Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 835
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO(S). OF 2025)
@ DIARY NO. 16901/2025
COMMUNIDADE OF TIVIM, TIVIM, BARDEZ GOA …APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF GOA & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Delay of 146 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is condoned.
Leave granted.
1
2. The appellant before this court is a ‘Communidade’ or an
agricultural association of villagers that has properties in
common and the income derived from these properties
accrues in favour of its members. The system is peculiar to
Goa and is based on the concept of collective village
ownership, which was originally called as the ‘Gaunkari
System’ and the village communities owning the land
Signature Not Verified
collectively were known as ‘gaunkaria’ which ultimately came
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.07.14
17:57:08 IST
Reason:
1 Portugese translation of the English word ‘Community’.
Page 1 of 12
to be termed as ‘communidades’ during the Portuguese
colonisation of Goa.
3. Under challenge before us in this Appeal is the judgment dated
06.08.2024 by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant,
stood dismissed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.
4. The High Court while doing so has upheld the order dated
13.04.2023 by which the Administrative Tribunal, Goa has
refused to grant permission to the Appellant to compromise
proceedings instituted by the private respondents herein
(respondent Nos. 3 to 11) under the Goa, Daman and Diu
Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter ‘
Tenancy Act,
1964 ’).
5. At the outset, it is necessary to mention here at this stage that
the administration of Comunidades is governed by the Code
of Comunidades (hereinafter ‘ the Code ’). Article 154 (3) of
the Code empowers the Administrative Tribunal to grant
permission to the Communidade to compromise terms in any
suit to which the Communidade is a party.
6. The facts which have led to filing of the Writ Petition before the
High Court can be summarised as under:
a) Two properties (hereinafter ‘ Suit Properties ’) belonging to
the appellant, known as “Oiteil-De-Madel” bearing Survey
No. 448/0 & “Levelechy Aradi” bearing Survey No. 440/0
are situated in the village of Tivim in the taluka of Bardez
Page 2 of 12
in Goa and were leased to the predecessors-in-interest of
the private respondents by the appellant, in July, 1978.
b) A civil suit was filed by the predecessor of the private
respondents praying that his name be entered in the
Tenants column in the Survey numbers which correspond
to the two properties mentioned above. This suit was
decreed on 08.01.1986 & consequently, the name of the
predecessor of the private respondents was entered as
tenant of the two properties. Since no appeal was preferred
against the decree passed by the Trial Court, the same
attained finality. Thereafter, predecessor of the private
respondents herein passed away on 01.02.2015.
c) On 08.12.2016, the private respondents herein filed
Tenancy Application No. 71/2016 before the Civil Judge,
Junior Division (B-Court), Bicholim (hereinafter ‘ Trial
Court ’) for declaration of Tenancy under Section 7 of the
Tenancy Act, 1964. Despite service of notice to the
appellant by the Trial Court, no appearance was entered on
its behalf, which led to the case being proceeded ex-parte
against the appellant.
d) Vide Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2017, Trial Court
allowed the Tenancy Application, consequently declaring
the private respondents as agricultural tenants of the Suit
Properties. Aggrieved by the declaration of tenancy, the
appellant preferred Tenancy Appeal before the Ad-hoc
District Judge-I at Mapusa, Goa (hereinafter ‘ Appellate
Court ’).
Page 3 of 12
e) The above-mentioned appeal remains pending before the
Appellate Court till date. All the same, during pendency of
the Tenancy Appeal, an Extraordinary General Body
Meeting of the appellant was held on 14.03.2021, in which
members of the appellant deliberated upon the Tenancy
Appeal and also considered the fact that if the appeal fails,
they stand to lose a major chunk of land held by the
Communidade. It is at this meeting that the Communidade
resolved that as a compromise, the land in dispute could be
bifurcated into a 60:40 sharing ratio, with 60% of the land
being allotted to the private respondents and 40% of the
land to be retained by the communidade.
f) Pursuant to the above, Managing Committee of the
Communidade had further deliberations and finally, a
General Body Meeting was convened on 31.10.2021
wherein consent terms were finalised and agreed upon. All
the same, before filing these consent terms before the
Appellate Court, permission was needed from the
Administrative Tribunal in terms of Article 154 (3) of the
Code. Accordingly, on 22.02.2023, respondent No. 2 herein
i.e., Administrator of Communidades forwarded the
consent terms to the Administrative Tribunal for approval.
g) As stated earlier, by an Order dated 13.04.2023, such
permission was denied by the Administrative Tribunal and
this Order of the Administrative Tribunal was assailed by
the Communidade before the High Court by way of a Writ
Petition.
