Full Judgment Text
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Reserved on: 22 March, 2021
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Pronounced on: 26 March, 2021
+ W.P.(C) 7401/2017
SUNIL KUMAR NAGPAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Parmod Kumar Bhardwaj,
Adv. with Mr. Sunil Kumar Nagpal,
Petitioner in person
versus
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ORS .... Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajesh Sharma, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
% J U D G M E N T
1. Disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, who was
working as Chief Manager at the South Extension Branch of the
Respondent Bank (“the Bank” hereinafter), were initiated vide charge
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sheet dated 11 December, 2013 and an Addendum Memorandum
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dated 21 March, 2014. These proceeded to an inquiry report dated 7
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January, 2015 and culminated in an order dated 27 March, 2015 by
the Disciplinary Authority(“DA”) whereby the petitioner was
dismissed from service. The Petitioner’s appeal against this order, and
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revision therefrom, were dismissed vide orders dated 10 February,
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2016 and 7 January, 2017 respectively.
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2. The petitioner prays that the Inquiry Report dated 7 January,
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2015, order dated 27 March, 2015, order dated 10 February, 2016
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and order dated 7 January, 2017 be quashed and set aside.
Consequently, the petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus directing
reinstatement of the petitioner in service with consequential benefits
along with arrears and interest @18% per annum.
3. Alternatively, it is prayed that the respondents be directed to
impose any other suitable penalty apart from dismissal from service.
Facts
4. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Probationary Officer
at the Bank in 1984 and, in the month of June 2011, came to be posted
as Chief Manager at the South Extension branch of Bank.
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5. On 27 September, 2013, the petitioner was served a
Memorandum by the Zonal manager, Zonal office alleging acts of
omission and commission committed by him while discharging his
duties at the South Extension branch and at the Khan Market branch of
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the Bank, to which the petitioner replied vide letter dated 14 October
2013.
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6. Vide letter dated 22 October, 2013, the petitioner was
informed that his reply was not satisfactory and that disciplinary
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action was initiated against him. Further, vide Memo dated 26
October, 2013, the petitioner was placed under suspension, followed
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by the charge sheet dated 11 December, 2013 issued by the Senior
Regional Manager acting as the DA.
7. The charge-sheet proposed to hold a departmental enquiry
against the petitioner in regard to alleged acts of misconduct
committed by him as set out in 17 Articles of Charge. The petitioner
was directed to submit his written statement of defence within seven
days of the receipt of the charge-sheet.
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8. In continuation of the aforementioned charge-sheet dated 11
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December, 2013 (supra) , an Addendum dated 21 March 2014 was
also issued to the petitioner wherein 10 additional charges were added
to the existing Articles of Charge. The petitioner was directed to
submit a written statement of defence within 7 days of the receipt of
this Addendum.
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9. Thereafter, vide orders dated 29 March, 2014, the Inquiry
Authority (“IA”) and the Presenting Officer (“PO”) were appointed.
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10. Inquiry proceedings against the petitioner commenced on 6
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May, 2014, and were concluded on 25 November, 2014. Written
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briefs were submitted by the PO on 10 December, 2014 and the
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petitioner on 11 December, 2014, culminating in an Inquiry Report
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dated 7 January, 2015.
11. Out of the 17 charges which formed part of the Charge-sheet
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dated 11 December, 2013 ( supra ), the IA had held charges 1, 3, 6, 9
to 13 and 15 as proved and Charges 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16 and 17 as not
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proved, and out of the 10 charges which constituted part of the
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Addendum to Memorandum dated 21 March, 2014 (supra ), three
charges were held to be proved against the Petitioner.
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12. The Senior Regional Manager of the Bank, as DA, on 13/19
January, 2015, addressed a disagreement note to the petitioner
concurring with all the findings of the IA, except for Charge Nos. 2 ,4
and 17 which the IA had found not to have been proved against the
petitioner. The reasons for disagreement were stated in the letter, and
the petitioner was given an opportunity to submit its written
submissions within 7 days of receipt thereof. The inquiry report dated
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7 January, 2015 was annexed with the disagreement note.
13. Written submissions, in response to the aforementioned
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disagreement note were filed by the petitioner on 17 February, 2015
wherein the petitioner disputed the findings of the IA as being
erroneous qua the charges the IA had held to be proved against the
petitioner and also disputed the charges wherein the DA had differed
with the findings of the IA.
14. DA on observing the entire record of the enquiry proceedings
both oral as well as documentary and written briefs submitted by the
PO and petitioner before the IA, findings of IA and written
submissions submitted by Petitioner before the DA, vide order No.
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RO(South)/HRD/DAD/2014-15/933 dated 27 March, 2015 held
charges 1 to 4, 6, 7(partly proved), 9 to 13 and 15 to 17 and
Addendum charges 1, 2, 7, 9 to be proved and remaining charges not
to be proved.
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15. The DA, noting that the petitioner had misutilised his position
as branch head by carrying out reckless financing, violating bank
systems and procedures, acting in a manner which was unbecoming of
a bank employee and failing to take all possible steps to protect the
interests of the bank recorded the following observations:
“Looking to the nature and gravity of the charges proved
against the CSO and considering the facts, enquiry
proceedings, written briefs of PO, and CSO, findings of
enquiring authority and written submissions of CSO and
having regard to the acts of omission and commission
committed by the CSO wherein unethical, manipulative and
accommodative transactions have been done in the accounts
for concealment of correct status of the account, Five
Borrowal frauds have been perpetrated, as also the huge loss
of 12 crores, likely to be suffered by the bank on accounts of
lapses attributable to Sh. Nagpal. I observe that his
continuation in the bank is a threat to the organisation and the
staff working with him and these acts if not checked at this
moment will result in adverse consequences causing huge
monetary losses to the bank which is custodian of Public
Money…”
Having so observed, the DA came to impose the punishment, on the
petitioner, of “dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment” in terms of regulation 4(j) of Central bank of
India Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976
(“the Regulations”, hereinafter), further directing that the petitioner
would “not be entitled for any increment falling due during the period
of suspension and for the difference between the full wages and
subsistence allowance and any other privileges for the period of
suspension”, or to “any type of leave for the suspension period.”
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16. Against the aforementioned order dated 27 March, 2015
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( supra ), the petitioner preferred an appeal on 10 May, 2015 which
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was dismissed vide order dated 10 February, 2016 with the following
observations:
(i) The principles of natural justice have been observed by
the IA. Every opportunity had been provided to him to rebut the
charges levelled against him, to cross examine the bank’s
witnesses and to produce witnesses/evidences in his own
defence which was also stated to have been availed by the
petitioner. It was also observed that the petitioner was also
given the opportunity to defend his case through his
representative, which, too, he availed.
(ii) The enquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance
with the regulations of Central Bank of India Officer Employees
(Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (“the Regulations”,
hereinafter).
(iii) All points raised by the petitioner in appeal were already
dealt with and most of the objections raised by the petitioner
were mere repetitions of objections raised in his submissions
against the findings of the IA which had already been taken care
of and dealt in the final orders issued in this regard.
(iv) The plea, of the petitioner, that the DA had erroneously
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proceeded only against the petitioner, who was the
recommending authority, without taking action against the
sanctioning authorities, the DA held that staff accountability
was fixed in the bank as per well-set guidelines and well-
established policy framed by their central office and
disciplinary action is initiated against the persons who are found
accountable for the lapses/ misconduct. It was noted that in the
present case also accountability was fixed on recommending
officials, as well as other staff and accordingly disciplinary
action was initiated against them. Simply alleging that the DA
has intentionally shifted all onus on the petitioner was stated to
not serve any purpose as a number of bank officials of different
levels were said to be involved in staff accountability exercise.
It was observed that disciplinary action proceedings are initiated
only after completion of such well-defined exercise and proper
identification of officials accountable for the slippage of
accounts to NPA or fraud etc.
(v) The contention, of the petitioner, that some of the
accounts had become NPAs only after his transfer from the
branch, which was attributable to poor follow up by the
petitioner’s successors, the DA observed that, as per the
guidelines of the Bank, if the account became a NPA only due
to poor monitoring and follow-up of the branch officials,
responsibility would not attach to the sanctioning official, but,
on the other hand, if the account had become NPA due to
weaknesses/lacunas occurred at the time of appraisals/sanctions,
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then the recommending/sanctioning authorities would be held
responsible. In the case of the petitioner, the DA held that the
charges against the petitioner included five fraud accounts
involving large sums of money, in respect of which frauds were
perpetrated owing to lapses on the part of the petitioner.
(vi) On the objection of the petitioner that sufficient
opportunity in the manner of providing documents of defence
was not granted to him, the appellate authority observed that on
going through the inquiry proceedings, that all reasonable
opportunities were provided to the petitioner to defend his case.
It was, furthermore, added that the impartiality of the
departmental enquiry was evident as the IA had directed the PO
for providing the demanded documents which were very large
in number to the petitioner for defending his case.
