Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 16727-16728 of 1996
PETITIONER:
Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams & anr
RESPONDENT:
Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2003
BENCH:
S.N. Variava & H.K. Sema.
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
S. N. Variava J
These Appeals are against the Judgment dated 25th September,
1996 by which two Writ Petitions seeking writs of prohibition and a
contempt petition have been disposed of.
The dispute in this proceedings relates to 28.58 acres in Survey
Numbers 686, 645 and 679 of Tirumala Village. This land is situated on
Tirumala Hills where the temple of Sri Venkateshwara Swamy is
situated. The Appellants are the statutory Devasthanam in control and
management of the temple. The facts leading to the present litigation
are set out in the impugned Judgment. In the impugned Judgment the
Appellants are referred to as "T.T.D." whereas the Respondents are
referred to as "the Tallapaka people". The facts, as set out in the
impugned Judgment, are as follows:
"4. Sri Krishna Devaraya one of the greatest Emperors
who ruled southern India in the 15th century granted an
extent of Ac. 27-04 cents of land on Tirumala Hills (now
covered by Survey Nos. 586 and 645) to Sri Tallapaka
Annamacharya, the celebrated saint, composer and
reformer, the progenitor of the petitioners herein (for short
"the Tallapaka people"). Annamacharya was a great
devotee of Lord Venkateswara, in whose praise he wrote
and composed music for 32,000 devotional songs. He
attained immortality as the greatest devotee of Lord
Venkateswara and also the founder of the Bhakti cult,
propagating the philosophy of Sri Ramanuja. Kings and
emperors showered upon him honours and granted large
number of inams in recognition of the spiritual service he
rendered. He and his descendants, for over centuries,
endowed vast properties for religious and charitable
purposes. Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu, the father of
the petitioner in W. P. No. 8347 of 1996 and C.C. No. 373
of 1996 was the 12th descendant of Annamacharya.
5. The T.T.D. filed an application before the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Chandragiri in 1962 under the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
against Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu seeking
resumption of the inam alleging that it was a grant in
favour of the "Manager for the time being of
Nandanavanam at Tirumala or Tirupati to be held for the
support of Sri Venkataswara Swamy Pagoda at Tirumala
and to be held so long as the conditions of the grant are
duly fulfilled". The T.T.D. contended that the grant was for
the maintenance of flower and Tulasi garden and fruit
bearing trees for the daily worship of and offering to Lord
Venkateswara but neither offerings were made nor plants
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and trees maintained much less flowers and Tulasi plants
were supplied from the Nandanavanam to the deity by the
inamdars. The T.T.D. therefore, prayed for: (i) resumption
of the inam and determining it as a grant of both
melwaram and kudiwaram (land revenue as well as
proprietary right); and (ii) regranting the inam to the
T.T.D. as an endowment. That application was disposed of
by the Revenue Divisional Officer holding that the Inams
Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri had already issued a
ryotwari patta under the Inams Abolition Act in favour of
the T.T.D. and, therefore, no further relief was called for.
The inamdars carried the matter in revision to the
Commissioner, Survey, Settlements and Land Records (for
short "the Commissioner") under Section 14-A of the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (for short "the Inams
Abolition Act") and the Commissioner, while allowing the
revision, remitted the matter to the Tahsildar for fresh
enquiry on the ground that while granting patta in favour
of the T.T.D. the Deputy Tahsildar had not issued notices
to the parties.
6. After the remand, the Deputy Tahsildar conducted an
enquiry under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act after
notices to both the Institution (T.T.D.) and the inamdars
and recorded a finding that the land in question is an inam
land in Ryotwari village and that it was not held by an
institution. On appeal, preferred by the T.T.D., the
Revenue Divisional Officer affirmed the order of the Deputy
Tahsildar. The T.T.D. carried the matter in revision to the
Commissioner who, while recording the concession made
by the Counsel for the T.T.D., that the lands in question
were in possession of the inamdars on the crucial dates (as
envisaged by Section 4 of the Inams Abolition Act) and
that the inamdars had been in possession of the lands
since 7-6-1933, dismissed the revision petition.
xxx xxx xxx
7. The T.T.D. filed W.P. No. 11895 of 1986 challenging
the order of the Commissioner affirming the orders of the
subordinate statutory tribunals and the inamdar filed W. P.