Page 4 of 12
7. The short question that arose for consideration before the High
Court, which will also be before this Court is whether the
Administrative Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant the
appellant, permission to compromise proceedings with the
private respondents in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code?
The High Court as we know has already held that this
permission could not have been granted under law.
8. We have heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned counsel for the
appellant who submits that the Administrative Tribunal has
erred in refusing to grant permission to the Communidade,
and as such, the High Court ought not to have upheld the
Administrative Tribunal’s decision. He contends that the best
interests of the appellant and its members have to be
considered and both the High Court as well as the
Administrative Tribunal have failed to take into consideration
the fact that the appellant had finalised consent terms,
keeping in mind its best interest and in the absence of such
terms, the suit properties would have to be regarded as
‘tenanted land’ which is allotted to the private respondents
herein, which would in turn be contrary to the appellant’s
best interests.
Page 5 of 12
9. It is Mr. Ahmadi’s second argument that the Code itself by virtue
of Article 30 (4) (g) empowers the Communidade to deliberate
upon, the withdrawal and compromise of civil suits and this
aspect of the matter was completely ignored by the High
Court.
10. For the respondent no. 1-State of Goa and respondent no. 2,
we have heard learned counsel Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, who
supports the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and
submits that the same warranted no interference by the High
Court and hence, there is no infirmity with the order
impugned. Learned counsel would argue that the consent
terms sought to be entered into between the appellant and
the private respondents is nothing but an attempt to bypass
and negate the provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as
well as the Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 (hereinafter
‘ Land Use Act ’).
11. In this regard, the learned Counsel has referred to Clauses i),
iii), v), x) and xi) of the consent terms, which essentially
confer to the private respondents ‘ all rights and interests,
which rights shall be akin to full ownership rights ’ over 60% of
the land and reciprocally, the appellant is to have ‘ exclusive
rights free from any tenancy claim
’ over 40% of land.
Page 6 of 12
Additionally, these clauses also stipulate that the private
respondents can use and utilise 60% of the land ‘ for any
purpose whatsoever ’ in lieu of which the appellant is also
entitled to use its share of 40% of land ‘ in the manner
deemed fit and proper. ’
12. It is therefore the respondent-State’s contention that the
proposed consent terms effectively accord freehold ownership
rights over the land in question to both the parties and also
allows them to use the land for non-agricultural purposes,
which is in blatant violation of statutory provisions contained
in the Tenancy Act as well as the Land Use Act.
13. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and having
perused the material on record, we are of the considered
opinion that the Administrative Tribunal has rightly refused
to grant permission to the consent terms finalised by the
appellant. A bare perusal of the same indicates that it is
nothing but an attempt to circumvent the statutory
framework laid down in Tenancy Act and also violates the
Land Use Act.
We are in complete agreement with the Administrative
14.
Tribunal, Goa which has refused to accord its permission to
the filing of the consent terms. What weighed in with the
Tribunal is the fact that these terms effectively wipe out
Page 7 of 12
tenancy rights of the private respondents which was declared
by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and by
the proposed compromise, the parties have agreed that in
lieu of the 60:40 bifurcation of land between them, the
judgment dated 01.09.2017 stands set aside. This prompted
the Tribunal to observe that instead of testing the
correctness of judgment dated 01.09.2017 on merits before
the appellate court, the parties intend to set aside the
judgment by way of compromise.
