein was served with a charge­sheet, the direction issued in the said case may not be relevant to him any longer. 

suspended for more than six years.  This Court found that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the respondent No.1 therein under suspension any longer.

who,   though   called   upon   to   participate   in   the   departmental proceedings, has on his own, chosen not to participate therein. 45 It is the respondent No.1, who had objected to the initiation of the   departmental   proceedings   by   the   Commissioner   on   the ground   of   jurisdiction   and   refused   to   participate   in   the departmental   proceedings.     We   therefore   find   that   the respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to take benefit of his own wrong.     In   any   case,   we   find   that   the   issue   of   prolonged suspension   would   be   taken   care   of   by   directing   the departmental proceedings to be completed within a stipulated period but the suspension of respondent No.1 would continue

Court is not sustainable in law.  

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of 2020 is quashed and set aside;   46

respondent No.1 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay is dismissed;  (iii) The   departmental   proceedings   initiated   against respondent   No.1   are   directed   to   be   completed   as expeditiously   as   possible   and   in   any   case,   within   a period of four months from the date of this judgment. The   respondent   No.1   would   continue   to   be   under suspension till the conclusion of the said departmental proceedings; and

the above terms. No order as to costs. ..…..….......................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] .…….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; MARCH 31, 2022. 47