ABHISHEK KUMAR SINGH vs. G. PATTANAIK

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA INHERENT JURISDICTION CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 625­626 OF 2019 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 Abhishek Kumar Singh           … Petitioner Versus G. Pattanaik & Ors.                  …Respondents WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 642­643 OF 2019 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 671­672 OF 2019 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 395­396 OF 2020 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 408­409 OF 2020 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date: 2021.06.03 13:28:00 IST Reason: 2 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 598­599/2020  IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018/2018 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 669­670 OF 2020 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 671­672 OF 2020 IN  CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 491 OF 2020 AND TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1209/2020 J U D G M E N T A.M. Khanwilkar, J. These cases essentially assail the orders dated 4.12.2018 1. and 2.3.2020 issued by the Chief Engineer (A­2­1), Uttar Pradesh 1 Jal Nigam, Lucknow , pursuant to the judgment of this Court 2 dated 15.11.2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 11017­11018/2018 .    This Court by the aforesaid judgment, had directed the Uttar Pradesh 1 For short, “the Chief Engineer” or “respondents” 2  Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam & Ors. v. Ajit Singh Patel & Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 285 3 Jal   Nigam   (the   respondent   corporation)   to   comply   with   the 3 judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad   dated 28.11.2017 in a batch of writ petitions (leading case being Writ­A No. 37143/2017) and pass a fresh, reasoned order. In pursuance of the aforementioned decision of this Court, 2. the   Chief   Engineer   issued   order   dated   4.12.2018,   thereby reengaging the petitioners and other appointees to their previous place   of   posting.     However,   with   a   caveat   that   the   said appointment was subject to the liberty granted by this Court and that no arrears would be paid by the respondent corporation. The order of the Chief Engineer dated 4.12.2018 is reproduced thus: “The order dated 11.8.2017 passed by the Chief Engineer (A­2­1)  U.P.   Jal  Nigam   Lucknow   has   been  set   aside  by Hon’ble   High   Court   Allahabad   by   its   order   dated 28.11.2017   in   W.P.   No.   A­37143/2017   and   Review Application No. 2/2018 is also rejected by Hon’ble High Court in its order dated 25.07.2018. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld [ sic ] the above order passed by Hon’ble High Court in Civil Appeal No. 11017­11018/2018 titled as U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors. v. Ajit Singh & Ors. In the above context you are expected to perform your duty   at   your   previous   posting   place   within   15   days from issuing of this order. That it is being clarified that the said appointment will ,   by   the be   subject   to   the   liberty   granted   to   Nigam Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   of   India   vide   judgment   dated 15.11.2018 in   Civil Appeal No. 11017­11018/2018. The concerning paragraphs are extracted below:  3 For short, “the High Court” 4 “15. In view of the above, the challenge to the impugned th th judgment dated 28  November, 2017 and 25  July, 2017 must   fail   but   with   a   clarification   that   the   competent authority   is   free   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   in accordance with law. 16. We   may   not   be   understood   to   have   expressed   any opinion either way on the merits of the course of action open to the appellants against the respondents including against   the   other   appointees   under   the   same   selection 4 process.  All questions in that behalf are left open.” That no Arrears prior to the fresh date of appointment will be granted by Nigam .” (emphasis supplied) This order, according to the contempt petitioners, is in the 3. teeth   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   dated   15.11.2018   and, therefore, the respondents be proceeded for having committed wilful disobedience of the order of this Court. 4. Thereafter, in terms of the liberty granted by this Court in the aforementioned judgment, the respondent corporation passed a fresh order dated 2.3.2020, annulling the appointment of the petitioners and similarly placed Assistant Engineers.  In arriving at the fresh decision, reliance was placed upon the two internal inquiry reports dated 29.5.2017 and 7.7.2017; expert reports — of   IIIT   Allahabad   dated   11.9.2018   and   IIT   Kanpur   dated 15.9.2018; CFSL report dated 11.12.2019; and recommendation made by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) in its final report 4  extracted in paragraph 14 ibid 5 dated   22.1.2020   received   by   the   respondent   corporation   on 18.2.2020, to cancel the recruitment process due to corruption involved. The two expert reports given by Assistant Professor at IIT   Kanpur   and   Associate   Professor   at   IIIT   Allahabad   dated 15.9.2018 and 11.9.2018 respectively, pointed out that the audit trail/checksum   and   time   stamps   of   the   candidates   were   not made   available   and   therefore,   segregation   of   tainted   and untainted candidates was not possible, in absence of primary data.     The   operative   portion   of   the   order   dated   2.3.2020   is reproduced below: “20. ….. After   the   investigation   conducted   by   the department in the case, the reports of both the experts, the   relevant   recommendation/conclusion   of   the   SIT investigation and after examination of the records, it has become clear that the selection process in question .  is void ab initio for the above reasons In view of the above, the office memo number 08/A­2­ 1/2151­0201/17 dated 03.01.2017, memo no. 09/ A­2­1 / 2151­0201/17 dated 03.01.2017 and memo number 10/A­ 2­1/2151­0201/17   dated   03.01.2017   is   cancelled   with effect from the date of issue i.e. date 03.01.2017 and the appointments in question are declared void from the said date. Due   to   the   cancellation   of   the   above   office memorandum   issued   on   dated   03.01.2017,   the   orders which were circulated on 04.12.2018 to contribute again are effectively annuled. The Assistant Engineer appointed under this process will get the protection of salary allowances etc. received so far   and   no   recovery   will   be   made   from   them.   In   the discharge   of   departmental   responsibilities,   the 6 administrative and financial functions performed by them so far will remain valid.” (emphasis supplied) 5. This order has been assailed by the writ petitioner(s) directly in this Court by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 491/2020.  We are informed   that   the   same   order   has   been   assailed   by   similarly placed persons governed by the impugned order by way of writ petition(s) before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and also at its Bench at Lucknow.  Some of them have filed transfer petition   before   this   Court,   to   transfer   their   Writ   Petition   No. 13083/2020 (S/S) filed at Lucknow Bench of the High Court and to hear it along with contempt petitions pending in this Court involving  overlapping  issues.    Accordingly,  the  assail in these petitions is to the aforementioned order dated 4.12.2018, as well as, order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondents. 6. In Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 625­626/2019, 642­643/2019 5 and 671­672/2019 , the grievance of the petitioners is that the respondents have appointed them afresh instead of reinstatement with continuity of service along with arrears of wages and thus, have  wilfully   violated   the   direction   of   this   Court   in   judgment 5 Collectively, “contempt petitions against non­payment of arrears” 7 15.11.2018, to give full effect to the High Court’s judgment dated 28.11.2017.  7. Whereas, in Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 395­396/2020, 408­ 6 409/2020,   598­599/2020,   669­670/2020   and   671­672/2020 , the grievance is that the order of the respondents dated 2.3.2020, have   annulled   the   appointment   of   the   petitioners,   without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in violation of the judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018 in Civil Appeal No. 11017­11018/2018.  In W.P. (C) No. 491/2020, the petitioners have prayed for 8. quashing of order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondent and to reinstate  the petitioners with continuity of  service and full back wages.   While, in T.P. (C) No. 1209/2020, the petitioners seek to withdraw and transfer to this Court, Writ Petition (C) No. 13083/2020   (Service   Single),   which   is   pending   before   the Lucknow Bench of the High Court, as the order dated 2.3.2020 (impugned therein) is already subject matter in second set of contempt petitions including W.P.(C) No. 491/2020 before this Court. 6 Collectively, “contempt petitions against termination” 8 CONTEMPT PETITIONS AGAINST REENGAGEMENT WITHOUT CONTINUITY OF SERVICE AND ARREARS OF BACK WAGES VIDE ORDER DATED 4.12.2018: 9. The factual background leading to filing of these contempt petitions is that the respondents, vide order dated 11.8.2017, annulled   the   recruitment   process   pursuant   to   which   the petitioners were employed, thereby terminating services of the petitioners.  The said order was challenged before the High Court and came to be set aside by way of common judgment dated 28.11.2017.     The   above   judgment   also   directed   that   the petitioners be permitted to work and be paid regular monthly salary.  The relevant extract of this decision is reproduced thus: ­ “…..

