VIJAYA vs. STATE REP BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1573/2022 (@Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)  No.5139/2020) VIJAYA                                             Petitioner(s)                                 VERSUS STATE REP BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE               Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T   SURYA KANT, J. Leave granted. 2. The   appellant   is   wife   of   the   de­facto   complainant   Mani   @ Allimuthu. After about 2 years of their marriage, the couple was blessed with a daughter. It appears that on account of appellant’s failure to cook sufficient food for her in­laws, who visited their house, a quarrel took place between the husband and the wife. The appellant, unfortunately, decided to commit suicide and consumed a poisonous substance, Odeuvanthlai, which she also administered to their 10 months old daughter. The husband of the appellant, namely, the de­facto complainant, had gone for work at that time and when he came back to his house after his work on 10­10­2012, he found both the appellant and their daughter unconscious. They were taken Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2022.09.22 11:53:09 IST Reason: to Vinayaga Mission Hospital, Salem where the baby girl died on 13­10­2012. When the appellant gained consciousness, her purported Dying Declaration (Exhibit `P­20’) was recorded on 11­10­2012 by 2 learned   Judicial   Magistrate   (P.W.   13).   The   appellant   eventually survived. The husband of the appellant had meanwhile reported the matter to the Police, which led to registration of a case under Sections 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘Code’) against the appellant for causing the death of their daughter.  3. The appellant was put on trial, in which 14 witnesses were examined   from   the   prosecution   side,   besides   reliance   on   23 documents.  4. The   Principal   Sessions   Judge,   Namakkal   found   the   appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 304(1) and 309 of the Code and sentenced her under Section 304(1) to undergo imprisonment for one year along with fine of Rs.5,000/­, in default whereof, she was required   to   undergo   further   imprisonment   for   three   months.   The appellant was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months under Section 309 of the Code along with fine of Rs.1,000/­. 5. The   appellant   preferred   appeal   before   the   High   Court   of Judicature at Madras, but her appeal was turned down by the High Court on the following premise:­ “10. On reading of the entire materials EX.P20 recorded by P.W. 2 stated that being the dying declaration at the time when   she   was   admitted   in   the   hospital,   the   learned Magistrate recorded the statement from the appellant. The appellant has clearly admitted that she consumed poison due to the stomach pain and also she gave the poison to the child.  The   statement   under   Section  164   of  Cr.P.C.,   made before the learned Judicial Magistrate, and the evidence of the doctor that she has consumed poison and the same was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8. Therefore no other evidence   is   necessary   to   find   out   that   the   accused   has committed  the   offence.   The   medical   evidence   also 3 corroborated   the   same.   The   learned   counsel   for   the appellant would submit that the accused was admitted in the Government hospital, Salem, but the medical certificate was not produced. FIR also registered after three days from the date of occurrence. 11.   On   considering   the   case,   there   was   a   wordy   quarrel between   the   family   members   and   due   to   the   quarrel   the accused suddenly taken the decision to consume poison and gave   the   same   to   her   child   also.   Thereafter,   she   was admitted in Government hospital immediately. The statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., from the deceased which was marked as Ex.P20 and which was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8 doctor who has given treatment to the deceased Kanishka and the accused Vijaya.” 6. The question that arises for consideration is whether it is tenable to uphold the conviction of the appellant solely on the basis of her purported dying declaration (Exhibit `P20’) which also appears to have been classified as a Statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, considering that Appellant has denied making any statement? 7. In this regard, there has been a clear and consistent approach taken by this Court toward a dying declaration when the individual in question subsequently survives. In  State of U.P. v. Veer Singh (2004) 10 SCC 117 , it was held: “5. It is trite law that when maker of purported dying declaration   survives   the   same   is   not   statement   under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the   'Evidence   Act')   but   is   a   statement   in   terms   of Section 164 of the Code. It can be used under Section 157 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of corroboration and under Section 155 for the purpose of contradiction.”  4 8. There are also some decisions of this Court which cast doubt on   whether   such   a   statement   can   be   treated   as   a   confessional statement.  