Full Judgment Text
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 404 OF 2012
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)NO.8012 OF 2010)
ARADADI RAMUDU @ AGGIRAMUDU ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE, THROUGH
INSPECTOR OF POLICE, YANAM ... RESPONDENT
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the
judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal
No.1083/2007 dated 05.11.2009. By the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court, after re-
appreciating the entire evidence on record, has
confirmed the Order of the Additional Sessions
Judge, Pondicherry in S.C.No.99 of 1997 dated
29.04.1999, by which the appellant-accused was
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convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short “the IPC”) and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life.
3. The deceased (Gangammal) was the wife of
appellant-accused. It is the case of the
prosecution that the accused was an alcoholic, and
habitually beating his wife after picking up a
quarrel with her for silly reasons. He also didn’t
reside under the same roof with her, and only
occasionally visited her. Gangammal was eking her
livelihood by working as a domestic servant. At the
time of the incident, Gangammal and the accused had
a son and a daughter.
4. It appears that on the previous night of
the incident, the accused severely beat Gangammal
as he doubted her fidelity. On 13.08.1997, around
6.45 a.m., the accused attacked her neck with a
kitchen knife, causing her to bleed profusely,
which ultimately led to her death.
5. It has come in the evidence of P.W.2 (the
neighbour) that she barged into the Gangammal’s
house on hearing her shriek in pain, and found
Gangammal in a severely injured condition. In her
evidence, she has also stated that Gangammal told
her that the accused had caused the knife injury on
her neck. Thereafter, P.W.2 has deposed that she
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asked Gangammal to change her blood soaked saree
and arranged for a rickshaw puller to shift
Gangammal from the house to the Government Hospital
at Yanam.
6. In the hospital, P.W.1 (the doctor)
treated the deceased. In the Examination-in-Chief,
he has elaborated the nature of the injuries that
Gangammal had suffered and the treatment that was
given to her. He has further stated that, for
better treatment, he had advised P.W.2 to take her
to the Government Hospital, Kakinada. He has
further stated that Gangammal had told him that the
accused had first tried to throttle her neck and
later on stabbed her on the neck with a knife.
7. We have the evidence of P.W.3 (son of the
accused and deceased) and P.W.4 (daughter of the
accused and deceased), who, at that time, were 16
years and 14 years respectively. Both of them, in
one voice, have stated that there used to be
quarrel between their mother and father and their
father used to beat their mother. They have also
stated that after they came back to the house, they
were informed that the accused had caused the knife
injury on the neck of their mother.
8. P.W.5 (the rickshaw puller who transported
the deceased to Government Hospital, Yanam) has
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testified that the deceased had stated to him that
the accused had stabbed her on the neck. P.W.12
(the doctor who treated the deceased at Government
Hospital, Kakinada) has explained the treatment she
gave to the deceased in her evidence, and has
confirmed that the death of the deceased was caused
by the stab injury inflicted on her neck. In the
evidence of P.W.13 (the medical examiner who
conducted the post mortem) and the post mortem
report, the nature of the injury on the body of the
deceased and the seriousness of the same has come
on record.
9. The Trial Court, after appreciating and
analysing the entire evidence on record, has came
to the conclusion that the knife injury caused by
the accused on the neck of the deceased was
sufficient to cause her death. Accordingly, it has
convicted and sentenced the accused under Section
302 of the IPC, awarding rigorous imprisonment for
life. The same is confirmed by the High Court,
which decision is impugned before us.
10. We have heard Shri. Shekhar Prit Jha,
learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant
and Shri. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent. We have also perused
the evidence on record and the testimonies of the
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various witnesses.
11. After a careful analysis of the evidence
on record, we are of the firm opinion that the
conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court
and confirmed by the High Court, does not suffer
from any legal infirmity which would call for our
interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
12. However, Shri Jha, learned amicus curiae
would contend before us that in the instant case,
the sentence requires to be modified from Section
302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II of IPC. According to
the learned amicus curiae that the accused had no
intention to kill the deceased and the injury which
was inflicted on the deceased was not sufficient to
convict and sentence the accused under Section 302
of the IPC.
13. Shri. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent has stated that the
factum of the accused causing the knife injury on
the neck of the deceased has come in the
testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5
and P.W.6 (a village elder). He would also state
that the injury sustained by the deceased was of a
serious nature and ultimately led to her death. The
learned senior counsel would submit that in light
of the evidence on record, our interference, in
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respect of the sentence, was not called for.