9 the   respondents   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other affected parties on the basis of observations made above. No order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied) Another writ petition filed by some of the petitioners before 10. Lucknow   bench   of   the   High   Court,   being   Service   Bench   No. 19863/2017 was also disposed of on 12.12.2017, in terms of the judgment dated 28.11.2017, in the following words: “….. Accordingly, this writ petition is also allowed in terms of the judgment and order dated 28.11.2017 passed by this Court at Allahabad in the bunch of Writ Petitions, leading Writ Petition being Writ­A No. 37143 of 2017, Ajit Singh Patel and others vs. State of U.P. and others with a further direction  to permit the petitioners to work on the post of   Assistant   Engineer   (Civil),   Assistant   Engineer (Electrical/   Mechanical)   and   Assistant   Engineer (Computer Science/ Electronics and Communication / Electrical and Electronics) and pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues to them  with a liberty to the   respondents   to   pass   a   fresh   reasoned   order   after providing   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   petitioners   and other parties on the basis of the observations made by this Court   at   Allahabad   in   the   judgment   and   order   dated 28.11.2017 (supra). …..” (emphasis supplied) 11.  Upon failure of the respondents to act upon the directions passed   in   judgment   dated   28.11.2017,   the   petitioner(s)   filed Contempt   Application   (Civil)   No.   6218/2017   before   the   High Court.  Meanwhile, the respondents preferred SLP (C) Nos. 5410­ 10 5419/2018   before   this   Court   assailing   the   judgment   dated 28.11.2017.  The said special leave petitions were disposed of by an   order   dated   16.3.2018,   holding   that   the   respondents   may approach High Court for a liberty to re­work the answer sheets on the basis of corrections.  The said order reads thus: ­ “ORDER Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for   the  petitioners, points  out  that  the  petitioners  having found out that there were defective questions and incorrect answer   keys,   the   High   Court   should   have   permitted   the petitioners to re­work the merit list. He submitted that the High Court has gone wrong in insisting for an individual notice in the factual matrix of this case. In this regard he has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Vikas Pratap   Singh   and   Others   v.   State   of   Chhattisgarh   and Others, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 494.  Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent(s), however, points out that whether the questions were defective or key answers were incorrect are disputed question and, therefore, liberty should be granted to the respondents to participate in the inquiry. He further submits that the decision of this Court referred to by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners may not apply to the facts of this case.  Be   that   as   it   may,   having   gone   through   the impugned judgment, we do not find that the door is yet closed. It is for the petitioners, if they are so advised, to approach the High Court itself for a liberty to re­work the answer sheets on the basis of the corrections, in case the High Court is also of the view that the corrections need to be made .  The special leave petitions are, accordingly, disposed of.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” (emphasis supplied) 11 12. Upon   disposal   of   the   said   special   leave   petitions,   the respondents furnished an undertaking to the High Court in the Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6218/2017 that the judgment dated 28.11.2017 will be complied with on or before 15.5.2018. In the meantime, the respondents preferred a Review Application No. 2/2018 in Writ ­ A No. 37143/2017, wherein the High Court, vide   order   dated   25.7.2018,   refused   to   interfere   with   the judgment dated 28.11.2017 and reiterated that it was open to the respondents to pass a fresh order.   This order dated 25.7.2018 reads thus: ­

In allowing the petition, we have held that the order impugned   in   the   writ   petition   has   been   passed   in violation of principles of natural justice and that the selection   as   a   whole   was   not   liable   to   be   cancelled without   undertaking   any   exercise   to   separate   the tainted candidates from the untainted one's. The court in   the   end   while   allowing   the   writ   petitions   had permitted the applicants to pass a fresh reasoned order after   providing   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the

The applicants till date have not passed any fresh order.

The Review Application stands disposed of.” (emphasis supplied) 13. Since the undertaking filed in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6218/2017 was not complied with even after the disposal of the   review   petition,   the   High   Court   by   order   dated   6.8.2018, directed that upon failure to file compliance affidavit before next date   of   hearing,   the   presence   of   the   respondents   would   be required for framing of charges of contempt.  Likewise, in another contempt petition before the Lucknow bench of the High Court (against   non­compliance   of   judgment   dated   12.12.2017),   a similar order was passed on 7.8.2018.  14. The respondents carried the matter in appeal before this Court vide Civil Appeal Nos. 11017­11018/2018, impugning the judgment   and   orders   dated   28.11.2017   passed   in   Writ­A   No. 37143/2017 and also dated 25.7.2018 in Review Application No. 13 2/2018.  It may be useful to advert to an interim order passed by this Court in the stated appeal, dated 20.8.2018, which may have some bearing on the grounds under consideration.   The same reads thus: ­  “ The only liberty granted to the petitioners and as rightly   understood   by   the   learned   Advocate   General appearing for the State was to segregate the tainted from the untainted as per Order dated 16.03.2018 .  We direct the petitioners to file a report, in a sealed cover, within one month from today, as to what steps have been taken pursuant to the Judgment dated 28.11.2017 passed by the High Court and the order dated 16.03.2018 by this Court in the Special Leave Petition.  List on 20.09.2018.  The petitioners may approach the High Court and seek for extension of time.” (emphasis supplied) Be that as it may, the decisions of the High Court referred to above stood confirmed by this Court vide order dated 15.11.2018, giving liberty to the respondent(s) to pass a fresh, reasoned order. The relevant portion of the decision of this Court reads thus: ­

15. In view of the above, the challenge to the impugned th   th judgment dated 28 November, 2017 and 25   July, 2017 must fail   but with a clarification that the competent authority of  Nigam is free to pass a fresh, reasoned order in accordance with law . 16. We   may   not   be   understood   to   have   expressed   any opinion either way on the merits of the course of action open to the appellants against the respondents including against   the   other   appointees   under   the   same   selection process.  All questions in that behalf are left open.” (emphasis supplied)  After the judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018, the High 15. Court in the Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6218/2017, vide order dated 26.11.2018, directed the respondents to comply with the judgment dated 28.11.2017 in the first instance.  An order of even date was made in Contempt No. 1428/2018 by the Lucknow bench of the High Court on similar lines. 16. In terms of the directions of this Court in judgment dated 15.11.2018   and   that   of   High   Court   in   the   two   orders   dated 26.11.2018, the respondents passed the impugned order dated 4.12.2018 (reproduced in paragraph No. 2 above), reengaging the petitioners, albeit, without continuity of service and arrears.  The 15 respondents   also   filed   affidavit   of   compliance   before   the   High Court.  17. In Contempt Application No. 6218/2017, the petitioner filed objections to the said affidavit of compliance on 10.12.2018 on the ground that withholding the payment of arrears is directly in teeth of the judgment dated 28.11.2017, as confirmed by this Court vide judgment dated 15.11.2018 and thus, it amounts to wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court. Similarly, in Contempt No. 1428/2018, the objections were 18. first   noted   in   order   dated   17.12.2018   and   then,   a   detailed affidavit of objections was filed on 21.1.2019. The High Court, vide   order   dated   22.1.2019,   observed   that   the   reinstatement should be followed by payment of full back wages and directed the   respondents   to   pay   the   same   within   three   months.     The relevant portion of the said order is reproduced thus: “..... The Supreme Court has observed in the case of Deepali 7 Gundu Surwase   that reinstatement ordinarily should be followed by payment of full back wages. It is not the case of the respondents that the termination order has not been set aside by this Court. It is also not the case   of   the   respondents   that   the   petitioners   have   been gainfully employee during the period that they remained out   of   service   due   to   termination   order   which   has 7  Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors .   (2013) 10 SCC 324 16 ultimately been set aside. Therefore, the respondents are directed   to   give   arrears   of   salary   as   are   due   to   the petitioner after termination order is set aside by this Court. The  back wages of  the  petitioners  in  compliance of  the orders passed by this Court in writ jurisdiction shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months. List this matter after three months on 29.4.2019 by which date if all arrears of salary are not paid, then the Managing Director of U.P. Jal Nigam shall appear in person to assist this Court.” Thereafter,   by   order   dated   1.4.2019,   the   High   Court 19. recorded that the respondents are  prima facie  guilty of wilful and deliberate disobedience and directed their presence before the Court   on   next   date   of   hearing,   for   framing   charge.     The respondents   assailed   the   said   order   by   way   of   SLP(C)   No. 10774/2019.   This Court, vide order dated 7.5.2019, observed that after the decision in Civil Appeal No. 11017­11018/2018, the   contempt   petitions   cannot   be   continued   before   the   High Court and be deemed to have been withdrawn to this Court. Liberty was granted to the petitioners to pursue other remedies as per law against the impugned orders. 20. The   respondents   had   challenged   the   High   Court’s   order dated   22.1.2019   by   way   of   SLP   (C)   Diary   No.   15756/2019, wherein this Court by order dated 10.5.2019, had followed the 17 order   passed   in   SLP   (C)   No.   10774/2019   to   withdraw   the contempt petition.  21. In these circumstances, the present contempt petitions in reference to the order dated 4.12.2018 regarding reengagement without continuity of service and arrears of back wages, arise for our consideration. 22. The   thrust   of   the   argument   of   the   petitioners   in   these petitions is that the effect of judgment of High Court in setting aside the termination order dated 11.8.2017, as upheld by this Court is that the termination order stood effaced in its entirety. As   such,   it   was   necessary   to   issue   a   formal   order   of reinstatement along with continuity in service and arrears of pay for the relevant period.  It is not open to the respondents to give any other interpretation.  It was then urged that the petitioners were   not   gainfully   employed   elsewhere   between   the   dates   of termination   and   reinstatement   and   therefore,   were   entitled   to back wages.     In support, reliance has been placed upon the 8 decision of this Court in  Deepali Gundu Surwase .  Further, it was submitted that denial of back wages would amount to giving premium to the respondents for their wrongdoings. It was also 8 supra at Footnote No. 7 18 9 pointed out that in  Deepali Gundu Surwase , the judgment of 10 this Court in   , J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal & Anr. which has been relied upon by the respondents, was held to be not a good law. 23. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondents   would   submit   that neither the High Court in its judgment dated 28.11.2017 nor this Court in its judgment dated 15.11.2018 had directed payment of arrears. Reliance was then placed on the decisions of this Court 11 in   J.K. Synthetics Ltd.   and   U.P. State Brassware Corpn. 12 , to submit that arrears Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey cannot   be   claimed   as   a   matter   of   right   upon   reinstatement, unless it has been expressly granted by the Court. In that, the petitioners are not entitled to arrears.   Further, the petitioners cannot now claim arrears as it would amount to claiming a fresh relief and is beyond the scope of contempt proceedings, whilst placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in   Director of Education,   Uttaranchal   &   Ors.   v.   Ved   Prakash   Joshi   & 13   It is urged that the petitioners had accepted the terms of Ors. 9  supra at Footnote No. 7 10 (2007) 2 SCC 433 11  supra at Footnote No. 10 12 (2006) 1 SCC 479 13 (2005) 6 SCC 98 19 re­engagement without any demur and therefore it was not open to them to claim back wages.  CONTEMPT   PETITIONS   AGAINST   FRESH   TERMINATION ORDER DATED 2.3.2020: The   fresh   termination   order   dated   2.3.2020   came   to   be 24. passed pursuant to the liberty given by this Court, leading to filing of the present petitions.   The background facts are that there   were   several   lapses   by   few   officials   of   the   respondent corporation and M/s. Aptech Private Limited (the testing agency) in relation to the selection process for filling up 122 posts of Assistant Engineers (113 ­ Civil, 5 ­ Electrical/Mechanical and 4 ­   Electrical   and   Electronics/Electronics   and Communication/Computer Science).  That as per the agreement between the respondent corporation and the testing agency, the testing agency was required to display the answer key for three days   and   to   take   remedial   action   on   the   objections   received. Further, the testing agency was also required to retain the data pertaining to the examination for at least one year.  The testing agency breached the aforesaid conditions  and interviews were conducted, without confirming if the answer key was uploaded or 20 not.   The   interviews   of   34,158   candidates   were   conducted   in tearing haste on 30.12.2016 and 31.12.2016 and the final result was released on 3.1.2017, and the appointments were made on the same day i.e., 3.1.2017.  Since non uploading of the answer key   had   deprived   the   candidates   of   the   opportunity   to   file objections,   the   unsuccessful   candidates   approached   the   High Court alleging that the recruitment process was not transparent and was replete with several illegalities and irregularities.   The High   Court,   in   Writ   Petition   Nos.   A/15948/2017   and 9794/S.B./2017   (preferred   by   unsuccessful   or   non­selected candidates), directed the respondent corporation to inquire into the said grievance and ensure that appropriate action is taken. Accordingly,   two   separate   inquiries   were   conducted   by   the officers wherein several irregularities were found.  On the basis of these inquiries, the entire selection process was declared void­ab­ initio and an order to that effect was passed on 11.8.2017.  The said order later on came to be set aside vide judgment dated 28.11.2017 of the High Court.  25. Meanwhile,   a   complaint   was   received   by   the   U.P. Government   (Home   Department)   in   regard   to   various 21 examinations   pertaining   to   recruitment   to   several   posts (including   the   present   recruitment   process).     The   government forwarded the same to SIT for investigation.  The SIT in its initial enquiry found that the testing agency had removed the entire data pertaining to the present recruitment process from the main server, in violation of the condition to store it for a year.  The said fact   was   also   admitted   by   the   testing   agency.     Therefore,   in absence of original data, assistance of the Directors of IIT Kanpur and   IIIT   Allahabad   was   sought   to   segregate   the   tainted   and untainted candidates.  The finding in the two expert reports,  inter alia,  was that the response sheet was uploaded after a long gap after   the   conclusion   of   the   test   which   casts   a   doubt   of manipulation in the response sheets.  Further, the data provided by the testing agency did not contain the Timestamps and Mouse Clicks of the candidates and there is no mention of the Audit Trail/Checksum.   Therefore, the authenticity of the answers of the candidates could  not be verified and certified.    Moreover, since primary data was not available and the data stored in the CD could not be authenticated, it was not possible to segregate the tainted and untainted candidates. 22 26. In   the   meantime,   this   Court   in   Civil   Appeal   No.   11017­ 11018/2018 (against judgment dated 27.11.2017 and judgment in review dated 25.7.2018), had observed that the expert reports were not available while passing order dated 11.8.2017 and gave liberty to pass a fresh reasoned order by considering the previous inquiry   reports   and   other   data  that   becomes   available   to   the respondents.  27. In separate proceedings pending before the High Court in W.P. No. 12222/2017 (against recruitment for other posts), the Court   passed   an   order   dated   21.5.2019   that   it   was   for   the respondent corporation to decide to annul the entire selection process if the segregation cannot be undertaken.  The said order was upheld by the High Court in Special Appeal (Defective) No. 625/2019 and 626/2019 (intra court appeals) by an order dated 31.7.2019.   Furthermore,   the   SIT   sent   its   final   report   dated 22.1.2020 to the Government, which was made available to the respondent corporation on 18.2.2020.  The said report mentions that the testing agency had removed primary data from the cloud server in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and recommended to consider cancelling all the appointments made in the exams 23 conducted   by   the   testing   agency   (including   for   the   post   of Assistant Engineer).  In view of the aforesaid, and in exercise of the liberty granted by this Court, the order dated 2.3.2020 was passed   on   the   aforesaid   findings.     Aggrieved   therefrom,   the present contempt petitions have been filed. 28. The case of the petitioners is that the High Court and also this Court had held that the termination order dated 11.8.2017, terminating the services of the petitioners (and other appointees) , was invalid as it was passed without adhering to the en masse principles   of   natural   justice.     