No. 11437 of 1986 contending that an extent of Ac. 3-05
cents of land in question was illegally occupied by the
T.T.D. without paying compensation and, therefore, he
was entitled to be compensated for the wrongful
deprivation. A learned single judge heard both the
matters together and by a common judgment, allowed the
writ petition filed by the T.T.D. holding that the grant in
question was to the institution and that the possession of
the land "on the relevant dates" by the inamdars was only
on behalf of the institution but not in recognition of their
rights as inamdars and that the view of the Commissioner
that the inam was burdened with service was contrary to
the recitals in the two title deeds. The learned Judge by
his common judgment dated 17-4-1987 quashed the
revisional order of the Commissioner and consequently
dismissed W.P. No. 11437 of 1986 filed by the inamdar.
Two Writ Appeals W.A. Nos. 1752 of 1987 and 4 of 1993
arising out of the above two writ petitions were allowed by
a common judgment dated 23-12-1992.
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\200¦â\200¦â\200¦
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8â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..The judgmen
t of the Division
Bench was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal Nos. 3468-69 of 1993â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦.â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦ the
Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals on 11-1-1995â\200¦
â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..Review Petition Nos. 683-684 of 1995
seeking review of the aforesaid order of the Supreme
Court 9th May, 1995 were dismissed.
9. After the dismissal of the review petitions by the
Supreme Court the Tallapaka people (inamdars) filed an
application before the Inams Deputy Tahsildar for grant of
patta under Section 7(1) of the Inams Abolition Act and
the same was granted by the Deputy Tahsildar by an order
dated 9-8-1995.
10. The T.T.D. filed a suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995 in the
Court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupati seeking
a declaration that it is the absolute owner of the Ac. 25-08
cents of land covered by Survey Nos. 686 and 679/92 and
for a consequential direction to the Tallapaka people to
surrender possession of the same. The T.T.D. also filed an
appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition Act
before the Revenue Divisional Officer challenging the grant
of patta by the Deputy Tahsildar in favour of the Tallapaka
people. In the plaint filed in O.S. No. 69 of 1995, it was
averred by the T.T.D. inter alia, that the entire property
lying within the limits of Tirumala belongs to the deity.
Lord Venkateswara. The question of title to the suit land
was not the subject matter of the earlier litigation between
the T.T.D. and the Tallapaka people and in spite of the
failure of the T.T.D. in the revenue proceedings and the
judgment in the writ appeals (the first Tallapaka case), the
question of title can still be agitated in a Civil Court. After
adverting to certain G.O’s. and the earlier proceedings
before the revenue authorities it was averred by the T.T.D.
in the plaint that the inam was to the temple and not a
personal grant to the Tallapaka people. As already stated
at the very outset, the inamdars (the Tallapaka people)
filed the present two writ petitions, each for a writ of
Prohibition: one in regard to the suit and the other in
regard to the appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer,
Tirupati restraining them from proceeding further in the
matters. In the contempt case it was alleged by the
inamdars that the T.T.D. in deliberate disobedience of the
judgment of this Court in the first Tallapaka case had
instituted the suit and, therefore, it is liable to be punished
for contempt. "
By the impugned Judgment the contempt petition has been dismissed.
However writs of prohibition have been issued in the following terms:
"34. In the result, both the W.Ps. are allowed. A writ of
prohibition will issue in W.P. No. 5997 of 1996 prohibiting
the principal Subordinate Judge Tirupati from proceeding
with the suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995. Likewise, a writ of
prohibition will issue in W.P. No. 8347 of 1996 prohibiting
the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati from proceeding
with the appeal preferred by the T.T.D. against the order
of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in S.R. No. 1/95
dated 9.8.1995."
The reasoning adopted in the impugned judgment, in granting the writ
of prohibition, is that having urged all contentions in the earlier round
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of litigation Appellants were now estopped from claiming any rights.
The High Court held that the principles of res judicata applied. The
High Court justified issuance of writs of prohibition on the following
reasoning:
"If the Civil Court and the Court of the Revenue Divisional
Officer were permitted to proceed with the trial and the
appeal, they would be acting outside their powers. A writ
of prohibition can be issued to prevent a person from
acting or continuing to act in such a way as to abuse
jurisdiction of a judicial or quasi-judicial body. It is not
necessary for the petitioners to wait until the decisions are
rendered by the Civil Court and the Revenue Divisional
Officer and then move this Court for a writ of certiorari."