14. Though the submission of the learned
amicus curiae looks attractive at the first blush,
weighing the same with the facts of the present
case and evidence on record, in our opinion, the
same has no merit.
15. In State of UP v. Indrajeet, (2000) 7 SCC
249, this Court held:
“7……Absence of intention to cause death
coupled with the lack of knowledge that
death would be inevitably caused on
account of the injury would make the
offence fall only under Section 304 Part
II IPC, and not under Section 302 IPC……”
In Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa, (2009) 17
SCC 724, this Court held:
“41……It is trite law that Section 304 Part
II comes into play when the death is
caused by doing an act with knowledge that
it is likely to cause death but there is
no intention on the part of the accused
either to cause death or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause
death.”
16. In other words, this Court has held that
for modification of sentence from Section 302 to
Section 304 Part II, not only should there be an
absence of the intention to cause death, but also
an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury
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that in the ordinary course of things was likely to
cause death.
17. There is concurrent affirmative finding of
fact by both the Courts below regarding the
intention of the accused to kill the deceased.
Having perused the evidence on record, and on
account of the concurrent findings, we are unable
to accept the submission of Shri. Jha that there
was an absence of intention to kill on the part of
the accused, meriting our interference in sentence.
Further, this Court, in Chahat Khan v. State of
Haryana, (1972) 3 SCC 408, held:
“9……When a person is causing an injury on
such a vital part the intention to kill
can certainly attributed to him…”
18. Assuming for a moment that the accused had
no intention to kill the deceased, it can still be
said that he had the intention to cause an injury
which would in the ordinary course of things would
cause her death. In Virsa Singh v. The State of
Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495, this Court, speaking through
Vivian Bose, J., held (at pg. 1501):
“…It does not matter that there was no
intention to cause death. It does not
matter that there was no intention even to
cause an injury of a kind that is
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sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature (not that there is any
real distinction between the two). It does
not even matter that there is no knowledge
that an act of that kind will be likely to
cause death. Once the intention to cause
the bodily injury actually found to be
present is proved, the rest of the enquiry
is purely objective and the only question
is whether, as a matter of purely
objective inference, the injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. No one has a
license to run around inflicting injuries
that are sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature and claim that
they are not guilty of murder. If they
inflict injuries of that kind, they must
face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably
deduced that the injury was accidental or
otherwise unintentional.”
19. In Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010) 6
SCC 457, held:
“22…… The appellant in this instance has
used a kitchen knife. A kitchen knife with
sharp edges is a dangerous weapon and it
is very obvious that the appellant was
aware that the use of such a weapon can
cause death……”
20. In the instant case, it has come on record
that the accused was an alcoholic and he was in the
habit of beating his wife regularly after consuming
enough and more liquor. It is also a matter of fact
confirmed by the two Courts below that on the date
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of the incident, there was a quarrel between the
accused and the deceased, and the accused caused
injury on the neck of the deceased with a kitchen
knife.
21. The doctor (P.W.1) in his medical report
has stated the nature of the injuries suffered by
the deceased due to the knife injury caused by the
accused. A perusal of the medical report would
definitely indicate that those injuries were
sufficient enough to cause the death of the
deceased. That apart, we should also notice that
before the deceased was shifted to the Government
Hospital at Yanam for treatment of the injuries,
the saree worn by the deceased was literally soaked
in blood. Therefore, her neighbour, who has come on
record as (P.W.2), has stated that she had to
advise the deceased to change her saree. This would
indicate that because of the injuries suffered,
there was profuse loss of blood which itself was
sufficient enough to cause the death of the
deceased.
22. In our view, the evidence on record is
more than sufficient to indicate that the accused
had the intention to cause such injury on the body
of the deceased that would be in all likelihood
cause her death in the natural course of things,
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fulfilling the conditions imposed by Section 300 of
IPC for punishment under Section 302.
23. Keeping in view all these aspects, the
submission of Shri. Jha, learned amicus curiae that
the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial
Court and confirmed by the High Court requires to
be modified from Section 302 IPC to Section 304
Part-II IPC, cannot be accepted by us.
24. In view of the above, we do not see any
merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal
stands dismissed.
Ordered accordingly.
...................J.
(H.L. DATTU)
...................J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 15, 2012
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