Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 1296
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5454 OF 2019
ROHAN VIJAY NAHAR & ORS. …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. …Respondent(s)
WITH
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Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.11.08
10:12:38 IST
Reason:
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J U D G M E NT
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not
dominion. The Constitution of India creates courts of record
that are independent in their spheres and yet binds them
together through a coherent hierarchy. The High Courts in
India possess a wide jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court of
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India remains the final interpreter of law. Article 141 of the
1
Constitution of India declares that the law laid down by this
Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144
of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to
act in aid of this Court. These are not ceremonial recitals.
They are the structural guarantees that convert dispersed
adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice
and commands public confidence.
2. Appellate jurisdiction exists to correct errors and to settle the
law so that like cases receive like outcomes. When a superior
court reverses, modifies, or remands, the court below must
give full and faithful effect to that disposition. The authority
to decide on appeal carries the authority to require
compliance, for without obedience, the hierarchy would
become an empty form. Resistance or evasion does not merely
disserve a party before the court, it erodes predictability,
multiplies litigation, and weakens faith in the rule of law. The
maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which literally
means that it is in the public interest that litigation should
come to an end, reminds us that the society has an interest
in achieving finality, and finality from the apex court is the
glue that holds a nationwide system of justice together.
3. Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into
harmony. It requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to
binding precedent even where a judge is personally
unpersuaded. The lawful course is to apply the precedent and,
if needed, record reasons for inviting a larger Bench to
1
Hereinafter referred to as, “the Constitution”
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reconsider it. The unlawful and unjust course is to distinguish
in name while disregarding in substance or to recast issues in
order to sidestep a rule that binds. “ Stare decisis et non quieta
movere” which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb
settled matters, is not a slogan but a safeguard of equality
before the law. Judges do not sit to settle scores. The gavel is
an instrument of reason and not a weapon of reprisal. A
vindictive stance is incompatible with the oath to uphold the
Constitution and the law.
4. Judges across our country must remember that collegiality is
the companion virtue of independence and that a reversal on
appeal is not a personal affront but the ordinary operation of
a constitutional hierarchy that corrects error and settles law.
Respect for the senior jurisdiction is not subservience. It is an
acknowledgment that all courts pursue a common enterprise
to do justice according to law. An Appellate Court reviews and,
where necessary, sets right the decision of the lower court
with restraint and measured language, and the courts below
reciprocate through prompt, reasoned, and transparent
compliance. Courts speak through reasons, and reasons that
align with binding authority preserve both legality and
legitimacy of the judiciary. Articles 141 and 144 of the
Constitution make obedience a constitutional duty and not a
matter of personal preference. A judgment that attempts to
resist binding authority undermines the unity of law, burdens
litigants with avoidable expense and delay, and invites the
perception that outcomes depend on the identity of the judge.
In a constitutional judiciary, it is the law, as declared, that
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brings the conversation to a close. We restate the simple duty
of Courts: apply precedent as it stands and give effect to
appellate directions as they are framed. In that discipline lies
the confidence of litigants and the credibility of courts.
5. The present batch of 96 civil appeals arises from the judgment
dated 27.09.2018 rendered by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay in a group of writ petitions preferred by the
appellants. The High Court declined to interfere with the
revenue mutations and annotations that described the
subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having
vested in the State. The High Court proceeded on the footing
that notices said to have been issued around 1960 and
published in the Official Gazette were sufficient foundation to
treat the lands as private forest under the acquisition regime.
On this approach the High Court dismissed the writ petitions
and refused the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought
by the landholders. One of those petitions is Writ Petition No.
6417 of 2015 which has given rise to the civil appeal before
us titled “Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others versus The State of
Maharashtra and Others.”
6. Before proceeding to the specific facts of these appeals, it is
necessary to set out the provisions central to the matters
before us.
2
6.1. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 , as adapted and amended in
the erstwhile State of Bombay and in the State of
Maharashtra, contains Chapter V which deals with control
over forests and lands not being the property of
2
Hereinafter referred to as, “IFA”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 7 of 40
Government. By the Indian Forest Act as amended by
Bombay Act 62 of 1948, Section 34-A was inserted to
provide an inclusive definition of “forest” for the purposes
of Chapter V. By the same amending law, “wastelands”
were removed from the reach of certain parts of Chapter V
with effect from 04.12.1948. Further amendments were
carried out by Bombay Act 24 of 1955 and by Maharashtra
Act 6 of 1961. Section 35 of this Act empowers the State
Government to regulate or prohibit specified activities in
any forest for stated public purposes. The aforementioned
provisions have been reproduced hereunder:
“34A. Interpretation :- For the purposes of the
Chapter “forest” includes any land containing
trees and shrubs, pasture, lands and any other
land whatsoever which the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
to be a forest.
35. Protection of forests for special purposes
:-
(1) The State Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette-
(i) regulate or prohibit in any forest-
(a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for
cultivation ;
(b) the pasturing of cattle;
(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;
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(d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or
the stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees;
(e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;
(f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of
trees and timber; or
(g) the quarring of stone or the burning of lime or
charcoal or the collection or removal of any forest
produce or its subjection to any manufacturing
process;
(ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of
forests and their protection from fire; when such
regulation or prohibition appears necessary for
any of the following purposes;
(a) for the conservation of trees and forests;
(b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or
the reclamation of saline or water logged land, the
prevention of landslips or of the formation of
ravines and torrents, or the protection of land
against erosion, or the deposit thereon of sand,
stones or gravel;
(c) for the improvement of grazing;
(d) for the maintenance of a water supply in
spring, river and tanks;
(e) for the maintenance, increase and distribution
of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel;
(f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation
works and hydro-electric works;
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(g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling
stones, floods and drought;
(h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways
and other lines of communication ; and
(i) for the preservation of the public health.
(2) The State Government may, for any such
purpose, construct at its own expense in any
forest such work as it thinks fit.
(3) No notification shall be made under sub section
(1) nor shall any work be begun under sub section
(2), until after the issue by an officer authorised by
the State Government in that behalf of a notice to
the owner of such forest calling on him to show
cause within a reasonable period to be specified
in such notice why such notification should not be
made or work constructed as the case may be,
and until his objection, if any, and any evidence
he may produce in support of the same, have been
heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf
and have been considered by the State
Government.
(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under
sub section (1) should not be made, may require
that for any period not exceeding one year or till
the date of the making of a notification, whichever
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is earlier the owner of such forest and all persons
who are entitled or permitted to do therein any or
all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub
section (1), whether by reason of any right, title or
interest or under any licence or contract or
otherwise, shall not, after the date of the notice
and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as
the case may be, do any or all the things specified
in clause (i) of sub section (1), to the extent
specified in the notice.
(5) A notice issued under sub section (3) shall be
served on the owner of such forest in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for
the service of summons and shall also be
published in the manner prescribed by rules.
(5A) Where a notice issued under sub section (3)
has been served on the owner of a forest in
accordance with sub section (5), any person
acquiring thereafter the right of a ownership of
that forest shall be bound by the notice as if it had
been served on him as an owner and he shall
accordingly comply with the notice, requisition
and notification, if any, issued under this section.
(6) Any person contravening any requisition made
under sub section (4) in a notice to show cause
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why a notification under sub section (1) should not
be made shall, on conviction , be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months or with fine, or with both.
(7) Any person contravening any of the provision
of a notification issued under sub section (1) shall,
on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine, or with both.”
6.2. The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975,
came into force on 30.08.1975. Section 2(c-i) of this Act
defines “forest” for the purposes of that Act.
“Section 2(c-i)- “forest” means a tract of land
covered with trees (whether standing, felled,
found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody
vegetation, whether of natural growth or planted
by human agency and existing or being
maintained with or without human effort, or such
tract of land on which such growth is likely to have
an effect on the supply of timber, fuel, forest
produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate, stream
flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such
matters and includes-
(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;
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(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or
was part of a forest or was lying within a forest
on the thirtieth day of August, nineteen seventy
five;
(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable
or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a
forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State
Government;
(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture
or for any purposes ancillary thereto;
(v) all the forest produce therein, whether
standing, felled, found or otherwise;”
Section 2(f) defines “private forest” as follows:
“Section 2(f) - “‘private forest’ means any forest
which is not the property of Government and
includes-
(i) any land declared before the appointed day to
be a forest under Section 34-A of the Forest Act;
(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification
issued under sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the
Forest Act, is in force immediately before the
appointed day;
(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been
issued under sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the
Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding
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two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify
in this behalf;
(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been
issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act;
(v) in a case where the State Government and any
other person are jointly interested in the forest, the
interest of such person in such forest;
(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such
forest which are considered to be necessary for
the convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and
lands appurtenant thereto;”
Section 3 provides that with effect from the
appointed day all private forests in the State shall
stand acquired and shall vest in the State
Government free from all encumbrances, subject
to the limited saving provided in Section 3(2).
