Sadiq B. Hanchinmani vs. The State Of Karnataka

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1282
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.11336 OF 2022]
SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
R1: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
R2: CHNDRUMAL
R3: SANJAY
R4: NANDKUMAR
R5: VIJAY
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. _____ OF 2025]
[@DIARY NO.39619 OF 2022]
SADIQ B. HANCHINMANI ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
R1: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
Signature Not Verified
R2: MRS. VEENA
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.11.04
18:41:24 IST
Reason:
R3: MADHAV
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J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted in both petitions.
3. The instant criminal appeals, at the instance of the complainant,
seek to assail the Final Judgments and Orders dated 18.11.2021 in
CRLP No.100651/2018 [ 2021:KHC-D:90 ] (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Second Impugned Order’) and dated 24.07.2019 in CRLP
No.100549/2018 [ 2019:KHC-D:5908 ] (hereinafter referred to as the
‘First Impugned Order’) passed by two learned Single Judges of the High
Court of Karnataka, Bench at Dharwad (hereinafter referred to as the
‘High Court’), whereby the High Court allowed the accused-private
1
respondents’ petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’), consequently
quashing the Order dated 18.01.2018 passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class-III Court, Belagavi (hereinafter referred to as the

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‘JMFC’), insofar as it related to the respective accused-private
respondents.
BRIEF FACTS:
4. The appellant-complainant lodged a private complaint viz . PCR
No.1/2018 before the JMFC against the private respondents under
Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).
5. The appellant-complainant had filed a suit being O.S. No.43/2009
before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi, seeking a
declaration that he is the owner in possession of the suit property as per
oral gift by his father and also to declare the Sale Deed dated
03.02.2009 executed by his father Bashirahmad in favour of accused
no.1 as illegal, void and not binding on him. It is relevant to note that
Bashirahmad remained ex-parte since he did not contest the suit. The
matter was heard and the suit came to be dismissed on 28.03.2013.
Consequently, the appellant preferred an appeal being R.F.A.
No.4095/2013 before the High Court. An interim application under Order
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2 3
XLI Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’) was filed seeking stay of the
operation of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide Order
dated 03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to maintain
status quo regarding title and possession of the suit property, which was
extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was subsequently
vacated.
6. During the pendency of the afore-noted appeal, the appellant
came to know that on 18.06.2015, Veena, (accused no.1) though in the
F.I.R. her name is mentioned as Meena and her husband, along with
others, broke open the lock put to the suit property without permission

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and trespassed into the same and started renovation/construction in the
suit property. The appellant issued a Notice calling upon them to stop the
renovation/construction work. The renovation/construction work was
stopped. The appellant later came to know that, on 18.10.2015, accused
nos.1 and 2 and others again broke open the lock put to the property
and re-started the work. The appellant then filed an application under
4
Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with Section 151 of the CPC, being
I.A.No.1/2015 in R.F.A. No.4095/2013, seeking initiation of contempt
proceedings against accused nos.1 and 4. Accused no.1 filed a reply to
I.A.No.1 of 2015 and produced a document embossed as an E-Stamp
Paper dated 20.05.2013, styled as a Rent Agreement and some rent
receipts. The said Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in
favour of accused no.2.
7. The appellant filed an application before the Inspector General of
Registration and Commissioner of Stamps, Bengaluru, Department of
Stamps and Registration, Government of Karnataka, for getting a
certified copy of the document, which was produced by the
4
‘ 2-A. Consequence of disobedience or breach of injunction. —(1) In the case of disobedience of
any injunction granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 or breach of any of the terms on
which the injunction was granted or the order made, of the Court granting the injunction or making the
order, or any Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person
guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained
in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his
release.
(2) No attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of
which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the
proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay
the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto. ’
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contemnor/accused no.1 before the Court in the first appeal, styled as a
Rent Agreement. The appellant came to know that the said E-Stamp
Paper was fake, as he obtained certified copy(ies) of the Stamp Paper
bearing same serial number, which did not tally with the Stamp Paper
that was produced before the High Court.