(vii) In response to the objection raised by the petitioner that
double punishments were awarded to him for the same alleged
offence, the Appellate Authority stated that after going through
the entire proceedings of the Departmental enquiry, it observed
that in four borrowal accounts, a minuscule part of the charge
was regarding unethical entries in these accounts, while Charge
No. 13 exclusively dealt in unethical transactions which
included of 23 such transactions. It was observed, that this
charge of unethical transactions was serious in nature and it was
duly established that these unethical transactions were carried
out at the behest of the petitioner for concealment of factual
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status of accounts which were otherwise NPA.
However, noting that these lapses were only a minuscule part of
the charge and as such could have no bearing on the essence of
the charges and the resultant penalty.
(viii) On the objection of the petitioner as to how he could have
benefited from these alleged unethical transactions and on the
plea that the Bank staff and supervisory staff had carried out
these transactions on their own at the behest of borrowers and
that there was no loss to the bank, the Appellate Authority held
the plea of the petitioner to be not acceptable. It was stated that
as a branch head, the petitioner had to face the consequences of
the increased NPA and so the net impact of the fraudulent
entries would check the escalation of NPA of the branch and
thereby ease his position. It was moreover observed that one
could not digest the logic that at the behest of the borrowers,
junior staff of the branch were effecting these alleged unethical
transactions without bringing it to the notice of the petitioner.
Noting that the petitioner was the branch head and thus the
custodian of the branch, It was observed that it was the
petitioner’s paramount duty to check any such misdeeds in the
branch, however, the petitioner had failed to carry out his duties
diligently and rather himself had indulged in such malpractices
as it was only the petitioner being the branch head who could
have benefited from these transactions for concealment of NPA
status of the account.
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(ix) It was also stated that the plea of increasing/decreasing
the limit as being done by the junior staff in the borrowal
accounts without taking the petitioner into confidence was not
tenable. It was stated that the junior staff would not decrease or
increase the limit of the borrower on their own without bringing
the same to the knowledge of the branch head. It was stated that
in fact the petitioner had manipulated the CBS system by
increasing/decreasing the sanctioned limits to provide benefit to
the customer and accommodate them for reasons best known to
the petitioner which reflected on his doubtful integrity, ulterior
motives and malafide intentions.
(x) On the plea of the petitioner that no reckless advances
were made by him and that he was only achieving the target set
by the regional office in a very consistent manner from month
to month basis, it was observed that from the factual position of
the branch, it was evident that there was a sudden burst of NPA
as well as reporting of fraud in the borrower accounts of the
branch which were financed during the petitioner’s stay at the
branch. This was stated to very much indicate that the advances
were made in a reckless manner.
(xi) Regarding the award of heavy punishment against the
petitioner, it was noted that the punishment should be
commensurate with the nature and gravity of lapses/misconduct
committed by the erring official. Moreover, the total amount of
loss to be borne by the Bank due to misconduct of the airing
officials was also a major factor for deciding the quantum of
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penalty/punishment.
17. In light of the observations as stated hereinabove, the Appellate
Authority, dismissed the appeal and held the consolidated penalty as
imposed by the DA to be commensurate with the gravity of the proven
charges.
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18. Against the order dated 10 February 2016 ( supra ), the
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petitioner filed a review petition on 31 March 2016, the crux of
which came to be noted in the order of dismissal of the review petition
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dated 7 January, 2017 in the following terms:
“The crux of the subject review petition dated 31-3-2016
submitted by Mr. Nagpal is as under :-
• The DA has intentionally evaded to take cognizance of
the responsibilities of recommending officers in case of the
reported fraud cases and shifted all onus to him.
• The DA has awarded the punishments in a biased
manner, as, no enquiry has been initiated against any of the
authorities of RLCC with an intention to target him as a
scapegoat.
• There was no concealment of facts on his part, as,
availing multiple finance was from the borrowers side.
• Enquiry held against the principles of natural justice.
• Enquiry held without having sufficient evidence
brought on record.”
19. The Reviewing Authority dismissed the Review Petition,
observing that review, under Regulation 18 of the Regulations, was
possible only where the charged officer placed new material or
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evidence before the Reviewing Authority. The petitioner, it was held,
had not done so; ergo no case for review had been made out. The
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Reviewing Authority, therefore, confirmed the order, dated 27
March, 2015, of the DA, dismissing the petitioner from service.
20. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner approached this
Court.
21. Owing to considerable time having passed since judgement was
initially reserved in this matter, learned Counsel for the parties were
permitted to re-argue the matter. Fresh written submissions were also
filed, by learned Counsel for the petitioner. Arguments were re-heard
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on 22 March, 2021, and judgement was reserved, for pronouncement
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today, i.e. on 26 March, 2021.
Rival Submissions
22. Arguing for the petitioner, Mr Ankur Chhibber contended thus:
(i) The petitioner had, behind him, 30 years of meritorious
and blemishless service, all of which were wiped away by the
impugned decision to dismiss him from service.
(ii) The manner in which the DA had chosen to disagree with
the findings of the IA and, thereafter, to punish the petitioner,
were unknown to law. The IA had held Articles 1, 3, 6, 9 to 13
and 15 of the Articles of Charge against the petitioner to be
proved and Articles 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16 and 17 not to be proved.
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Of these, the disagreement note expressed disagreement qua the
findings of the IA in respect of Articles 2, 4 and 17. The
disagreement note, however, was issued in violation of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v.
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Kunj Behari Misra , as they reflected a pre-determined intent,
of the DA, to hold against the petitioner on the said charges.
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Kunj Behari Misra had also been followed, by this Court, in
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Rajpal Singh v U.O.I. This, according to Mr Chhibber, was
fatal. In juxtaposition, Mr Chhibber also invited my attention to
the fact that, of all the Articles of Charge against him, the DA
found only Charges 2, 3, 4, 9 and 13 sufficient to warrant
dismissal or removal from service. At the conclusion of the
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order dated 27 March, 2015, the DA proceeded to award a
“consolidated penalty”. In other words, submits Mr Chhibber,
even as per the DA, dismissal from service was justified only in
respect of Articles 2, 3, 4, 9 and 13, seen together . Once, the
decision qua Articles 2 and 4 stood vitiated on account of the
manner in which the DA had chosen to disagree with the
findings of the IA in respect thereof, Mr. Chhibber would
submit that the “consolidated penalty”, too, could not sustain.
At the very least, therefore, he submits, the DA ought to be
directed to reconsider the matter from the stage of issuance of
the disagreement note.
(iii) Besides, such awarding of a “charge by charge”
punishment was unknown to the law, and contrary to the
1
(1998) 7 SCC 84
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Regulations.
(iv) No criminal intent having been imputed to the petitioner,
he ought not to have been awarded the extreme punishment of
dismissal from service. The punishment awarded to the
petitioner was, therefore, shockingly disproportionate to the
charges against him. Reliance was placed, in this context, on
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Staff Accountability Circular dated 25 February, 2012, which
envisaged taking of risks as an integral part of the business in
banking institutions, and contemplated disciplinary action only
against staff members who were guilty of misconduct or moral
turpitude, or who were found working against the interests of
the bank.
(v) The petitioner alone could not be held liable for the
recommending and sanctioning of the loans. The petitioner had
been targeted only to save the Sanctioning Authority.
(vi) At the very least, therefore, a case for reducing the
quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner was made out.
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During the course of arguments on 22 March, 2021, learned Counsel
advanced a further submission, not to be found either in the
contentions advanced before the authorities below, or in the writ
petition or in the written submissions filed before this Court, that, in
violation of Regulation 4 of the Regulations, the petitioner had not
been afforded a second opportunity of hearing before being awarded
2
2016 SCC OnLine Del 1586
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the punishment of dismissal from service.
23. Beyond the extent suggested by the above submissions, learned
Counsel for the petitioner did not, fairly, call upon the Court to
review, on merits, the findings of the authorities below.
24. In response, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted
thus:
(i) No violation of the principles of natural justice could be
said to have been occasioned in the present case. Reliance was
placed, in this context, on Oriental Bank of Commerce v R. K.
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Uppal .
(ii) The High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, did not sit as a court of appeal,
over the decisions of the authorities below, taken in the
disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent employee.
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(iii) Apropos the disagreement note dated 13/19 January,
2015, the petitioner had filed a detailed response, running into
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93 pages, on 17 February, 2015, meeting the Inquiry Report
and the disagreement note charge by charge. In view thereof,
no fatal infirmity could be said to exist, merely because of the
manner in which the disagreement note was worded.
(iv) The charges against the petitioner being admittedly
serious in nature, the punishment of dismissal could not be
3
2011 (10) SCR 218
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regarded as disproportionate in any manner.
(v) Referring to the authorities as aforementioned, the
Respondent-Bank contended that the petitioner was given
adequate opportunity to give submissions to the note of
disagreement as well as Inquiry Report and the petitioner, it is
contended, wilfully did not file the written submissions, which,
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as is pointed out, runs into 93 pages, filed by him on 17
February, 2015 in reply to the disagreement note by the DA
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dated 13/19 January, 2015.
Reliance was placed, by learned Counsel for the respondent, on the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy General Manager v.
4
Ajai Kumar Srivastava .