“ Section 3 - Vesting of private forests in State
Government
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
law for the time being in force or in any settlement,
grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or
order of any court, tribunal or authority or any
other document, with effect on and from the
appointed day, all private forests in the State shall
stand acquired and vest, free from all
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encumbrances, in, and shall be deemed to be,
with all rights in or over the same or appertaining
thereto, the property of the State Government; and
all rights, title and interest of the owner or any
person other than Government subsisting in any
such forest on the said day shall be deemed to
have been extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply
to so much extent of land comprised in a private
forest as is held by an occupant or tenant and is
lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day
and is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by
Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 for the time being
in force or any building or structure standing
thereon or appurtenant thereto.
(3) All private forests vested in the State
Government under sub-section (1) shall be
deemed to be reserved forests within the meaning
of the Forest Act.”
Section 5 authorises State Government entry and
taking over of possession of private forests which
stand acquired and vested.
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“ Section 5 - Power to take over possession of
private forests
Where any private forest stands acquired and
vested in the State Government under the
provisions of this Act, the person authorised by the
State Government or by the Collector in this
behalf, shall enter into and take over possession
thereof, and if any person resists the taking over
of such possession, he shall without prejudice to
any other action to which he may be liable, be
liable to be removed by the use of such force as
may be necessary.”
Section 24 repeals Sections 34-A, 35, 36, 36-A,
36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Indian Forest Act on
and from the appointed day, with a later re-
enactment mechanism for restored lands
brought in by the Amending Act of 1978
operating through Section 22-A.
“ Section 24 - Repeal of Sections 34-A to 37 of
the Forest Act
“(1) On and from the appointed day, Sections 34-
A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest
Act shall stand repealed.
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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), on and from the date of commencement
of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)
(Amendment) Act, 1978 (14 of 1978), Sections 34-
A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest
Act shall, in respect of the lands restored under
Section 22-A, be deemed to have been re-enacted
in the same form and be deemed always to have
been in force and applicable in respect of such
lands, as if they had not been repealed.”
6.3. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, came into force on
25.10.1980. Section 2 of that Act restrains the use of forest
land for non-forest purposes without the prior approval of
the Central Government and also regulates de-reservation
and assignment of forest land.
3
6.4. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 , provides the
framework for preparation and maintenance of the record
of rights and for mutation of entries upon changes in title
or enjoyment. The MLRC also provides departmental
remedies by way of appeal, revision and correction of
entries. These provisions form the revenue backdrop
against which the impugned mutations and annotations
were made and challenged.
7. The essential factual backdrop common to this batch of
appeals may be summarised as under:
3
Hereinafter referred to as, “MLRC”
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7.1 The appellants are landowners in the State of Maharashtra.
The factual background across these appeals and cognate
matters that have reached the High Court and this Court
over time is broadly similar with only minor variations. The
Respondent State Authorities assert that during the early
1960s notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were issued
and published in the Official Gazette. The stated purpose
of these notices was to call upon owners of lands described
as forest to show cause why regulatory measures under
Section 35(1) of the IFA should not be made and to afford
them an opportunity of objection and hearing, including
interim restraint as contemplated by Section 35(4) of the
IFA. Such notices were said to have been addressed to the
appellants and to other similarly placed private landholders
in the concerned districts. The landowners allege that such
notices were not personally served as contemplated by
Section 35(5) of the IFA, that no inquiry on objections was
ever held, and that no proceedings culminated in a final
notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. The landowners
state that the proceedings then lay dormant for extended
periods.
4
7.2 The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975
commenced on 30.08.1975. The landowners allege that
even after its commencement the State Authorities did not
take possession under Section 5 of the MPFA and for
decades the lands continued to be dealt with as private
holdings. Transfers were effected, permissions were
4
Hereinafter referred to as, “MPFA”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 18 of 40
granted by revenue and charity authorities, planning
documents described the lands as agricultural or no
development zones, possession remained with private
owners or transferees, and no compensation was paid. The
State Authorities, on the other hand, contend that
publication of the notices and the inclusive definition of
private forest in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA furnished the
legal basis for vesting.
7.3 Beginning around 2001, the State Authorities initiated an
administrative exercise to annotate village records so as to
reflect affectation by forest proceedings and vesting under
the MPFA. Talathis and Circle Officers made entries in
village forms including the other rights column of Form VII
and Form XII with references to notices under Section 35(3)
of the IFA from the 1960s and in several matters the name
of the State was thereafter carried into the ownership
column. The landowners allege that these mutations were
made without prior notice and without adherence to the
MLRC. The State Authorities state that the entries were
ministerial reflections of statutory consequences.
7.4 The annotations and mutations produced collateral effects.
Sub-Registrars declined registration of instruments having
regard to departmental instructions. Possession
nonetheless remained with private parties. No award of
compensation was made. Departmental remedies under
the MLRC were invoked by several landholders but many
such proceedings did not reach adjudication. In that
situation writ petitions were filed seeking correction of
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records, declaratory relief regarding title and vesting, and
restoration of entries consistent with private title and
possession. This pattern also appears in cognate matters
already decided, and it forms part of the common factual
narrative that frames the present batch.
8. The nature of the challenges brought before the High Court
across this subject matter, including earlier cognate petitions,
was as follows:
8.1 The landholders approached the High Court by various
petitions to question the legality of revenue annotations
and mutation entries that described their lands as affected
by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State.
They sought quashing of those entries and a declaration
that their lands were not private forests within the meaning
of the MPFA. They also prayed for directions to restore the
record of rights in the names of the private owners and for
consequential reliefs to protect title and possession.
8.2 The principal grounds urged by the petitioners were that
publication of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA in the
Official Gazette without personal service under Section
35(5) of the IFA could not lawfully found any adverse
consequence. They pleaded that no inquiry on objections
was ever held and that no notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA was ever issued. They asserted that the
proceedings lay dormant for decades and that a stale or
inchoate notice could not trigger vesting under Section 3 of
the MPFA. They further contended that possession had
never been taken under Section 5 of the MPFA, that
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compensation had never been paid, and that the lands
continued to be treated as private holdings in revenue and
planning processes for long periods. Violations of the MLRC
and breach of natural justice were also pleaded.
8.3 The State responded that issuance of notices referable to
Section 35(3) of the IFA in the early 1960s brought the
lands within the inclusive definition of private forest in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and that vesting under Section
3 of the MPFA followed as a matter of law. It was submitted
that the challenged revenue entries were ministerial
reflections of statutory consequences. The State also raised
objections regarding delay and laches and pointed to
departmental remedies available under the MLRC.
In many of these petitions the High Court heard the matters
8.4
together and treated them as raising common questions.
The issues framed typically included whether the fact of a
notice said to have been issued under Section 35(3) of the
IFA was by itself sufficient to attract Section 2(f)(iii) of the
MPFA, whether service under Section 35(5) of the IFA and
a final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA were
jurisdictional preconditions, whether long dormancy could
defeat subsequent assertions of vesting, and whether the
impugned mutations could stand in the face of the
procedures mandated by the MLRC.
9. In one cognate batch of writ petitions decided by the High
Court on 24.03.2008, namely “ Oberoi Constructions Private
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 21 of 40
5
Limited v. State of Maharashtra , which was later set aside
by this Court in “ Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of
6
Maharashtra , the High Court gave the following findings:
9.1 In that matter, the petitioners were real-estate developers
who had acquired lands in Mumbai Suburban District long
after Gazette publications of notices said to be under
Section 35(3) of the IFA. For decades the lands had been
treated as non-agricultural and placed in industrial or
residential zones under successive development plans.
Around 2005–2006, the State Authorities made mutation
and annotation entries recording the lands as “private
forest” and as vested in the State under the MPFA. The
petitioners challenged these entries and the foundational
reliance on old Section 35(3) notices, invoking absence of
personal service, the lack of any final notification under
Section 35(1) of the IFA, prolonged dormancy, and
inconsistency with permissions under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and proceedings
under the Urban Land Ceiling law.
9.2 Proceeding principally on two Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of
7
Maharashtra , the High Court held that the expression in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, “a notice has been issued
under Section 35(3) of the IFA”, is satisfied by the fact of
issuance, which could be evidenced by Gazette publication.
Service under Section 35(5) of the IFA or culmination in a
5
2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311
6
(2014) 3 SCC 430
7
(2000) 3 SCC 143
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 22 of 40
notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA was not treated
as a jurisdictional precondition.
9.3 The High Court further held that Section 35(4) of the IFA
does not create any lapse by efflux of time, and that the
MPFA contains no requirement that a notice be “live” or
“subsisting.” The Court declined to read such a gloss into
Section 2(f)(iii), rejecting arguments based on delay,
abandonment, or desuetude.
9.4 Treating Section 34-A of the IFA as an inclusive
interpretation clause, the High Court rejected the
submission that a prior declaration under Section 34-A was
a sine qua non for measures under Section 35 of the IFA or
for invoking Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
9.5 On vesting and its incidents, the High Court concluded that
Section 3 of the MPFA, with its non obstante clause,
prevailed over inconsistent zoning, permissions, or
exemptions under other enactments. Development plans
under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 and proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling law
could not defeat statutory vesting. The impugned revenue
mutations and annotations were sustained as ministerial
reflections of such vesting, and objections based on the
MLRC were not accepted, particularly in light of directions
issued in public-interest proceedings to update records.