15. Moreover, the Tribunal also expressed its dismay at the fact
that these consent terms have the effect of bypassing the
Tenancy Act, since it confers full ownership rights to the
private respondents who have been declared as tenants and
any compromise which is contrary to a statute cannot be
entered into by the appellant.
16. Section 9 of the Tenancy Act lists down the modes of
termination of tenancy and specifies that tenancy can only be
terminated via three modes. The first is when the tenant
himself surrenders his right of tenancy to the landlord in the
manner contained in Section 10. Similarly, in the second
situation, the landlord may terminate the tenancy, but only
on the basis of the specific grounds contained in Section 11.
Page 8 of 12
Lastly, Section 9 (c) provides for termination under any other
specific provision of the Tenancy Act. It is abundantly clear
that by means of the proposed compromise, the parties have
essentially terminated the tenancy, without recourse to any
of the modes referred to in Section 9 of the Act.
17. We shall now refer to Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act which is
titled “ Special rights and privileges of tenants. ” Section 18A in
this chapter provides that every tenant shall be deemed to
have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as a
tenant on the tillers’ day, subject to other provisions of the
Act. This chapter then lays out the procedure to be followed.
Section 18C provides for the Mamlatdar to first issue public
notice to the tenants who are deemed to have purchased the
lands as well as the landlords of such lands and other
interested persons. The purchase price payable by a tenant to
the landlord is then indicated in the Table contained in
Section 18D. We must also take note of the fact that Section
18K of the Tenancy Act prohibits a tenant who has
purchased the land from transferring the land without the
Mamlatdar’s prior permission. If the proposed consent terms
are to be allowed, not only would the tenant be conferred full
ownership rights, in complete disregard of the procedure for
Page 9 of 12
purchase mentioned above, but it would also mean that the
tenant would be conferred a right to alienate land, without
seeking permission of any statutory authority.
18. It is also important to take note of the fact that even after a
tenant has purchased the land in question after complying
with the procedure contemplated under Chapter IIA, he is
barred from using the land for any purpose other than
agriculture, as per Section 2 of the Land Use Act, which
reads as under:
“ 2. Regulation of use of land. — Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and
Country Planning Act, 1974 (Act 21 of 1975), or in any
plan or scheme made thereunder, or in the Goa Land
Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969), no land which is
vested in a tenant under the provisions of the Goa, Daman
and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964)
shall be used or allowed to be used for any purpose other
than agriculture. ”
19. A bare reading of the aforementioned provisions is enough to
come to the conclusion that the proposed consent terms or
the compromise sought to be entered by the appellant with
the private respondents falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the
Tenancy Act and the Land Use Act, insofar as it creates
freehold ownership rights over tenanted land, without
resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of
such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that
Page 10 of 12
these terms effectively allow the appellant, as well as the
private respondents, to use an agricultural land for non-
agricultural purposes. In other words, the compromise not
only circumvents procedural aspects contained in Chapter
IIA of the Tenancy Act but also allows the parties to use the
suit properties for a purpose which is expressly barred by the
Land Use Act. The compromise sought by the parties is
nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The so called
compromise or agreement is a ploy to defeat the provisions of
law and therefore it has been rightly denied the legal sanctity
which was sought.
20. As regards the submission of the learned counsel relating to
Art. 30 (4) (g) of the Code, it is to be noted that the said
provision merely empowers a Communidade to deliberate
upon terms of compromise, which upon finalisation, has to
be forwarded to the Administrative Tribunal. By no stretch of
imagination can this provision be construed to mean that it
confers an unfettered power on the Communidade to enter
into a compromise, without the Tribunal’s sanction.
21. Hence, we see absolutely no reason to interfere with the order
dated 06.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay at
Goa.
Page 11 of 12
22. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
23. All the same, we deem it necessary to clarify that we have
expressed no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the dispute
between the appellant and private respondents as regard the
claim of Tenancy. The Tenancy Appeal filed by the appellant
before the Appellate Court shall be decided on its own merits,
in accordance with law.
….....................................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
……..................................J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 14, 2025.