25. Arguing in rejoinder, learned Counsel for the petitioner
submitted that, even if the Regulations did not provide for grant of
personal hearing by the appellate authority, this requirement had to be
read into the Regulations, to ensure compliance with the principles of
natural justice. He invited my attention to the judgement of this Court
5
in R. R. Peri v. Oriental Bank of Commerce which, according to
him, involved near identical facts, and in which this Court had reduced
the punishment awarded to the charged officer. He exhorted on this
Court to adopt a similar approach in the present case.
4
(2021) 2 SCC 212
5
MANU/DE/2551/2013
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Analysis and Conclusions
26. Of the Articles of Charge contained in the charge-sheet dated
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11 December, 2013, the IA held Articles 1, 3, 6, 9 to 13 and 15 to be
proved, and Articles 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 16 and 17 not to be proved. The
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disagreement note, dated 13 /19 January, 2015 held Articles No. 2, 4
and 17 to be proved. The manner in which the DA chose to word the
disagreement note, qua these Articles of Charge, is unambiguous. It is
clear that, qua these Articles of Charge, the DA had made up his mind,
and that, therefore, all further proceedings, in respect thereof, stand
1
completely vitiated. The law, in this regard, in Kunj Behari Misra , is
clear and unexceptionable. The disagreement note has necessarily to
be tentative in nature, and any indication that the DA had decided ,
even before the charged officer had an opportunity to respond in that
regard, that the charges stood proved, vitiates the exercise of
disagreement in its entirety. The submission, by the petitioner, of a
93-page response thereto, and the consideration thereof by the DA,
even if exhaustive, cannot cure this defect, for the simple reason that,
once the DA had, on record, arrived at a final decision qua the Articles
of Charge in respect of which he disagreed with the IA, all subsequent
proceedings in respect thereof stood reduced to a mere formality.
27. In my view, therefore, the finding that Articles 2, 4 and 17 of
the Articles of Charge stood proved cannot sustain the scrutiny of law.
28. The final conclusion of the DA, in the order of punishment,
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therefore, can survive only in respect of the remaining Articles of
Charge. Of these, the DA found Articles 1, 3, 6, 10 to 13, 15 and 16
of the initial charge sheet, and Articles 1, 2, 7 and 9 of the Addendum,
to be proved.
29. The DA resorted to a somewhat unusual practice of expressing
his opinion regarding the punishment which each proved Article of
Charge would entail, but, inasmuch as he finally awarded punishment
on a cumulative view of the proved Articles of Charge, this, in my
view, is not a fatal infirmity.
30. Qua these Articles of Charge which the DA found proved, he
found the petitioner to be liable to punished with
(i) removal from service, in respect of Articles 1,
(ii) dismissal from service, in respect of Article 3 and 13,
(iii) reduction of pay by four stages, in respect of Article 6, 10
to 12 and 16, and Addendum Charges 1, 2, 7 and 9, and
(iv) reduction in pay by five stages, in respect of Article 15.
31. As such, of the Articles of Charge which the DA found proved
against the petitioner (apart from Articles 2, 4 and 17), “dismissal
from service” was found to be a suitable punishment only in respect of
Articles 3 and 13.
32. Articles 3 and 13 of the Articles of Charge against the petitioner
are, however, unquestionably serious in nature. The findings of the
DA, in respect thereof, read thus:
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“Charge 3
Sehej Enterprises: Centrade A/c No. 3175711945:
Sh. Nagpal sanctioned Overdraft limit of Rs. 150.00 lacs
under Centrade Scheme on 14.4.2012 to M/s Sehej
Enterprises against Property bearing no. A-70 (old No. 16-C,
Village NangliJalib, now known as Ganesh Nagar, Block-A,
New Delhi. While sanctioning the loan he committed
following acts of Omission and Commission:
i. He failed to observe due-diligence in the
account.
ii. He failed to conduct discrete market enquiries
about the credentials of the borrowers and
collateral securities accepted for mortgage. It
was subsequently revealed that party has
defrauded the bank by depositing
fake/fabricated title deeds. PNB have informed
that the above party had availed loan against
security of same property mortgaged with us.
iii. He failed to ensure Comparison of Certified
copies of title deed with the original so to check
the genuineness. The Title deeds held with the
Bank are not genuine.
iv. He failed to conduct Independent inspection
and local enquiry of property mortgaged with
us. It has facilitated the party to defraud the
bank by depositing fake title deeds.
v. He failed to generate CIBIL commercial Report
of this Borrower for verification. This ClBIL
report clearly indicates a loan of Rs.3.00 crores.
The CIBIL report is not generated from the
Branch id.
vi. He failed to ensure proper and independent
valuation of property as the same has got done
by only one valuer.
vii. He failed to obtain Closure certificate/statement
regarding closure of A/C with Allahabad Bank.
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viii. He failed to conduct renewal of account,
renewal of Insurance of property and ensure
ITR Verification for last 3 years.
ix. A/C is out of order since 31.05.2013. However,
Sh. Nagpal has shown it as regular by
manipulating transfer of Rs. 10000.00 from OD
A/C Vikas Collection on 29.6.2013 and
reversing the same on 01.07.2013.
The borrower has availed multiple Finance from different
Banks by concealment of Facts and perpetrated fraud On the
bank as the title deeds deposited with the bank to constitute
security are not genuine. The bank is likely to suffer financial
loss of Rs.l57.43Lacs + Interest.
IA in her findings and after discussion on the exhibits and
arguments of both the sides in detail has held the Charge as
proved.
CSOE in his written submissions has referred to various
exhibits and deposition of MW-3 in reply to various questions
has held the charge as not proved.
PO has put forth documents MEx-239/1 to 239/7, MEX-240/l
to 240/4, MEX-241/1 to 241/2, DEX-843/1 to 843/5, MEX-
243/2, MEX-245. HEX.246/1 to 246/3, DEX.819/1 to 819/11,
DEX-823, DEX-833/l, MEX-249/1 to 249/10, MEX-425,
MEX-251/1, MEX-252/1 and MEX-252/2, MEX-247/1 to
247/7, DEX-887/10,DEX-850/l and 850/2 and has examined
MW-3 vide various questions at EPP-191 and EPP-227.
After examining all the documentary and oral evidences in
respect of this charge, I agree with the views of IA and find
that CSOE failed to perform his duties diligently and in
contravention of Bank norms which resulted in perpetration of
this Fraud, thus, causing substantial loss to the Bank. Keeping
in view the above, I concur with the findings of IA and hold
the charge as “PROVED”
The above acts committed by Sh. Nagpal are in contravention
of Central Office guidelines. Thus due to his above lapses, the
fraud has been perpetrated and recovery is not forthcoming in
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this account.
I find that had the CSOE been vigilant and observed due
diligence while sanctioning this account, the borrower could
not have perpetrated fraudulent acts with the Bank thus
causing huge financial loss of Rs. 157.43 lacs+ Interest +
Charges.
As such Shri S.K. Nagpal acted in a manner which is
unbecoming of an officer employee and did not take all
possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank
and did not discharge his duties with utmost integrity,
honesty, devotion and diligence and is charged under
Regulation 3 (1) and 3(3) read with Regulation 24 of Central
Bank of India Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations,
1976, attracting penalty under Regulation ‘4’ of Central Bank
of India Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal)
Regulations 1976, as amended from time to time.
The above acts tantamount to gross misconduct with ulterior
motives and looking to the Fraud perpetrated in the account
and gravity of the charge and huge loss of Rs. 157.43 lacs +
interest, I award the following penalty to CSO in respect of
this charge:
Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment in terms of Regulation 4(j) of Central
Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal)
Regulations, 1976, amended up to date.”
“Charge No. 13:
Unethical Transactions:
Sh. Nagpal failed to furnish correct status of borrowal
accounts. He Concealed following NPA accounts by
Transferring the amount from other accounts to the Probable
NPA accounts and reversing the same after one or two days.
The account of Vikas Collection was used as a conduit and
was in no away related to the business of the borrower.
23 such transactions have been done. One such transaction is
discussed in detail as under to describe the modus-operandi.
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The other 21 identical manipulative and accommodative
transactions are given in Annexure A.
Amount Credited from OD Vikas collection A/c No.
3064937301 to A/C no. 3154712353 of Balaji Metals on
29.11.2012 and reversed on 30.11.2012.
1.29.11.2012 Rs.30,000/- to A/C No.3154712353 Balaji
Metal Works reversed on 30.11.2012.
On 29.11.2012 a sum of Rs. 30000/- was transferred from OD
account no. 30644937301 of M/s Vikas Collection to A/c No.
3154712353 of M/s Balaji Metals as the same was on verge of
slippage to NPA and that any credit would be treated as
repayment by the CBS system.
Hence this credit prevented slippage of this account and this
account was shown as PA by the system. As the account was
upgraded by system and there purpose was over the amount of
Rs. 30000/- was reversed on 30.11.2012.
This entire transaction was carried out vide contra Vouchers
without obtaining any mandate from the account holders. No
mandate of the party whose account has been debited is on
record. Although these entries were posted and authorised by
other staff members, but Sh. Nagpal being the Branch head
failed to monitor these transactions which were manipulative,
accommodative and unethical in nature.
The details of other 21 identical manipulative and
accommodative transactions are given in Annexure-A
attached herewith.
