Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1094 OF 2006
Jaishree Anant Khandekar ...Appellant(s)
- Versus -
State of Maharashtra ..Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. The tragic incident happened over spilled milk.
2. On 15.12.2000, Aruna, w/o Nagnath- accused No.4,
received severe burn injuries in an incident which
took place around 2.30 p.m. Aruna, the victim, was
staying in her house at Dhangar, Moha, District
Parbhani with her three children aged about 6
years, 3 years and 8 months respectively. The
appellant’s husband was the nephew of Aruna and
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they were having the relations as cousin mother-in-
law and daughter-in-law. Admittedly the relation
was far from cordial. Nagnath, husband of Aruna,
was serving in SRP and not at the place of
occurrence at the time of the alleged incident. The
appellant and her husband, who was serving as a
teacher, were staying in another part of the same
house as a tenant and the house was owned by Aruna.
There was easy access from one house to the other.
The incident is said to have occurred in the
kitchen of Aruna. The appellant did not dispute her
presence in the place of occurrence.
3. The prosecution allegation as unfolded is that
on 15.12.2000, in the afternoon, Aruna kept a pot
of milk on an electric hot plate in the kitchen,
and at that time electricity supply was not there
but the switch was on. Keeping the pot in that
position, Aruna went to the terrace but when she
got the smell of burnt milk, she rushed to the
kitchen to find that electric supply had resumed
and boiling milk had spilled over the pot. Seeing
this, Aruna got annoyed and asked the appellant why
did she not inform Aruna about resumption of
2
electric current and the spilling of milk. To that
question of Aruna, appellant became annoyed and
responded in words which were rather offensive.
4. Further allegation is that the appellant did
not stop at her harsh reply but entered the kitchen
of Aruna, took the kerosene container and poured it
on her shoulder and, thereafter, ignited the flame
and ran to the terrace and declared that Aruna had
received burns from electric current.
5. The victim sustained severe burn injuries which
were estimated at 100% and was rushed to the Rural
Hospital at Gangakhed and, thereafter, shifted to
S.R.T.R Medical College Hospital at Ambajogai. In
the course of receiving treatment, she succumbed to
her burn injuries on 1.1.2001.
6. She was thus alive for 15 days after the
incident. The statement of Aruna which was recorded
by API Sk. Abdul Rauf at Rural Hospital, Gangakhed
was registered as F.I.R. and on completion of
investigation chargesheet was filed.
3
7. In all seven witnesses were examined by the
prosecution and the Court also examined three more
witnesses. Several dying declarations were given by
the deceased-Aruna.
8. In this matter six persons had to face the
trial for charges under Section 498A read with
Section 34 of I.P.C.
9. The present appellant was charged for an
offence of murder under Section 302 and the other
five accused persons were tried for having abetted
commission of offence of murder by the appellant.
10. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the
accused persons of the charges under Section 498-A
read with Section 34 I.P.C. The accused Nos. 2 to 6
were also acquitted of the charges under Section
302 read with Section 109 I.P.C.
11. The appellant was held guilty of the offence of
murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and also
to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default, to suffer
further simple imprisonment for four months.
4
12. It is an appeal by the sole appellant.
13.
On 15.12.2000, Aruna made five dying
declarations at different hours and the
prosecution relied on them and it appears that
both the Trial Court and the High Court
sustained the prosecution case primarily on the
basis of those dying declarations. Those
declarations are as follows:
(1)
Exhibit 48 – Case history recorded by
Dr. Sangram (P.W. 2) upon admission at
Gangakhed Hospital.
(2) Exhibit 58 – Dying declaration recorded
by ASI Sk. Abdul Rauf and treated as
FIR.
(3) Exhibit 52 – Dying declaration recorded
by Executive Magistrate Shivaji (P.W.3).
(4)
Exhibit 87 – Dying declaration recorded
by Executive Magistrate Smt. Bilkis at
Ambajogai at 7 p.m.
(5)
Exhibit 79 – Dying declaration recorded
by CW1 Head Constable Lamture at 10:25
p.m. at Ambajogai.
14.
The High Court found that though there is some
deviation in the narration of facts in these
five dying declarations but they are consistent
in material particulars in the sense that
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certain facts are common in all of them. They
are that after a brief exchange of hot words,
the appellant poured kerosene over the shoulder
of Aruna and ignited her. It is also clear that
nobody came to help the victim to extinguish
the flames and the victim was trying to do that
with water. The appellant came to the terrace
and declared that the victim has got burnt
through electric current.
