Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE CHAIRMAN, THIRUVALLUVAR TRANSPORT CORPORATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCIL
DATE OF JUDGMENT09/02/1995
BENCH:
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
BENCH:
AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
MOHAN, S. (J)
CITATION:
1995 AIR 1384 1995 SCC (2) 479
JT 1995 (2) 441 1995 SCALE (1)525
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
1. The short question which arises for consideration in
the present appeal is whether the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission (hereinafter called ’the National
Commission’) constituted under Section 20 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 (for short ’the 1986 Act’) had
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim for compensation
arising out of a motor vehicle accident, notwithstanding the
jurisdiction conferred on a Claims Tribunal constituted
under the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 (for short ’the 1988
Act’). The factual matrix in which this question arises for
consideration, briefly stated, is as under.
2. Shri. K.Kumar was travelling from Kombakonam to
Thanjavur on the night between 2nd and 3rd June, 1990 in an
omnibus which met with an accident near village Vayalur
while trying to avert a bullock-cart. It appears that when
the bus driver was in the -process of over-taking the
bullock-cart, the bullocks got panicky whereupon the driver
swerved the bus to the left and ran into the branches of a
tree on the road side resulting in damage to the vehicle;
the window panes having been smashed. As the vehicle
suddenly swerved and the driver applied the brakes Shri. K.
Kumar who was sitting in the centre of the rear seat was
thrown in the front and hit against the iron side-bar,
sustaining a serious head injury. Subsequently he succumbed
to the injury. The Consumer Protection Council, Tamil Nadu,
on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased
lodged a complaint before the National Commission under the
1986 Act claiming compensation. The appellant herein con-
tested the claim contending that the claimant, i.e., the
Council, had no locus standi to maintain the action and in
any the National Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain
a petition since exclusive jurisdiction was conferred by the
1988 Act on the Claims Tribunal constituted thereunder. The
National Commission, contends the appellant, side-stepped
the question regarding jurisdiction and without answering
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the same awarded Rs.5,10. lacs by way of compensation with
-interest at 18% per annum from 1st May, 1992 till the date
of payment. In addition thereto a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was
awarded by way of costs. The entire payment together with
costs was ordered to be made within three months from the
date of judgment. It is against the said decision of the
National Commission that the present appeal is preferred.
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3. In order to appreciate the principal contention
relating to the jurisdiction of the National Commission, it
is necessary to look to the relevant provisions of the 1986
Act. This law was enacted to provide for better protection
of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make
provision for the establishment of consumer councils and
other authorities for the settlement of consumers’ disputes
etc. Section 2 contains the dictionary of the said Act.
Section 2(c) defines a complaint to mean any allegation made
in writing by a consumer complaining that as a result of any
unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice
adopted by any trader he had suffered loss or damage or the
goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him were
defective or the services hired or availed of or agreed to
be hired or availed of by him were deficient in any respect
or that a trader was guilty of charging a price in excess of
the fixed price or that displayed on the goods or packet
containing such goods Section 2(d) defines a consumer as
under:-
"S. 2(d) - ’consumer’ means any person who,-
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which
has been paid or promised or partly paid and
partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment and includes any user of such
goods other than the person who buys such
goods for consideration paid or promised or
partly paid or partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment when such use is
made with the approval of such person, but
does not include a person who obtains such
goods for resale any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a
consideration which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under
any system of deferred payment and includes
any beneficiary of such services other then
the person who hires or avails of die services
for consideration paid or promised, or partly
paid and partly promised, or under any system
of deferred payment, when such services are
availed of with the approval of the first
mentioned person."
Section 2(e) defines a "consumer dispute" to mean, a dispute
where the person against whom a complaint has been made,
denies or disputes the allegations contained in the
complaint. Section 2(f) defines a "defect" to mean any
fault, imperfection or shortcoming in the quality, quantity,
potency, purity or standard expected to be maintained by or
under any law by a trader in any manner whatsoever in
relation to any goods. Deficiency says Section 2(g) means
any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the
quality, nature and manner of performance which is required
to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in
force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person.
Section 2(o) defines "service" as under:
service" means service of any description
which is made available to potential users and
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includes the provision of facilities in
connection with banking, financing, insurance,
transport, processing, supply of electrical of
other energy, board or lodging of both,
housing construction, entertainment, amusement
or the purveying of news or other information,
but does not include the rendering of any
service free of charge or under a contract of
personal service."