However,   the   respondent corporation   had   yet   again   passed   the   order   dated   2.3.2020 without following the principles of natural justice.  By doing so, the respondent corporation in effect has restored the termination order dated 11.8.2017, under the guise of the liberty granted by this Court.  The same cannot be countenanced. 29. It   was   urged   that   the   decision   of   this   Court   dated 15.11.2018 contained a categorical direction for the respondent corporation to pass a fresh reasoned order after providing an opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   affected   parties.     However,   the impugned order had been passed in violation thereof.  In support, 24 reliance   is   placed   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Haryana 14 Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. to contend that the judgments are not to be read like statutes. It was then urged that liberty to pass a fresh order ‘in accordance with   law’   cannot   be   stretched   to   such   an   extent   that   would circumvent compliance with principles of natural justice. 30. It   was   contended   that   the   reliance   placed   by   the respondents   upon   decisions   of   High   Court   in   W.P.   No. 12222/2017 and Special Appeal (Defective) No. 625/2019 and 626/2019 is misplaced and  untenable as the  same has been done only to overcome the orders of this Court.  It was submitted that   the   executive   cannot   sit   in   appeal   or   revision   over   the judicial orders.  Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court 15 in  Union of India & Anr. v. K.M. Shankarappa  and  Union of 16 India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , to contend that an attempt to renew an order which had been quashed by the Court, would amount to legal malice.  31. Per   contra,   the   respondents   would   submit   that   the judgment dated 15.11.2018 had directed the respondents to act 14 (2002) 3 SCC 496 15 (2001) 1 SCC 582 16 (2013) 16 SCC 147 25 upon the High Court’s judgment dated 28.11.2017, wherein the petitioners   were   permitted   to   work   on   the   post   of   Assistant Engineers.     The   respondents   duly   complied   with   the aforementioned   judgment   of   this   Court,   by   appointing   the petitioners vide order dated 4.12.2018.   It was then urged that this Court had granted liberty to the respondents to proceed in the matter in accordance with law.   Therefore, contempt action cannot   be   maintained   in   respect   of   order   dated   2.3.2020   in absence   of   any   specific   direction   to   afford   opportunity   to   the petitioners despite the conclusion and opinion recorded by the competent   authority   that   segregation   of   tainted   and   the untainted was not possible.   The respondents contend that in such a case the entire selection process stood vitiated and no notice/opportunity need be given to the petitioners.  Reliance is placed upon decisions of this Court in  Union of India & Ors. v. 17 ,   O.   Chakradhar Veerendra   Kumar   Gautam   &   Ors.   v. 18 Karuna Nidhan Upadhyay & Ors. ,   M.P. State Coop. Bank 19 ,   Ltd.,   Bhopal   v.   Nanuram   Yadav   &   Ors. Nidhi   Kaim   v. 20 State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. ,  Kunhayammed & Ors. v. 17 (2002) 3 SCC 146 18 (2016) 14 SCC 18 19 (2007) 8 SCC 264 20 (2016) 7 SCC 615 26 21 State of Kerala & Anr.  and  Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, 22 Kollegal  to contend that the respondents have not violated the judgment dated 15.11.2018.  In law, the decision of High Court dated   28.11.2017   had   merged   in   the   judgment   of   this   Court dated  15.11.2018.     It   was   then   submitted   that   no   additional direction can be given in a contempt proceeding as the same would amount to exercise of review jurisdiction.   In support of this plea, reliance is placed upon the decisions in  Bihar Finance Service   House   Construction   Cooperative   Society   Ltd.   v. 23 Gautam Goswami & Ors.   and  Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 24 Limited & Ors. v. M. George Ravishekaran & Ors. .    It was then urged that civil contempt would require wilful disobedience. Passing of order dated 2.3.2020, assuming it to be a case of disobedience, the same cannot be termed as wilful.   Thus, no contempt action can be  maintained.    Reliance  was  placed  on 25 decision of this Court in  Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. , 21 (2000) 6 SCC 359 22 (2019) 4 SCC 376 23 (2008) 5 SCC 339 24 (2014) 3 SCC 373 25 (2014) 16 SCC 204 27 Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Company 26  and  Limited & Ors. Kapildeo Prasad Sah & Ors. v. State of 27 Bihar & Ors. .  It was then submitted that the implementation of orders can be insisted depending on its practicability.  But, in the fact situation of this case, giving notice to the petitioners was not practical.  Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court 28 in  Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather .  RE: W.P. (C) No. 491/2020  32. W.P.(C) No. 491/2020 is filed for quashing and setting aside the   termination   order   dated   2.3.2020   and   to   direct   the respondents to reinstate the petitioners with full back wages and continuity of service.  Several applications were filed in the above petition seeking impleadment as parties. I.A. No. 116777/2020, I.A. No. 106077/2020 and I.A. No. 93552/2020 have been filed by the successful candidates.  Whereas, I.A. No. 50899/2020 is filed by the candidates who were declared unsuccessful or non­ selected in the initial merit list, but whose score was revised after considering the objections to the answer key, so as to enter the 26 (2010) 12 SCC 770 27 (1999) 7 SCC 569 28 (1994) 4 SCC 34 28 merit   list.       An   application   for   directions   being   I.A.   No. 50896/2020 was filed by the aforesaid unsuccessful candidates seeking to be appointed as per the revised merit list and to pay arrears   from   January,   2017   when   they   ought   to   have   been appointed.  The applications of the unsuccessful or non­selected candidates shall be dealt with a little later. 33. The   ground   for   filing   the   above   writ  petition   is   that  the termination order dated 2.3.2020 is violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (g)   and   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     That,   the respondent corporation had malafidely tried to improve its case at every stage by adding new grounds.  For instance, in the first inquiry report dated 29.5.2017, the Chief Engineer stated that the sanction for a few posts was made by Board of Directors of the respondent corporation, which was not competent to do so, as   only   the   Government   had   authority   to   sanction   posts. Further, the candidates with lower marks in the written test were given higher marks in the interview and that the entire selection process was rushed through within a period of less than one month from the date of advertisement issued on 13.12.2016 and appointment   orders   issued   on   3.1.2017,   presumably   because 29 election   code   of   conduct   was   about   to   come   into   force. Thereafter, in second inquiry report dated 7.7.2017, the Chief Engineer added that the respondent corporation could not have recruited without permission of the Finance Department of the Government in view of the loan of Rs.300 crores given by the Government   to   the   respondent   corporation.     Further,   the examination results were published without inviting objections, some of the answers in the answer key and some questions in the question   paper   were   wrong   and   that   answer   sheets   of   4 successful candidates were identical. Then,   in   the   termination   order   dated   11.8.2017,   it   was 34. added   that   the   permission   of   Election   Commission   of   India should have been taken as the Model Code of Conduct had come into effect prior to joining date.   Before the High Court, it was urged that the  respondent corporation was  facing shortage of funds   and   was   not   in   a   position   to   pay   so   many   additional employees and that provision was not made for reservation of posts   in   accordance   with   law.     Thereafter,   in   the   review application,   the   ground   taken   was   that   on   the   basis   of 30 revaluation, some of the selected candidates would not even have been eligible for the interview. 35. The   petitioners   would   submit   that   the   writ   petition   is maintainable   in   view   of   violation   of   their   fundamental   rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.  Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in   Romesh Thappar v. 29 .   It   was   urged   that   the   action   of   the State   of   Madras respondents in adding new grounds at each stage shows that the respondent corporation despite being ‘State’ under Article 12 of the   Constitution,   has   been   prosecuting   the   matter   like   a desperate private litigant, under dictation. The petitioners would then urge that the impugned order 36. had  been  passed   by   the   respondents   whilst  relying   upon   the opinion of experts that there was a possibility that the response filed by certain candidates ‘might have been doctored’, which is a mere   speculation,   without   any   data   in   its   support.     