8. The Rent Agreement was executed by accused no.1 in favour of
accused no.2, and the appellant alleges that it was ante -dated to show
that it came into existence prior to the date of the status quo Order
passed by the High Court.
9. It is contended that all the accused, in collusion with one another,
created and produced the forged, fabricated and manufactured
document to obtain a favourable order and to obtain the possession of
the suit property and have also concocted the rent receipts to justify their
possession over the property. A complaint was also lodged with Khade
Bazar Police Station, Belagavi to enquire about the forgery and
concoction of the document. Still, no steps were taken by the police on
the said complaint.
10. The appellant later filed a private complaint before the JMFC. The
JMFC vide Order dated 18.01.2018 felt that the matter was to be
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5
referred for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The JMFC
referred the case for investigation to the Khade Bazar Police Station.
Accordingly, a First Information Report was registered against accused
nos.1 to 7 as Crime No.12/2018 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) for
offences punishable under Sections 120B, 201, 419, 471, 468 and 420
of the IPC, and investigation was undertaken. The learned JMFC in the
Order dated 18.01.2018 recorded ‘ The complainant has complied with
the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka
Shrivastava vs. State of UP in (2015) 6 SCC 287. ’ (sic)
11. The High Court, in the First Impugned Order, observed as under,
inter alia :
‘ 10. … Without mentioning anything the learned
Magistrate has passed the order for further
investigation though no law contemplated the learned
Magistrate to go for further investigation. If at all any
further investigation has to be made that will be only
after if any final report is filed by the investigating
agency and if there are any deficiencies and if any
request is made by the police under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C, then under such circumstances the Court can
exercise. But when the private complaint has been
filed and directly the court has passed for further
investigation without any justifiable reasons in that
light, the said order itself appears to be not justifiable
5
‘ 156.Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case .—
(1)…
(2)…
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as
abovementioned. ’
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since the court has not applied its mind and it is not
sustainable in the eye of law. ’
(emphasis supplied)
12. The High Court, in the Second Impugned Order, recorded, inter
alia , as below:
‘ 24. … Even though, respondent No.2 filed a suit
before the civil court seeking declaration of his right
over the property claiming to be the owner of the
property on the basis of the oral gift deed and that the
registered sale deed executed by his father in favour
of accused No.1 is not binding on him, admittedly, the
said suit filed in O.S.No.43/2009 came to be dismissed
and it is held that registered sale deed is executed by
the father of respondent No.2 conveying the title over
the property in favour of accused Nos.1, and
respondent No.2 is not entitled for the declaration as
sought for. Challenging the said judgment and decree,
RFA No.4095/2013 is filed before this court, which is
still pending for consideration. Even though status-quo
order was passed in respect of the title and
possession of the property, it is made clear by this
court that it is only to protect the title and possession
of accused No.1, who is held to be in possession over
the schedule property. Even though the said finding
given by the trial court is under challenge before this
court, the fact remains that there are no prima facie
materials to contend that the possession of the
property was handed over in favour of respondent
No.2 by his father at any time. …
xxx
27. It is also pertinent to note that accused No.2 and 5
to 7 who are petitioners herein, are not parties either in
O.S.No.43/2009 or in RFA No.4095/2013 before this
court. Under such circumstances, respondent No.2
should have made clear about the role played by these
petitioners in concocting the document as contented
by him and producing the same before the court to
take advantage of the same in the first information. ’
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(emphasis supplied)
THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
13. The primary contention of the appellant is that the Rent
Agreement produced by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent in
collusion with other respondents on an E-Stamp Paper is fake.
14. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that
even the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of
Stamps, addressed a letter to the Registrar, High Court of Karnataka,
stating that on perusal of the reports submitted by the Area Manager (E-
Stamping) and the authorized signatory of the Karnataka State
Souharda Federal Co-operative Ltd., Bengaluru, prima facie , the E-
Stamp purchased by Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent and used for
the Rent Agreement is a fake E-Stamp.