At this stage it is necessary to set out Section 14 of the Andhra
Pradesh (Andhara Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the said Act) which reads as
follows:
"Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:-No suit or other
proceedings shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set
aside or modify any decision of the Tehsildar, the revenue
Court, or the Collector under this Act, except where such
decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or
collusion of parties."
Mr. Venugopal submitted that proceedings under the said Act are
summary in nature. He submitted that such summary proceedings can
never bar a suit on title. He submitted that on the question, whether a
civil Court’s jurisdiction is barred, because a patta has been granted
under the said Act, there are a number of authorities of this Court. He
fairly pointed out the Judgments in the cases of Vatticherukuru Village
Panchayat vs. Nori V. Deekshithulu reported in 1991 Supp (3) SCC
228, Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar vs.
Government of A. P. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 75, Pushpagiri Math vs.
Kopparaju Veerabhadra Rao reported in 1996 (9) SCC 202, S.
Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramalingam reported in 1997 (6) SCC 143. In
all these cases it has been held that the suit on title was barred. He
submitted that there are identical provisions in the Tamil Nadu Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the Madras
Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. He
submitted that there are a number of decisions of this Court where it
has been held that merely because a patta has been granted the
jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide title is not barred. He pointed
out the judgments in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam reported in 1985 (4) SCC 10, R. Manicka Naicker vs.
E. Elumalai Naicker reported in 1995 (4) SCC 156, Sayyed Ali vs. A.P.
Wakf Board, Hyderabad reported in 1998 (2) SCC 642 and Sri-La-Sri
Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal vs. T. Parvathi Ammal reported
in 1998 (9) SCC 603. He submitted that there is a conflict of opinion
between the above-mentioned two sets of decisions. He submitted that
in view of the conflict of decisions the question whether a civil court
has jurisdiction to try a suit on title should be referred to a larger
bench. We are unable to except this submission. One set of Judgments
are under the said Act whereas the other set of judgments are under
legislations in Tamil Nadu. In Sri-La-Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi
Avargal’s case (supra) reliance had been placed on Vatticherukuru’s
case (supra) in support of the proposition that a suit on title was
barred. The three Judge bench distinguished that case on the ground
that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the Tamil Nadu Acts
are different. Once a three Judge bench has taken a view that the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act are different from those of the
Tamil Nadu Acts it cannot be said that there is any conflict of
decisions. The decision of the three Judge bench is binding on this
Court. It will thus have to be held that in respect of the said Act the
first set of Judgments would apply whereas in respect of the
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legislations in Tamil Nadu the second set of Judgments would apply. It
must be mentioned that in support of the submission that the title suit
is not barred Mr. Venugopal had also relied upon a full bench judgment
of the Madras High Court reported in (1998) The Madras Law Journal
Reports 722.
Thus as per the law laid down by this Court in Andhra Pradesh
the civil Court would have jurisdiction only in cases of
misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of parties. The question still
remains whether the High Court could or should have, in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction, issued writs of prohibition against the civil Court from
proceeding with the suit before it and against the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the
Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor.
It must be remembered that in the Civil Procedure Code there are
sufficient provisions, particularly Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2,
which give to the civil Court powers to decide its own jurisdiction and
questions regarding maintainability of the suit. The civil Court is also
competent to decide whether a suit before it is barred on principles of
estoppal or res judicata.
Mr. Venugopal submitted that apart from Certiorari, this is the
first time where a High Court has issued a writ, against a Civil Court,
prohibiting it from proceeding with a civil suit instituted before it. He
submitted that there are elaborate provisions in the Civil Procedure
Code for rejecting a plaint and/or deciding questions of maintainability
and for trying issues of its own jurisdiction as preliminary issues. Mr.
Venugopal submitted that the precedent set has enormous potential of
being mis-utilised and for multiplying litigation. He submitted that if
this is permitted, a defendant who does not want an interim order to
be passed against him would seek writs of prohibition against the
Court from proceeding with the hearing and disposal of the suit.
Mr. Venugopal submitted that the consequences would be far reaching.