15.
The defence version is that Aruna is hot
tempered and did not approve the stay of the
appellant in her house even though the
appellant and her husband were staying by
paying rent. Aruna used to pick up quarrels
with the appellant on flimsy pretexts and she
was keen to ensure that the appellant does not
stay in the house at Gangakhed.
16.
Further, defence version is that the appellant
tried to extinguish the fire of Aruna and
during the process, she suffered burn injuries.
The appellant’s stand in her statement under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 is that Aruna
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herself set her on fire and appellant tried to
extinguish the flames and in the process
sustained certain burn injuries and she has
been falsely implicated out of the victim’s
grudge towards her.
17.
It appears that the injuries on the appellant
are very insignificant. She sustained only 4-5%
burn injuries that too not on her palm but near
her elbow.
18. Neither the Trial Court nor the High Court
accepted the defence plea and it is also
difficult for us to accept the same.
19.
We find that the High Court has made a detailed
analysis of all the dying declarations which
are marked as Exhibit Nos. 48, 52, 58, 79 and
87 and out of these dying declarations, the
High Court found that Exhibit Nos. 48, 52, 79
and 87 are not without defects. The High Court
found, Exhibit 58, which is treated as F.I.R.,
had an endorsement to the effect that the
patient was fully conscious at the time of
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making the statement. In it an endorsement was
made by the Medical Officer that the dying
declaration (Exhibit 58) was read over to
Aruna and she had admitted that the same has
been correctly recorded.
20.
Learned Judges of the High Court found that
Exhibit 58 was recorded within 15-20 minutes
prior to 3:45 p.m. and on the basis of the
same, F.I.R. was registered at 4 p.m.
21.
Learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the
dying declarations pointing out certain defects
in their recording, but the learned Judges of
the Trial Court and the High Court rightly did
not attach much importance to that inasmuch as
they are consistent in material particulars.
Learned Judges of the High Court found that the
two dying declarations (Exhibits 58 and 87) are
acceptable and reliable. Learned Judges also
found that the dying declaration (Exhibit 48),
which records the history by the Medical
Officer, is also reliable.
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22.
We also find that the evidence of P.W.4
(Bhaskar) in substantial part corroborates the
facts stated in the dying declaration.
Therefore, the statement in dying declaration
is not uncorroborated.
23.
The law relating to dying declaration is an
exception to the hearsay rule.
24.
The rationale behind admissibility of a dying
declaration was best expressed, not in any
judgment, but in one of the soliloquies in
Shakespeare’s King John, when fatally wounded
Melun wails:
‘Have I met hideous
death within my view,
Retaining but a quantity of life,
Which bleeds away
even as a form of wax,
Resolveth from his figure
’gainst the fire?
What in the world should
make me now deceive,
Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
Why should I then be false
since it is true
That I must die here
and live hence by truth?’
(See King John , Act V, Scene iv.)
9
25. Both Taylor and Wigmore in their treatise on
Evidence took refuge to the magic of Shakespeare to
illustrate the principles behind admissibility of
dying declaration by quoting the above passage.
26. Among the judicial fraternity this has been
best expressed, possibly by Lord Chief Justice
Baron Eyre (See. R. Vs. Woodcock , (1789) 1 Lea.
502, and which I quote: -
“...That such declarations are made in
extremity, when the party is at the point
of death, and when every hope of this
world is gone; when every motive to
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is
induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth; a
situation so solemn and so awful is
considered by the law as creating an
obligation, equal to that which is imposed
by a positive oath in a court of
justice...”
10
27. The test of admissibility of dying declaration
is stricter in English Law than in Indian Law.
28. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1876 brought out
a ‘Digest of the Law of Evidence’ and its
introduction is of considerable interest even
today. The author wrote that English Code of
Evidence is modelled on the Indian Evidence Act of
1872.
29. In the words of the author:
“In the autumn of 1872 Lord
Coleridge (then Attorney General)
employed me to draw a similar code for
England. I did so in the course of
the winter, and we settled it in
frequent consultations. It was ready
to be introduced early in the Session
of 1873. Lord Coleridge made various
attempts to bring it forward, but he
could not succeed till the very last
day of the Session. He said a few
th
words on the subject on the 5 August,
1873, just before Parliament was
prorogued. The Bill was thus never
made public, though I believe it was
ordered to be printed.