Page 12 of 12
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 835
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO(S). OF 2025)
@ DIARY NO. 16901/2025
COMMUNIDADE OF TIVIM, TIVIM, BARDEZ GOA …APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF GOA & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Delay of 146 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is condoned.
Leave granted.
1
2. The appellant before this court is a ‘Communidade’ or an
agricultural association of villagers that has properties in
common and the income derived from these properties
accrues in favour of its members. The system is peculiar to
Goa and is based on the concept of collective village
ownership, which was originally called as the ‘Gaunkari
System’ and the village communities owning the land
Signature Not Verified
collectively were known as ‘gaunkaria’ which ultimately came
Digitally signed by
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.07.14
17:57:08 IST
Reason:
1 Portugese translation of the English word ‘Community’.
Page 1 of 12
to be termed as ‘communidades’ during the Portuguese
colonisation of Goa.
3. Under challenge before us in this Appeal is the judgment dated
06.08.2024 by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant,
stood dismissed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.
4. The High Court while doing so has upheld the order dated
13.04.2023 by which the Administrative Tribunal, Goa has
refused to grant permission to the Appellant to compromise
proceedings instituted by the private respondents herein
(respondent Nos. 3 to 11) under the Goa, Daman and Diu
Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter ‘
Tenancy Act,
1964 ’).
5. At the outset, it is necessary to mention here at this stage that
the administration of Comunidades is governed by the Code
of Comunidades (hereinafter ‘ the Code ’). Article 154 (3) of
the Code empowers the Administrative Tribunal to grant
permission to the Communidade to compromise terms in any
suit to which the Communidade is a party.
6. The facts which have led to filing of the Writ Petition before the
High Court can be summarised as under:
a) Two properties (hereinafter ‘ Suit Properties ’) belonging to
the appellant, known as “Oiteil-De-Madel” bearing Survey
No. 448/0 & “Levelechy Aradi” bearing Survey No. 440/0
are situated in the village of Tivim in the taluka of Bardez
Page 2 of 12
in Goa and were leased to the predecessors-in-interest of
the private respondents by the appellant, in July, 1978.
b) A civil suit was filed by the predecessor of the private
respondents praying that his name be entered in the
Tenants column in the Survey numbers which correspond
to the two properties mentioned above. This suit was
decreed on 08.01.1986 & consequently, the name of the
predecessor of the private respondents was entered as
tenant of the two properties. Since no appeal was preferred
against the decree passed by the Trial Court, the same
attained finality. Thereafter, predecessor of the private
respondents herein passed away on 01.02.2015.
c) On 08.12.2016, the private respondents herein filed
Tenancy Application No. 71/2016 before the Civil Judge,
Junior Division (B-Court), Bicholim (hereinafter ‘ Trial
Court ’) for declaration of Tenancy under Section 7 of the
Tenancy Act, 1964. Despite service of notice to the
appellant by the Trial Court, no appearance was entered on
its behalf, which led to the case being proceeded ex-parte
against the appellant.
d) Vide Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2017, Trial Court
allowed the Tenancy Application, consequently declaring
the private respondents as agricultural tenants of the Suit
Properties. Aggrieved by the declaration of tenancy, the
appellant preferred Tenancy Appeal before the Ad-hoc
District Judge-I at Mapusa, Goa (hereinafter ‘ Appellate
Court ’).
Page 3 of 12
e) The above-mentioned appeal remains pending before the
Appellate Court till date. All the same, during pendency of
the Tenancy Appeal, an Extraordinary General Body
Meeting of the appellant was held on 14.03.2021, in which
members of the appellant deliberated upon the Tenancy
Appeal and also considered the fact that if the appeal fails,
they stand to lose a major chunk of land held by the
Communidade. It is at this meeting that the Communidade
resolved that as a compromise, the land in dispute could be
bifurcated into a 60:40 sharing ratio, with 60% of the land
being allotted to the private respondents and 40% of the
land to be retained by the communidade.