He submitted that if this is permitted, a writ of prohibition can be
issued by a High Court in one State against the trial of a suit in
another State provided summons are served or interim orders are
received in that State, so that part of the cause of action arises in the
former State. In support of this submission he relied upon the case of
Navinchandra N. Majithia vs State of Maharashtra and others reported
in 2000 (7) SCC 640.
Mr. Venugopal showed to this Court the case of Mirajkar vs State
of Maharashtra reported in 1966 (3) SCR 779. In this case the High
Court had stopped publication of the proceedings of a trial before it. A
writ under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging
the validity of that order on the ground that it infringed fundamental
rights under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. It was held,
by the majority, that if a judicial Tribunal makes an order, which it has
jurisdiction to make, the order cannot offend a fundamental right. It
was held that an order is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if the
Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matters that were litigated
before it. It was held that the Tribunal having jurisdiction does not act
without jurisdiction if it makes an error in the application of law. It was
held that if a judicial order is erroneous any person aggrieved by the
order, even a stranger, can file an appeal. It was held that the
question about existence of jurisdiction as well as validity and
propriety of the order cannot be raised in writ proceedings.
Mr. Venugopal also relied upon a well reasoned judgment of the
Madras High Court in the case of I. S. Lulla vs Smt. Hari and others
reported in AIR (1962) Madras 458 wherein it has been held that
Article 226 does not clothe the High Court with jurisdiction to quash
the orders of a subordinate Court. It has been held that orders
susceptible to appeal or revision cannot be quashed by a Writ of
certiorari or a writ of prohibition restraining or prohibiting the
subordinate Court from proceeding to exercise jurisdiction in any
matter before it. It has been held that the jurisdiction to issue writ is
not a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It has been held that jurisdiction
under Article 226 is an original jurisdiction which is quite distinct and
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separate from the appellate jurisdiction.
Mr Venugopal also relied upon the case of U. P. Sales Tax
Service Association vs Taxation Bar Association reported in 1995 (5)
SCC 716. In this case it has been held that the writ of Prohibition can
only be issued when the inferior Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act
without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of
rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself
ultra vires or unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention
of fundamental rights.
Mr Venugopal very fairly brought to the notice of this Court the
case of The Failika Dabvali Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs Madan Lal
reported in 1977 (2) SCC 435 where a Writ of certiorari was issued
against a judgment on the footing that the Court had acted illegally
and there was an error apparent on the face of the record. It is
however to be noted that there is no discussion, in this case, as to the
circumstances under which a Writ of certiorari or prohibition can be
issued. He also fairly pointed out the case of Chhedi Lal Gupta & Ors.
vs Mohammad Sattar reported in AIR (1963) Allahabad 448 wherein it
had been mentioned that the Writ of Prohibition had been issued
earlier by the High Court from proceeding with the trial on the ground
that the suit was one for infringement of trademark and could thus, by
virtue of Section 73 of the Trademark Act, be filed only in the Court of
the District Judge at Allahabad. However it must be noted that in this
case it had been held that the Writ of Prohibition did not prevent the
trial Court from returning the plaint for presentation to the proper
Court under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.
On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that Article 226 of the
Constitution of India makes no distinction with respect to the power
which a Writ Court can exercise for any of the prerogative writs which
can be issued for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution of India or for any other purpose. He submitted
that mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are exercised in the same
manner depending upon the nature of the controversy and the stage
at which they can be effective. He submitted that a certiorari was a
writ addressed to a proceeding in the Court and order passed therein
whereas a prohibition was directed to the subordinate Court or to any
other judicial or quasi-judicial authorities.
Mr. Mishra submitted that the instant case was one where a suit
was being entertained in the teeth of a specific bar under the said Act
and even though the suit was hit by res-judicata. He submitted that
all the issues were adjudicated by the competent quasi-judicial
authorities and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court and
this Hon’ble Court in the earlier round of litigation. He submitted that
the Civil Court has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining and
proceedings with the suit. He submitted that the inferior court cannot
traverse the findings in the judgment of the High Court and this
Hon’ble Court. Mr. Mishra submitted that the primary rule is that a
writ of prohibition is issued to a Court which also is an authority and
since it is issued to a Court it is also issued to such persons or
authorities who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers.
