Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAIS AHMAD
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/08/1999
BENCH:
S.Saghir Ahmad, D.P.Wadhwa
JUDGMENT:
S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.
Leave granted.
Appellant’s writ petition in the Allahabad High Court
which was listed on 24.4.1996 was disposed of in the absence
of his counsel and was dismissed on merits. An application
filed thereafter for setting aside the order dated 24.4.1996
was dismissed on 27.8.1997. It is against this order that
the present appeal has been filed.
The writ petition in which the above order was passed
was listed before the High Court on 24.4.1996. The counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant had sent an "Illness
Slip". This is not disputed. It is also not disputed that
the counsel was ill. It is further not disputed that the
Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court had granted the
application of the appellant’s counsel for adjournment of
his cases on the ground of his being ill. The court,
however, did not adjourn the case and proceeded to hear and
dispose of the writ petition on merits in the absence of the
appellant’s counsel. The writ petition, as pointed out
earlier, was ultimately dismissed and when an application
for recall of the order dated 24.4.1996 was given, it was
also rejected by the High Court on the ground that the
"Illness Slip" sent by the appellant’s counsel was not
brought to the notice of the court. The court also observed
that the writ petition has been decided on merits and,
therefore, there was no occasion to recall that order.
Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that
if the mistake was that of the office of the Court in not
bringing to the notice of the court that the counsel for the
appellant had sent an "Illness Slip", the appellant cannot
be made to suffer and in that situation the High Court would
retain its jurisdiction to recall an erroneous order under
its inherent It is also contended that the High Court while
considering the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution exercises Constitutional powers which are not
fettered by any constraints and, therefore, even if merits
of the writ petition were considered in the absence of the
counsel for the appellant, the judgment passed on that
basis, can still be recalled.
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Article 225 of the Constitution provides as under:
"Jurisdiction of existing High Courts -- Subject to
the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of
any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of
powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution,
the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any
existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges
thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the
Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to
regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof
sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution :
[Provided that any restriction to which the exercise
of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with
respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning
any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was
subject immediately before the commencement of this
Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such
jurisdiction.]"
This Article provides that the jurisdiction of the
High Court, the law administered therein and the respective
powers of Judges in relation to the administration of
justice shall be the same as they were immediately before
the commencement of the Constitution.
Thus, the power of the High Court as they were before
the Constitution have been preserved. One of the powers so
preserved is the power to make rules of court and to
regulate the sitting of the courts.
Even before the Constitution came into force, the High
Court of Allahabad had already made the Rules for regulating
its business etc. in the Court. We would not trace the
history whether there did exist rules made under Section 108
of the Government of India Act, 1915 or under the Government
of India Act, 1935. The present Allahabad High Court has
been re-constituted on amalgamation of the erstwhile Oudh
Chief Court with the High Court in 1948. In exercise of the
power under Article 225 of the Constitution, the High Court
has framed Rules known as "Rules of Court, 1952" which came
into force with effect from 15.9.1952. Chapter VI of the
Rules provides for hearing and adjournment of cases. Rule
15 of this Chapter provides as under :
"Chapter VI, Rule 15 - Hearing and Adjournment of
Cases (Rules of Court):
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(1) The Chief Justice may on the application of an
advocate postpone his case for such time as he may deem
proper, if he is satisfied that such postponement is
necessary on account of a marriage, death and illness or any
other unavoidable or urgent reason.
(2) An application under this Rule shall be
accompanied by a list of cases desired to be postponed
specifying the occasion or occasions, if any, when any such
case was previously postponed under this Rule. It shall
also indicate the cases in which the date of hearing has
been fixed by a Bench. If any omission or inaccuracy in
this regard is discovered, the application (or if any
advocate whose such application has been allowed is found to
have appeared before any of the Benches of the Court or
before any other Court or Tribunal except where the
postponement has been ordered specifically on ground of
appearance before any particular Court or Tribunal, in any
case, whether for orders, admission or hearing), the
application for postponement of cases shall stand rejected
automatically."
The Chief Justice has the exclusive jurisdiction under
the Constitution to distribute the business of court among
various Judges for purposes of disposal of cases. It is the
Chief Justice who constitutes and decides about the
composition of Division Benches or the Judges who would sit
single. This is part of his administrative functions. This
Rule gives effect to the administrative powers of the Chief
Justice and it enables the Chief Justice to adjourn the
cases provided an application is given to him on the grounds
set out in the Rule. This power obviously has been
conferred upon the Chief Justice to facilitate the listing
of cases. If a counsel on account of the reasons set out in
the Rule, which also includes his illness, is unable to
attend the court on any particular day or for any particular
period of time, he can make an application to the Chief
Justice that his cases may not be listed either on that day
or during the period mentioned in the application. Once
this application is allowed, it becomes the duty of the
Registry to give effect to this order by not listing the
cases of that counsel before the court. If, however, such a
case is listed by mistake, the litigant or the counsel
cannot be the sufferer, in accordance with the saying that
"the mistake of the court would not harm a litigant."