Section 3 provides that the provisions of the Act shall be
in addition to and not in
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derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time
being in force. Section 12 inter alia provides that a
complaint in relation to any goods sold or delivered or
agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or
agreed to be provided may be filed with a District Forum by
the consumer to whom such goods are sold or delivered or
agreed to be sold or delivered or such service provided or
agreed to be provided or by any recognised consumer
association whether the consumer confirmed is a member of
such association or not. The explanation to the section
states that a "recognised consumer association" means any
voluntary consumer association registered under the
Companies Act, 1956 or any other law for the time being in
force. Section 21 deals with the jurisdiction of the
National Commission with which we are concerned. It reads
as under:
"21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission - Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission
shall have jurisdiction.
(a) to entertain-
(i)complaints where the value of the goods or
services and compensation, if any, claimed
exceeds rupees twenty lakhs; and
(ii)appeals against the orders of any State
Commission; and
(b) to call for the records and pass ap-
propriate orders in any consumer dispute which
is pending before or has been decided by any
State Commission where it appears to the
National Commission that such State Commission
has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it
by law, or has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the
exercise of its
jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity.
4. From the Preamble and the various Provisions of the
1986 Act it becomes clear that whenever a complaint in
relation to any goods sold or delivered or agreed to be sold
or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be
provided arises, the complainant, i.e. the consumer or any
voluntary consumer association or the Central or any State
Government can move the appropriate Forum under the statute
for redressal. If the amount claimed by way of compensation
exceeds the minimum stated in section 21, the National
Commission can take jurisdiction, hear and dispose of the
complaint. The limit of Rs. 20 lakhs was substituted for
Rs. 10 lakhs by Amendment Act 50 of 1993. In the present
case, it is an admitted fact that no petition was filed on
behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased victim
of the accident before the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal
constituted under the 1988 Act. After the lapse of the
period of six months which is the period of limitation for
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preferring -such a claim expired, the respondent preferred
an application claiming Rs.20 lakhs before the National Com-
mission, It is, therefore, obvious that the claim was
preferred before the National Commission since the legal
representatives of the deceased had failed to prefer the
claim before the Tribunal under the 1988 Act. It would,
therefore, the proper at this stage to refer to a few
provisions of the 1988 Act.
5. The said Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the
law relating to motor vehicles. Section 2(28) defines a
"motor vehicle" or "vehicle" to mean any mechanically
propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the
power of
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propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or
internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has
not been attached and a trailer. The vehicle which was
-involved in the accident was indisputably a vehicle within
the meaning of the said provision. Chapter XII refers to
Claims Tribunals. Section 165 provides that a State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute one or more Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for
such area as may be specified in the notification for the
purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in re-
spect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury
to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or
damages to any property of a third party so arising, or
both. Section 166 next provides that an application for
compensation may be made by the person who has sustained the
injury or by the owner of the property or where death has
resulted from the accident, by -all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly
authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.
Section 168 then says that on receipt of an application for
compensation, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice
of the application to the insurer and after giving the
parties an opportunity of being- heard, hold an inquiry and
make an award determining the amount of compensation which
appears to be a just. Section 175 next provides that where
any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no
Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
question relating to any claim for compensation which -may
be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area.
In the present case the death had occurred due to the injury
suffered in the accident arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle. The legal
representatives of the deceased did not prefer any claim
before the Claim Tribunal for the area in which the accident
occurred but instead the respondent-council preferred the
claim before the National Commission which without examining
the question whether or not it had jurisdiction awarded a
sum of Rs. 5,10 lakhs by way of compensation.