In support of the submission that the High Court has power to
issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Mr
Mishra relied upon the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed
Ishaque reported in (1955) SCR 1104. In this case the question was
whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against an Election Tribunal
after it had become functous officio. It was held that the intention of
the Constitution was to vest in the High Court a power to supervise
decisions of Tribunals by issue of appropriate writs and directions and
that the exercise of that power cannot be defeated by technical
consideration of form and procedure. It was held that the High Courts
must however observe the principles which regulate the exercise of
such jurisdiction. It was held that before a writ of certiorari can be
issued there must be an error apparent on the face of the record.
Observations in following cases were cited with approval:
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"The decision in Rex v. Northumberland
Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw ([1951] 1
K.B. 711) was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation
Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw ([1952] 1 K.B. 338). In
laying down that an error of law was a ground for granting
certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that it must be
apparent on the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who
stated the power in broad and general terms observed :
"It will have been seen that throughout all the cases
there is one governing rule : certiorari is only available to
quash a decision for error of law if the error appears on the
face of the record".
The position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. :
"It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak
of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring an
order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the
proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where
revealed on the face of an order or decision, or
irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where
shown".
In Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. and
Others ([1952] S.C.R. 583), it was observed by this court
that under article 226 the writ should be issued "in grave
cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers
act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in
violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to
exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error
apparent on the face of the record". In T. C. Basappa v. T.
Nagappa ([1955] S.C.R. 250) the law was thus stated :
"An error in the decision or determination itself may
also be amenable to a writ of ’certiorari’ but it must be a
manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings,
e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of
the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error
which can be corrected by ’certiorari’ but not a mere wrong
decision".
Mr Mishra also relied upon the case of Union of India and others
vs Upendra Singh reported in 1994 (3) SCC 357. In this case the
Central Administrative Tribunal had examined the correctness of
charges framed in a disciplinary proceedings. It was held that the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was akin to the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226. It has then been held that:
"4. â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦ A writ of prohibition is issued
only
when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that
a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound by the
technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative
writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United
Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to
the said writs must be kept in view, as observed by this
Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa ((1955) 1 SCR 250 :
AIR 1954 SC 440). It was observed by Mukherjea, J.
speaking for the Constitution Bench :
"The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of
our Constitution is very wide and the powers of
the Supreme Court as well as of all the High
Courts in India extend to issuing of orders,
writs and directions including writs in the
nature of ’habeas corpus, mandamus, quo
warranto, prohibition and certiorari’ as may be
considered necessary for enforcement of the
fundamental rights and in the case of the High
Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of
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the express provisions in our Constitution we
need not now look back to the early history or
the procedural technicalities of these writs in
English law, nor feel oppressed by any
difference or change of opinion expressed in
particular cases by English Judges. We can
make an order or issue a writ in the nature of
’certiorari’ in all appropriate cases and in
appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the
broad and fundamental principles that regulate
the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of
granting such writs in English law."
5. The said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a
seven-Judge Bench in Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962
SC 1621, 1625) The reason for this dictum is self-evident.
If we do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles
that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of
granting such writs in English law, the exercise of
jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it tends to
become arbitrary and capricious. There will be no
uniformity of approach and there will be the danger of the
jurisdiction becoming personalised. The parameters of
jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from
Court to Court. (emphasis supplied)
Mr Mishra also relied upon the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai vs State of
Uttar Pradesh reported in 1963 (1) SCR 778. In this case the question
was whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India was maintainable against an assessment made by a sales tax
officer under a valid act. The majority held that the writ petition was
not maintainable. In this case it has been held by Aiyar J as follows:
"Now, I come to the controversial area. What is the
position with regard to an order made by a quasi-judicial
authority in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in
pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra
vires ? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction means authority to decide.
Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered
or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the
purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon
cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for
certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. Where
a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a
matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a
wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The
question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not
on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to
enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these
facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable "at the
commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry’.
(Rex v. Bolten ([1841] I Q.B. 66, 74.)). Thus, a tribunal
empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss
of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law
and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the
tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction
by determine any of those questions incorrectly but it has
no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or
damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its
jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no
legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those
matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly
constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential
preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its
jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect
determination of any question that it is empowered or
required (i.e.,) had jurisdiction to determine. â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦â\200¦..