f) Pursuant to the above, Managing Committee of the
Communidade had further deliberations and finally, a
General Body Meeting was convened on 31.10.2021
wherein consent terms were finalised and agreed upon. All
the same, before filing these consent terms before the
Appellate Court, permission was needed from the
Administrative Tribunal in terms of Article 154 (3) of the
Code. Accordingly, on 22.02.2023, respondent No. 2 herein
i.e., Administrator of Communidades forwarded the
consent terms to the Administrative Tribunal for approval.
g) As stated earlier, by an Order dated 13.04.2023, such
permission was denied by the Administrative Tribunal and
this Order of the Administrative Tribunal was assailed by
the Communidade before the High Court by way of a Writ
Petition.
Page 4 of 12
7. The short question that arose for consideration before the High
Court, which will also be before this Court is whether the
Administrative Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant the
appellant, permission to compromise proceedings with the
private respondents in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code?
The High Court as we know has already held that this
permission could not have been granted under law.
8. We have heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned counsel for the
appellant who submits that the Administrative Tribunal has
erred in refusing to grant permission to the Communidade,
and as such, the High Court ought not to have upheld the
Administrative Tribunal’s decision. He contends that the best
interests of the appellant and its members have to be
considered and both the High Court as well as the
Administrative Tribunal have failed to take into consideration
the fact that the appellant had finalised consent terms,
keeping in mind its best interest and in the absence of such
terms, the suit properties would have to be regarded as
‘tenanted land’ which is allotted to the private respondents
herein, which would in turn be contrary to the appellant’s
best interests.
Page 5 of 12
9. It is Mr. Ahmadi’s second argument that the Code itself by virtue
of Article 30 (4) (g) empowers the Communidade to deliberate
upon, the withdrawal and compromise of civil suits and this
aspect of the matter was completely ignored by the High
Court.
10. For the respondent no. 1-State of Goa and respondent no. 2,
we have heard learned counsel Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, who
supports the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and
submits that the same warranted no interference by the High
Court and hence, there is no infirmity with the order
impugned. Learned counsel would argue that the consent
terms sought to be entered into between the appellant and
the private respondents is nothing but an attempt to bypass
and negate the provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as
well as the Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 (hereinafter
‘ Land Use Act ’).
11. In this regard, the learned Counsel has referred to Clauses i),
iii), v), x) and xi) of the consent terms, which essentially
confer to the private respondents ‘ all rights and interests,
which rights shall be akin to full ownership rights ’ over 60% of
the land and reciprocally, the appellant is to have ‘ exclusive
rights free from any tenancy claim
’ over 40% of land.
Page 6 of 12
Additionally, these clauses also stipulate that the private
respondents can use and utilise 60% of the land ‘ for any
purpose whatsoever ’ in lieu of which the appellant is also
entitled to use its share of 40% of land ‘ in the manner
deemed fit and proper. ’
12. It is therefore the respondent-State’s contention that the
proposed consent terms effectively accord freehold ownership
rights over the land in question to both the parties and also
allows them to use the land for non-agricultural purposes,
which is in blatant violation of statutory provisions contained
in the Tenancy Act as well as the Land Use Act.
13. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and having
perused the material on record, we are of the considered
opinion that the Administrative Tribunal has rightly refused
to grant permission to the consent terms finalised by the
appellant. A bare perusal of the same indicates that it is
nothing but an attempt to circumvent the statutory
framework laid down in Tenancy Act and also violates the
Land Use Act.
We are in complete agreement with the Administrative
14.
Tribunal, Goa which has refused to accord its permission to
the filing of the consent terms. What weighed in with the
Tribunal is the fact that these terms effectively wipe out
Page 7 of 12
tenancy rights of the private respondents which was declared
by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and by
the proposed compromise, the parties have agreed that in
lieu of the 60:40 bifurcation of land between them, the
judgment dated 01.09.2017 stands set aside. This prompted
the Tribunal to observe that instead of testing the
correctness of judgment dated 01.09.2017 on merits before
the appellate court, the parties intend to set aside the
judgment by way of compromise.
