Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 8431 of 1997
PETITIONER:
M/s. Continental Construction Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
State of U.P.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/09/2003
BENCH:
CJI & S.B. Sinha.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
W I T H
C.A. No. 8453 of 1997
S.B. SINHA, J :
These two appeals involving common questions of law and fact were
taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common
judgment.
FACTS:
The parties hereto entered into a contract dated 20th August, 1964
for the purpose of construction of Obra dam, Power house, structures and
appurtenant works. Disputes and differences having arisen between the
parties as regard supply of extra quantity of earth and rock, the matter
was referred to an arbitrator.
As far back as on 23.8.1972, the appellant herein invoked the
arbitration agreement contained in Clause 17 of the contract in
connection with earthfill and rockfill which was recorded from 53rd
running bill upto the 88th running bill. One Shri J.S. Pujji was
appointed as an arbitrator by the appellant. As the respondent did not
appoint any arbitrator the appellant requested the said arbitrator to
proceed in the matter as a sole arbitrator whereupon he entered into a
reference. The respondent herein filed application before the Court of
District Judge purported to be in terms of Sections 33 and 9 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 which was allowed. Being aggrieved by and
dissatisfied with the judgment of the District Judge, the appellant
filed appeal before the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court by an
order dated 17.4.1980 directed that both the contractor and the State
Government shall nominate their respective arbitrators for resolving the
disputes with regard to the claim for extra charges for earth and rock
work made by the contractor for the period subsequent to 28.12.1967 and
15.6.1968 respectively. The parties thereafter filed their respective
statements of claim, statements of defence and replications before the
arbitrators. However, no award could be made by the learned arbitrator
within the statutory period as the disputes and differences were
referred to the Umpire in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
The Umpire was appointed by the Court of Civil Judge, Sonebhadra
with the consent of the parties.
The appellant herein filed a statement of claim for a sum of Rs.
43,50,958.48 on extra quantity of 8,45,319.471 cu. m. of earthfill
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excavated from the external sources obtained from borrow areas at the
rate of Rs. 880.91 per 100 cu.m. It also made a claim of Rs.
26,47,746.34 for extra quantity of 1,66,524.927 cu.m. of rock excavated
from the external sources/quarries at the rate of Rs. 1590/- per 100
cu.m. The Umpire appointed for determination of disputes between the
parties who was a retired Engineer-in-chief of the respondent herein
awarded a sum of Rs. 7,29,764.00 in respect of the claim for extra
quantity of earthfill and a sum of Rs. 8,74,256.00 in relation to its
claim for rockfill. The appellant herein filed applications for making
the said awards as rule of the Court. Respondent, however, filed
objections thereto in terms of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
By reason of an order dated 23.8.1995 the said applications of the
respondent were allowed and the awards were set aside by the Civil
Judge, (Senior Division) Mirzapur. The appellant herein preferred
appeals thereagainst which were dismissed by the High Court inter alia
on the ground that in terms of the provisions of the contract the
appellant herein could not make any extra claim for supply of earth or
rock.
SUBMISSIONS:
Mr. Shiv Kumar Suri, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant would inter alia submit that the question as to whether
the claim as regards extra item of earth and rock work can be claimed or
not was considered by the Allahabad High Court in FAFO No. 155 of 1975
(M/s. Continental Construction (P.) Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others) disposed of on 17th April, 1980 holding that such claim is
maintainable. It was contended that the award being a non-speaking one,
the learned Civil Judge, Mirzapur and the High Court must be held to
have acted illegally and without jurisdiction in entering into the merit
of the matter. The learned counsel would urge that the arbitrator had
the requisite jurisdiction to construe the contract independently and in
absence of any finding to the effect that the awards ex facie were
perverse, the same could not have been set aside by reason of the
impugned judgments.
Our attention has been drawn to the fact that even before the
Umpire the respondent admitted that the appellant herein is entitled for
the extra items of admitted total quantity of earth and rock to the
extent of 8,45,319.471 cu.m. and 1,66,524.927 cu.m. respectively and
only in terms of such admission the awards have been passed.
The learned counsel would contend that from the awards it would
appear that although the claims of the appellant were for a sum of Rs.
43,50,958.48 and Rs. 26,47,746.34; the learned Umpire awarded only a sum
of Rs. 7,29,764.00 and Rs. 8,74,256.00 in its favour.
Mr. Subodh Markandeya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the umpire was
bound by the terms of the contract and could not have travelled beyond
the same. The learned counsel would contend that before the Civil
Judge, Mirzapur an affidavit was filed to the effect that the Department
has not admitted any claim of the opposite party. In support of the
said contention, the learned counsel has produced before us the
affidavit of one Shri Uma Nath Misra filed in Case No. 91 of 1993 and 92
of 1993 in the Court of Civil Judge, Mirzapur.
FINDINGS:
There is no dispute that there existed an arbitration agreement
between the parties as would appear from the fact of the matter, as
referred to hereinbefore, that the learned umpire passed a non-speaking
award.