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The characteristic attribute of judicial act or decision is that
it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or
fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot,
in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless
the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which
the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles
govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu
but also the findings of administrative bodies which are
held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are
deemed to have been invested with power to err within the
limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep
within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as
valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res
judicata has been applied to such decisions."
On the basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court
and the High Courts have power to issue writs, including a writ of
prohibition. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the
inferior Court or Tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of
jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice,
(c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or
unconstitutional, or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of
fundamental rights. The principles, which govern exercise of such
power, must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued
only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial disciplines of the highest order
has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs. It must be remembered
that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction distinct from appellate
jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be disguised in the form of
a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed to be used "as a
cloak of an appeal in disguise". Lax use of such a power would impair
the dignity and integrity of the subordinate Court and could also lead
to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the
subordinate Court. It was not even argued that there was total lack
of jurisdiction in the civil Court. It could not be denied that the civil
Court, before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the
maintainability of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction.
The civil Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred
by Section 14 of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel.
Thus unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High
Court should not have prevented the Court of competent jurisdiction
from deciding these questions. In other words the High Court should
not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide these questions.
In the impugned Judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong
reason, has been given as to why the civil Court could not be allowed
to decide these questions. The impugned Judgment does not state that
the civil Court had either proceeded to act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation of rules of natural justice or
that it had proceeded to act under law which was ultra vires or
unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of fundamental
rights. The impugned Judgment does not indicate as to why the High
Court did not consider it expedient to allow the civil Court to decide on
questions of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The
impugned judgment does not indicate why the civil Court be not
allowed to decide whether the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14
of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel. To be
remembered that no fundamental right is being violated when a Court
of competent jurisdiction is deciding, rightly or wrongly, matters
before it.
Faced with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that in the written
statement filed by the Respondents it had been contended that the
suit was not maintainable and was barred on principles of res
judicata/estoppel. He submitted that in spite of these points having
been urged before the civil Court an interim injunction restraining the
Respondents from alienating the suit lands had been issued. He
submitted that the civil Court had thus exercised jurisdiction when it
clearly had no jurisdiction. He submitted that it was under these
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circumstances that the Respondents filed writ petitions before the High
Court. On this submission Mr. Venugopal pointed out to us that whilst
granting an interim injunction the civil Court had considered, prima
facie, the question of maintainability of the suit. Mr. Venugopal also
pointed out that the Respondents had filed an appeal against the order
granting interim injunction. It was pointed out that the appeal is also
dismissed holding prima facie that the suit was maintainable. Mr.
Mishra could not deny these facts. These facts indicate how chaotic a
result has prevailed by grant of the writ of prohibition. The impugned
Judgment prohibits the civil Court from proceeding with the suit. Thus
the suit will lie on the dormant file of the civil Court indefinitely.
However the interim injunction granted by the civil Court, as affirmed
by the appellate Court, will continue to operate. To be remembered
that in the impugned Judgment there is no reference to these orders
and no writ of certiorari has been issued quashing those orders. The
end result would be that the suit cannot proceed yet the Respondent
will continue, indefinitely, to be restrained by the interim order. Faced
with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that this Court in exercise of
its powers should quash the interim order. Mr. Mishra submitted that
this was the equitable and correct course to be followed by this Court.
He submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned
order as it would be futile to force the Respondents to undergo a full
round of litigation for a second time when all questions, between the
parties, including questions of title were already decided in the earlier
round of litigation.
We have considered the rival submissions. It is not possible to
accept Mr. Mishra submission that this Court should quash the interim
orders. Those orders are not before this Court and this Court cannot
blindly quash orders passed by Courts of competent jurisdiction
without even looking into the orders. Even presuming, without so
holding, that the suit is not maintainable by virtue of Section 14 of the
said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel in our view the High
Court should have permitted the civil Court, which was competent to
decide these questions to do so. At the most the High Court could
have directed the civil Court to decide these issues as preliminary
issues. In our view the correct course is to set aside the impugned
Judgment and direct the civil Court to decide the question of
maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14 of the said Act and/or
its jurisdiction to entertain the suit as also the question whether the
suit is barred by principles of res judicata as preliminary issues. We
see no substance in the apprehension that in deciding the preliminary
issues the civil Court will not keep in mind Judgments of this Court (set
out therein above) pertaining to maintainability of the suit once patta
is granted under the said Act. Undoubtedly the civil Court would see
whether in effect the suit is for purposes of setting aside or modifying
the decisions taken in the earlier round of litigation.