Debit and Credit entries in the same account were made
through batch entry which are as under:-
1. 27.08.2012 Rs.25,000.00 in ODBD A/C No. 3070480550.
2. 30.04.2013 Rs.46,000.00 in OD cent mortgage A/C No.
3135835185 Sanjeev Narang.
3. 31.05.2013 Rs.10,000.00 in OD cent mortgage A/C No.
3135835185 Sanjeev Narang
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4. 09.07.2013 Rs.26,000.00 in OD cent mortgage A/C No.
3089986305 Biram Bati
5. 26.03.2013 Rs.2,75,000.00 in OD cent mortgage A/C No.
3181092266 of Vivek Gupta
On account of these manipulative transactions, Sh. Nagpal
concealed the correct position of accounts which were
otherwise NPA. The accounts are irregular and are likely to
turn into NPAs. The Bank is likely to suffer huge financial
loss, which is prejudicial to the interest of the Bank.
IA in her findings and after discussion on the exhibits and
arguments of both the sides in detail has held the Charge as
proved .
CSO in his written submissions has Referred to deposition of
MW-2 in reply to Q No.54 at EPP-173, deposition of MW-3
vide reply to Q No.-12 at EPP-180and examination of MW-3
vide Q No. 2,3 at EPP-203 and Q No,250 at EPP-225.
After examination of documents marked as MEX
301/1,MEX-415,MEX-416, MEX-407 DEX-252/2 to 252/3,
MEX-407,MEX-411,412,413,414,415,416,417,MEX-418/1 to
418/2 DEX- 887/15 and examination of MW-2 vide various
questions at EPP-166,167,168,172,173,180,225. It is duly
substantiated that above referred transactions and other 21
identical manipulative and accommodative transactions were
done as per details in Annexure-A. These entries were done to
conceal the correct position of the accounts which otherwise
were NPA.
On perusal of Enquiry proceedings it is established that there
was no mandate from respective account holders for effecting
these transfers from their accounts and that these entries were
passed on verbal instructions of CSO which is duly testified
by MW-3 during cross examination vide Q No. 11 appearing
on EPP-180 and reply to Q No,256 appearing on EPP-255.
It is observed that the only person to benefit from these
manipulative entries was CSO as such an action would not
have benefitted either MW-2 the maker and MW-3 the
checker Of these transactions. These entries resulted in
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concealment of correct status of the accounts which otherwise
were NPA.
After re-examining all the documentary and oral evidences in
respect .of this charge it is clearly established that these
manipulative transactions were carried out at the instance of
Sh. Nagpal in order conceal the correct position of accounts
which were Otherwise NPA. These accounts were irregular
and were likely to slip in to NPA category. From these
manipulative and; accommodative transactions it is
established that CSO had malafide intentions with ulterior
motives which is unbecoming of an Officer.
Thus Shri S K. Nagpal acted in a manner which is
unbecoming of an officer employee and did not take all
possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank
and did not discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty
devotion and diligence and is charged under Regulation 3(1)
and 3(3) read with Regulation 24 of Central Bank of India
Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations,1976, attracting
penalty under Regulation ‘4’ of Central Bank of India Officer
Employees" (Discipline 8t Appeal) Regulations 1976 as
amended from time to time.
Keeping in view the above, I concur with the findings of IA
and hold the charge as “PROVED” beyond doubt and
considering the malafide intention and gravity of this charge, I
award the penalty as under:
Dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for
future employment in terms of Regulation 4(j) of Central
Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal)
Regulations, 1976, amended up to date.”
33. In this context, I find the reliance, by Mr. Rajesh Kumar, on the
4
judgement in Ajai Kumar Srivastava to be apt. The respondent
before the Supreme Court, in that case, too, was a bank employee, in
respect of whom serious charges, albeit with allegations of mala fides ,
were levelled, in effecting bank transactions including, inter alia ,
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advancing of loans. The IA found Article 1 of the Articles of Charge
not to be proved, and Articles 2 to 7 to be proved. The DA disagreed
with the IA in respect of Article 1. A disagreement note was issued to
the respondent, along with a copy of the Inquiry Report. The DA held
all Articles of Charge to have been proved, and dismissed the
respondent from service. On the appeal, therefrom, also failing, the
respondent approached the High Court, which set aside the order of
the DA and the appellate authority as being unreasoned. The Bank
appealed to the Supreme Court. Holding, inter alia , that the decisions
of the disciplinary and the appellate authority were detailed and
reasoned, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of the Bank . Paras
22 to 28 of the judgment of the Supreme Court read thus:
| “22. The power of judicial review in the matters of | |
|---|---|
| disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate | |
| authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article | |
| 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is | |
| circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or | |
| procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of | |
| principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication | |
| of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been | |
| earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. | |
| Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 and later in State of | |
| T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 and further | |
| examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. | |
| Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 wherein it | |
| has been held as under: (B.C. Chaturvedi6 case, SCC pp. 759- | |
| 60, para 13) | |
| “13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of | |
| facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate | |
| authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the | |
| evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary | |
| enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings | |
| on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of | |
| evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted |
6
(1995) 6 SCC 749
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| 23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision | |
|---|---|
| of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC | |
| 768 and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court | |
| in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471. |
| 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of | |
|---|---|
| the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision- | |
| making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is | |
| to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of | |
| conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the | |
| proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, | |
| inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of | |
| the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where | |
| the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority | |
| is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such | |
| as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the | |
| conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by | |
| the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent | |
| error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a | |
| writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of | |
| judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of | |
| correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a | |
| matter of fact. |
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| findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the | |
|---|---|
| disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for | |
| disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to | |
| the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence | |
| available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to | |
| remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. |
| 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable | |
|---|---|
| to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only | |
| requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent | |
| must be established by such evidence acting upon which a | |
| reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may | |
| arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against | |
| the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or | |
| surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the | |
| departmental enquiry proceedings. |
| 28. The constitutional court while exercising its | |
|---|---|
| jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 | |
| of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of | |
| fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except | |
| in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no | |
| evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that | |
| no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have | |
| arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence | |
| to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental | |
| authority, the same has to be sustained.” |
IA regarding Article 1, the DA had not given any reasons. In this
regard, the Supreme Court observed thus:
“ 33. The submission which was made in regard to the note
of disagreement not being served upon the respondent
delinquent as to Charge 1 is concerned, this Court does find
substance to hold that the disciplinary authority on receiving
the report of enquiry, if was not in agreement with the finding
recorded by the enquiry officer, was under an obligation to
record its reasons of disagreement and call upon the
delinquent for his explanation in the first place before
recording his finding of guilt and undisputedly the procedure
as prescribed by law was not followed and that has caused
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| prejudice to the respondent and indeed it was in violation of | |
|---|---|
| the principles of natural justice. We are of the considered | |
| view that so far as the finding of guilt recorded by the | |
| disciplinary authority in reference to Charge 1 is concerned, | |
| that could not be held to be justified in holding him guilty. |
| 34. But this may not detain us any further for the reason | |
|---|---|
| that Charge 1 in reference to which the finding recorded by | |
| the enquiry officer has been overturned by the disciplinary | |
| authority is severable from the other charges (Charges 2-7) | |
| levelled against the respondent which were found proved by | |
| the enquiry officer and the finding of fact was confirmed by | |
| the disciplinary/appellate authority after meeting out | |
| objections raised by the respondent delinquent in his written | |
| brief furnished at different stages. |
| 35. If the order of dismissal was based on the findings of | ||
|---|---|---|
| Charge 1 alone, it would have been possible for the court to | ||
| declare the order of dismissal illegal but on the finding of | ||
| guilt being recorded by the enquiry officer in his report in | ||
| reference to Charges 2-7 and confirmed by the | ||
| disciplinary/appellate authority was not liable to be interfered | ||
| with and those findings established the guilt of grave | ||
| delinquency which, in our view, was an apparent error being | ||
| committed by the High Court while interfering with the order | ||
| of penalty of dismissal inflicted upon the respondent | ||
| employee. | ||
| 36. It is supported by the judgment of the Constitution | ||
| Bench of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan | ||
| Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 wherein it has been observed | ||
| as under: (AIR pp. 785-86, para 9) | ||
| “9. The High Court has held [Bidya Bhushan | ||
| Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, 1959 SCC OnLine Ori | ||
| 43] that there was evidence to support the findings on | ||
| Heads (c) and (d) of Charge (1) and on Charge (2). In | ||
| respect of Charge 1(b) the respondent was acquitted by | ||
| the Tribunal and it did not fall to be considered by the | ||
| Governor. In respect of Charges 1(a) and 1(e) in the | ||
| view of the High Court ‘the rules of natural justice had | ||
| not been observed’. The recommendation of the | ||
| Tribunal was undoubtedly founded on its findings on | ||
| Charges 1(a), 1(e), 1(c), 1(d) and Charge (2). The High |
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| 37. This was further considered by this Court in Binny | |
|---|---|
| Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 3 SCC 806 as under: (SCC p. 813, | |
| para 9) | |
| “9. … It was urged that the Court should not have | |
| assumed that the General Manager would have | |
| inflicted the punishment of dismissal solely on the | |
| basis of the second charge and consequently the | |
| punishment should not be sustained if it was held that | |
| one of the two charges on the basis of which it was | |
| imposed was unsustainable. This was rejected | |
| following the decision in State of | |
| Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra , AIR 1963 SC | |
| 779 , wherein it was said that if an order in an enquiry | |
| under Article 311 can be supported on any finding as | |
| substantial misdemeanour for which punishment |
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| 38. Yet again, in Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) | |
|---|---|
| 2 SCC 868 , this Court held: (SCC p. 873, para 19) | |
| “19. In view of this, the deficiency or reference to | |
| some irrelevant matters in the order of the | |
| Commissioner, had not prejudiced the decision of the | |
| case on merits either at the appellate or revisional | |
| stage. There is authority for the proposition that where | |
| the order of a domestic tribunal makes reference to | |
| several grounds, some relevant and existent, and others | |
| irrelevant and non-existent, the order will be sustained | |
| if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have | |
| passed the order on the basis of the relevant and | |
| existing grounds, and the exclusion of irrelevant or | |
| non-existing grounds could not have affected the | |
| ultimate decision (see State of | |
| Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC | |
| 779).” |
| 39. The Constitution Bench has clearly laid down that even | |
|---|---|
| after the charges which have been proved, justify imposition | |
| of penalty, the court may not exercise its power of judicial | |
| review.” |
35. The judgment of the Supreme Court concludes with the
following instructive words, regarding the conduct of bank employees:
“ 42. Before we conclude, we need to emphasise that in
banking business absolute devotion, integrity and honesty is a
sine qua non for every bank employee. It requires the
employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and he
deals with money of the depositors and the customers and if it
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| is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would | |
|---|---|
| be impaired. It is for this additional reason, we are of the | |
| opinion that the High Court has committed an apparent error | |
| in setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent dated | |
| 24-7-1999 confirmed in departmental appeal by order dated | |
| 15-11-1999.” |
36. Apropos the need for a greater degree of circumspection, in
conducting of affairs by bank employees, I have had occasion to
7
observe, in Ishwar Pal Singh v. Punjab National Bank , thus:
“33. In respect of delinquent bank employees, a distinct
jurisprudence has developed, which may be reflected in the
following passages, from Chairman and Managing Director,
United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364 ,
Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583 and State
Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212 :
“A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards
of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of
the depositors and the customers. Every
officer/employee of the bank is required to take all
possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is
unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and
discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this
Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69
: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to
say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case,
when the officer/employee acted without authority.