The Umpire in his award has recorded:
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"Claim No. 1 amounting to Rs. 43,50,958.48 (plus
interest and costs) on account of the work of
earthfill in Dam Embankment from the 53rd running
bill upto the 88th running bill, involving a
quantity of 10,33,702.306 cum of earthfill with
earth obtained from borrow area. Against the
said quantity, the Respondents admitted the
quantity of 8,45,319.471 cu.m. for this claim
and this was accepted by the Claimants. The
Claimants have claimed a rate of Rs. 420.91 per
100 cu.m. over and above the rate of Rs. 460.00
per 100 cu.m. provided in item No. 64 of the
schedule, and have furnished analysis of rates
for earthfill in Dam Embankment after borrowing
material from borrow areas and sources other
than the excavations of the Dam, Power House,
Spillway, Approach and Tail Race Channels.
Against this, I award Rs. 7,29,764.00 (Rs. Seven
lacs twenty nine thousand, seven hundred and
sixty four) only."
A similar award has been passed in respect of claim of the
appellant relating to rock fill. A bare perusal of the said awards
would clearly go to show that the respondent herein admitted a part of
the claim of the appellant which in turn was accepted by it.
Such an admission presumably was made having regard to the
documents which were filed by the parties before the Umpire as also
decisions of the Allahabad High Court in The respondent did not raise
any question as regard the said admission of part of the quantity of
earth fill and rock fill before the Umpire. A vague statement was made
that the claim of the appellant was not admitted while dealing with the
question as to whether the award should have been a reasoned one or not.
The submission that no such admission is made is not borne out from the
records. On the other hand, such admission must have been made in view
of the documents maintained by the respondent as otherwise the exact
figure of earthfill or rockfill was not possible to be mentioned in the
awards.
In view of the order of the High Court dated 17.4.1980 the Umpire
was required to adjudicate upon the claim of the appellant. For the
said purpose he was required to take into consideration the terms and
conditions of contract vis-‘-vis the conduct of the parties. It is not
a case where the learned Umpire has travelled beyond the contract.
The matter relating to construction of the contract and/ or
application thereof fell for consideration before the arbitrators.
According to the appellant, the work in question did not fall within the
purview of the excepted matter. Determination of the said question was,
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of the Umpire.
The award is a non-speaking one. It is trite that the Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act,
1940 can interfere with the award only in the event the arbitrator has
misconducted himself or the proceeding or there exists an error apparent
on the face of the award.
The learned Civil Judge and the High Court have not found that the
Umpire acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independent on
the contract. No finding has been arrived at that the Umpire has made
conscious disregard of the contract which was manifest on the fact of
the award.
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The court exercises a very limited jurisdiction while adjudicating
upon an objection to the award in terms of Section 30 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940.
In the instant case, the Umpire has merely set out the claims,
given the history of the claims and awarded certain amount. He has not
disclosed his mind indicating as to why he had done so or what was done.
The Courts, therefore, could not interfere with the award merely on ipse
dixit.
In M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. Vs. Government of Kerala and Another
[(1989) 2 SCC 38] this Court has laid down the law in the following
terms:
"But, in the instant case the court had examined
the different claims not to find out whether
these claims were within the disputes referable
to the arbitrator, but to find out whether in
arriving at the decision, the arbitrator had
acted correctly or incorrectly. This, in our
opinion, the court had no jurisdiction to do,
namely, substitution of its own evaluation of
the conclusion of law or fact to come to the
conclusion that the arbitrator had acted
contrary to the bargain between the parties.
Whether a particular amount was liable to be
paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a
decision within the competency of the arbitrator
in this case. By purporting to construe the
contract the court could not take upon itself
the burden of saying that this was contrary to
the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction.
It has to be determined that there is a
distinction between disputes as to the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes
as to in what way that jurisdiction should be
exercised. There may be a conflict as to the
power of the arbitrator to grant a particular
remedy."
The question again came up for consideration before a three-Judge
Bench of this Court recently in State of U.P. Vs. Allied Constructions
[2003 (6) SCALE 265]. This Court held:
"Any award made by an arbitrator can be set
aside only if one or the other term specified in
Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940
is attracted. It is not a case where it can be
said that the arbitrator has misconducted the
proceedings. It was within his jurisdiction to
interpret Clause 47 of the Agreement having
regard to the fact-situation obtaining
therein.(sic) It is submitted that an award
made by an arbitrator may be wrong either on law
or on fact and error of law on the face of it
could not nullify an award. The award is a
speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned
sufficient and cogent reasons in support
thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is
trite, is a matter for arbitrator to determine
(see M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. versus The
Government of Kerala, AIR 1989 SC 890). Section
30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for
setting aside an award is restrictive in its
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operation. Unless one or the other condition
contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award
cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge
chosen by the parties and his decision is final.
The Court is precluded from reappraising the
evidence. Even in a case where the award
contains reasons, the interference therewith
would still be not available within the
jurisdiction of the Court unless, of course, the
reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is
based on a wrong proposition of law. As error
apparent on the face of the records would not
imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents
and materials on record. Once it is found that
the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one,
the Court will refrain itself from interfering."
The aforementioned decisions constitute binding precedents.
For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the
impugned judgments cannot be sustained. The impugned judgments are,
therefore, set aside. The awards made by the learned Umpire are
directed to be made rule of court. These appeals are allowed
accordingly. No costs.