9.6 Reliance was placed on the presumption of regularity of
official acts; the fact that many petitioners were derivative
owners without personal knowledge of the original events
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 23 of 40
was noted. On this reasoning, the writ petitions were
dismissed.
10. The judgement in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v.
State of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court
and decided by a three Judge Bench on 30.01.2014 and has
been the prevailing precedent in such matters viz . Godrej &
Boyce (supra) . This Court gave the following findings:
10.1 This Court held that the mere issuance of a notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA is not, by itself, sufficient to treat
land as a “private forest” within Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
The answer to the principal question was returned in the
negative.
10.2 Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of
the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced
from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on
the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce
evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may
be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal
consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service
is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA,
requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as
prescribed, reinforces this conclusion.
10.3 On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar
(Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the
Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 24 of 40
IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise
regarding the two-hectare exclusion. It was overruled to
that extent.
10.4 The Court further clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA
saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and
pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left
undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The
State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice
from 1956–57, never taken to its statutory culmination,
cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day.
10.5 On the definitional plane, the Court reaffirmed that the
“means and includes” formulation in Section 2(c-i) of the
MPFA does not dilute the primary sense of “forest”. Lands
long designated for urban use, developed under sanctioned
plans and permissions, and integrated with municipal
infrastructure could not, on the admitted facts, be regarded
as “forest” either in the primary or extended sense of
Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA.
10.6 Recognising the expropriatory character of the MPFA, the
Court applied strict construction. Fundamental norms of
fairness and good governance preclude unsettling settled
civilian and commercial arrangements after prolonged
State inaction, particularly where the State itself facilitated
and acquiesced in development over decades.
10.7 Even assuming arguendo that the lands were forest,
wholesale demolition and dispossession after half a century
was neither feasible nor in the public interest on the facts
recorded. The equities of third-party purchasers and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 25 of 40
residents, the State’s prolonged acquiescence, and the
practical impossibility of “restoration” militated against
such a course.
10.8 In consequence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s
judgement was set aside, and actions premised solely on
stale notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were quashed.
11. After the judgement of Godrej and Boyce (supra) , the High
Court has followed it as a binding precedent and used its
findings to decide similar matters, whose facts are akin to
those of the appellants before us. Some of these are enlisted
hereunder:
8
11.1 Satellite Developers Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra :
Here the High Court held that mere issuance of a notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA does not vest land in the
State. It further observed that entries made in 2006
pursuant to directions in a public interest litigation would
not, by themselves, effect vesting, particularly when no
further steps under Section 35(3), Section 35(4), and
Section 35(5) of the IFA were undertaken.
11.2 Sinhagad Technical Education Society v. Deputy
9
Conservator of Forests : In the case of a subsequent
purchaser, the High Court reaffirmed that service of notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA is mandatory.
10
11.3 Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra :
Emphasising Godrej and Boyce (supra) , the High Court
8
2014 SCC OnLine Bom 66
9
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 293
10
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5832
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 26 of 40
reiterated that mere issuance of a notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA is not sufficient to vest land with the State
and declined a remand as futile given the authorities’ stated
stance.
Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (Dr.) v. Tahsildar, District
11.4
11
Thane : The High Court held that a bare Section 35(3)
notice under the IFA is insufficient to effect vesting.
12
11.5 Lalit A. Sangtani v. State of Maharashtra : The High
Court underscored that due service of a notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA is mandatory.
13
Bharat Chandulal Nanavati v. Union of India
11.6 :
Addressing a subsequent purchaser and proceedings
under Section 22A of the MPFA, the High Court held that
“issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA necessarily includes
service. Finding no proof or contemporaneous record of
service of the notice dated 17.02.1956, the High Court
concluded that proceedings under Section 22A of the MPFA
could not be founded merely on Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
14
11.7 Global Estate Developers v. State of Maharashtra :
The High Court confined itself to whether the land qualified
as “private forest” under the MPFA and reiterated the
mandate of service under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.8 Indrajeet Kashinath Kaiswal v. State of
15
Maharashtra : The High Court clarified that Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA applies only to “live” or “pipeline”
11
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 295
12
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 248
13
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3862
14
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8345
15
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6743
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 27 of 40
notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA, not stale notices left
undecided.
16
11.9 Nana Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra : In a
matter involving acquisition and subsequent return, the
High Court again insisted upon proof of service of the notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.10 Shree Maruti Sansthan Trust v. State of
17
Maharashtra : For a subsequent purchaser, the High
Court noted that apart from an entry in the “Golden
Register” there was no material showing issuance and/or
service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.11 Vishram Vishwanath Kunte v. State of
18
Maharashtra : During the pendency of an inquiry under
Section 22A of the MPFA, a mutation entry branded the
land as forest; the High Court deprecated recurring
affidavits from State officers asserting that Godrej and
Boyce (supra) laid down no law, terming this “continued
defiance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Godrej & Boyce…”.
12. However, for the present appellants, whose facts are similar
to those of the various petitioners in the different judgements
of the High Court as well as those in Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) discussed above, the High Court vide the impugned
judgment and order dated 28.09.2018 dismissed all the writ
petitions. It would be worthwhile to record here that one
member of the Division Bench of the High Court had authored
16
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 340
17
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 7074
18
WP No. 594 of 2022, decided on 16.09.2022
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 28 of 40
the decision in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v.
State of Maharashtra (Supra) that was later overturned in
Godrej and Boyce (supra) . The impugned judgment proceeds
on the following reasons:
12.1
The High Court framed the primary issue as whether
Godrej and Boyce (supra) applied, and secondly whether
subsequent purchasers could rely upon it when their
predecessors-in-title had not questioned the applicability of
the MPFA or the steps taken thereunder.
12.2 Proceeding from Section 3 of the MPFA, the High Court held
that vesting of all “private forests” was complete on the
appointed day (30.08.1975) and that any post-1975
transactions were ineffectual to confer title. Mutation
entries made in 2002 were treated as a ministerial
reflection of an earlier vesting rather than its source.
12.3 On Section 35 process under the IFA, the High Court
accepted the State’s case that notices under Section 35(3)
of the IFA had been issued and served, and, in several
matters, that a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA
was in force before the appointed day. Reliance was placed
on the “Golden Register”, Gazette extracts, possession
notices referable to Section 5 of the MPFA, lists circulated
in 1976, and panchanamas; the contrary pleadings of the
petitioners were described as guarded or vague.
12.4 The High Court distinguished Godrej and Boyce (supra) ,
observing that the owners there had an earlier consent
decree, long-standing sanctioned development, and an
evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through. On that
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 29 of 40
basis, the High Court treated Godrej and Boyce (supra) as
fact-specific and of limited assistance to subsequent
purchasers.
12.5 As to the term “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and
the service requirement traced to Section 35(5) of the IFA,
the High Court did not dispute the principle in Godrej and
Boyce (supra) but concluded that, on the records cited, the
requirement stood satisfied in these matters.
12.6 On “stale” versus “live” notices, the High Court read
Godrej and Boyce (supra) as context-bound and, in any
event, held that even if Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were
unavailable, the State could succeed on the primary
definition of “forest” in Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA, including
by reference to natural growth and contiguity with reserved
forest.
12.7 The High Court emphasised that most petitioners were
subsequent purchasers who came on the scene long after
30.08.1975, and stated it was “surprising” that they sought
to contest service under Section 35(3) of the IFA without
affidavits from original owners or contemporaneous
material; burden was effectively placed on the petitioners
to dislodge official records.
12.8 Entries describing lands as “Private Forest-Forest
Department” were justified as having been made pursuant
to directions in PIL No. 17 of 2002 and Government
circulars; the High Court considered the challenge to such
entries, decades after vesting, to be misconceived.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 30 of 40
12.9 Arguments based on Section 21 of the MPFA were rejected;
the High Court treated that provision as an enabling route,
not a precondition to vesting already effected by Section 3
of the MPFA.
12.10
Contentions invoking the two-hectare exclusion in Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were declined, the High Court holding
that later allotment of gata/survey sub-divisions could not
undo vesting.
12.11 Objections raised under Section 22A of the MPFA and to
certificates under Section 6 of the MPFA were addressed
with reference to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the
High Court reiterating that prior approval under that Act
was necessary and past non-compliant issuances could not
aid the petitioners.
12.12 While one exceptional matter (e.g., involving long-standing
urban use or missing records) was remitted for verification
by the Collector, the High Court otherwise dismissed the
petitions, characterising several as commercially motivated
and not bona fide, and cautioning that entertaining them
would weaken forest protection.
13. We have gone through the comprehensive material on record,
the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and
for the respondent-State, as well as the impugned order of the
High Court. Having done so, we are of the considered view
that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained for the following reasons:
13.1 In our opinion, the controlling legal position is settled. For
vesting to occur under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 31 of 40
footing of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the
IFA must not only be issued but must also be served upon
the landholder. The expression “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii)
of the MPFA Act comprehends due service on the owner,
because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object,
including the jurisdictional plea that the land is not a forest
within Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA Act, and obliges the State
to consider such objection. We are unable to agree with the
High Court that the reproduction of a draft text of Section
35(1) beneath a Section 35(3) show cause in the Gazette
amounts to a concluded notification under Section 35(1) of
the IFA. A notice that grants time for objections cannot
coexist with a final decision under Section 35(1) without
rendering the statutory hearing illusory. Mutation entries
are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition
that lacks the statutory predicates. They neither create title
in the State nor divest title from the private owner.