It was drawn on the model of the
Indian Evidence Act and contained a
complete system of law upon the
subject of evidence.”
30. In that book, Article 26 sums up the English
law relating to dying declaration as under:-
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“ Article 26. Dying Declaration as to
Cause of Death
A declaration made by the declarant as
to the cause of his death, or as to any of
the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death, is deemed to be
relevant only in trials for the murder or
manslaughter of the declarant; and only
when the declarant is shown, to the
satisfaction of the judge, to have been in
actual danger of death, and to have given
up all hope of recovery at the time when
his declaration was made.
Such a declaration is not irrelevant
merely because it was intended to be made
as a deposition before a magistrate, but
is irregular.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. In Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act the
underlined portion is not there. Instead Section 32
(1) is worded differently and which is set out:
“32. Cases in which statement of relevant
fact by person who is dead or cannot be
found, etc., is relevant – Statements,
written or verbal, of relevant facts made
by a person who is dead, or who cannot be
found, or who has become incapable of
giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot
be procured, without an amount of delay or
expense which under the circumstances of
the case appears to the Court unreasonable,
are themselves relevant facts in the
following cases:-
(1) when it relates to cause of death –
When the statement is made by a person as
to the cause of his death, or to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death, in cases in which
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the cause of that person’s death comes into
question.
Such statements are relevant whether
the person who made them was or was not, at
the time when they were made, under
expectation of death, and whatever may be
the nature of the proceeding in which the
cause of his death comes into question.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. The Privy Council in the case of Nembhard Vs.
The Queen , 1982 (1) The All England Law Reports 183
(Privy Council), while hearing an appeal from the
Court of Appeal of Jamaica, made a comparison of
the English Law and Indian Law by referring to the
underlined portions of Section 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act at page 187 of the report. Sir Owen
Woodhouse, speaking for the Privy Council, pointed
out the different statutory dispensation in Indian
Law prescribing a test of admissibility of dying
declaration which is distinct from a common law
test in English Law.
33. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic
truthfulness of human character at the dying
moments of one’s life, admissibility of dying
declaration is also based on the doctrine of
13
necessity. In many cases victim is the only eye
witness to a crime on him/her and in such
situations exclusion of the dying declaration, on
hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends of
justice. American Law on dying declaration also
proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty of
death leading to an intrinsic faith in truthfulness
of human character and the necessity principle.
34. On certainty of death, the same strict test of
English Law has been applied in American
Jurisprudence. The test has been variously
expressed as ‘no hope of recovery’, ‘a settled
expectation of death’. The core concept is that
the expectation of death must be absolute and not
susceptible to doubts and there should be no chance
of operation of worldly motives. (See Wigmore on
Evidence page 233-234).
35. This Court in Kishan Lal Vs. State of
Rajasthan , AIR 1999 SC 3062, held that under
English Law the credence and the relevance of the
dying declaration is admissible only when the
person making such statement is in hopeless
14
condition and expecting imminent death. Justice
Willes coined it as a “settled hopeless expectation
of death” ( R Vs. Peel , (1860) 2 F. & F. 21, which
was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R
Vs. Perry , (1909) 2 KB 697). Under our Law, the
declaration is relevant even if it is made by a
person, who may or may not be under expectation of
death, at the time of declaration. (See para 18,
page 3066). However, the declaration must relate to
any of the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death.
36. Again in Sudhakar and Another Vs. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2602, a three-Judge Bench
of this Court noted that Indian Law has made a
departure from English Law relating to
admissibility of dying declaration. This Court has
held in para 7 as follows:-
“(1) Section 32 is an exception of the rule
of hearsay and makes admissible the statement
of a person who dies, whether the death is a
homicide or a suicide, provided the statement
relates to the cause of death, or exhibits
circumstances leading to the death. In this
respect, as indicated above, the Indian
Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar
conditions of our society and the diverse
nature and character of our people, has thought
it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32
to avoid injustice.”
15
37. Going by the wider test and considering the
facts of this case, we have no hesitation that the
dying declarations on which High Court has placed
reliance are admissible.
38. Certain cases have been cited at the Bar by the
learned counsel for the parties which lay down the
same principles and are discussed below.
39. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for
the appellant on the decision of this Court in
Sanjay Vs. State of Maharashtra , (2007) 9 SCC 148.
In that case, this Court held that the husband is
entitled to the benefit of doubt in view of the
fact that the first dying declaration and the
subsequent one substantially vary in essential
particulars.