15. The learned counsel further stated that the District Registrar,
Belagavi, has directed that a police complaint be filed against
Chandrumal M. Parchani-respondent, the purchaser of the E-Stamp
Paper and Sri Gajanana Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit,
Danegalli, Shahapur, Belagavi which sold the fake E-Stamp Paper and a
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separate complaint has been filed qua the said Sri Gajanana
Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit.
16. The learned counsel emphasised that when the appellant filed an
application before the Inspector General of Registration and
Commissioner of Stamps, Department of Stamps and Registration,
Government of Karnataka, for obtaining a Certified Copy of the
document, which was produced before the High Court styled as a Rent
Agreement, the appellant came to know that the said E-Stamp Paper
was fake, as he obtained cerified copy(ies) of Stamp Paper bearing a
same serial number, which did not tally with the Stamp Paper that was
produced before the High Court.
17. Learned counsel urged that it is conspicuous from the facts of the
case that all the private respondents, in both appeals, in collusion with
each other, concocted, forged, fabricated and manufactured the
document and produced the same before the High Court with mala fide
intention to obtain a favourable order and gain possession of the suit
property. It was advanced that the private respondents played fraud
upon the Court and also caused obstacles in the stream of the justice
delivery system.
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18. In addition, learned counsel canvassed that the possibility of a
conspiracy hatched by the accused cannot be ruled out since there is
prima facie material that substantiates the appellant’s claim that the E-
Stamp Paper is a forged document.
19. It is further submitted that the appellant wrote a letter to various
authorities, including the learned Chief Justice of the High Court. In turn,
the Secretary to the learned Chief Justice, vide Letter dated 14.09.2017,
instructed to follow-up with the investigation on the complaint filed
against the purchaser of the fake E-Stamp Paper and the Sri Gajanana
Multipurpose Souharda Sahakari Niyamit, the issuer of the fake E-Stamp
Paper.
20. Learned counsel contended that the High Court overlooked
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v State of Maharashtra , (2021) 19
SCC 401 , holding that criminal proceedings should not be thwarted at
the initial stage and the police should be allowed to investigate into the
matter and to submit a Final Report, when there are prima facie
materials against the accused.
21. Learned counsel pointed towards the conduct of Veena-
respondent. It is stated that she has deliberately and intentionally
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concealed facts regarding the filing of Special Leave Petitions (Civil)
No.1667-1668/2016 titled ‘ Meena M. Dongare v Sadiq S/O
Bashirahmad Hanchanmani ’ against the Order dated 07.12.2015 in IA
No.1/2023 passed by the High Court. The same was taken up on
01.02.2016, but withdrawn on the first date of listing as under:
‘ Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
seeks permission to withdraw the Special Leave
Petitions with liberty to approach the High Court.
In view thereof, the Special Leave Petitions are
dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to approach the
High Court by filing appropriate application for
appropriate relief. ’
22. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court,
through the Impugned Orders, has turned a blind eye to the fake E-
Stamp Paper, despite discrepancies such as party names and the
amount of stamp duty.
23. The learned counsel wrapped up submissions by pointing out that
the investigation at the relevant point was at a nascent stage, and the
persons involved were on anticipatory bail, and no harm would have
been caused if the investigation was allowed to be completed.
24. Learned counsel submitted that the disputed document was first
produced before the High Court in R.F.A. No.4095 of 2013, and only
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then did the existence of such document come to the knowledge of the
appellant. After obtaining a copy of the said document from the
department concerned and also after obtaining reports from the
Karnataka State Souharda Federal Co-Operative Ltd., Bengaluru, it is
evident that it was accused no.2 who had forged the E-Stamp Paper and
the document styled as a Lease/Rent Agreement before the High Court.
As such, an in-depth investigation was required. It was prayed to allow
the appeals.
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1-THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA:
25. The counsel for the State reiterated some submissions made by
the appellant but clarified and supplemented the same infra .
26. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the main
ground urged by respondents no.2 to 5 (accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7) in
Criminal Appeal No. of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No.11336 of 2022 as
reflected in the Second Impugned Order before the High Court was that
earlier, accused nos.1 and 3, against whom criminal proceedings were
initiated, had approached the High Court by filing CRLP No.100549/2018
seeking the quashing of proceedings initiated against them. The High
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Court, therein, concluded that the JMFC, without application of judicial
mind, had referred the matter for investigation. Therefore, Criminal
Petition No.100549/2018 was allowed and proceedings against
respondents no. 2 and 3 (accused nos.1 and 3) in Criminal Appeal No. .
of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) No. of 2025 @ Diary No.39619 of 2022 were
quashed vide the First Impugned Order.
27. Learned counsel argued that accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 claimed
parity as they contended that they were also on similar footing. But
allegations against accused nos.1 and 3 are different from those against
accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, parity should not be extended to
them.

28. Learned counsel submitted that applying the same principles, the
Second Impugned Order followed, but the learned Single Judges ought
to have remanded the matter as the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018
referring the matter for investigation to the police was a curable defect,
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6
hit by Section 460 of the Code, as it would fall under irregularities which
do not vitiate proceedings.
29. Learned counsel submitted that the Second Impugned Order
opined that the appellant had not made clear the role played by the
accused nos.2, 5, 6 and 7 in concocting and forging the document and
concluded that their role, against anybody, including the Court, was
unclear, but based on the documents on record, it was evident that the
forged E-stamp Paper was purchased by accused no.2. Prayer was
made to pass appropriate Order/Judgment, factoring in the submissions
noted supra .
SUBMISSIONS BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:
30. It is pertinent to note that learned counsel for the accused-private
respondents entered appearance but the private respondents did not file
6
‘ 460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings. —If any Magistrate not empowered by law to
do any of the following things, namely:—
(a) to issue a search-warrant under Section 94;
(b) to order, under Section 155, the police to investigate an offence;
(c) to hold an inquest under Section 176;
(d) to issue process under Section 187, for the apprehension of a person within his local jurisdiction
who has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction;
(e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190;
(f) to make over a case under sub-section (2) of Section 192;
(g) to tender a pardon under Section 306;
(h) to recall a case and try it himself under Section 410; or
(i) to sell property under Section 458 or Section 459,
erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground
of his not being so empowered .’
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any Counter-Affidavit. Learned counsel supported the Impugned Orders
and urged that no good ground was made out to upset the views taken
therein.
31. Learned counsel submitted that vide Order dated 28.03.2016 in
I.A. No.3/2016, the High Court vacated the status quo Order dated
03.06.2013, qua the suit property and the keys of premises were handed
over to accused no.1 during the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013.
32. It was also submitted that the appellant harboured ulterior motive
against the private respondents, which is why he had chosen to register
the private complaint i.e., PCR No.1/2018.
33. Learned counsel argued that as R.F.A. No.4095/2013, concerning
the suit property, was decided ultimately in favour of the private
respondents concerned, therefore, no criminal liability could be hoisted
on them.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
34. The questions for consideration may be summed up as: (i) whether
the direction for investigation to the police issued by the JMFC under
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Section 156(3) of the Code, which was quashed by the Impugned
Orders, is justified based on the facts and circumstances of the cases,
and; (ii) whether the JMFC had sufficient material before it so as to
justify the course of action of referring the matter for investigation to the
police invoking power under Section 156(3) of the Code, resulting in the
institution of the FIR.
35. The relevant and undisputed facts are that in R.F.A. No.4095/2013
before the High Court, an interim application under Order XLI Rule 5
read with Section 151 of the CPC was filed seeking stay of the operation
of the Judgment and Decree dated 28.03.2013. Vide Order dated
03.06.2013, the High Court passed an interim order to maintain status
quo regarding title and possession of the suit property, which was
extended during the pendency of the appeal, but was subsequently
vacated. During the pendency of R.F.A. No.4095/2013, the appellant
came to know that on 18.06.2015, accused no.1 and her husband, along
with others, had broken open the lock put to the suit property without
permission and trespassed into the same and started
renovation/construction in the suit property. The appellant issued a
Notice calling upon them to stop the renovation/construction work. The
renovation/construction work was stopped. The appellant later came to
know that, on 18.10.2015, accused nos.1 and 2 and others again broke
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open the lock put to the property and re-started the work. Thereafter, the
appellant filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A read with
Section 151 of the CPC i.e. I.A.No.1/2015 in R.F.A. No.4095/2013,
seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against accused nos.1 and 4.