13.2 On the facts across these appeals, we find that the essential
links in the statutory chain are missing. There is no proof
of service of any Section 35(3) notice of the IFA on the then
owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of
the IFA. Actual possession has at all times remained with
private owners and this position is reflected in the revenue
records that describe them as occupants. No possession
was taken under Section 5 of the MPFA Act, no schemes
were set in motion under Section 4, no compensation
exercise was undertaken under Section 7, and no inquiry
under Section 6 was held at a time proximate to the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 32 of 40
appointed day of 30 August 1975. The materials produced
by the State include undated and unverified possession
papers that do not inspire confidence when set against
decades of undisturbed private possession. In one instance
the State relies on a pipeline notice which was addressed
to a person who was not the owner as on 29 or 30 August
1975. In another, the land forms part of an industrial estate
converted to non-agricultural use long before 1975. In yet
another, there was never any claim that a Section 35(3)
notice was even issued. These features are wholly
inconsistent with a completed vesting under Section 3(1) of
the MPFA Act.
13.3 We are not persuaded by the Respondent State’s reliance
on post-hoc material. Satellite imagery and panchnamas
drawn in 2016 do not establish the character of the lands
on the appointed day, which is the only relevant date for
Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act. A nineteenth century
notification, invoked for the first time at the appellate stage
to suggest linkage with a reserved forest, was not the
foundation of the impugned mutations and cannot be used
to improve the case now. The administrative orders must
stand or fall on the reasons originally given and the High
Court could not sustain vesting on grounds that were never
the basis of action. The absence of any notification under
Section 34A of the IFA further weakens the State’s position.
We also find merit in the submission that a restoration
under Section 22A of the MPFA Act presupposes a lawful
vesting. When the foundational vesting is unproven, any
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 33 of 40
purported restoration cannot cure the defect, and in any
event the limited window created by Section 22A cannot be
reopened decades later. Expropriatory legislation must be
construed strictly and Article 300-A of the Constitution
requires that no person is deprived of property save by
authority of law. When a statute prescribes a manner of
doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not at all.
Here, several mandatory steps are absent. Any one missing
step would defeat vesting. The High Court was therefore in
error in treating the case as if only a consequential
mutation remained.
13.4 We are also unable to accept the distinctions drawn by the
High Court. The binding ratio on service, on the need for a
live process, and on strict compliance does not turn on
whether an appellant is an original owner or a subsequent
purchaser. It also does not turn on whether construction
has occurred on the land. The State itself has, on earlier
occasions, recognised that subsequent purchasers cannot
be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings which they had
no means to discover. The record here shows that the
revenue entries continued to carry the names of the private
owners, which indicates that even the State did not treat
these lands as vested forests. To hold that a subsequent
purchaser is in a worse position than one who developed
land would invert the logic of the statute and would reward
illegality while penalising restraint. We reject that
approach.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 34 of 40
13.5 We are further of the view that a remand for an inquiry
under Section 6 of the MPFA Act is neither warranted nor
efficacious. Such an inquiry is designed to be
contemporaneous with the appointed day so that
meaningful evidence on the character of the land can be
adduced by both sides. After the passage of nearly half a
century, that exercise would be largely academic and would
not cure the absence of the mandatory preconditions of a
served notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA and a lawful
progression towards a notification under Section 35(1). The
authorities have also adopted a concluded litigating stance
on the very matters they would be called upon to decide,
which would not inspire confidence in the fairness of any
remanded proceeding. In our opinion, the impugned
judgment rests on a misreading of the Gazette, an
impermissible dilution of mandatory statutory steps, and
reliance on materials that are extraneous to the original
basis of action. It therefore cannot be sustained.
14. While the High Court in the impugned judgement dismissed
all the writ petitions by a common order, it did not attempt
any principled differentiation among the petitions before it.
Having closely examined the record, and in order to assess
the distinctions the High Court is said to have perceived with
the petitioners in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) , we have
undertaken our own classification for clarity. We have no
hesitation in stating that had this exercise been undertaken
by the High Court in the impugned judgement, considerable
judicial time could have been saved and directed to the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 35 of 40
unsettled legal questions on which many litigants rest their
hopes. It is with this consideration in mind that we proceeded
to categorise the 96 civil appeals into 3 categories.
14.1 The first category concerns the status of ownership, that is
to say whether the appellants’ title was derived before or
after the alleged notices under IFA were issued around
1960s by the State Government. For clarification, if a title
is devolved by inheritance subsequently but if the land has
been owned by the same family throughout, the ownership
would be deemed to be continuing since the land came first
in the family’s possession. On our analysis, 77 appeals
involve derivative title and 19 involve continuing or ongoing
title. The second category concerns the period of ownership,
namely whether ownership commenced before or after the
enforcement of MPFA. In this category, 72 appellants
acquired ownership after MPFA and 24 appellants owned
the land before MPFA. The third category concerns the
existence of construction on the subject lands. In this
category, 26 appellants have raised some form of
construction on the subject lands, while 70 appellants have
not raised construction or the position is not clearly
established on the materials placed on record.
14.2 After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no
legally relevant distinction between the present cases and
the decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) . The ratio in
Godrej and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live
process capable of culminating in a notification under
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 36 of 40
Section 35(1) of the IFA, and strict compliance with the
statutory steps that alone can support vesting under
Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section
2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the same deficiencies
Godrej and Boyce (Supra)
that were fatal in . There is no
proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA
on the then owners. There is no final notification under
Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with
private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action
was taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act.
These features mirror the very elements that led this Court
to hold that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) .
14.3 We do not accept the distinctions on which the High Court
sought to sidestep Godrej and Boyce (Supra) . The fact that
some appellants are subsequent purchasers does not
diminish the requirement of service and a live statutory
process. Godrej and Boyce (Supra) itself concerned a
batch in which many parties were not original owners, yet
the controlling principles were applied uniformly. The
presence or absence of construction is equally irrelevant to
the legal question of vesting. What matters is compliance
with the prerequisites of the MPFA Act and the IFA. The
present record shows revenue entries that continued to
reflect private ownership and occupation. It shows a
pipeline notice addressed to a person who was not the
owner on the relevant date. It shows lands long converted
to non-agricultural or industrial use. None of this allows
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 37 of 40
the State to dispense with service under Section 35(3) of
the IFA or to conjure a final notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA from a draft placed beneath a show cause. In our
opinion, the differences invoked by the High Court are
insubstantial and cannot displace the binding ratio.
14.4 We find that the High Court’s approach amounts to an
attempt to avoid a binding precedent rather than to apply
it. The impugned reasoning rests on a misreading of a
Gazette publication that only reproduced a draft text and
expressly invited objections. It relies on material that is
subsequent to the appointed day and that was never the
foundation of the impugned mutation entries. It treats
mutation as if it were constitutive of title and not a
ministerial reflection of underlying legal events. Each of
these moves stands at odds with Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) , which requires strict adherence to the statutory
sequence before vesting can be asserted.
14.5 Judicial discipline required faithful application of the law
declared by this Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution. Coordinate Benches of the High Court have
consistently followed Godrej and Boyce (Supra) in closely
comparable situations. The impugned judgment
nonetheless revives positions that Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) has rejected. We also note that the Bench was
presided over by the same Judge who had earlier taken a
contrary view that was set aside by this Court. We do not
attribute motive. However, when a judgment minimizes a
binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 38 of 40
distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of
a reluctance to accept precedent. Such an approach
conveys a measure of pettiness that is inconsistent with the
detachment that judicial reasoning demands. In our view,
this is an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare
decisis.
14.6 We accordingly hold that the present appeals are
indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) . The record discloses the same jurisdictional defect
of non-service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA,
the same absence of a final notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps
under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA Act. In such
circumstances the High Court could not, consistently with
Article 141 of the Constitution, avoid the binding ratio by
treating immaterial differences as determinative. In our
opinion, fidelity to binding precedent and to the statutory
scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the
impugned order must be set aside.
15. In view of the foregoing analysis, the appeals are allowed.
16. The impugned judgment and order dated 27.09.2018 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 6417
of 2015, amongst others, is set aside. The writ petitions before
the High Court in the aforementioned matter are allowed. All
mutation orders and any declarations treating the subject
lands as private forests are quashed and set aside.
Consequential corrections be made in the revenue records.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 39 of 40
17. Liberty is reserved to the State to initiate such proceedings, in
accordance with law, as per the relevant Statutes and to bring
them to a logical conclusion after following due process of
law.
18. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
………………………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
………………………………………..J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 07, 2025
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 40 of 40
2025 INSC 1296
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5454 OF 2019
ROHAN VIJAY NAHAR & ORS. …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. …Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5501 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5511 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14074 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14075 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14076 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14077 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14087 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14078 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14083 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14079 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14080 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 14081 OF 2024
CIVIL APPEAL No. 9434 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5468 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5458 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5473 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5455 OF 2019
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.11.08
10:12:38 IST
Reason:
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J U D G M E NT
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. The judiciary draws its strength from discipline and not
dominion. The Constitution of India creates courts of record
that are independent in their spheres and yet binds them
together through a coherent hierarchy. The High Courts in
India possess a wide jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court of
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India remains the final interpreter of law. Article 141 of the
1
Constitution of India declares that the law laid down by this
Court binds every court in the country. Further, Article 144
of the Constitution obliges all authorities, civil and judicial, to
act in aid of this Court. These are not ceremonial recitals.