In the instant case, admittedly, the counsel for the
appellant had applied to the Chief Justice for his cases
being not listed on account of illness and that application
was allowed and, therefore, it was the duty of the Registry
that the cases in which he was appearing as a counsel were
not shown in the cause-list before any court. This case,
incidentally, was shown in the cause-list on 24th April,
1996 and was disposed of. It is stated in the application
for recall of that order that the counsel had sent an
’Illness Slip’, but this plea has not been accepted by the
court on the ground that the Illness Slip was not brought to
the notice of the court. It is important to note that the
fact that the ’Illness Slip’ was sent to the court is not
disputed. What is disputed is that this was not brought to
the notice of the court. The tradition in the Allahabad
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High Court is that an "Illness Slip" is usually given to the
Court Master or the Bench Secretary of the Court and it is
expected of the Bench Secretary that he would bring it to
the notice of the court either at the beginning of the day
or at the time when the case is called out and taken up for
hearing. Once the "Illness Slip" is brought to the notice
of the Court, the case, traditionally, is adjourned.
"Traditions" of a court are built upon the edifice of
cooperation between Judges and lawyers over a period of
years. "Traditions", are doctrines, customs, practices,
beliefs and usages which are handed down from generation to
generation. As pointed out earlier, one of the traditions
of the Allahabad High Court, which is now more than 130
years old and has seen many generations of lawyers, is that
a case would be adjourned on the "Illness Slip" of a
counsel. This and other traditions of the Court bind the
lawyers and Judges in a sacred relationship of mutual trust
and understanding. The adjournment of a case on the
"Illness Slip" reflects the court’s respect for the counsel
and its consciousness that a lawyer or counsel, though an
officer of the court, is nevertheless a human being who can
fall ill. It also reflects the faith and trust the lawyer
has in the Court that the Court would, on his "illness
slip", adjourn the case.
It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the
facility of adjournment available to the counsel on the
ground of "Illness Slip" is a facility which has been abused
more often than not, so much so that interim orders once
obtained have notoriously been found to have continued for a
long time merely on the "illness slip" and, therefore, the
facility of adjournment on this basis should be abolished so
that the litigant whose counsel has fallen ill, may make
alternative arrangement and the hearing of the case may not
be affected. That may be true in rare cases and in that
situation the Judges would not act upon the "Illness Slip"
if it is found, from a mere look at the running order sheet,
that the facility has been misused or abused. But, isolated
examples would not be destructive of the noble tradition.
Moreover, litigants in this country are generally poor
(agriculturists) coming from rural areas or they are govt.
servants or workmen in an industrial establishment or the
like and they cannot afford or manage the luxury of engaging
another counsel. This privilege is available only to the
Central or State Governments who not only have Standing
Counsel but also standby counsel (panel lawyers) and,
therefore, only the State counsel can dare plead for
abolition of adjournment on "Illness Slip", which we hereby
reject as absurd and inappropriate.
In the instant case, the counsel for the appellant had
applied to the Chief Justice that on the grounds of his
illness he would not be able to conduct his cases for a
particular period of time and the application was allowed
for the period upto 23rd April, 1996. The case was listed
on the very next day of the expiry of the leave period. On
that day, since the counsel was still not well, he sent an
"Illness Slip" which, unfortunately, was not brought to the
notice of the court with the result that the court on a
consideration of the merits of the case dismissed the writ
petition. Since leave of absence to the counsel had already
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been granted by the Chief Justice upto 23rd April, 1996, it
is quite understandable that on 24th April, 1996, when the
case was listed, the counsel was still unwell and could not
come to the court and, therefore, could not conduct the case
which, in keeping with the high and noble tradition, should
have been adjourned on the "Illness Slip" of that counsel.
This having not been done has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice.
For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal,
set aside the judgment and order dated 24.4.1996 by which
the writ petition was dimissed on merits, as also the
judgment and order dated 27.8.1997 by which the application
for recall of that order was rejected. We remand the case
again to the High Court for a fresh decision of the writ
petition in accordance with law after giving an opportunity
of hearing to the counsel for the parties. There will be no
order as to costs.