Accused no.1 filed a reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015 and produced a document
embossed as an E-Stamp Paper dated 20.05.2013, styled as a Rent
Agreement and some rent receipts. This Rent Agreement was executed
by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2. The defence taken in the
reply to I.A.No.1 of 2015 was that prior to the passing of the status quo
order on 03.06.2013, the suit property had already been let out to
accused no.2 on 20.05.2013 on rent basis, with a copy of the Rent
Agreement also annexed therewith. Further, rent receipts for a monthly
rental of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand) were also enclosed. We
may pause here since this will be a turning point in the present cases.
The Rent Agreement by accused no.1 in favour of accused no.2 is said
to have been executed on 20.05.2013. However, the Rent Agreement
which was produced shows it was executed on E-Stamp Paper bearing
no.IN-KA82473995873571L dated 20.05.2013. This document upon
verification by the appellant, under the Right to Information Act, 2005
from the Inspector General of Registration and Commissioner of
Stamps, Bengaluru, Department of Stamps and Registration,
Government of Karnataka reveals that the said E-Stamp Paper Number
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with the same date of registration related to a Sale Agreement between
one J.D. Duradundi and one S.B. Janagouda. Thus, it is clear that the
Rent Agreement produced before the High Court was shown on the E-
Stamp Paper was used by the aforesaid persons for a Sale Agreement,
unconnected to accused nos.1 and 2 or to any Rent Agreement.
36. The accused no.1 has also stated that the tenant i.e., accused
no.2 might have renovated and cleaned the suit property on 18.10.2015.
This is where the Court finds the truth coming out. In the copy of the
Rent/Lease Agreement which has been brought on record before the
High Court by accused no.1 herself, it is clearly stipulated that accused
no.2 will not change the nature of the premises and should not carry out
any repairs to the said premises without the written consent of accused
no.1. It is not the case of accused no.1 that accused no.2 had sought
any permission. Arguendo , assuming that accused no.2 might have
made some renovations, the same by itself would not serve to absolve
accused no.1 of the responsibility cast by the Order dated 03.06.2013 to
maintain status quo ; further, if she was aware that accused no.2 was
violating the terms of the Rent/Lease Agreement, inaction on her part to
take appropriate action or steps against/in respect of accused no.2
would make her responsible for any violation of the Order dated
03.06.2013, which she concedes might have been done by accused
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no.2 on 18.10.2015, i.e., during the period of subsistence of the Order
dated 03.06.2013, as the status quo came to be vacated only on
28.03.2016. Examined, additionally, from another lens, even if an
injunction order is subsequently set aside, consequences for
breach/violation of the same when it subsisted, could still befall upon the
7
violator, as held in Samee Khan v Bindu Khan , (1998) 7 SCC 59 .
37. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the position of law
enunciated in Madhao v State of Maharashtra , (2013) 5 SCC 615 ,
wherein it was held that:
‘ 18.  When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not
bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the
complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The
Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading
of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein
disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of
the complaint to the police for investigation under
Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save
the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted
in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty
of the police to investigate, he will be justified in
adopting that course as an alternative to taking
cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the
case of a complaint regarding the commission of
cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3)
can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes
cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a).
However, if he once takes such cognizance and
embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV,
he is not competent to revert back to the pre-
cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). ’
(emphasis supplied)
7
This position of law was recently reiterated in Lavanya C v Vittal Gurudas Pai , 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 499 , where one of us (P. Mithal, J.) was part of the coram .
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38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC’s Order dated
18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material is available to justify a
full-fledged investigation by the police. The JMFC, to our mind, had
rightly referred the matter for investigation to the police since a prima
facie case stood made out against the accused, in view of the material
that was available with the JMFC. In Ramdev Food Products Private
Limited v State of Gujarat , (2015) 6 SCC 439 , three learned Judges of
this Court opined:
‘ 13.  We may first deal with the question as to whether
the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section
156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section
202(1) and what are the parameters for exercise of
power under the two provisions.
xxx
22.  Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
22.1.  The direction under Section 156(3) is to be
issued, only after application of mind by the
Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take
cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone
the issuance of process and finds a case made out to
proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is
issued. In other words, where on account of credibility
of information available, or weighing the interest of
justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway
direct investigation, such a direction is issued.