6. The question which then arises for consideration is
whether the National Commission had jurisdiction to
entertain the claim application and award compensation in
respect of an accident involving the death of Shri K. Kumar
caused by the use of a motor vehicle. Clearly the Claims
Tribunal constituted for the area in question, had
jurisdiction to entertain any claim for compensation arising
out of the fatal accident since such a claim application
would clearly fall within the ambit of section 165 of the
1988 Act. The 1988 Act can be said to be a special Act in
relation to the claims of compensation arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle. The 1986 Act being a law dealing
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with the question of extending protection to consumers in
general, could, therefore, be said to be a general law in
relation to the specific provisions concerning accidents
arising out of the use of motor vehicles found in Chapter
XII of the 1988 Act. Ordinarily the general law must yield
to the special law. Besides, the complaint in question
cannot be said to be in relation to any goods sold or
delivered or agreed to be sold or delivered or any service
provided or agreed to be provided to the deceased. The
expression " service" as defined by the 1986 Act means
service of any description which is made available to
potential users and includes the provision of facilities
inter alia
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in connection with transport. The accident that occurred
had nothing to do with service provided to the deceased.
This becomes obvious when one reads the provision along with
the definition of complaint in section 2(c) and service in
section 2(o) of the 1986 Act. Complaint according to
section 2(c) means any application in writing in relation to
an unfair trade practice or as a restrictive trade practice
adopted by any trader or in relation to goods bought by him
or agreed to be bought by him. Both these clauses have no
application whatsoever. The third clause relates to the
services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or
availed of by a consumer. Therefore, at best it can be said
the complaint in question related to the service hired or
availed of by the deceased. The complaint in the instant
case cannot be said to be in relation to any service hired
or availed of by the consumer because the injury sustained
by the consumer had nothing to do with the service provided
or availed of by him but the fatal injury was the direct
result of the accident on account of which he was thrown out
of his seat and dashed against the iron handle of the seat
in front of him. We, have,, therefore, no manner of doubt
that this case squarely fell within the ambit of section 165
of the 1988 Act and the Claims Tribunal constituted
thereunder for the area in question had jurisdiction to
entertain the same. As pointed out earlier, the 1988 Act
and, in particular, the provisions in Chapter XII thereof
creates a Forum before which the claim can be laid if it
arises out of an accident caused by the use of a motor ve-
hicle. That being a special law would prevail over the
relevant general law such as the 1986 Act but in the instant
case even that question does not arise for the simple reason
that the dispute in question did not attract the
jurisdiction of the National Commission, whatsoever, and the
National Commission has not shown how it had jurisdiction.
The issue was pointedly raised and for reasons best known to
the National Commission it failed to come to grip with it.
Surprisingly, there is no discussion whatsoever in the order
of the National Commission in this behalf We arc, therefore,
of the opinion that the National Commission did not have
jurisdiction and as counsel for the appellant put it this
was a case of unwarranted exercise of jurisdiction.
7. In fact only a few months ago i.e., on 15thApril, 1993,
while disposing of a revision application in the case of
Union of India & Anr v. M.Adai Kalam II (1993)
CPJ145(N.C.)the National Commission held that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain complaints of loss. destruction,
damage or non-delivery of goods by railway on account of
deficiency in service since such claims fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Claims Tribunal con-
stituted under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Yet
it is difficult to comprehend how it exercised jurisdiction
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in the present case.
8. This Court while admitting the appeal on 3rdJanuary,
1994 specifically stated that no notice need be sent to the
widow and the child who were awarded compensation. Not only
that the appellant was directed to pay the compensation to
the widow and the child within three months therefrom. It
is obvious from this order that this Court felt that it was
not necessary to make the window and the child run to this
Court to settle the question of law. The respondent-counsel
did not appear in response to the notice but having
448
regard to the importance of the question this Court by its
order dated 31st August, 1994 requested Shri R.P. Bhatt to
assist this Court amicus curiae in answering the question
whether or not in such cases the National Commission has
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In the circum-
stances it is not necessary for us to go into compensation
since there is no question of reversing the award in the
sense of calling upon the widow and the child to refund the
amount of compensation already received. The main emphasis
was to decide the question of law as it was apprehended that
similar cases which have become time barred under the 1988
Act may be taken to the National Commission under the 1986
Act even though that body had no jurisdiction whatsoever.
We should, therefore, rest content by deciding the question
of jurisdiction and holding that the National Commission had
no jurisdiction whatsoever and was entirely wrong in
exercising jurisdiction and awarding compensation. However,
in the facts and circumstances of this case while we reverse
the order of the National Commission by allowing this appeal
we direct that the appellant will -not be entitled to re-
cover the compensation money already paid to the widow and
the child under this Court’s order. The appeal %ill stand
disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
449