40. In the instant case the factual position is not
the same, so the decision in Sanjay (supra) has no
application.
16
41. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel
on the decision in Mohan Lal and Ors Vs. State of
Haryana , (2007) 9 SCC 151, wherein the Court found
that before the dying declaration was recorded, the
relatives of the deceased including father and
mother of the deceased were present with her and
were subsequently asked to leave the room. In the
facts of that case, learned Judges opined that the
dying declaration was clearly the result of
tutoring and was not a free and voluntary one. The
same is not the factual position in this case.
42. Reliance was also placed on Maniben w/o
Danabhai Tulshibai Maheria Vs. State of Gujarat ,
(2007) 10 SCC 362, where S.B. Sinha, J. delivering
the judgment held that minor discrepancies in dying
declaration would not be material. The learned
Judge also held that a dying declaration does not
cease to be one just because death took place 25
days after the incident. This view of His Lordship
is, if I may so with respect, consistent with
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support
of this, the learned Judge relied on a decision of
17
this Court in Ravikumar alias Kutti Ravi Vs. State
of Tamil Nadu , (2006) 9 SCC 240, in which case this
Court gave certain guidelines on the basis of which
dying declaration has to be appreciated. Relevant
excerpts from the judgment in Ravikumar alias Kutti
Ravi (supra) would show that the principles laid
down therein are applicable in the facts of the
present case. Those excerpts are extracted
hereunder:
“5. Section 32 of the Evidence Act,
1872 is an exception to the general rule
against hearsay. Sub-section (1) of
Section 32 makes the statement of the
deceased admissible which is generally
described as “dying declaration”. The
dying declaration essentially means
statements made by the person as to the
cause of his death or as to the
circumstances of the transaction
resulting in his death. The admissibility
of the dying declaration is based upon
the principle that the sense of impending
death produces in man’s mind the same
feeling as that of a conscientious and
virtuous man under oath. The dying
declaration is admissible upon
consideration that the declarant has made
it in extremity, when the maker is at the
point of death and when every hope of
this world is gone, when every motive to
the falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.
Notwithstanding the same, care and
caution must be exercised in considering
the weight to be given to these species
of evidence on account of the existence
of many circumstances which may affect
their truth. The court has always to be
on guard to see that the statement of the
deceased was not the result of either
tutoring or prompting or a product of
imagination. The court has also to see
18
and ensure that the deceased was in a fit
state of mind and had the opportunity to
observe and identify the assailant.
Normally, therefore, the court in order
to satisfy itself that the deceased was
in fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration, has to look for the medical
opinion. Once the court is satisfied that
the declaration was true and voluntary,
it undoubtedly, can base its conviction
on the dying declaration without any
further corroboration. It cannot be laid
down as an absolute rule of law that the
dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is
corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely the rule of
prudence.....”
43. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court
finds that in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the dying declaration has to be
accepted.
44. Reliance was also placed on Sham Shankar
Kankaria Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC
165, where the learned Judge referred to the issue
of admissibility of the evidence recorded in dying
declaration, on the maxim of “nemo moriturus
paesumitur mentire – which means “a man will not
meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth.”
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45. Therefore, if the aforesaid principles are
applied in the instant case, the Court finds that
the dying declarations in this case can be relied
upon.
46. In the case of Shaikh Bakshu & Ors Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 269, the Court held that
if there are serious infirmities in the dying
declaration, namely, discrepancy as to the place of
occurrence, as to the burn marks and also
discrepancy as to how the deceased was brought to
the hospital, conviction on the basis of such a
dying declaration is not sustainable.
47. In the instant case, there are no such
discrepancies. Facts in all the five dying
declarations match in their essential particulars.
Therefore, the case of Shaikh Bakshu (supra) is
distinguishable from the present case.
48. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Parthu ,
(2007) 12 754, where the State came up in appeal
against the order of acquittal granted by the High
20
Court, this Court while reversing the High Court
judgment of acquittal held that non issuance of
certificate in the dying declaration to the effect
that the statement of the deceased was recorded
correctly before the Investigating Officer will not
vitiate the same. Learned Judge held by referring
to several judgments that the hypertechnical
view should not be taken. The Bench
also held that the view of this Court in
Paparambaka Rosamma and others Vs. State of A.P. ,
(1999) 7 SCC 695, has not been correctly decided
and is not the correct enunciation of law. On this
judgment reliance was also placed by the learned
counsel for the State and we are of the view that
the ratio of this judgment delivered by S.B. Sinha,
J. supports the State in the present case also.
49. In the decision in the case of Vithal Vs. State
of Maharashtra , (2006) 13 SCC 54 the same
principles have been reiterated. In a case of
multiple dying declarations, if there is no
inconsistency, the same are reliable. Learned Judge
also held that the mere fact that the accused who
21
is alleged to have poured kerosene on the deceased
was inimically disposed towards the deceased cannot
by itself be a fact to disbelieve the dying
declaration or to throw out the prosecution case.