It must also be mentioned that during arguments Mr. Venugopal
had submitted that the Appellants were considering applying for
amendment of the plaint in order to plead fraud. We are sure that if
any such application is made the same will be considered on its merits
after hearing the other side. It must be mentioned that Mr. Mishra had
submitted that by the proposed amendments admissions are sought to
be retracted. We see no reason to conclude that the civil Court would
permit retraction of admissions.
Finally it must be mentioned that both sides had argued on the
merits of the case. Mr. Venugopal relied upon, what he called, Title
Deeds bearing Numbers 2920 in respect of 1.53 acres and 2921 in
respect of 27.4 acres. The two grants are identically worded. Thus it is
sufficient to reproduce Grant number 2920 which reads as follows:
"NO.2920
Title deed granted to the Manager for the time being
of Nandanavanam at Tirupati and Tirumala.
1. By order of the Governor in council of Madras acting
on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in
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Council, I acknowledge your title to a Devadayam of
Nandanavanam Inam consisting of the right to the
Government Revenue on land claimed to be (one)
1.53 acres of dry and situated in the village of
Tirumala, Taluk of Chandragiri, District of North
Arcot and held for the support of Venkateswara
Swamy Pagoda in the village.
2. This Inam is confirmed to you and your successors
tax-free to the held without interference as long as
the conditions of the grant duly fulfilled.
Sd/- Inam Commissioner"
He submitted that these grants are in favour of the manager and are
a gift to the temple. He submitted that these were granted as far back
as 9th August, 1882. He submitted that on 21st April 1960 a patta was
granted to the Devasthanam under the said Act. He submitted that the
grant of patta was confirmed in appeal by the RDO, Tirupati. He
submitted that on 4th November 1965 the Government of Andhra
Pradesh confirmed the grant of patta. He submitted that the 9th April
1990 rules were framed under Section 97 read with Section 153 of the
Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and
Endowments Act, 1987 and Rule 196 declared these properties as the
exclusive properties of the Devasthanam. He submitted that clearly
the title to the property was with the Devasthanam. He submitted that
in the earlier proceedings the only question was to whom a Ryotwari
patta had to be granted. He submitted that in those proceedings the
question of title was not looked into. He submitted that this Court in its
order dated 11th January 1995, affirmed the findings of the
Commissioner to the effect that the title to the Inam lands was not a
condition precedent for grant of patta. He submitted that thus this
Court had made it clear that it was not going into the question of title
in those proceedings. He submitted that the Appellants were thus not
estopped from filing a suit and the principles of res judicata had no
application.
Mr. Venugopal submitted that a Ryotwari patta is only a bill for
direct payment of revenue to the State and if at all only prima facie
evidence of title. In support of this proposition he relied upon the book
on Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency by S. Sunderraja Iyengar
and the case of Ramamoorthy vs State of Madras reported in (1970)
The Indian Law Reports 788. Mr. Venugopal submitted that a mere
decision on grant of patta cannot exclude a subsequent suit based on
title. Mr. Venugopal submitted that no provision of the said Act
provides expressly for a determination of title. He submitted that Rule
15(1) of the Rules made under the Act, provides for summary
proceedings. Mr. Venugopal submitted that if a decree is passed in
their suit on title then the grant of a Ryotwari patta will get nullified
incidentally. He submitted that the purpose of the said Act cannot be
that notwithstanding title (unlike agrarian reforms) the inamdar
institution will stand deprived of its property by a sidewind.
On the other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that the Suit is barred
in view of the specific findings by the revenue authorities and as
affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 4/1993
and 1752 of 1987 in the first Thallappaka case reported in 1993 (1)
Andhra Law Times 293. He relied on this Judgment and pointed out
that on consideration of Section 3, 4(1), 7 & 14(A) of the said Act, it is
held that as per the Inam’s Fair Register the legal title was that of
Respondents and not Appellants. He submitted that the said decision
has finally settled the question of title and rights as a rayat. Mr. Mishra
pointed out the plaint in the suit now filed by the Appellants that there
was no plea of misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in this suit. He
pointed out that even in answer to the writ petitions filed by the
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Respondents, the Appellants had not taken up a contention that the
earlier findings were obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or collusion.