They are the structural guarantees that convert dispersed
adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice
and commands public confidence.
2. Appellate jurisdiction exists to correct errors and to settle the
law so that like cases receive like outcomes. When a superior
court reverses, modifies, or remands, the court below must
give full and faithful effect to that disposition. The authority
to decide on appeal carries the authority to require
compliance, for without obedience, the hierarchy would
become an empty form. Resistance or evasion does not merely
disserve a party before the court, it erodes predictability,
multiplies litigation, and weakens faith in the rule of law. The
maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” which literally
means that it is in the public interest that litigation should
come to an end, reminds us that the society has an interest
in achieving finality, and finality from the apex court is the
glue that holds a nationwide system of justice together.
3. Judicial discipline is the ethic that turns hierarchy into
harmony. It requires courtesy, restraint, and obedience to
binding precedent even where a judge is personally
unpersuaded. The lawful course is to apply the precedent and,
if needed, record reasons for inviting a larger Bench to
1
Hereinafter referred to as, “the Constitution”
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reconsider it. The unlawful and unjust course is to distinguish
in name while disregarding in substance or to recast issues in
order to sidestep a rule that binds. “ Stare decisis et non quieta
movere” which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb
settled matters, is not a slogan but a safeguard of equality
before the law. Judges do not sit to settle scores. The gavel is
an instrument of reason and not a weapon of reprisal. A
vindictive stance is incompatible with the oath to uphold the
Constitution and the law.
4. Judges across our country must remember that collegiality is
the companion virtue of independence and that a reversal on
appeal is not a personal affront but the ordinary operation of
a constitutional hierarchy that corrects error and settles law.
Respect for the senior jurisdiction is not subservience. It is an
acknowledgment that all courts pursue a common enterprise
to do justice according to law. An Appellate Court reviews and,
where necessary, sets right the decision of the lower court
with restraint and measured language, and the courts below
reciprocate through prompt, reasoned, and transparent
compliance. Courts speak through reasons, and reasons that
align with binding authority preserve both legality and
legitimacy of the judiciary. Articles 141 and 144 of the
Constitution make obedience a constitutional duty and not a
matter of personal preference. A judgment that attempts to
resist binding authority undermines the unity of law, burdens
litigants with avoidable expense and delay, and invites the
perception that outcomes depend on the identity of the judge.
In a constitutional judiciary, it is the law, as declared, that
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brings the conversation to a close. We restate the simple duty
of Courts: apply precedent as it stands and give effect to
appellate directions as they are framed. In that discipline lies
the confidence of litigants and the credibility of courts.
5. The present batch of 96 civil appeals arises from the judgment
dated 27.09.2018 rendered by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay in a group of writ petitions preferred by the
appellants. The High Court declined to interfere with the
revenue mutations and annotations that described the
subject lands as affected by forest proceedings and as having
vested in the State. The High Court proceeded on the footing
that notices said to have been issued around 1960 and
published in the Official Gazette were sufficient foundation to
treat the lands as private forest under the acquisition regime.
On this approach the High Court dismissed the writ petitions
and refused the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought
by the landholders. One of those petitions is Writ Petition No.
6417 of 2015 which has given rise to the civil appeal before
us titled “Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others versus The State of
Maharashtra and Others.”
6. Before proceeding to the specific facts of these appeals, it is
necessary to set out the provisions central to the matters
before us.
2
6.1. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 , as adapted and amended in
the erstwhile State of Bombay and in the State of
Maharashtra, contains Chapter V which deals with control
over forests and lands not being the property of
2
Hereinafter referred to as, “IFA”
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 7 of 40
Government. By the Indian Forest Act as amended by
Bombay Act 62 of 1948, Section 34-A was inserted to
provide an inclusive definition of “forest” for the purposes
of Chapter V. By the same amending law, “wastelands”
were removed from the reach of certain parts of Chapter V
with effect from 04.12.1948. Further amendments were
carried out by Bombay Act 24 of 1955 and by Maharashtra
Act 6 of 1961. Section 35 of this Act empowers the State
Government to regulate or prohibit specified activities in
any forest for stated public purposes. The aforementioned
provisions have been reproduced hereunder:
“34A. Interpretation :- For the purposes of the
Chapter “forest” includes any land containing
trees and shrubs, pasture, lands and any other
land whatsoever which the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
to be a forest.
35. Protection of forests for special purposes
:-
(1) The State Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette-
(i) regulate or prohibit in any forest-
(a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for
cultivation ;
(b) the pasturing of cattle;
(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;
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(d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or
the stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees;
(e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;
(f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of
trees and timber; or
(g) the quarring of stone or the burning of lime or
charcoal or the collection or removal of any forest
produce or its subjection to any manufacturing
process;
(ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of
forests and their protection from fire; when such
regulation or prohibition appears necessary for
any of the following purposes;
(a) for the conservation of trees and forests;
(b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or
the reclamation of saline or water logged land, the
prevention of landslips or of the formation of
ravines and torrents, or the protection of land
against erosion, or the deposit thereon of sand,
stones or gravel;
(c) for the improvement of grazing;
(d) for the maintenance of a water supply in
spring, river and tanks;
(e) for the maintenance, increase and distribution
of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel;
(f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation
works and hydro-electric works;
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(g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling
stones, floods and drought;
(h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways
and other lines of communication ; and
(i) for the preservation of the public health.
(2) The State Government may, for any such
purpose, construct at its own expense in any
forest such work as it thinks fit.
(3) No notification shall be made under sub section
(1) nor shall any work be begun under sub section
(2), until after the issue by an officer authorised by
the State Government in that behalf of a notice to
the owner of such forest calling on him to show
cause within a reasonable period to be specified
in such notice why such notification should not be
made or work constructed as the case may be,
and until his objection, if any, and any evidence
he may produce in support of the same, have been
heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf
and have been considered by the State
Government.
(4) A notice to show cause why a notification under
sub section (1) should not be made, may require
that for any period not exceeding one year or till
the date of the making of a notification, whichever
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is earlier the owner of such forest and all persons
who are entitled or permitted to do therein any or
all of the things specified in clause (i) of sub
section (1), whether by reason of any right, title or
interest or under any licence or contract or
otherwise, shall not, after the date of the notice
and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as
the case may be, do any or all the things specified
in clause (i) of sub section (1), to the extent
specified in the notice.
(5) A notice issued under sub section (3) shall be
served on the owner of such forest in the manner
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for
the service of summons and shall also be
published in the manner prescribed by rules.
(5A) Where a notice issued under sub section (3)
has been served on the owner of a forest in
accordance with sub section (5), any person
acquiring thereafter the right of a ownership of
that forest shall be bound by the notice as if it had
been served on him as an owner and he shall
accordingly comply with the notice, requisition
and notification, if any, issued under this section.
(6) Any person contravening any requisition made
under sub section (4) in a notice to show cause
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why a notification under sub section (1) should not
be made shall, on conviction , be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months or with fine, or with both.
(7) Any person contravening any of the provision
of a notification issued under sub section (1) shall,
on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine, or with both.”
6.2. The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975,
came into force on 30.08.1975. Section 2(c-i) of this Act
defines “forest” for the purposes of that Act.
“Section 2(c-i)- “forest” means a tract of land
covered with trees (whether standing, felled,
found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody
vegetation, whether of natural growth or planted
by human agency and existing or being
maintained with or without human effort, or such
tract of land on which such growth is likely to have
an effect on the supply of timber, fuel, forest
produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate, stream
flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such
matters and includes-
(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;
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(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or
was part of a forest or was lying within a forest
on the thirtieth day of August, nineteen seventy
five;
(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable
or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a
forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State
Government;
(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture
or for any purposes ancillary thereto;
(v) all the forest produce therein, whether
standing, felled, found or otherwise;”
Section 2(f) defines “private forest” as follows:
“Section 2(f) - “‘private forest’ means any forest
which is not the property of Government and
includes-
(i) any land declared before the appointed day to
be a forest under Section 34-A of the Forest Act;
(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification
issued under sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the
Forest Act, is in force immediately before the
appointed day;
(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been
issued under sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the
Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding
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two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify
in this behalf;
(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been
issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act;
(v) in a case where the State Government and any
other person are jointly interested in the forest, the
interest of such person in such forest;
(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such
forest which are considered to be necessary for
the convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and
lands appurtenant thereto;”
Section 3 provides that with effect from the
appointed day all private forests in the State shall
stand acquired and shall vest in the State
Government free from all encumbrances, subject
to the limited saving provided in Section 3(2).