It   was submitted that the data upon which the respondents relied, to pass the order dated 2.3.2020, was available even at the time of passing of the judgment dated 15.11.2018 by this Court; and is in the nature of ‘being repacked in a fresh package’ and the same 29 1950 SCR 594 31 cannot be permitted as per decision of this Court in   Manohar 30 .   Lal (Dead) by LRs. v. Ugrasen (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. 37. It was urged that the respondents deliberately did not ask the testing agency for checksum data until one year period of storing had expired.   It was then pointed out that the testing agency, in an affidavit before the High Court (in W.P. (S/S) No. 7647/2020 – relating to another examination), had stated certain facts concerning the present selection process.  Particularly, that the primary data was not deleted but merely moved from the cloud server to data storage centre in accordance with its Data Retention Policy and is still available with the testing agency and that the respondent corporation had never approached them for obtaining the  same.   Therefore, the  opinion given by the two experts was based on conjectures and surmises that the primary data is not available.  38. It was submitted that the SIT Report dated 22.1.2020 and the reports of Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) dated 28.8.2019, 19.11.2019, 11.12.2019 and 1.1.2020 (considered by the SIT in its report) relied upon by the respondents in passing the   impugned   order   ought   to   have   been   served   upon   the 30 (2010) 11 SCC 557 32 petitioners before taking any adverse action against them, in light 31 of dictum in  Union of India & Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor .  Further, the SIT report is in the nature of a final report by an investigative agency and cannot be treated as conclusive proof of malpractices. Moreover, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer at the cost of any malfeasance by the testing agency.  39. It   was   urged   that   the   documents   relied   upon   by   the respondents have never been proved or subjected to scrutiny by a fact­finding authority or tribunal, nor had the petitioners been given an opportunity to meet the assertions made therein. That the testing agency had by letter dated 7.11.2017 intimated the SIT that primary data was stored in data storage facility and not the   hard   drive,   despite   which,   the   SIT   raided   its   office   on 10.9.2018 and seized random hard drives of ‘dump data’ and sent  the   same   to  CFSL.    Therefore,   the  very   basis   of   CFSL’s analysis is flawed.  40. Further, despite the finding in SIT report that the testing agency was a part of criminal conspiracy for deleting the primary data, the respondents continued to engage the testing agency for conducting examinations. The respondent corporation procured a 31 (2011) 4 SCC 589 33 letter   dated   31.8.2020   from   the   Addl.   Chief   Secretary, Government   of   U.P.   recommending   to   the   DGP,   SIT   that   the testing   agency   be   blacklisted,   about   three   years   after   the irregularities came to its knowledge, which clearly demonstrates malafides.  It was then submitted that there is no substance in the argument that the selection process was hastily completed as the   same   was   in   full   compliance   with   the   advertisement   and applicable   SoP   and   Rules   of   the   respondent   corporation. Moreover, the said argument was rejected by the High Court in judgment dated 28.11.2017.  It   was   then   urged   that   the   only   liberty   granted   to   the 41. respondents   is   to   rework   the   answer   sheets   based   on   the corrections, after giving candidates an opportunity of hearing. Further, the respondent corporation had failed to discharge the burden that the response sheets were manipulated and argued of inability   to   verify   the   veracity   of   examination   process,   which cannot be permitted.  42. The   submission   that   principles   of   natural   justice   were violated was akin to the submissions made in the above contempt petitions. It was submitted that there can be no exception to the 34 principle of  audi alter partem.   Reliance is placed upon decision of this Court in   Nisha Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & 32   and   Ors. Indian   Institute   of   Information   Technology, Deoghat Jhalwa, Allahabad & Anr. v. Dr. Anurika Vaish & 33   to submit that when termination order was set aside for Ors. not hearing the affected parties before passing it and liberty is granted   to   pass   a   fresh   reasoned   order,   the   employer­State cannot pass another fresh termination order without hearing the affected persons yet again. 43. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondents   would   raise   a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the Writ Petition   as   the   alternate   remedy   under   Article   226   of   the Constitution   was   not   exhausted,   whilst   placing   reliance   on decisions   of   this   Court   in   P.N.   Kumar   &   Anr.   v.   Muncipal 34 ,   Corporation   of   Delhi Kanubhai   Brahmbhatt   v.   State   of 35 Gujarat ,   Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v. State of Sikkim & 36 ,   Ors. Confederation   of   All   Nagaland   State   Services 32 (2014) 16 SCC 392 33 (2017) 5 SCC 660 34 (1987) 4 SCC 609 35 1989 Supp (2) SCC 310 36 (2010) 4 SCC 513 35 37 Employees’ Assn. & Ors. v. State of Nagaland   and   Amrit 38 . Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi & Ors. It was also pointed out that parties similarly placed to that of the petitioners filed writ petition before the High Court being W.P. (C) No. 13083/2020 (Service Single) and even the petitioners ought to have approached High Court. 44. With reference to petitioners’ reliance on affidavit filed by the testing agency, the respondents would submit that the onus was on the testing agency to give correct and complete data to the SIT for investigation.   It was pointed out that the SIT had recorded the statement of Mr. Vishvajeet Singh, Technical and Delivery Head of the testing agency, wherein he stated that the examination data was kept in the cloud only for a month, after which it was downloaded onto the ‘local environment’ ­ the hard disk.     Further,   the   testing   agency   had   itself   accepted   in   the certificate provided to the SIT under Section 65­B of the Indian 39 Evidence Act, 1872 , that the original primary data had been deleted and the backup data does not contain any system logs. And that, the deletion of primary server data made it impossible 37 (2006) 1 SCC 496 38 (1975) 4 SCC 714 39 For short, ‘the 1872 Act’ 36 to   re­analyse   the   response   sheets   using   the   secondary   data provided in the form of CDs, as the same is not accurate.  It was then urged that the respondent corporation had taken prompt action against its officials involved in the irregularities committed in the recruitment process.  45. It was submitted that the respondents had rightly cancelled the entire recruitment process and terminated the services of all the recruits in accordance with law as the illegality was of such nature   that   the   tainted   candidates   could   not   have   been segregated   from   the   untainted   and   the   veracity   of   the   entire examination process was doubtful.  Further, it was urged that if the tainted and untainted candidates could be segregated, the show   cause   notice   would   have   been   issued   to   the   concerned candidate.  However, since the segregation was not possible and did  not   take   place,   the   entire   recruitment   process   had   to   be 40 cancelled in view of  .   Thus, no individual show O. Chakradhar cause   notice   was   necessary   in   law.   This   submission   of   the respondents is similar to the stand taken by them in the above contempt petitions. 40  supra at Footnote No. 17 37 46. It was then urged that even if an opportunity of hearing is given to the candidates, it would be an empty formality as the respondents do not have primary data to compare actual correct answers given by the candidates, as it would be impossible to segregate the tainted and untainted candidates in absence of the primary data.  Even if an opportunity of hearing is granted, the decision of the respondent corporation would remain the same. Reliance in that regard was placed upon decision of this Court in Dharampal   Satyapal   Limited   v.   Dy.   Commissioner   of 41 Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. . RE:   IMPLEADMENT   APPLICATIONS   BY   NON­SELECTED CANDIDATES: Coming   to   the   impleadment   applications   filed   by   non­ 47. selected candidates, their case is that upon objections raised by the   candidates   that   the   answer   key   was   not   released,   the respondents had published the answer sheet and answer key on 28.2.2017.     The   applicants   found   various   errors   therein   and being   aggrieved,   they   had   filed   W.P.   Nos.   10667/2017   and 21876/2017   before   the   High   Court,   wherein   the   High   Court 41 (2015) 8 SCC 519 38 directed the respondents to conduct an enquiry in the alleged irregularities.     Pursuant   thereto,   an   inquiry   was   conducted wherein the errors were taken note of and accordingly, the testing agency had submitted a revised list to the respondents.  