15. Moreover, the Tribunal also expressed its dismay at the fact
that these consent terms have the effect of bypassing the
Tenancy Act, since it confers full ownership rights to the
private respondents who have been declared as tenants and
any compromise which is contrary to a statute cannot be
entered into by the appellant.
16. Section 9 of the Tenancy Act lists down the modes of
termination of tenancy and specifies that tenancy can only be
terminated via three modes. The first is when the tenant
himself surrenders his right of tenancy to the landlord in the
manner contained in Section 10. Similarly, in the second
situation, the landlord may terminate the tenancy, but only
on the basis of the specific grounds contained in Section 11.
Page 8 of 12
Lastly, Section 9 (c) provides for termination under any other
specific provision of the Tenancy Act. It is abundantly clear
that by means of the proposed compromise, the parties have
essentially terminated the tenancy, without recourse to any
of the modes referred to in Section 9 of the Act.
17. We shall now refer to Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act which is
titled “ Special rights and privileges of tenants. ” Section 18A in
this chapter provides that every tenant shall be deemed to
have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as a
tenant on the tillers’ day, subject to other provisions of the
Act. This chapter then lays out the procedure to be followed.
Section 18C provides for the Mamlatdar to first issue public
notice to the tenants who are deemed to have purchased the
lands as well as the landlords of such lands and other
interested persons. The purchase price payable by a tenant to
the landlord is then indicated in the Table contained in
Section 18D. We must also take note of the fact that Section
18K of the Tenancy Act prohibits a tenant who has
purchased the land from transferring the land without the
Mamlatdar’s prior permission. If the proposed consent terms
are to be allowed, not only would the tenant be conferred full
ownership rights, in complete disregard of the procedure for
Page 9 of 12
purchase mentioned above, but it would also mean that the
tenant would be conferred a right to alienate land, without
seeking permission of any statutory authority.
18. It is also important to take note of the fact that even after a
tenant has purchased the land in question after complying
with the procedure contemplated under Chapter IIA, he is
barred from using the land for any purpose other than
agriculture, as per Section 2 of the Land Use Act, which
reads as under:
“ 2. Regulation of use of land. — Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and
Country Planning Act, 1974 (Act 21 of 1975), or in any
plan or scheme made thereunder, or in the Goa Land
Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969), no land which is
vested in a tenant under the provisions of the Goa, Daman
and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964)
shall be used or allowed to be used for any purpose other
than agriculture. ”
19. A bare reading of the aforementioned provisions is enough to
come to the conclusion that the proposed consent terms or
the compromise sought to be entered by the appellant with
the private respondents falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the
Tenancy Act and the Land Use Act, insofar as it creates
freehold ownership rights over tenanted land, without
resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of
such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that
Page 10 of 12
these terms effectively allow the appellant, as well as the
private respondents, to use an agricultural land for non-
agricultural purposes. In other words, the compromise not
only circumvents procedural aspects contained in Chapter
IIA of the Tenancy Act but also allows the parties to use the
suit properties for a purpose which is expressly barred by the
Land Use Act. The compromise sought by the parties is
nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The so called
compromise or agreement is a ploy to defeat the provisions of
law and therefore it has been rightly denied the legal sanctity
which was sought.
20. As regards the submission of the learned counsel relating to
Art. 30 (4) (g) of the Code, it is to be noted that the said
provision merely empowers a Communidade to deliberate
upon terms of compromise, which upon finalisation, has to
be forwarded to the Administrative Tribunal. By no stretch of
imagination can this provision be construed to mean that it
confers an unfettered power on the Communidade to enter
into a compromise, without the Tribunal’s sanction.
21. Hence, we see absolutely no reason to interfere with the order
dated 06.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay at
Goa.
Page 11 of 12
22. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
23. All the same, we deem it necessary to clarify that we have
expressed no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the dispute
between the appellant and private respondents as regard the
claim of Tenancy. The Tenancy Appeal filed by the appellant
before the Appellate Court shall be decided on its own merits,
in accordance with law.
….....................................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
……..................................J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 14, 2025.
Page 12 of 12