He pointed out that even in this Civil Appeal there is no ground that
there had been any misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in obtaining
the earlier decision. He submitted that thus the express bar to the
suit, as provided under Section 14 of the said Act, willfully apply. He
submitted that the High Court, in the impugned Judgment, has rightly
held so. Mr. Mishra submitted that the Suit is also barred on the
principle of constructive res-judicata. In support of the submission that
principles of res-judicata to apply even to decisions in Writ proceedings
Mr. Mishra relied upon the case of Gulabchand Parekh vs State of
Bombay reported in 1965 (2) SCR 547. In support of the submission
that the Inam Fair Register is evidence of utmost importance Mr
Mishra relied upon the cases of N. Y. Lakshminarasimachari vs Sri
Agasthewaraswami Varu of Kolakalur reported in 1960 (2) SCR 768;
Shri Vallabharaya Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna vs Deevi
Hanumancharyulu & Ors. reported in 1979 (3) SCC 778 and
Subramania Gurukkal vs Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam reported
in 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 519.
Mr. Mishra submitted that in the earlier round of proceedings
Appellants had admitted that the possession, on the relevant date, was
with the Respondents. Mr. Mishra pointed out that in the first
Thallappaka’s case the Commissioner while dismissing Appellants
revision application noted in the order dated 7.2.1986 that the then
counsel for the Appellants conceded as follows:
"The counsel for the T.T.D. concedes that the lands were in
possession of the respondents on the crucial dates and
that in the notice issued by the executive officer, T.T.D. in
his ROC No. G1/10291/59 dated 8.8.1959 it has been
clearly stated that Tallapakam Venkata Seshacharyulu and
others were in possession of the lands since 7.6.1933."
Mr. Mishra submitted that it was an admitted position, even in the
plaint of the suit now filed by the Appellants, that the Respondents
were in possession of the land. He submitted that as the Respondents
alone enjoyed the land, their possession was sufficient for acceptance
of their entitlement for Ryotwari patta. He submitted that the
Appellants had produced no documentary evidence to show that land
in question belonged to the temple. He submitted that on the contrary
there was evidence to show that Appellants had filed a suit against one
Mahant Prayag Das for recovery of possession of vast extents of lands.
He submitted that significantly in that suit theses lands were not
shown as lands of the Appellants. He submitted that in that suit the
Appellants claimed 16 plots of land describing them as Nandanavanam
i.e. garden of the temple, however, no relief was claimed in respect of
these lands and these lands were not described in the said suit as
Nandanavanam or the garden belonging to the temple. Mr. Mishra
submitted that in view of the above noted facts the High Court’s
Judgment is correct in law. Mr. Mishra submitted that Section 2 A of
the said Act has to be read with Section 4(1) and 7 of the Act. While
communal lands would vest in the Government other village lands in
possession of the inamdar shall remain with him and he would be
entitled to Ryotwari Patta.
We see no reason to express any opinion on the rival
submissions. Were we to express any opinion we would be committing
the same mistake that the High Court has committed viz usurping the
jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide these questions. We therefore
express no opinion on merits.
In view of what is set out herein above we set aside the
impugned Judgment to the extent that it prohibits the civil Court from
proceeding with Suit 69 of 1995. We direct the civil Court to frame and
decide, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months
from today, preliminary issues as to maintainability of the suit in view
of Section 14 of the said Act and whether the suit is barred on
principles of res judicata/estoppel.
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We are in agreement with the observations of the High Court
that grant of Patta to the Respondents was a formality in pursuance of
the decisions in the earlier round of litigation. It is only if it is held that
the Appellants suit is maintainable and not barred on principles of res
judicata/estoppal that the Appellants can be allowed to pursue the
appeal. Thus the writ of prohibition preventing the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the
Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in
S.R. No. 1/95 dated 9.8.1995 must continue for the present. Those
proceedings shall therefore continue to remain stayed till after the final
decision on the preliminary issues. If the preliminary issues are finally
answered in favour of the Appellants then the writ of prohibition in
respect of the appeal shall automatically stand vacated. If however the
preliminary issues are finally answered against the Appellants the writ
of prohibition shall stand confirmed.
These Appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no
order as to costs.