The very discipline of an organization more
particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its
officers and officers acting and operating within their
allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by
itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The
charges against the employee were not casual in nature
and were serious.”
7
MANU/DE/0575/2020
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8
( P.C. Kakkar , para 14)
“As noted above, the employee accepted that there was
some lapse on his part but he pleaded lack of criminal
intent. A bank employee deals with public money. The
nature of his work demands vigilance with the inbuilt
requirement to act carefully. Any carelessness invites
action.”
9
( Lalit Popli , para 20)
“Confronted with the facts and the position of law,
learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
leniency may be shown to the respondent having
regard to long years of service rendered by the
respondent to the Bank. We are unable to countenance
such submission. As already said, the respondent being
a bank officer holds a position of trust where honesty
and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning
and it would not be proper to deal with the matter
leniently. The respondent was a Manager of the Bank
and it needs to be emphasised that in the banking
business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and
honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee
and in particular the bank officer so that the confidence
of the public/depositors is not impaired. It is for this
reason that when a bank officer commits misconduct,
as in the present case, for his personal ends and against
the interest of the bank and the depositors, he must be
dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to be
dealt with leniently."
10
( Ramesh Dinkar Punde , para 21)
34. On the aspect of susceptibility, to disciplinary
proceedings, to attack in judicial review, on the ground of
violation of the principles of natural justice, whether
contained in the applicable statutory provisions, or at common
law, a caveat has been entered, by a line of authorities of the
Supreme Court, the most well-known of which is, probably,
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] ,
which held that perceived infraction of the principles of
natural justice could be vitiate disciplinary proceedings only
8
(2003) 4 SCC 364
9
(2003) 3 SCC 583
10
(2006) 7 SCC 212
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if, as a consequence of such infraction, prejudice was shown
to have resulted to the delinquent officer. Helpfully, for all of
whom Article 141 of the Constitution of India enjoins the
duty to faithfully follow the law laid down by the Supreme
11
Court, State Bank of Patiala neatly sets out, in para 33 (of
the report), the principles enunciated therein, thus (even while
clarifying that the said principles were not meant to be
exhaustive):
“(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
provisions governing such enquiries should not be set
aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should
enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a
substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in
character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be
complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory
of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would
not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural
provision, the position is this: procedural provisions
are generally meant for affording a reasonable and
adequate opportunity to the delinquent
officer/employee. They are, generally speaking,
conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every
procedural provision cannot be said to automatically
vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases
falling under -- "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no
hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of
procedural provision should be examined from the
point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation
has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in
defending himself properly and effectively. If it is
found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate
orders have to be made to repair and remedy the
prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the
order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to
have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference
11
(1996) 3 SCC 364
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is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered
that there may be certain procedural provisions which
are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by
itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on
proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the
body of the judgment, take a case where there is a
provision expressly providing that after the evidence of
the employer/government is over, the employee shall
be given an opportunity to lead defence in his
evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does
not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent
officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-
evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called
for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of
prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair
hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect
can also be looked at from the point of view of
directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so
inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is
only another way of looking at the same aspect as is
dealt with herein and not a different or distinct
principle.
(4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is
not of a mandatory character, the complaint of
violation has to be examined from the standpoint of
substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order
passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside
only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to
the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision,
which is of a mandatory character, it has to be
ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the
interest of the person proceeded against or in public
interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be
seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said
requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is
found to have waived it, then the order of punishment
cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation.
If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent
officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision
could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal
should make appropriate directions (include the setting
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aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the
approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B.
Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 72 . The ultimate test is
always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of
fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only
obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice
-- or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held
to be implied by the very nature and impact of the
order/action -- the Court or the Tribunal should make a
distinction between a total violation of natural justice
(rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of
the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment.
In other words, a distinction must be made between
"no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e.,
between "no notice 'V' no hearing" and "no fair
hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed
would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or
a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally,
liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take
proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance
with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the
latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule
of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the
standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court
or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the
circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or
did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made
shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is
made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in
the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf
are laid down elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem
(the primary principle of natural justice) the
Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said
rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that
there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which
should guide them in applying the rule to varying
situations that arise before them.
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(7) There may be situations where the interests of
State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the
rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the
Court may have to balance public/State interest with
the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an
appropriate decision."
11
35. State Bank of Patiala continues to be followed, till
as late as Manisha Jaiprakash v. U.O.I. (2019) 10 SCC 115 ”
In the same decision, following various decisions of the Supreme
Court, it was held, in paras 29 to 32, thus:
“29. It would be appropriate, at the outset, to analyse the
scope of interference, by a writ Court exercising powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with disciplinary
proceedings, and the findings returned therein, or punishment
imposed as a consequence thereof.
30. There are authorities galore, which expound on the
scope of interference, by writ courts, with disciplinary
proceedings, and orders of punishment, passed by disciplinary
authorities/appellate authorities. We need search no further
than the recent decision, of the Supreme Court in State of
Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj (2020) 3 SCC 423 , which
encapsulates, by reference to its earlier decisions in State of
Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Ra o AIR 1963 SC 1723,
B.C. Chaturvedi v. U.O.I. (1995) 6 SCC 749, U.O.I. v. H.C.
Goel (1964) 4 SCR 781, High Court of Judicature at
Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil (2000) 1
SCC 416, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584, U.O.I. v. G. Gunayuthan (1997)
7 SCC 463, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana (1999)
5 SCC 762 and U.O.I. v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 ,
practically all the relevant indicia, which govern the exercise
of the power of judicial review, by writ courts, in such cases.
Paras 7 to 11, 13 and 14 of the report in N. Gangaraj deserve
to be reproduced, in extenso, thus:
“7. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High
Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial
review is confined to the decision-making process. The
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power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an
appellate authority.
8. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama
12
Rao , a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that
the High Court is not a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a departmental
enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held
as under:
“7. The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution
is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant: it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court
in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to
review the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence....”
8
9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , again, a
three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of
judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The
12
AIR 1963 SC 1723
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Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not
act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings
on the evidence. It was held as under:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial review is
meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion
which the authority reaches is necessarily
correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry
is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned
to determine whether the inquiry was held by a
competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings
or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that
finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor
of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority accepts that evidence and conclusion
receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of
statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as
no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding and mould the relief so
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as to make it appropriate to the facts of each
case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole
judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The
appellate authority has co-extensive power to
reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict
proof of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to
be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In
Union of India v. H.C. Goel, this Court held at
page 728 that if the conclusion, upon
consideration of the evidence, reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers
from patent error on the face of the record or
based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued."
10. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay
13
through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil , this
Court held that interference with the decision of
departmental authorities is permitted if such authority
had held proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations
prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It
was held as under:
“16. The Division Bench of the High Court
seems to have approached the case as though it
was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High
Court. Interference with the decision of
departmental authorities can be permitted, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such
enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
13
(2000) 1 SCC 416
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vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the very
face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that
no reasonable person could have arrived at such
a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the
above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is
the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has
been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence
on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is
not a matter for canvassing before the High
Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution.”
11. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi
14
Chand Nalwaya , this Court held that the courts will
not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence
led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground
that another view is possible on the material on record.
If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
evidence will not be ground for interfering with the
findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as
under:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not
act as an appellate court and reassess the
evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the
enquiry has been fairly and properly held and
the findings are based on evidence, the question
of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable
nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere
with findings of fact recorded in departmental
14
(2011) 4 SCC 584
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enquiries, except where such findings are based
on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the
material on record. Courts will however
interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or
statutory regulations have been violated or if the
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala
fide or based on extraneous considerations.
(vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India-, Union
of India v. G Gunayuthan-, and Bank of India v.
Degala Suryanarayana-, High Court of
Judicature at Bombay v. Shashi Kant S. Patil,.”
xxx xxx xxx
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India
15
v. P. Gunasekaran , this Court held that while
reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as
an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings.
The Court held the parameters as to when the High
Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary
proceedings:
“13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in
the enquiry, in case the same has been
conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the
evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the
evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal
15
(2015) 2 SCC 610
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evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however
grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of
punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
14. On the other hand learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon the judgment reported as
Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari , (2017) 2
SCC 208 , wherein this Court held that if the
disciplinary authority records a finding that is not
supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding
which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could
interfere with the finding of the disciplinary
proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of
that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere
with the findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the
findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent
is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only
on the ground that there are discrepancies in the
evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the
evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The
Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and
returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of
misconduct.”
31. From the above extracted passages, the following
definitive guiding principles may be said to emanate:
(i) A writ court, exercising power of judicial
review over the decision of the disciplinary or
appellate authority, does not sit in appeal over the said
decisions.
(ii) The power of judicial review, vested in the writ
court, is confined to the decision making process. It is
intended to ensure that the aggrieved individual has
received fair treatment at the hands of the authorities
below, and is not intended to ensure that the conclusion
of the authorities below is necessarily correct in the
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eyes of the court.
(iii) The writ court is, therefore, required to
determine, essentially, whether
(a) the enquiry was held by a competent
authority,
(b) the enquiry was held according to the
procedure prescribed in that regard and
(c) principles of natural justice were, or were
not, violated.
(iv) So long as some evidence exists, on the basis of
which the disciplinary or appellate authorities have
proceeded, and the said evidence reasonably supports
the conclusion arrived at by the said authorities, the
writ court would not review or reassess the evidence
and arrive at its independent finding thereon. At the
same time, the finding of the disciplinary/appellate
authority must be based on some evidence. If so, the
adequacy, sufficiency or even reliability of the
evidence, is not open for examination by the writ court.
(v) Technical stipulations, contained in the
Evidence Act, 1872, and the standards of proof
contemplated therein, do not apply to disciplinary
proceedings.
(vi) The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of
facts, though the appellate authority has co-extensive
power to re-appreciate evidence, as well as interfere
with the punishment awarded. The writ court will not
correct an error of fact of the disciplinary authority,
howsoever grave. The exercise of assessment of facts
and re-appreciation of evidence, has, however,
necessarily to stop at the stage of the appellate
authority. The writ court is required to forbear from
doing so.
(vii) The writ court can, however, interfere where
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(a) the Enquiry Officer is not competent to
enquire into the charges,
(b) the disciplinary authority is not
competent to pass the order of punishment,
(c) the disciplinary proceedings are not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in that
regard,
(d) the principles of natural justice have been
violated,
(d) the decision(s) of the authorities below
is/are vitiated by extraneous considerations,
(e) the decisions of the authorities are
arbitrary or capricious, or
(f) the conclusions of the authorities below
are such as no reasonable person, conversant
with the facts would arrive at and are,
consequently, perverse.
(viii) The writ court can interfere with the quantum of
punishment if it shocks the conscience of the court,
applying the principles of Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
32. In Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari (2017) 2
SCC 308 , the Supreme Court held, additionally, that a writ
court could interfere with the decision of the
disciplinary/appellate authority, where the decision(s) were
vitiated by non-application of mind, or were unreasoned. In
the said case, the Supreme Court held that the appellate
authority had "added insult to injury", by mechanically
reproducing the findings of the disciplinary authority, thereby
evidencing non-application of mind on its part.”
37. This Court is not expected to sit as a Court of Appeal over the
decisions of the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority.
The law in this regard is clear and well settled, and it would be a
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transgression of the jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, if the Court were to enter into the intricacies
of the allegations against the petitioner, or the findings of the IO, the
DA and the Appellate Authority in that regard. Even qua Articles 3
and 13 of the articles of charge, the findings of the Disciplinary
Authority are exhaustive and reasoned. It cannot be said that the
Disciplinary Authority, or the Appellate Authority, have acted
mechanically, or merely by reiterating the findings of the IA.
38. The allegations in Articles 3 and 13 of the articles of charge
against the petitioner involved financial impropriety in the matter of
dealing with the affairs of the Bank, inter alia , with regard to
extending of loans and other facilities. The acts of the petitioner have
been found to have resulted in possible loss, to the bank, of around ₹
12 crores. No serious traversal to this finding of fact has been
attempted, by learned Counsel for the petitioner. All that was sought
to be urged on merits, was that the petitioner was merely a
recommending authority, and that his recommendations were subject
to further sanction by higher authorities, against whom no action had
been taken. On this aspect, too, the law is no longer res integra . It is
not open to a delinquent officer to contend that, because other officers,
who may have been equally or more complicit, in the delinquency,
have not been proceeded against appropriately, he should be let off, or
subjected to a more lenient approach.
39. The findings regarding misconduct, having been committed by
the petitioner, are pure findings of fact, arrived at by conscious
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appreciation of the material on record and after grant of adequate
opportunity to the petitioner. These findings, clearly are not
susceptible to interference, in exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction by
this Court.
40. Articles 3 and 13 of the Articles of Charge against the petitioner
are, by themselves, sufficient to justify an order dismissing him from
service. In view of the nature of the allegations and concurrent
findings of the IO, DA and Appellate Authority against the petitioner,
I am unable to agree with learned Counsel for the petitioner that any
bereft could enure to him under the Staff Accountability Circular
th
dated 25 February, 2012 of the Bank. The decision in Ajai Kumar
4
Srivastava relies on authorities which hold that if the order of
punishment can be justified even on some of the articles of charge
held to be proved against the delinquent employee, and no case for
interference with the findings qua the said articles of charge is made
out, the High Court would not re-visit the order of punishment of the
delinquent employee. One may also cite in this regard, the judgment
16
in State of U.P. v. Nand Kishore Shukla .
41. Even on this score, therefore, no case for interference with the
order of punishment with the petitioner can be said to exist.
nd
42. On 22 March, 2021, as noted hereinabove, learned Counsel for
the petitioner submitted that, by not having granted the petitioner a
further opportunity of hearing before awarding punishment to him, the
16
(1996) 3 SCC 750
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authorities below had acted in contravention of Regulation 4 of the
Regulations. In the first place, this submission does not find place
either in the writ petition or in any of the written submissions filed by
the petitioner. No such contention was advanced before the
Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority or the Revisionary
nd
Authority either. It has been raised for the first time on 22 March,
2021. That apart, the Regulations dealing with imposition of major
penalty, applicable to the Bank, do not require a further opportunity of
hearing before awarding the penalty. In this context, I may reproduce
Regulation 4 to 6 of the Regulations, thus:
“ 4. Penalties
The following are the penalties which may be imposed on an
officer employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good
and sufficient reasons.
Minor Penalties
a. censure;
b. withholding of increments of pay with or
without cumulative effect;
c. withholding of promotion;
d. recovery from pay or such other amount as may
be due to him of the whole or paid of any pecuniary
loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of
orders. .
e. reduction to a lower stage in time-scale of pay
for a period not, exceeding 3 years, without cumulative
effect and not adversely affecting his pension.
Major Penalties
f. same as provided for in (e) above reduction to a
lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified
period with further directions, as to whether or not the
officer will earn increments of pay during the period of
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such reduction and whether on the expiry of such
period the reduction will or will not have the effect of
postponing the future increments of his pay;
g. reduction to a lower grade or post;
h. compulsory retirement;
i. removal from service which shall not be a
disqualification for future employment;
j. dismissal which shall ordinarily be a
disqualification for future employment.