In that revised merit list, these applicants had stood higher in the merit list than the appointees. The respondents, instead of reworking the   appointments   in   accordance   with   the   revised   list,   had annulled   the   entire   selection   process   first   vide   order   dated 11.8.2017 (which was later set aside) and then again by order dated 2.3.2020. These applicants would submit that various grounds noted 48. by the respondents in the order dated 2.3.2020 had already been rejected by the High Court in its judgment dated 28.11.2017, whereby the earlier order dated 11.8.2017 was set aside.   The High Court in the said judgment had held that there was no prohibition imposed against appointment on regular selection in the model code of conduct and the post of Assistant Engineers were regular in nature.   That the requirement mandating prior sanction   of   the   State   Government   was   not   applicable   to   the present   case   as   the   requirement   was   made   by   G.O.   dated 39 13.12.2016   whereas   the   selection   process   in   question   had commenced on 19.11.2016.  That the permission to advertise the posts was  made  by   the  Chairman,   which  was  ratified  by   the Board of Directors of the respondent corporation.  The argument of malafide in the selection process was rejected by the High Court and the said judgment was upheld by this Court. 49. It was urged that the testing agency undertook the exercise of rectification of incorrect entries in the key and submitted a report to the respondents dated 8.8.2017 containing the revised merit   list   and   therefore,   the   only   option   available   to   the respondents   was   to   act   upon   the   revised   merit   list.     It   was submitted that cancellation of entire selection process (by order dated 2.3.2020) when it was merely a case of certain infirmities in   the   evaluation,   would   be   unreasonable,   arbitrary   and disproportionate.   In support of this plea, reliance is placed upon decisions of this Court in  Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U. 42 Puthuvalnikathu & Anr. ,  Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of 43   and   Bihar & Ors. K. Channegowda & Ors. v. Karnataka 44 Public Service Commission & Ors. . 42 (2003) 7 SCC 285 43 (2013) 4 SCC 690 44 (2005) 12 SCC 688 40 50. It was then urged that the principle of proportionality has been   recognised   as   an   aspect   of   Article   14   by   this   Court   in Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State 45 of   Madhya   Pradesh   &   Ors.   and   in   view   whereof,   the cancellation of entire selection process, being disproportionate, is violative of Article 14. 51. Further, it was urged that even in the case of malpractice and malafide, entire selection process should not be cancelled but the tainted and untainted candidates ought to be segregated. In support of this plea, reliance was placed on decisions of this Court in  Inderpreet Singh Kahlon & Ors. v. State of Punjab 46 &  Ors. ,   Girjesh  Shrivastava  & Ors.  v.  State  of  Madhya 47  and  Pradesh & Ors. Joginder Pal & Ors. v. State of Punjab 48 & Ors. .   It was then urged that the mandate of decisions of High Court dated 28.11.2017 and 25.7.2018 and of this Court dated   16.3.2018   and   15.11.2018   was   to   re­work   the   answer sheets   and   a   limited   liberty   to   that   effect   was   given   to   the respondents.  The applicants would then take a stand similar to 45 (2016) 7 SCC 353 46 (2006) 11 SCC 356 47 (2010) 10 SCC 707 48 (2014) 6 SCC 644 41 that of the petitioners in the above contempt petitions, to submit that the judgment of a court has to be understood in its entirety and cannot be read as a statute, whilst relying upon the decision of   this   Court   in   Purnendu   Mukhopadhyay   &   Ors.   v.   V.K. 49 Kapoor & Anr. .  Therefore, the order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondents is against the mandate of the above judgments. RE: TRANSFER PETITION: 52. In T.P. (C) No. 1209/2020, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 139A for transfer/withdrawal of Writ Petition (C) No. 13083/2020 (Service Single) pending before the High Court to this Court as the subject matter of the said writ petition   (impugned   order   dated   2.3.2020)   is   already   pending challenge before this Court in W.P. No. 491/2020 and companion contempt petitions. In W.P. (C) No. 13083/2020 (Service Single) before the High Court, the petitioners have relied upon opinion of their own expert, Dr. A.V. Subrahmanyam, Assistant Professor at IIIT   Delhi,   who   had   discredited   the   IIT   and   IIIT   reports   and opined that the ‘checksum’ method of fingerprinting not having 49 (2008) 14 SCC 403 42 been deployed shall have no bearing on the candidates as they had no role to play in the same.  53. These petitioners would submit that the issue of veracity and   weight   of   experts   shall   be   examined   in   a   departmental inquiry and cannot be gone into before this Court.  Further, the petitioners urge that they would like to present their expert and to   cross   examine   other   experts,   so   that   the   truth   could   be distilled.  That the respondents ought to have had a departmental inquiry by giving the petitioners an opportunity to hear, so that the parties could have led their evidence and the decision should have been taken on the basis of the outcome of such inquiry.  54. We have heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Mr.   Ravindra   Raizada,   learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Gaurav Mehrotra, Mr. Kumar Shivam and Mr. Rohit Anil Rathi, learned counsel   ­   for   the   petitioners;   Mr.   Nizam   M.   Pasha   for   the impleaded petitioners; Ms. Sanskriti Pathak, learned counsel for applicants (candidates successful as per revised merit list); and Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents. 55.  The broad points that arise for our consideration are: 43 1.   Whether   the   order   dated   4.12.2018   passed   by   the respondents is in the teeth of judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018, requiring compliance of judgment of High Court dated   28.11.2017,   for   deliberate   failure   to   reinstate   with continuity of service and to pay arrears to the petitioners? 2. Whether the termination order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondents is in wilful disobedience of and in the teeth of   judgment   of   this   Court   dated   15.11.2018,   for   not following the principles of natural justice and is thus  non­ est  in law? CONSIDERATION 56. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to first answer the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of writ petition under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     We   have   no hesitation in rejecting this preliminary objection for more than one reason.  It is well­established position that if the termination order   is   assailed   on   the   ground   of   violation   of   principles   of natural justice or fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, such a grievance can be brought before the constitutional   Court   including   by   way   of   writ   petition   under 44 Article 32 of the Constitution of India.   It is a different matter that this Court may be loath in entertaining the grievance directly under Article 32 and instead relegate the petitioner(s) before the High Court to first exhaust the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  That is also because this Court will then have the advantage of the judgment of the High Court on relevant aspects.  In other words, it is not a question of maintainability of writ   petition,   but   one   of   exercise   of   discretion   with circumspection in entertaining writ petition under Article 32 in such   matters.     Further,   in   the   present   case,   there   are   other proceedings   pending   in  the  form  of   contempt  petitions  and  a transfer petition wherein the termination order dated 2.3.2020 is the subject matter.  Thus, the arguments in these cases will be overlapping.  In that, the self­same order has been impugned in the  writ  petition  filed   before   this   Court.     The   fact   that   other affected similarly placed persons have filed writ petitions directly before the High Court and which are stated to be pending, can be no impediment for this Court in entertaining and deciding the writ   petition.     For,   the   issue   regarding   the   purport   of   orders passed   by   this   Court   needs   to   be   answered   appropriately   in contempt petitions only by this Court.  It is not open to the High 45 Court to interpret or explain the order passed by this Court in previous proceedings between the parties.   The High Court can only   follow   the   dictum   of   this   Court   which   is   binding   on   it. Accordingly, we are not impressed by the preliminary objection taken by the respondents regarding the maintainability of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by similarly placed persons directly filed before this Court to assail the impugned order dated 2.3.2020, which is also subject matter of second set of contempt petitions. 57. As   aforesaid,   we   are   dealing   with   two   sets   of   contempt petitions.  The  first set  complains about non­compliance of order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the High Court, which came to be upheld   by   this   Court   consequent   to   disposal   of   special   leave petitions  being  SLP(C) Nos. 5410­5419/2018  vide  order  dated 16.3.2018, and more particularly, reiterated by this Court in its 50 order dated 15.11.2018   directing the respondents to first act upon the decision of the High Court dated 28.11.2017 and only thereafter   proceed   in   the   matter   in   accordance   with   law   by passing a fresh, reasoned order.  