22.2.  The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance
and postpones issuance of process are cases where
the Magistrate has yet to determine “existence of
sufficient ground to proceed”. Category of cases falling
under para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under Section 202.
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22.3.  Subject to these broad guidelines available from
the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the
Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to
case.
xxx
38.  In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V.
Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri)
380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul
Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)
731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC
615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao
Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185: (2010) 2
SCC (Cri) 801], the scheme of Sections 156(3) and
202 has been discussed. It was observed that power
under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate
before taking cognizance and was in the nature of pre-
emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise
its plenary power of investigation beginning with
Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet
under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202
applies at post-cognizance stage and the direction for
investigation was for the purpose of deciding whether
there was sufficient ground to proceed. ’
(emphasis supplied)
39. Ramdev ( supra ) was noticed in Cardinal Mar George Alencherry
v State of Kerala , (2023) 18 SCC 730 . The High Court, especially vide
the First Impugned Order, seems to have been unduly swayed by the
usage of the term ‘ further ’ by the JMFC. The relevant extract from the
First Impugned Order has already been quoted hereinabove. It would be
in the fitness of things to note the JMFC’s Order dated 18.01.2018:
‘ …
On perusal of the private complaint, it is noticed that
the aforesaid case needs to be further investigated by
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the police. Hence, this Court feels that the aforesaid
case needs to be referred under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C.
Hence, the above matter is referred to Khade Bazar
P.S. for investigation under Sec.156(3) of Cr.P.C.
… ’
(emphasis supplied)
40. The afore-extract leaves no room of doubt that the JMFC had
referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the Code, and the
usage of ‘ further ’ was not in the context of Section 173(8) of the Code,
which fine distinction the First Impugned Order has glossed over. The
case(s) at hand, in our considered view, demonstrate material showing
the commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it, which would
merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of the Impugned Orders
is necessitated.
41. This Court in a composition of three learned Judges observed in
Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. ( supra ) as follows:
‘ 16.  In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse
of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a
criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the
accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself
on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The
allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases
and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High
Court may stay the further investigation. However, at
the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs
and the police/investigating agency has a statutory
obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable
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offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck
between the rights of the genuine complainants and
the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable
offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the
investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable
offences on the one hand and those innocent persons
against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated
which may be in a given case abuse of process of law
and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and
the investigation has just begun, the High Court would
be circumspect in exercising such powers and the
High Court must permit the investigating agency to
proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its
statutory duty under the provisions of the Code. Even
in such a case the High Court has to give/assign brief
reasons why at this stage the further investigation is
required to be stayed. The High Court must appreciate
that speedy investigation is the requirement in the
criminal administration of justice. ’
42. It was further highlighted:
‘ 33.15.  When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused and the court when it exercises
the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to
consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence or not. The
court is not required to consider on merits whether or
not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable
offence and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. ’
(emphasis supplied)
43. Thus, on an overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances
of the case, the material on record and the submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties, the First and Second Impugned Orders
dated 24.07.2019 and 18.11.2021 are set aside. FIR Crime No.12 of
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2018, Khade Bazar Police Station stands restored. The police is directed
to investigate the case expeditiously in accordance with law. It goes
without saying that the private parties shall be at liberty to produce
material to indicate their defence(s)/position during the police
investigation as also before the Court concerned, in accordance with
law, at the appropriate stage.
44. Before parting, it is made clear that the observations made in this
Judgment are only for the purposes of considering the issue(s) before us
and shall neither prejudice nor aid the parties in any proceedings
pending inter-se . The appeals stand allowed as indicated above.
Pending applications stand closed. In the circumstances, however, we
propose no order as to costs.
…………………......................J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]

…………………......................J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 04, 2025
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