We may, in this regard, rely upon two decisions,  i.e., (i) “Ramprasad vs State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 30 and (ii) “S. Arul Raja vs State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 8 SCC 233. 9. In  Ramprasad (Supra)  the bar on classifying a statement as a dying declaration when the conveyer of the declaration does not succumb to his/her injuries, was detailed as follows: “ We   are   in   full   agreement   with   the   contention   of   the learned counsel that Ext.52 cannot be used as evidence under   Section   32   of   the   Evidence   Act   though   it   was recorded as a dying declaration. At the time when PW.1 gave the statement he would have been under expectation of death but that is not sufficient to wiggle it into the cassette   of   Section   32.   As   long   as   the   maker   of   the statement is alive it would remain only in the realm of a statement recorded during investigation. ”  10. The Court in  S. Arul Raja (Supra)  then went on to address the issue   of   such   a   statement   being   treated   as   a   confessional statement, by holding:  “ 40. This Court in the case of Sharawan Bhadaji Bhirad & Others v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 10 SCC 56   held   that   when   a   statement   is   recorded   as   a   dying declaration and the victim survives, such statement need not stand the strict scrutiny of a dying declaration, but may be treated as a statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. 41. Therefore, with the said statement inadmissible as a dying declaration, the question that arises is: whether the statement could be admissible either as a confession or as an extra­judicial confession? 42.   The   events   surrounding   the   confession   made   by   A1 while   in   hospital,   and   more   significantly,   in   police custody, are too ambiguous to support conviction of the appellant. 5 43.   Section   164   Cr.P.C.   provides   guidelines   to   be followed   for   taking   the   statement   of   accused   as   a confession. The one essential condition is that it must be   made   voluntarily   and   not   under   threat   or   coercion. This Court in Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal reported in (2007) 12 SCC 230 held as under: ­ "87. Confession ordinarily is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted upon. Confession may under certain circumstances and subject to law laid down by   the   superior   judiciary   from   time   to   time   form   the basis for conviction. It is, however, trite that for the said purpose the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the confession; (iii) corroboration. ” 11. Hence, the focus of our inquiry is two­fold: i) Whether the statement made by the Appellant, which does not qualify as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act but, rather, as a statement   under   Section   164   of   the   CrPC,   may   be   treated   as   a confession   statement;   and   ii)   Whether   there   is   corroborative evidence that supports the prosecution’s case. 12. At the outset, the subsequent denial by the Appellant of the statement attributed to her is of relevance. It further appears that PWs 1 & 5, Appellant’s husband who is also the complainant, and   her   father­in­law,   have   both   turned   hostile.   However,   the learned   Sessions   Judge   brushed   aside   this   factor   based   on   the rationale that these individuals were, ultimately, interested in ensuring that the Appellant was acquitted and hence resiled from their earlier statements which had supported her guilt. The trail court opined that the prosecution version of events was, by far, 6 the   more   plausible   and   logically   resulted   in   the   demise   of   the Appellant’s daughter. 13. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, has vehemently urged that   the   only   basis   for   the   conviction   of   Appellant   after   the hostile   turn   of   this   class   of   witnesses,   was   the   purported declaration   made   by   the   Appellant   while   she   was   admitted   in hospital and the statement of the doctor entrusted with treating the Appellant, PW8. However, he assails PW8’s statement as being shorn of any particulars beyond the fact that he treated Appellant and that both the Appellant and the deceased had consumed the same poisonous substance. 14. Undoubtedly   there   is   some   murkiness   surrounding   the   exact circumstances   in   which   the   Appellant   and   her   daughter   consumed Odeuvanthlai. The Appellant has attributed her initial statement on 11.10.2012, when she had regained consciousness in the hospital, to influencing from the police who allegedly convinced her that they would apprehend the individuals who had offered her daughter and her   the   tainted   honey,   and   also   recover   the   jewelry   that   these unidentified   persons   had   stolen.   However,   she   claimed   that   they asked her to remain silent about these details and simply convey that the two of them had consumed Odeuvanthlai.  15. This sequence of events has been disbelieved by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Be that as it may, this necessarily has an impact on the genuineness of the initial statement made by the Appellant. Combined with the subsequent hostile turns taken by some 7 of the vital witnesses in the trial, a seed of doubt is planted in terms of the conviction of the Appellant.  