Explanation ;- The following shall not amount to
a penalty within the meaning of this regulation
namely:-
i. withholding of one or more increments of an
officer employee on account of his failure to pass a
prescribed departmental test or examination in
accordance with the terms of appointment to the post
which he holds.
ii. stoppage of pay of an officer employee at the
efficiency bar in a time scale, on the ground of his
unfitness to cross the bar;
iii. non-promotion, whether in an officiating
capacity or otherwise, of an officer employee, to a
higher grade or post for which he may be eligible for
consideration but for which he is found unsuitable after
consideration of his case;
iv. reversion to a lower grade or post, of an officer
employee officiating in a higher grade or post on the
ground that he is considered, after trial, to be
unsuitable for such higher grade or post, or on
administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct;
v. reversion to his previous grade or post, of an
officer employee appointed on probation to another
grade or post, during or at the end of the period of
probation in accordance with the terms of his
appointment or rules or orders governing such
probation;
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vi. reversion of an officer employee to his parent
organisation in case he had come on deputation;
vii. termination of the service -
a. of an officer employee appointed on
probation, during or at the end of the period of
probation, in accordance with the terms of his
appointment, or rules or orders governing such
probation;
b. of an officer employee appointed in a
temporary capacity otherwise than under a
contract or agreement, on the expiration of the
period for which he was appointed, or earlier in
accordance with the terms of his appointment;
c. of an officer employee appointed under a
contract or agreement In accordance with the
terms of such a contract or agreement; and '
d. of an officer employee on abolition of
post;
viii. retirement of an officer employee on his
attaining the age of superannuation in accordance with
the rules and orders governing such superannuation;
ix. termination of employment of a permanent
officer employee by giving 3 months notice or on
payment of 3 months pay and allowances In lieu of
notice
x. termination of employment of an officer
employee on medical grounds, if he is declared unfit to
continue in bank's service by the bank's medical
officer.
Explanatory Notes
Penalties may be imposed for acts of misconduct or for
any other good and sufficient reasons. Thus
disciplinary action can be initiated and penalties
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imposed for acts which are not per se misconduct but
which amount to good and sufficient reasons:
For such of those actions that are mentioned in this
regulation as those which will not attract penalty or
disciplinary action, the procedure for imposing
penalties need not be followed.
5. Authority, to Institute disciplinary proceedings and
impose penalties
1. The Managing Director or any other authority
empowered by him by general or special order may institute
or direct the Disciplinary Authority to institute disciplinary
proceedings against an officer employee of the bank.
2. The Disciplinary Authority may himself institute
disciplinary proceedings.
3. The Disciplinary Authority or any authority higher
than it, may impose any of the penalties specified in
regulation 4 on any officer employee.
Explanatory Notes
• The Managing Director may initiate
Disciplinary proceedings by himself or by any
other authority empowered by him either by a
general or special order [Sub-regulation 1];
• This power is in addition to the power given to
the Disciplinary Authority separately
• Thus the power to impose penalties is given to
the Disciplinary Authority as well as any
authority higher to it.
6. Procedure for Imposing major penalties
1. No order imposing any of the major penalties specified
in clauses (f), (g), (h), (i) & (j) of regulation 4 shall be made
except after an inquiry is held in accordance with this
regulation.
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By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
2. Whenever the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion
that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an officer
employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any other
person who is, or has been, a public servant (herein after
referred to as the Inquiring Authority) to inquire into the truth
thereof.
Explanation :
When the Disciplinary Authority itself holds the
inquiry any reference in sub-regulation (8) to sub-
regulation (21) to the inquiring authority shall be
construed as a reference to Disciplinary Authority.
3. Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the
Disciplinary Authority shall, frame definite and distinct
charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer
employee and the articles of charge, together with a statement
of the allegations, list of documents relied on along with copy
of such documents and list of witnesses along with copy of
statement of witnesses, if any, on which they are based, shall
be communicated in writing to the officer employee, who
shall be required to submit, within such time as may be
specified by the Disciplinary Authority (not exceeding 15
days), or within such extended time as may be granted by the
said Authority, a written statement of his defence.
Provided that wherever it is not possible to furnish the
copies of documents. Disciplinary Authority shall
allow the officer employee inspection of such
documents within a time specified in this behalf.
4. On receipt of the written statement of the officer
employee, or if no such statement is received within the time
specified, an enquiry may be held by the Disciplinary
Authority itself, or if it considers it necessary so to do appoint
under sub-regulation (2) an Inquiring Authority or the
purpose:
Provided that it may not be necessary to hold an
inquiry in respect of the articles of charge admitted by
the officer employee in his written statement but shall
be necessary to record its findings on each such charge.
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 51 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
5. The Disciplinary Authority shall, where it is not the
inquiring Authority, forward to the Inquiring Authority:
i. a copy of the articles of charges and statements
of imputations of misconduct or is behaviour;
ii. a copy of the written statement of defence, if
any, submitted by the officer employee;
iii. a list of documents by which and list of
witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed
to be Substantiated;
iv. a copy of statements of the witnesses, if any;
v. Evidence proving the delivery of articles of
charge under sub-regulation (3);
vi. a copy of the order appointing the 'Presenting
Officer' in terms of sub-regulation (6).
6. Where the Disciplinary Authority itself enquires or
appoints an Inquiring Authority for holding an inquiry, if any,
by an order, appoint a public servant to be known as the
'Presenting Officer' to present on its behalf the case in support
of the articles of charge.
7. The officer employee may take the assistance of any
other officer employee but may not engage a legal practitioner
for the purpose, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by
the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner or the
Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of
the case, so permits.
Note: The officer employee shall not take the
assistance of any other officer employee who has two
pending disciplinary cases on hand in which he has
given assistance.
8. a The Inquiring Authority shall by notice in
writing specify the day on which the officer employee
shall appear in person before the Inquiring Authority.
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Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
b. On the date fixed by the Inquiring Authority, the
officer employee shall appear before the Inquiring
Authority at the time, place and date specified in the
notice.
c. The Inquiring Authority shall ask the officer
employee whether he pleads guilty or has any defence
to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of
charge, the Inquiring Authority shall record the plea,
sign the record and obtain the signature of the officer
employee concerned thereon.
d. The Inquiring Authority shall return a finding of
guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the
officer employee concerned pleads guilty.
Explanatory Note
The Officer employee, on receipt of the charge sheet is
required to submit his written statement of defence not
exceeding 15 days or within such extended time.
9. If the officer employee does not plead guilty, the
Inquiring Authority shall adjourn the case to a later date not
exceeding 30 days or within such extended time as may be
granted by the Inquiring Authority.
10. The Inquiring Authority while adjourning the case as
in sub-regulation (9) shall also record by an order that the
officer employee may for the purpose of preparing defence
i Complete inspection of the documents as in the
list furnished to him immediately and in any case not
exceeding 5 days from the date of such order if he had
not done so earlier as provided for in the proviso to
sub-regulation (3)
ii Submit a list of documents and witnesses, that
he wants for the inquiry,
iii give-notice within ten days of the order or
within such further time not exceeding ten days as the
Inquiring Authority may allow for the discovery or
production of the documents referred to in item (ii).
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 53 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
Note : The relevancy of the documents and the
examination of the witnesses referred to in item (ii)
shall be given by the Officer employee concerned.
11. The Inquiring Authority shall, on receipt of the notice
for the discovery or production of the documents, forward the
same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or
possession the documents are kept with a requisition for the
production of the documents on such date as may be
specified.
12. On receipt of the requisition under sub-regulation (11),
the authority having the custody or possession of the
requisitioned documents, shall arrange to produce the same
before the Inquiring Authority on the date, place and time
specified in the requisition.
Provided that the authority having the custody or
possession of the requisitioned documents may claim
privilege if the production of such documents will be
against the public interest or the interest of the bank. In
that event, it shall inform the Inquiring Authority
accordingly.
13. On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and
documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are
proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of
the Disciplinary Authority. The witnesses produced by the
Presenting Officer or by another Officer duly nominated by
the Disciplinary Authority to act on behalf of the Presenting
Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer or by the
Officer nominated by the Disciplinary Authority to act on
behalf of the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined
by or on behalf of the officer employee.
The Presenting Officer or the Officer nominated to act
on his behalf shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses' on
any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not
on a new matter, without the leave of the Inquiring Authority.
The Inquiring Authority may also put such questions to the
witnesses as it thinks fit.
14. Before the close of the case, in support of the charges,
the Inquiring Authority may, in its discretion, allow the
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 54 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the
charge sheet or may itself call for new evidence or recall or
re-examine any witness. In such case the officer employee
shall be given opportunity to inspect the documentary
evidence before it is taken on record, or to cross-examine a
witness, who has been so summoned. The Inquiring Authority
may also allow the officer employee to produce new
evidence, if it is of opinion that the production of such
evidence is necessary in the interests of justice.
15. When the case in support of the charges is closed, the
officer employee may be required to state his defence, orally
or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally,
it shall be recorded and the officer employee shall be required
to sign the record. In either case a copy of the statement of
defence shall be given to the presenting Officer, if any,
appointed.
16. The evidence on behalf of the officer employee shall
then be produced. The officer employee may examine himself
in his own behalf, if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by
the officer employee shall then be examined by the officer
employee and may be cross-examined by the Presenting
Officer. The officer employee shall -be entitled to re-examine
any of his witnesses on any points on which they have been
cross-examined, but not on any new matter without the leave
of the Inquiring Authority.