“ Section 3 - Vesting of private forests in State
Government
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
law for the time being in force or in any settlement,
grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or
order of any court, tribunal or authority or any
other document, with effect on and from the
appointed day, all private forests in the State shall
stand acquired and vest, free from all
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encumbrances, in, and shall be deemed to be,
with all rights in or over the same or appertaining
thereto, the property of the State Government; and
all rights, title and interest of the owner or any
person other than Government subsisting in any
such forest on the said day shall be deemed to
have been extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply
to so much extent of land comprised in a private
forest as is held by an occupant or tenant and is
lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day
and is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by
Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
(Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 for the time being
in force or any building or structure standing
thereon or appurtenant thereto.
(3) All private forests vested in the State
Government under sub-section (1) shall be
deemed to be reserved forests within the meaning
of the Forest Act.”
Section 5 authorises State Government entry and
taking over of possession of private forests which
stand acquired and vested.
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“ Section 5 - Power to take over possession of
private forests
Where any private forest stands acquired and
vested in the State Government under the
provisions of this Act, the person authorised by the
State Government or by the Collector in this
behalf, shall enter into and take over possession
thereof, and if any person resists the taking over
of such possession, he shall without prejudice to
any other action to which he may be liable, be
liable to be removed by the use of such force as
may be necessary.”
Section 24 repeals Sections 34-A, 35, 36, 36-A,
36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Indian Forest Act on
and from the appointed day, with a later re-
enactment mechanism for restored lands
brought in by the Amending Act of 1978
operating through Section 22-A.
“ Section 24 - Repeal of Sections 34-A to 37 of
the Forest Act
“(1) On and from the appointed day, Sections 34-
A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest
Act shall stand repealed.
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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), on and from the date of commencement
of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition)
(Amendment) Act, 1978 (14 of 1978), Sections 34-
A, 35, 36, 36-A, 36-B, 36-C and 37 of the Forest
Act shall, in respect of the lands restored under
Section 22-A, be deemed to have been re-enacted
in the same form and be deemed always to have
been in force and applicable in respect of such
lands, as if they had not been repealed.”
6.3. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, came into force on
25.10.1980. Section 2 of that Act restrains the use of forest
land for non-forest purposes without the prior approval of
the Central Government and also regulates de-reservation
and assignment of forest land.
3
6.4. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 , provides the
framework for preparation and maintenance of the record
of rights and for mutation of entries upon changes in title
or enjoyment. The MLRC also provides departmental
remedies by way of appeal, revision and correction of
entries. These provisions form the revenue backdrop
against which the impugned mutations and annotations
were made and challenged.
7. The essential factual backdrop common to this batch of
appeals may be summarised as under:
3
Hereinafter referred to as, “MLRC”
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7.1 The appellants are landowners in the State of Maharashtra.
The factual background across these appeals and cognate
matters that have reached the High Court and this Court
over time is broadly similar with only minor variations. The
Respondent State Authorities assert that during the early
1960s notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were issued
and published in the Official Gazette. The stated purpose
of these notices was to call upon owners of lands described
as forest to show cause why regulatory measures under
Section 35(1) of the IFA should not be made and to afford
them an opportunity of objection and hearing, including
interim restraint as contemplated by Section 35(4) of the
IFA. Such notices were said to have been addressed to the
appellants and to other similarly placed private landholders
in the concerned districts. The landowners allege that such
notices were not personally served as contemplated by
Section 35(5) of the IFA, that no inquiry on objections was
ever held, and that no proceedings culminated in a final
notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. The landowners
state that the proceedings then lay dormant for extended
periods.
4
7.2 The Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975
commenced on 30.08.1975. The landowners allege that
even after its commencement the State Authorities did not
take possession under Section 5 of the MPFA and for
decades the lands continued to be dealt with as private
holdings. Transfers were effected, permissions were
4
Hereinafter referred to as, “MPFA”
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granted by revenue and charity authorities, planning
documents described the lands as agricultural or no
development zones, possession remained with private
owners or transferees, and no compensation was paid. The
State Authorities, on the other hand, contend that
publication of the notices and the inclusive definition of
private forest in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA furnished the
legal basis for vesting.
7.3 Beginning around 2001, the State Authorities initiated an
administrative exercise to annotate village records so as to
reflect affectation by forest proceedings and vesting under
the MPFA. Talathis and Circle Officers made entries in
village forms including the other rights column of Form VII
and Form XII with references to notices under Section 35(3)
of the IFA from the 1960s and in several matters the name
of the State was thereafter carried into the ownership
column. The landowners allege that these mutations were
made without prior notice and without adherence to the
MLRC. The State Authorities state that the entries were
ministerial reflections of statutory consequences.
7.4 The annotations and mutations produced collateral effects.
Sub-Registrars declined registration of instruments having
regard to departmental instructions. Possession
nonetheless remained with private parties. No award of
compensation was made. Departmental remedies under
the MLRC were invoked by several landholders but many
such proceedings did not reach adjudication. In that
situation writ petitions were filed seeking correction of
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records, declaratory relief regarding title and vesting, and
restoration of entries consistent with private title and
possession. This pattern also appears in cognate matters
already decided, and it forms part of the common factual
narrative that frames the present batch.
8. The nature of the challenges brought before the High Court
across this subject matter, including earlier cognate petitions,
was as follows:
8.1 The landholders approached the High Court by various
petitions to question the legality of revenue annotations
and mutation entries that described their lands as affected
by forest proceedings and as having vested in the State.
They sought quashing of those entries and a declaration
that their lands were not private forests within the meaning
of the MPFA. They also prayed for directions to restore the
record of rights in the names of the private owners and for
consequential reliefs to protect title and possession.
8.2 The principal grounds urged by the petitioners were that
publication of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA in the
Official Gazette without personal service under Section
35(5) of the IFA could not lawfully found any adverse
consequence. They pleaded that no inquiry on objections
was ever held and that no notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA was ever issued. They asserted that the
proceedings lay dormant for decades and that a stale or
inchoate notice could not trigger vesting under Section 3 of
the MPFA. They further contended that possession had
never been taken under Section 5 of the MPFA, that
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compensation had never been paid, and that the lands
continued to be treated as private holdings in revenue and
planning processes for long periods. Violations of the MLRC
and breach of natural justice were also pleaded.
8.3 The State responded that issuance of notices referable to
Section 35(3) of the IFA in the early 1960s brought the
lands within the inclusive definition of private forest in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and that vesting under Section
3 of the MPFA followed as a matter of law. It was submitted
that the challenged revenue entries were ministerial
reflections of statutory consequences. The State also raised
objections regarding delay and laches and pointed to
departmental remedies available under the MLRC.
In many of these petitions the High Court heard the matters
8.4
together and treated them as raising common questions.
The issues framed typically included whether the fact of a
notice said to have been issued under Section 35(3) of the
IFA was by itself sufficient to attract Section 2(f)(iii) of the
MPFA, whether service under Section 35(5) of the IFA and
a final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA were
jurisdictional preconditions, whether long dormancy could
defeat subsequent assertions of vesting, and whether the
impugned mutations could stand in the face of the
procedures mandated by the MLRC.
9. In one cognate batch of writ petitions decided by the High
Court on 24.03.2008, namely “ Oberoi Constructions Private
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 21 of 40
5
Limited v. State of Maharashtra , which was later set aside
by this Court in “ Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of
6
Maharashtra , the High Court gave the following findings:
9.1 In that matter, the petitioners were real-estate developers
who had acquired lands in Mumbai Suburban District long
after Gazette publications of notices said to be under
Section 35(3) of the IFA. For decades the lands had been
treated as non-agricultural and placed in industrial or
residential zones under successive development plans.
Around 2005–2006, the State Authorities made mutation
and annotation entries recording the lands as “private
forest” and as vested in the State under the MPFA. The
petitioners challenged these entries and the foundational
reliance on old Section 35(3) notices, invoking absence of
personal service, the lack of any final notification under
Section 35(1) of the IFA, prolonged dormancy, and
inconsistency with permissions under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and proceedings
under the Urban Land Ceiling law.
9.2 Proceeding principally on two Judge Bench decision of this
Court in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of
7
Maharashtra , the High Court held that the expression in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, “a notice has been issued
under Section 35(3) of the IFA”, is satisfied by the fact of
issuance, which could be evidenced by Gazette publication.
Service under Section 35(5) of the IFA or culmination in a
5
2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311
6
(2014) 3 SCC 430
7
(2000) 3 SCC 143
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 22 of 40
notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA was not treated
as a jurisdictional precondition.
9.3 The High Court further held that Section 35(4) of the IFA
does not create any lapse by efflux of time, and that the
MPFA contains no requirement that a notice be “live” or
“subsisting.” The Court declined to read such a gloss into
Section 2(f)(iii), rejecting arguments based on delay,
abandonment, or desuetude.
9.4 Treating Section 34-A of the IFA as an inclusive
interpretation clause, the High Court rejected the
submission that a prior declaration under Section 34-A was
a sine qua non for measures under Section 35 of the IFA or
for invoking Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
9.5 On vesting and its incidents, the High Court concluded that
Section 3 of the MPFA, with its non obstante clause,
prevailed over inconsistent zoning, permissions, or
exemptions under other enactments. Development plans
under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 and proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling law
could not defeat statutory vesting. The impugned revenue
mutations and annotations were sustained as ministerial
reflections of such vesting, and objections based on the
MLRC were not accepted, particularly in light of directions
issued in public-interest proceedings to update records.