It is not in dispute that after the judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018, a consequential order 50  supra at Footnote No. 2 46 was passed by the High Court on 26.11.2018.  The respondents thus issued order dated 4.12.2018 (reproduced in paragraph 2 above), reengaging the petitioners on the concerned posts without continuity of service and arrears.   The grievance of the petitioners is that the unambiguous 58. direction given by the High Court and upheld by this Court was to reinstate the petitioners on the same position with full back wages.  No more and no less.  The respondents were, therefore, obliged to issue order of reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages.   The argument is attractive at the first blush, but on deeper scrutiny of the orders passed by the High Court and finally by this Court, it is noticed that the direction is limited to   permit   the   petitioners   to   work   on   the   posts   of   Assistant Engineer   (Civil),   Assistant   Engineer   (Electric/Mechanical)   and Assistant   Engineer   (Computer   Science   and   Electronics   and Communication/Electrical   and   Electronics)   and   to   pay   them regular salary month by month as and when it becomes due and payable to them. That can be discerned from the last paragraph of the order dated 28.11.2017 (reproduced in paragraph 9 above). On similar lines, the High Court disposed of another writ petition 47 challenging the termination order dated 11.8.2017 passed by the respondents,   vide   order   dated   12.12.2017   (reproduced   in paragraph 10 above).  In these orders, the expression used by the High Court is “to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned posts and to pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues to them”.   The order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the High Court was upheld by this Court on 16.3.2018.   In that order, after recording contentions of both sides, while disposing of petitions it is observed as follows: ­ “….. Be   that   as   it   may,   having   gone   through   the   impugned judgment, we do not find that the door is yet closed. It is for the petitioners, if they are so advised, to approach the High Court itself for a liberty to re­work the answer sheets on the basis of the corrections, in case the High Court is also of the view that the corrections need to be made. …..” The respondents had, therefore, pursued review petition as per the liberty given by this Court.  The same came to be disposed of by   the   High   Court   on   25.7.2018.     On   perusal   of   that   order (reproduced in paragraph 12 above), there is nothing to indicate that   the   High   Court   expressly   directed   reinstatement   of petitioners with continuity of service and back wages, as such. Even in the decision of this Court dismissing the appeals filed by 48 respondents,   vide   order   dated   15.11.2018   (reproduced   in paragraph 14 above), no such direction has been issued.   The limited direction is that the respondents must first act upon the decision of the High Court dated 28.11.2017 and only thereafter proceed in the matter in accordance with law by passing a fresh, reasoned order.   59. After cogitating over the orders passed by the High Court and this Court referred to above, it becomes amply clear that the High Court had quashed and set aside the first termination order dated   11.8.2017   solely   on   the   ground   that   it   was   passed   in violation of principles of natural justice and further observed that the selection as a whole was not liable to be cancelled without undertaking an exercise to separate the tainted candidates from the untainted.   While so observing, it was made clear that the respondents   were   free   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   in accordance with law. 60. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in accepting the explanation offered by the respondents that going by the text of the orders passed by the High Court and this Court,   it   was   open   to   the   respondents   to   issue   order   (dated 49 4.12.2018) to reengage the petitioners on the same posts from the date of order and to pay them regular salary month by month thereafter or as and when it would accrue to them.  The orders passed by the High Court and this Court, as aforementioned, do not   contain   explicit   direction   to   reinstate   the   petitioners   with continuity   of   service   and   back   wages   as   such.     Instead,   the expression used is only “to permit the petitioners to work on the posts” which were held by them at the time of their termination and “to pay them regular salary month by month” and “as and when the same accrues to them”.  Thus understood, it is not a case of wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court.   61. Arguendo,   the   interpretation   as   propagated   by   the petitioners of the stated orders dated 28.11.2017 passed by the High Court and 16.3.2018 of this Court, is a possible view.  Being another   possible   view,   the   benefit  must  then  be   given  to   the respondents.     For,   it   would   certainly   not   be   a   case   of   wilful disobedience   as   enunciated   by   this   Court   in   Sushila   Raje 51 Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired)   which follows the dictum of this 52 Court in  , State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari  Purnendu 51  (2008) 14 SCC 392 52  AIR 1961 SC 221 50 53 Mukhopadhyay   and   Maruti Udyog Limited v. Mahinder C. 54 . Mehta & Ors. 62. It is well settled that contempt action ought to proceed only in respect of established wilful disobedience of the order of the Court.     This   Court   in   paragraph   12   of   the   decision   in   Ram 55 Kishan  observed thus: ­ “ 12.  Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be es­ tablished that disobedience of the order is “wilful”.   The word “wilful” introduces a mental element and hence, requires looking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging his actions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. “Wilful” means knowingly intentional, conscious,   calculated   and   deliberate   with   full   knowl­ edge of consequences flowing therefrom . It excludes ca­ sual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily or negligent actions.   The act has to be done with a “bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, ob­ stinately or perversely” . Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or in­ advertently. It does not include any act done negligently or involuntarily.  The deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evil motive on his part . Even if there is a disobedi­ ence of an order, but such disobedience is the result of some  compelling  circumstances  under   which  it  was not possible for the contemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot be punished. “Committal or sequestra­ tion will not be ordered unless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct.” (Vide  S. Sundaram Pillai  v.  V.R. 56 Pattabiraman ,  Rakapalli   Raja   Ram   Gopala   Rao  v.  Nara­ 53         supra at Footnote No. 49 54        (2007) 13 SCC 220 55  supra at Footnote No. 25 56   (1985) 1 SCC 591 51 57 gani   Govinda   Sehararao ,  Niaz   Mohammad  v.  State   of 58 59 Haryana ,  Chordia Automobiles  v.  S. Moosa ,  Ashok Paper 60 Kamgar Union  v.  Dharam Godha ,  State of Orissa  v.  Mohd. 61 62 Illiyas   and  Uniworth Textiles Ltd.  v.  CCE ).” (emphasis supplied) It is useful to recall the exposition in   Director of Education, 63 Uttaranchal   and also in   K.G. Derasari & Anr. v. Union of 64 ;   wherein this Court observed that in exercising India & Ors. contempt jurisdiction, the primary concern must be whether the acts of commission or omission can be said to be contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions given in the judgment and order of the Court.  Further, the Court ought not to take upon itself power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment and order.  It is also not open to go into the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional directions or delete any direction, which course could be adopted only in review jurisdiction and not contempt proceedings. 57   (1989) 4 SCC 255 58   (1994) 6 SCC 332 59   (2000) 3 SCC 282 60   (2003) 11 SCC 1 61    (2006) 1 SCC 275 62   (2013) 9 SCC 753 63  supra at Footnote No. 13 64         (2001) 10 SCC 496 52 65 63. Reliance   placed   on   Deepali   Gundu   Surwase   by   the petitioners is inapposite.  It was a case of wrongful termination and   entitled   the   petitioner   therein   relief   of   back   wages.     The respondents   have   instead   relied   upon   the   exposition   in   P. Karupaiah (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. General 66 Manager,   Thruuvalluvar   Transport   Corporation   Limited 67 and  which has restated the legal position J.K. Synthetics Ltd.   regarding back wages.  It has been held that it is not automatic or natural consequence of reinstatement .   Suffice it to mention   that   for   reasons   already   recorded   hitherto   including   that   the limited direction given by the High Court and not disturbed by this Court was to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned posts and to pay them regular salary as and when the same accrues   to   them,   the   plea   under   consideration   needs   to   be recorded only to be rejected. 64. Be that as it may, keeping in mind the settled legal position, we have no hesitation in concluding that the case at hand does not   qualify   the   test   of   contumacious,   much   less   wilful disobedience   of   the   order   of   the   Court   by   the   officers   of   the respondents as such.   In other words, the basis on which the 65        supra at Footnote No. 7 66  (2018) 12 SCC 663 (paragraph 10) 67        supra at Footnote No. 10 53 contempt action against the respondents in reference to order dated 4.12.2018 issued by the respondents, has been initiated is tenuous.  Hence, the same is rejected.  We   would   now   revert   to   the   65. second   set   of   contempt petitions , which emanate from termination order dated 2.3.2020 issued by the respondents. These petitions essentially proceed on the allegation that the respondents committed wilful disobedience of the order of this Court dated 15.11.2018 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.   11017­11018/2018   in   not   affording   prior   opportunity   of hearing to the petitioners and similarly placed persons despite express direction contained in the said order.   For considering this   grievance,   we   may   reproduce   the   relevant   portion   of   the order dated 15.11.2018, which reads thus: ­