17. The Inquiring Authority may, after the officer
employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer
employee has not got himself examined, generally question
him on the circumstances appearing against him in the
evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him.
18. The Inquiring Authority may, after the completion of
the production of evidence, hear the Presenting Officer, if any
appointed, and the officer employee, or permit them to file
written briefs of their respective cases within 15 days of the
date of completion of the production of evidence, if they so
desire.
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 55 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
19. If the officer employee does not submit the written
statement of defence referred to in sub-regulation (3) on or
before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in
person, or through the assisting officer or otherwise fails or
refuses to comply with any of the provisions of these
regulations, the Inquiring Authority may hold the inquiry ex-
parte.
20. Whenever any Inquiring Authority, after having heard
and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an
inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is
succeeded by another Inquiring Authority which has, and
which exercises such jurisdiction, the Inquiring Authority so
succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its
predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly
recorded by itself:
Provided that if the succeeding Inquiring Authority is
of the opinion that further examination of any of the
witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is
necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall,
examine, cross-examine and re-examine any such
witnesses as herein before provided.
21. i. On the conclusion of the Inquiry the Inquiring
Authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the
following:
a.. a gist of the articles of charge and the statement
of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour;
b. a gist of the defence of the officer employee in
respect of each article of charge;
c. an assessment of the evidence in respect of each
article of charge;
d. the findings on each article of charge and the
reasons therefor.
Explanation :
If in the opinion of the inquiring Authority, the
proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 56 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
charge different from the original article of charge, it
may record its findings on such article of charge:
Provided that the findings on such article of charge
shall not be recorded unless the officer employee has
either admitted the facts on which such article of
charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of
defending himself against such article of charge.
ii The Inquiring Authority, where it is not itself the
Disciplinary Authority, shall forward to the Disciplinary
Authority the records of inquiry which shall include
a. the report of the inquiry prepared by it under
clause (i);
b. the written statement of defence, if any,
submitted by the Officer employee referred to in sub-
regulation (15);
c. the oral and documentary evidence produced in
the course of the inquiry;
d. written briefs referred to in sub-regulation (18)
if any; and
e. the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary
Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to the
inquiry.
Explanatory Note
A major penalty cannot be imposed on officer
employee without holding an inquiry in accordance
with this regulation;
For imposing a minor penalty, holding an inquiry is not
necessary unless the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied
that an inquiry is necessary. When it is decided that an
inquiry is not necessary by the Disciplinary Authority
then the summary procedure under Sub- Regulation 8
to 21 will have to be followed;
The Disciplinary Authority may inquire into the
allegations/imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 57 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
against an officer employee either by himself or
appoint an Inquiring Authority to conduct inquiry;
The inquiring Authority's duty is to inquire i.e., hold
inquiry into the charges contained in the statement of
allegations/imputations and submit its report to the
Disciplinary Authority for further action;
The charge sheet must be signed only by the
Disciplinary Authority;
The charges must be distinct and definite without any
ambiguity;
The articles of charge together with the statement of
allegations/imputations on which they are to be based
must be communicated to the officer employee in
writing. The list of documents to be relied on along
with copy of such documents and list of witnesses
alongwith copy of statement of witnesses, if any, on
which they are based must also be sent along with the
articles of charge;
The Officer employee on receipt of the charge sheet is
required to submit his written statement of defence not
exceeding fifteen days or within such extended time;
The words 'article of charge' are used in the same sense
as charges;
The articles of charge and the statement of
allegations/imputations together constitute the charge
sheet;
After receipt of the written statement of defence from
the officer employee or if no written statement is
received within the prescribed time limit or the
extended time limit, the Disciplinary Authority itself
may hold the inquiry or it may appoint another public
servant as inquiring Authority;
The appointment of the inquiring Authority must be by
way of an order and in writing;
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 58 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
The Disciplinary Authority when it is not the Inquiring
Authority, shall forward to the Inquiring Authority all
the documents mentioned in the regulation without
delay;
The regulation empowers the Disciplinary Authority to
appoint a public servant as the Presenting Officer, to
present on its behalf the case in support of the articles
of charge;
The appointment of the Presenting Officer is by way of
a written order, a copy of which is to be sent to the
inquiring Authority to enable him to send notices when
the inquiry is posted for hearing;
While appointing the inquiring Authority and the
Presenting Officer it must be ensured that both of them
are not in any way/manner connected with the
case/charges.
The charge sheeted officer may take the assistance of
any other officer employee for his defence assistant
during the inquiry proceedings.
The charge sheeted officer shall not take the assistance
of any other officer employee who has two pending
cases on hand in which he has given assistance and
shall not engage a legal practitioner unless the
Disciplinary Authority so permits.
The place, date and the time when the inquiry is to be
held must be properly communicated in writing by the
Inquiring Authority to the Charge sheeted officer and
the Presenting officer that too adequately well in
advance to enable them attend the same without fail;
When the inquiry commences and the charge sheeted
officer employee pleads not guilty to all, some or any
of the charges, the inquiry will have to proceed;
To enable the charge sheeted officer employee to
prepare his defence, the Inquiring Authority is required
to adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 59 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
days or within such extended time as may be granted
by the Inquiring Authority;
While fixing the date the Inquiring Authority has to
take into cognizance the time that will be taken to
produce the documentary evidence and its inspection
by the charge sheeted officer/defence. Preparation of
the defence by the charge sheeted officer/defence;
The Inquiring Authority should therefore before fixing
up the date for proceedings take into account the
convenience of the parties to the proceedings and then
arrive at a final logical decision;
On the date when the inquiry is fixed for hearing the
oral and documentary evidence is required to be
produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority,
The words by or on behalf of the Disciplinary
Authority' suggest that such evidence can be produced
by the Disciplinary Authority;
When the Charge Sheeted Officer seeks certain
documents, the authority having the custody of the
requisitioned documents may claim privilege if the
production such documents will be prejudicial to the
interest of the Bank/Public
Witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer should
be examined by him and may be cross examined by the
defence and if necessary, re-cross examined by the
defence, After the cross examination, if necessary, the
Presenting Officer may re-examine the witness, the re-
examination should be on a matter on which the
witness has already been cross examined and not on
any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring
Authority;
The inquiring Authority may put questions to the
witnesses, if the Inquiring Authority examines .the
witnesses then it should be made clear in the
proceedings that those statements were made in reply
by the questions put by it;
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 60 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
In a situation before the close of the case the,
Presenting Officer wants to bring in a evidence not
included in the list already furnished with the articles
of charges, then the Inquiring Authority may use its
discretion and allow the same.
This may also include call for new evidence or
reexamination of any witnesses, in case such evidence
is allowed, the defence will have to be given
opportunity to cross-examine or inspect the relevant
document;
After the Presenting Officer rests his case, the charge
sheeted officer employee may be required to state
either orally or in writing his defence, as he may
prefer,
The inquiring Authority may allow the defence also to
produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that it is
necessary in the interests of justice.
The evidences on behalf the charge sheeted officer
employee when being produced the officer employee
may offer himself as a witness on his own behalf. In
this case he can be cross examined;
When the defence produce the witnesses/ evidences the
same principle as applicable as in the case of witness
brought in by the Presenting Officer will be applicable;
After the close of evidence by the officer employee and
in case the officer employee has not got himself
produced as witness then the Inquiring Authority shall
generally question him on the circumstances appearing
against him. The purpose of this question is to give an
opportunity to the officer in his defence;
The Inquiring Authority, should record this carefully
making it clear that the replies were in reply to
questions by the inquiring authority;
If the charge sheeted officer fails or refuses to comply
with any of the provisions of these regulations, the
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W.P.(C) 7401/2017 Page 61 of 63
Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
Inquiring Authority may hold the inquiry ex-parte by
recording the complete details;
After the stage of completion of evidence of both sides
and the statement of the Officer employee, the parties
have to file their written briefs for their respective
cases within fifteen days of the date of completion of
their production, if they so desire;
In cases where an Inquiring Authority ceases to
exercise jurisdiction thereon then the succeeding
Inquiring Authority may proceed on the evidence
already recorded and record subsequent evidence itself
and also recall, examine, cross examine and re-
examine any witness whose evidence was already
recorded.
The Disciplinary Authority can himself hold the
enquiry or appoint an inquiring Authority to enquire
into the truth or otherwise of the charges, Thus the role
of the Inquiring Authority is limited to this only and
cannot exceed the same.
The Inquiring Authority should not write anything
about punishment or make any reference/
recommendations about it in his report. The ambit of
his report will thus be confined only to the aspect as to
whether the charge sheeted officer employee is guilty
to the charges or not;”
43. This submission of the petitioner, too, therefore, does not
commend acceptance.
Conclusion
44. In view of the aforesaid, no case for interference with the
impugned decision to dismiss the petitioner from service can be said
to be exist.
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Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56
45. Resultantly, the writ petition is dismissed, albeit with no orders
as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 26, 2021
HJ
Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
By:SUNIL SINGH NEGI
Signing Date:30.03.2021
08:48:56