9.6 Reliance was placed on the presumption of regularity of
official acts; the fact that many petitioners were derivative
owners without personal knowledge of the original events
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 23 of 40
was noted. On this reasoning, the writ petitions were
dismissed.
10. The judgement in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v.
State of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court
and decided by a three Judge Bench on 30.01.2014 and has
been the prevailing precedent in such matters viz . Godrej &
Boyce (supra) . This Court gave the following findings:
10.1 This Court held that the mere issuance of a notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA is not, by itself, sufficient to treat
land as a “private forest” within Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
The answer to the principal question was returned in the
negative.
10.2 Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of
the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced
from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on
the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce
evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may
be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal
consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service
is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA,
requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as
prescribed, reinforces this conclusion.
10.3 On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar
(Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the
Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 24 of 40
IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise
regarding the two-hectare exclusion. It was overruled to
that extent.
10.4 The Court further clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA
saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and
pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left
undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The
State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice
from 1956–57, never taken to its statutory culmination,
cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day.
10.5 On the definitional plane, the Court reaffirmed that the
“means and includes” formulation in Section 2(c-i) of the
MPFA does not dilute the primary sense of “forest”. Lands
long designated for urban use, developed under sanctioned
plans and permissions, and integrated with municipal
infrastructure could not, on the admitted facts, be regarded
as “forest” either in the primary or extended sense of
Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA.
10.6 Recognising the expropriatory character of the MPFA, the
Court applied strict construction. Fundamental norms of
fairness and good governance preclude unsettling settled
civilian and commercial arrangements after prolonged
State inaction, particularly where the State itself facilitated
and acquiesced in development over decades.
10.7 Even assuming arguendo that the lands were forest,
wholesale demolition and dispossession after half a century
was neither feasible nor in the public interest on the facts
recorded. The equities of third-party purchasers and
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 25 of 40
residents, the State’s prolonged acquiescence, and the
practical impossibility of “restoration” militated against
such a course.
10.8 In consequence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s
judgement was set aside, and actions premised solely on
stale notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were quashed.
11. After the judgement of Godrej and Boyce (supra) , the High
Court has followed it as a binding precedent and used its
findings to decide similar matters, whose facts are akin to
those of the appellants before us. Some of these are enlisted
hereunder:
8
11.1 Satellite Developers Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra :
Here the High Court held that mere issuance of a notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA does not vest land in the
State. It further observed that entries made in 2006
pursuant to directions in a public interest litigation would
not, by themselves, effect vesting, particularly when no
further steps under Section 35(3), Section 35(4), and
Section 35(5) of the IFA were undertaken.
11.2 Sinhagad Technical Education Society v. Deputy
9
Conservator of Forests : In the case of a subsequent
purchaser, the High Court reaffirmed that service of notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA is mandatory.
10
11.3 Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra :
Emphasising Godrej and Boyce (supra) , the High Court
8
2014 SCC OnLine Bom 66
9
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 293
10
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5832
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 26 of 40
reiterated that mere issuance of a notice under Section
35(3) of the IFA is not sufficient to vest land with the State
and declined a remand as futile given the authorities’ stated
stance.
Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (Dr.) v. Tahsildar, District
11.4
11
Thane : The High Court held that a bare Section 35(3)
notice under the IFA is insufficient to effect vesting.
12
11.5 Lalit A. Sangtani v. State of Maharashtra : The High
Court underscored that due service of a notice under
Section 35(3) of the IFA is mandatory.
13
Bharat Chandulal Nanavati v. Union of India
11.6 :
Addressing a subsequent purchaser and proceedings
under Section 22A of the MPFA, the High Court held that
“issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA necessarily includes
service. Finding no proof or contemporaneous record of
service of the notice dated 17.02.1956, the High Court
concluded that proceedings under Section 22A of the MPFA
could not be founded merely on Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA.
14
11.7 Global Estate Developers v. State of Maharashtra :
The High Court confined itself to whether the land qualified
as “private forest” under the MPFA and reiterated the
mandate of service under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.8 Indrajeet Kashinath Kaiswal v. State of
15
Maharashtra : The High Court clarified that Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA applies only to “live” or “pipeline”
11
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 295
12
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 248
13
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 3862
14
2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8345
15
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6743
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 27 of 40
notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA, not stale notices left
undecided.
16
11.9 Nana Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra : In a
matter involving acquisition and subsequent return, the
High Court again insisted upon proof of service of the notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.10 Shree Maruti Sansthan Trust v. State of
17
Maharashtra : For a subsequent purchaser, the High
Court noted that apart from an entry in the “Golden
Register” there was no material showing issuance and/or
service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA.
11.11 Vishram Vishwanath Kunte v. State of
18
Maharashtra : During the pendency of an inquiry under
Section 22A of the MPFA, a mutation entry branded the
land as forest; the High Court deprecated recurring
affidavits from State officers asserting that Godrej and
Boyce (supra) laid down no law, terming this “continued
defiance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Godrej & Boyce…”.
12. However, for the present appellants, whose facts are similar
to those of the various petitioners in the different judgements
of the High Court as well as those in Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) discussed above, the High Court vide the impugned
judgment and order dated 28.09.2018 dismissed all the writ
petitions. It would be worthwhile to record here that one
member of the Division Bench of the High Court had authored
16
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 340
17
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 7074
18
WP No. 594 of 2022, decided on 16.09.2022
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 28 of 40
the decision in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v.
State of Maharashtra (Supra) that was later overturned in
Godrej and Boyce (supra) . The impugned judgment proceeds
on the following reasons:
12.1
The High Court framed the primary issue as whether
Godrej and Boyce (supra) applied, and secondly whether
subsequent purchasers could rely upon it when their
predecessors-in-title had not questioned the applicability of
the MPFA or the steps taken thereunder.
12.2 Proceeding from Section 3 of the MPFA, the High Court held
that vesting of all “private forests” was complete on the
appointed day (30.08.1975) and that any post-1975
transactions were ineffectual to confer title. Mutation
entries made in 2002 were treated as a ministerial
reflection of an earlier vesting rather than its source.
12.3 On Section 35 process under the IFA, the High Court
accepted the State’s case that notices under Section 35(3)
of the IFA had been issued and served, and, in several
matters, that a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA
was in force before the appointed day. Reliance was placed
on the “Golden Register”, Gazette extracts, possession
notices referable to Section 5 of the MPFA, lists circulated
in 1976, and panchanamas; the contrary pleadings of the
petitioners were described as guarded or vague.
12.4 The High Court distinguished Godrej and Boyce (supra) ,
observing that the owners there had an earlier consent
decree, long-standing sanctioned development, and an
evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through. On that
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 29 of 40
basis, the High Court treated Godrej and Boyce (supra) as
fact-specific and of limited assistance to subsequent
purchasers.
12.5 As to the term “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and
the service requirement traced to Section 35(5) of the IFA,
the High Court did not dispute the principle in Godrej and
Boyce (supra) but concluded that, on the records cited, the
requirement stood satisfied in these matters.
12.6 On “stale” versus “live” notices, the High Court read
Godrej and Boyce (supra) as context-bound and, in any
event, held that even if Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were
unavailable, the State could succeed on the primary
definition of “forest” in Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA, including
by reference to natural growth and contiguity with reserved
forest.
12.7 The High Court emphasised that most petitioners were
subsequent purchasers who came on the scene long after
30.08.1975, and stated it was “surprising” that they sought
to contest service under Section 35(3) of the IFA without
affidavits from original owners or contemporaneous
material; burden was effectively placed on the petitioners
to dislodge official records.
12.8 Entries describing lands as “Private Forest-Forest
Department” were justified as having been made pursuant
to directions in PIL No. 17 of 2002 and Government
circulars; the High Court considered the challenge to such
entries, decades after vesting, to be misconceived.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 30 of 40
12.9 Arguments based on Section 21 of the MPFA were rejected;
the High Court treated that provision as an enabling route,
not a precondition to vesting already effected by Section 3
of the MPFA.
12.10
Contentions invoking the two-hectare exclusion in Section
2(f)(iii) of the MPFA were declined, the High Court holding
that later allotment of gata/survey sub-divisions could not
undo vesting.
12.11 Objections raised under Section 22A of the MPFA and to
certificates under Section 6 of the MPFA were addressed
with reference to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the
High Court reiterating that prior approval under that Act
was necessary and past non-compliant issuances could not
aid the petitioners.
12.12 While one exceptional matter (e.g., involving long-standing
urban use or missing records) was remitted for verification
by the Collector, the High Court otherwise dismissed the
petitions, characterising several as commercially motivated
and not bona fide, and cautioning that entertaining them
would weaken forest protection.