(emphasis supplied) 66.   The   Court   had   set   aside   the   termination   order   dated 11.8.2017 issued by the respondents, solely on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice.  At the same time, liberty was given to the respondents to pass a fresh order in accordance   with   law   including   by   undertaking   exercise   of segregating the tainted from the untainted candidates.   Indeed, the Court expected that before taking any precipitative action against the petitioners, the respondents must afford opportunity of hearing to them.   This observation is contextual.   It would come into play dependent upon the opinion eventually formed by respondents after due consideration of the material collated by them to distinguish the tainted and untainted candidates, was possible or otherwise.   Had the respondents concluded that it was possible to segregate tainted from untainted candidates, they would have been obliged to comply with the directions given by the   High   Court   and   restated   by   this   Court   in   order   dated 15.11.2018,   to   afford   prior   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons   before   passing   fresh, reasoned order.   However, from the subject termination order 55 dated 2.3.2020, which is a speaking order, it is crystal clear that after due enquiry and taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, in particular the enquiry reports and the opinion of the experts including final report of SIT, the respondents were of the considered opinion that it was not possible to segregate tainted from the untainted candidates for reasons recorded in that order. We are not inclined to go into the correctness of the said reasons, because it is subject matter of challenge in writ petitions pending before the High Court (as pointed out in Annexure R­29 of the Supplementary Affidavit), filed not only by Assistant Engineers, but also by Junior Engineers, Routine Grade Clerks and others.   67. We would, therefore, confine our analysis as to whether the respondents were justified in passing subject termination order dated 2.3.2020 without giving prior opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.  In light of the conclusion reached by the respondents in the stated order dated 2.3.2020 — that it was not possible to segregate the tainted from the untainted candidates, in law, it must follow that the respondents could annul the entire selection process and pass the impugned order without giving individual notices to the petitioners and similarly placed persons.  We are 56 fortified   in   taking   this   view   in   terms   of   the   exposition   in   O. 68   and the subsequent decisions of this Court in Chakradhar 69 70 Joginder   Pal ,   Veerendra   Kumar   Gautam   and   Vikas 71 , Pratap   Singh   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Chhattisgarh   &   Ors. 72 adverted to in paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 15.11.2018 of   this   Court   while   disposing   of   earlier   appeals   between   the parties.   68. In other words, since the respondents have concluded that it   was   not   possible   to   segregate   tainted   from   the   untainted candidates because of the reasons noted in the termination order dated 2.3.2020, in law, there was nothing wrong in respondents issuing   the   said   termination   order   without   affording   prior opportunity to the petitioners and similarly placed persons.  Had it   been   a   case   of   even   tittle   of   possibility   in   segregating   the tainted   from   the   untainted   candidates,   which   exercise   the respondents were permitted to engage in, in terms of the decision of this Court dated 15.11.2018, it would have been a different matter.  In that case alone, the petitioners and similarly placed 68  supra at Footnote No. 17 69  supra at Footnote No. 48 70  supra at Footnote No. 18 71  (2013) 14 SCC 494 72  supra at Footnote No. 2 57 persons could complain of wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court dated 15.11.2018.   69. Having said thus, we must conclude that even the second set of contempt petitions in reference to the subject termination order dated 2.3.2020 being in violation of direction given by this Court to afford opportunity to the petitioners vide order dated 15.11.2018, must fail. 70. Considering the fact that multiple writ petitions have been filed by different groups of affected persons before the High Court being similarly placed persons against the subject termination order dated 2.3.2020 and as the same are pending, as aforesaid, to   obviate   even   slightest   of   prejudice   being   caused   to   the petitioners in those cases, who are not before us, we refrain from examining the arguments regarding the justness and validity of the   stated   order   and   leave   all   other   contentions   open   to   the parties   to   be   pursued   before   the   High   Court   in   pending proceedings.     Consequently,  we  would  dispose  of  the  transfer petition, as well as, the writ petition by relegating the petitioners therein   including   the   applicants   in   intervention/impleadment applications,   to   pursue   their   grievance   in   the   form   of   writ 58 petitions before the High Court, which could be heard by the High   Court   analogously   along   with   all   other   pending   writ petitions   involving   overlapping   issues   to   obviate   any inconsistency and conflicting findings regarding the same subject matter in any  manner.   Indeed, in  the  event  the  High Court agrees with the conclusion recorded by the respondents in the stated order dated 2.3.2020, that it is not possible to segregate the tainted from the untainted candidates, the High Court would be bound by the observations made by us in this judgment.  For, in that eventuality, in law, it would not be necessary for the respondents to give prior hearing or afford opportunity to the petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons   before   annulling   the entire selection process and issuing the termination order under challenge. 71. Accordingly,   while   discharging   the   show­cause   notices issued in the concerned contempt petitions and disposing of all the contempt petitions, we deem it appropriate to relegate the petitioners in the transfer petition and the writ petition filed in this Court, before the High Court to pursue their remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution to assail the order dated 2.3.2020 59 with   further   direction   that   all   petitions   involving   overlapping issues and referred to in Annexure R­29 of the Supplementary Affidavit or any other writ petition pending or to be filed, list whereof be furnished by the parties to the High Court, for being heard analogously.  We request the High Court to expeditiously dispose of the writ petitions, leaving all contentions other than decided in this judgment, open to the respective parties to be raised before the High Court.   The same be decided on its own merits as per law. 72. In view of the above, we pass the following order: ­ (1) Show­cause notices issued in the respective contempt petitions stand discharged.   Contempt petitions are dismissed; (2) The transfer petition stands rejected, as a result of which the writ petitions referred to therein will now proceed   before   the   High   Court   in   terms   of   this judgment; (3) The   writ   petition   is   disposed   of   with   liberty   to   the petitioners   therein   including   applicants   in intervention/impleadment   applications   to   pursue 60 their remedy before the High Court by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if so advised.     That   writ  petition  be   decided   on   its   own merits in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations made in this judgment along with other pending   or   fresh   writ   petitions   involving   similar issues; and (4) We request the High Court to take up all writ petitions involving   overlapping   issues   together   for   analogous hearing expeditiously.  We leave all contentions open except the issues decided in this judgment. 73. There   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs.     All   pending interlocutory   applications   stand   disposed   of   in   terms   of   this judgment. ………………………………J.     (A.M. Khanwilkar) ………………………………J.     (B.R. Gavai) New Delhi; June 03, 2021. 61