16. At   this   stage,   it   is   important   to   understand   the   ambit   of “reasonable doubt” in a criminal proceeding. In  State of Haryana v. Bhagirath & Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 96  the difficulty in demarcating the contours of “reasonable doubt” was remarked upon: “ 10.   It   is   nearly   impossible   in   any   criminal   trial   to prove all elements with scientific precision. A criminal court   could   be   convinced   of   the   guilt   only   beyond   the range   of   a   reasonable   doubt.   Of   course,   the   expression "reasonable   doubt"   is   incapable   of   definition.   Modern thinking   is   in   favour   of   the   view   that   proof   beyond   a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral certainty to the judge. 11. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on Criminal Law in United States has quoted from judicial pronouncements in his book on "Wharton's Criminal Evidence" as follows (at page 31, volume 1 of the 12th Edition): It is difficult to define the phrase "reasonable doubt." However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or followed   is   that   given   by   Chief   Justice   Saw   in   the Webster Case. He says: "It is not mere possible doubt, because   everything   relating   to   human   affairs   and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,   leaves   the   minds   of   the   jurors   in   that consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction   to   a   moral   certainty   of   the   truth   of   the charge. 12. In the treatise on "The Law of Criminal Evidence" authored   by   HC   Underbill   it   is   stated   (at   page   34, Volume 1 of the Fifth Edition) thus: The   doubt   to   be   reasonable   must   be   such   a   one   as   an honest, sensible and fair­minded man might, with reason, entertain   consistent   with   a   conscientious   desire   to ascertain   the   truth.   An   honestly   entertained   doubt   of guilt is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an inference   of   the   possibility   of   the   innocence   of   the 8 accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one   which   arises   from   a   consideration   of   all   the evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a reasonable doubt. ” 17. Thus, the focus for us when ascertaining reasonable doubt is not merely the possibility of doubt or of another version of events but rather a version that survives the scrutiny of an honest and conscientious   judicial   mind.   In   the   present   case,   we   note   that following the incident, the marriage between the Appellant and PW1, the complainant, continues to subsist and that she has given birth to two minor children. 18. When considering the Appellant’s guilt, the Sessions Judge and the High Court have not satisfactorily considered the effect and impact of   PW1 & PW’5’s failure to support the prosecution. When considering the disputed confession by the Appellant, the bedrock on which the prosecution’s case stood was undone but the Sessions Judge and the High Court proceeded on what prima facie appears to be an almost unqualified acceptance that the confession remained unassailable. This was in spite of the fact that only PW8 remained to provide some degree of corroboration regarding the prosecution’s story.  19. The reasons for why PW1 & PW5 turned hostile may be numerous and  as  compelling  as  each  other.  While  the lower courts have 9 considered   them   to   be   interested   witnesses   concerned   with   the acquittal of the Appellant, we are unable to ascertain why that is a more likely reason for their non­cooperation than the fact that they   believed   the   Appellant   was   being   wrongly   accused   and   that their initial statements were taken under duress. 20. Undoubtedly, it is not incumbent upon us, nor possible, to undertake   such   a   factual   analysis   at   this   stage.   We   can   only observe   that   further   consideration   of   this   point   was   necessary, especially   in   light   of   the   guilt   of   the   Appellant   not   tallying easily with her continuing marriage to PW1 and her fostering of two children after the tragic loss of her first born. It is the absence of   an   evaluation   of   this   nuance   on   the   record   that   creates   a reasonable doubt in our minds regarding Appellant’s conviction. 21. When the facts and circumstances of a case are as peculiar as the one before us, the judicial responsibility to scrape the bottom of   the   barrel   and   address   the   specificities   head   on   is   even greater. It is in the same vein, that we are compelled to observe that   there   are   issues   of   contention   that,   having   not   been adequately addressed, benefit the Appellant. 22. For   the   reasons   aforesaid,   the   appeal   is   allowed   and   the Judgment   dated   27­4­2017   of   the   learned   Trial   Court   and   the impugned Judgment dated 19­3­2019 passed by the High Court both are set aside. 10 23. Needless   to   state   that   interim   protection   granted   by   this Court to the appellant on 13­8­2020 and continued on 16­10­2020, is made absolute. ................J (SURYA KANT) .................J      (HRISHIKESH ROY) NEW DELHI; 15TH SEPTEMBER, 2022.