13. We have gone through the comprehensive material on record,
the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants and
for the respondent-State, as well as the impugned order of the
High Court. Having done so, we are of the considered view
that the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained for the following reasons:
13.1 In our opinion, the controlling legal position is settled. For
vesting to occur under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 31 of 40
footing of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the
IFA must not only be issued but must also be served upon
the landholder. The expression “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii)
of the MPFA Act comprehends due service on the owner,
because service alone triggers the owner’s right to object,
including the jurisdictional plea that the land is not a forest
within Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA Act, and obliges the State
to consider such objection. We are unable to agree with the
High Court that the reproduction of a draft text of Section
35(1) beneath a Section 35(3) show cause in the Gazette
amounts to a concluded notification under Section 35(1) of
the IFA. A notice that grants time for objections cannot
coexist with a final decision under Section 35(1) without
rendering the statutory hearing illusory. Mutation entries
are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition
that lacks the statutory predicates. They neither create title
in the State nor divest title from the private owner.
13.2 On the facts across these appeals, we find that the essential
links in the statutory chain are missing. There is no proof
of service of any Section 35(3) notice of the IFA on the then
owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of
the IFA. Actual possession has at all times remained with
private owners and this position is reflected in the revenue
records that describe them as occupants. No possession
was taken under Section 5 of the MPFA Act, no schemes
were set in motion under Section 4, no compensation
exercise was undertaken under Section 7, and no inquiry
under Section 6 was held at a time proximate to the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 32 of 40
appointed day of 30 August 1975. The materials produced
by the State include undated and unverified possession
papers that do not inspire confidence when set against
decades of undisturbed private possession. In one instance
the State relies on a pipeline notice which was addressed
to a person who was not the owner as on 29 or 30 August
1975. In another, the land forms part of an industrial estate
converted to non-agricultural use long before 1975. In yet
another, there was never any claim that a Section 35(3)
notice was even issued. These features are wholly
inconsistent with a completed vesting under Section 3(1) of
the MPFA Act.
13.3 We are not persuaded by the Respondent State’s reliance
on post-hoc material. Satellite imagery and panchnamas
drawn in 2016 do not establish the character of the lands
on the appointed day, which is the only relevant date for
Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act. A nineteenth century
notification, invoked for the first time at the appellate stage
to suggest linkage with a reserved forest, was not the
foundation of the impugned mutations and cannot be used
to improve the case now. The administrative orders must
stand or fall on the reasons originally given and the High
Court could not sustain vesting on grounds that were never
the basis of action. The absence of any notification under
Section 34A of the IFA further weakens the State’s position.
We also find merit in the submission that a restoration
under Section 22A of the MPFA Act presupposes a lawful
vesting. When the foundational vesting is unproven, any
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 33 of 40
purported restoration cannot cure the defect, and in any
event the limited window created by Section 22A cannot be
reopened decades later. Expropriatory legislation must be
construed strictly and Article 300-A of the Constitution
requires that no person is deprived of property save by
authority of law. When a statute prescribes a manner of
doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not at all.
Here, several mandatory steps are absent. Any one missing
step would defeat vesting. The High Court was therefore in
error in treating the case as if only a consequential
mutation remained.
13.4 We are also unable to accept the distinctions drawn by the
High Court. The binding ratio on service, on the need for a
live process, and on strict compliance does not turn on
whether an appellant is an original owner or a subsequent
purchaser. It also does not turn on whether construction
has occurred on the land. The State itself has, on earlier
occasions, recognised that subsequent purchasers cannot
be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings which they had
no means to discover. The record here shows that the
revenue entries continued to carry the names of the private
owners, which indicates that even the State did not treat
these lands as vested forests. To hold that a subsequent
purchaser is in a worse position than one who developed
land would invert the logic of the statute and would reward
illegality while penalising restraint. We reject that
approach.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 34 of 40
13.5 We are further of the view that a remand for an inquiry
under Section 6 of the MPFA Act is neither warranted nor
efficacious. Such an inquiry is designed to be
contemporaneous with the appointed day so that
meaningful evidence on the character of the land can be
adduced by both sides. After the passage of nearly half a
century, that exercise would be largely academic and would
not cure the absence of the mandatory preconditions of a
served notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA and a lawful
progression towards a notification under Section 35(1). The
authorities have also adopted a concluded litigating stance
on the very matters they would be called upon to decide,
which would not inspire confidence in the fairness of any
remanded proceeding. In our opinion, the impugned
judgment rests on a misreading of the Gazette, an
impermissible dilution of mandatory statutory steps, and
reliance on materials that are extraneous to the original
basis of action. It therefore cannot be sustained.
14. While the High Court in the impugned judgement dismissed
all the writ petitions by a common order, it did not attempt
any principled differentiation among the petitions before it.
Having closely examined the record, and in order to assess
the distinctions the High Court is said to have perceived with
the petitioners in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) , we have
undertaken our own classification for clarity. We have no
hesitation in stating that had this exercise been undertaken
by the High Court in the impugned judgement, considerable
judicial time could have been saved and directed to the
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 35 of 40
unsettled legal questions on which many litigants rest their
hopes. It is with this consideration in mind that we proceeded
to categorise the 96 civil appeals into 3 categories.
14.1 The first category concerns the status of ownership, that is
to say whether the appellants’ title was derived before or
after the alleged notices under IFA were issued around
1960s by the State Government. For clarification, if a title
is devolved by inheritance subsequently but if the land has
been owned by the same family throughout, the ownership
would be deemed to be continuing since the land came first
in the family’s possession. On our analysis, 77 appeals
involve derivative title and 19 involve continuing or ongoing
title. The second category concerns the period of ownership,
namely whether ownership commenced before or after the
enforcement of MPFA. In this category, 72 appellants
acquired ownership after MPFA and 24 appellants owned
the land before MPFA. The third category concerns the
existence of construction on the subject lands. In this
category, 26 appellants have raised some form of
construction on the subject lands, while 70 appellants have
not raised construction or the position is not clearly
established on the materials placed on record.
14.2 After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no
legally relevant distinction between the present cases and
the decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) . The ratio in
Godrej and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice
under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live
process capable of culminating in a notification under
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 36 of 40
Section 35(1) of the IFA, and strict compliance with the
statutory steps that alone can support vesting under
Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section
2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the same deficiencies
Godrej and Boyce (Supra)
that were fatal in . There is no
proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA
on the then owners. There is no final notification under
Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with
private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action
was taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act.
These features mirror the very elements that led this Court
to hold that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) .
14.3 We do not accept the distinctions on which the High Court
sought to sidestep Godrej and Boyce (Supra) . The fact that
some appellants are subsequent purchasers does not
diminish the requirement of service and a live statutory
process. Godrej and Boyce (Supra) itself concerned a
batch in which many parties were not original owners, yet
the controlling principles were applied uniformly. The
presence or absence of construction is equally irrelevant to
the legal question of vesting. What matters is compliance
with the prerequisites of the MPFA Act and the IFA. The
present record shows revenue entries that continued to
reflect private ownership and occupation. It shows a
pipeline notice addressed to a person who was not the
owner on the relevant date. It shows lands long converted
to non-agricultural or industrial use. None of this allows
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 37 of 40
the State to dispense with service under Section 35(3) of
the IFA or to conjure a final notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA from a draft placed beneath a show cause. In our
opinion, the differences invoked by the High Court are
insubstantial and cannot displace the binding ratio.
14.4 We find that the High Court’s approach amounts to an
attempt to avoid a binding precedent rather than to apply
it. The impugned reasoning rests on a misreading of a
Gazette publication that only reproduced a draft text and
expressly invited objections. It relies on material that is
subsequent to the appointed day and that was never the
foundation of the impugned mutation entries. It treats
mutation as if it were constitutive of title and not a
ministerial reflection of underlying legal events. Each of
these moves stands at odds with Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) , which requires strict adherence to the statutory
sequence before vesting can be asserted.
14.5 Judicial discipline required faithful application of the law
declared by this Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution. Coordinate Benches of the High Court have
consistently followed Godrej and Boyce (Supra) in closely
comparable situations. The impugned judgment
nonetheless revives positions that Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) has rejected. We also note that the Bench was
presided over by the same Judge who had earlier taken a
contrary view that was set aside by this Court. We do not
attribute motive. However, when a judgment minimizes a
binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 38 of 40
distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of
a reluctance to accept precedent. Such an approach
conveys a measure of pettiness that is inconsistent with the
detachment that judicial reasoning demands. In our view,
this is an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare
decisis.
14.6 We accordingly hold that the present appeals are
indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce
(Supra) . The record discloses the same jurisdictional defect
of non-service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA,
the same absence of a final notification under Section 35(1)
of the IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps
under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the MPFA Act. In such
circumstances the High Court could not, consistently with
Article 141 of the Constitution, avoid the binding ratio by
treating immaterial differences as determinative. In our
opinion, fidelity to binding precedent and to the statutory
scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the
impugned order must be set aside.
15. In view of the foregoing analysis, the appeals are allowed.
16. The impugned judgment and order dated 27.09.2018 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 6417
of 2015, amongst others, is set aside. The writ petitions before
the High Court in the aforementioned matter are allowed. All
mutation orders and any declarations treating the subject
lands as private forests are quashed and set aside.
Consequential corrections be made in the revenue records.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5454 OF 2019 ETC. ETC. Page 39 of 40
17. Liberty is reserved to the State to initiate such proceedings, in
accordance with law, as per the relevant Statutes and to bring
them to a logical conclusion after following due process of
law.
18. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
………………………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
………………………………………..J.
[PRASANNA B. VARALE]
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 07, 2025
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