50. In Ranjit Singh & Ors Vs. State of Punjab ,
(2006) 13 SCC 130 , S.B. Sinha, J. speaking for the
Bench laid down, if there is an inconsistency
between the two dying declarations, the Court
should apply caution but the consistent part can be
taken note of. His Lordship has also held that
corroboration is required in the event of suspicion
as regards correctness or otherwise of the dying
declaration.
51. In Sham Shankar Kankaria (supra), a Two-Judge
Bench of this Court pointed out the rationale for
relying on dying declaration on the principles laid
down in Paniben (Smt) Vs. State of Gujarat , (1992)
2 SCC 474. Learned Judge further held that the rule
of corroboration on the facts stated in the
declaration is only one of prudence and nothing
else.
22
52. Various other judgments have been cited but
they have discussed almost identical principles.
53. The judicially evolved rules of caution for
acceptance of dying declaration have been stated by
this Court in Paniben (Smt) (supra), and in para
Nos. 18 and 19 of the said report, this Court has
formulated several principles for accepting dying
declaration, which have been laid down in various
judgments of this Court in the last few decades.
The principles stated in Paniben (Smt) (supra) have
been again repeated by this Court in Shakuntala
(Smt) Vs. State of Haryana , (2007) 10 SCC 168. The
said principles are so salutary and cardinal in
nature that they deserve to be reiterated and this
Court does so herein below:
“( i ) There is neither rule of law nor of
prudence that dying declaration cannot be
acted upon without corroboration. (See
Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. )
( ii ) If the court is satisfied that the
dying declaration is true and voluntary it
can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram
Sagar Yadav and Ramawati Devi v. State of
Bihar .)
23
( iii ) The court has to scrutinise the
dying declaration carefully and must
ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination. The deceased had an
opportunity to observe and identify the
assailants and was in a fit state to make
the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy
v. Public Prosecutor .)
( iv ) Where a dying declaration is
suspicious, it should not be acted upon
without corroborative evidence. (See
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. )
( v ) Where the deceased was unconscious
and could never make any dying declaration
the evidence with regard to it is to be
rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of
M.P. )
( vi ) A dying declaration which suffers
from infirmity cannot form the basis of
conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of
U.P. )
( vii ) Merely because a dying
declaration does not contain the details
as to the occurrence, it is not to be
rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu .)
( viii ) Equally, merely because it is a
brief statement, it is not to be
discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth.
(See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar .)
( ix ) Normally, the court in order to
satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit
mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical
opinion. But where the eyewitness said
that the deceased was in a fit and
conscious state to make the dying
declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. )
( x ) Where the prosecution version
differs from the version as given in the
dying declaration, the said declaration
24
cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P.
v. Madan Mohan .)
( xi ) Where there are more than one
statements in the nature of dying
declaration, the one first in point of
time must be preferred. Of course, if the
plurality of the dying declaration could
be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it
has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram
Gehani v. State of Maharashtra .)
13 . In the light of the above principles,
the acceptability of the alleged dying
declaration in the instant case has to be
considered. The dying declaration is only
a piece of untested evidence and must,
like any other evidence, satisfy the court
that what is stated therein is the
unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely
safe to act upon it. If after careful
scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it
is true and free from any effort to induce
the deceased to make a false statement and
if it is coherent and consistent, there
shall be no legal impediment to make it
the basis of conviction, even if there is
no corroboration. (See Gangotri Singh v.
State of U.P. , Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v.
State of Maharashtra , Meesala Ramakrishan
v. State of A.P. and State of Rajasthan v.
Kishore .)
14 . There is no material to show that the
dying declaration was the result or
product of imagination, tutoring or
prompting. On the contrary, the same
appears to have been made by the deceased
voluntarily. It is trustworthy and has
credibility.”
54. Just one more may be added to the aforesaid
principles. This Court in Paramjit Singh & Ors.
Vs. State of Punjab and Ors ., AIR 1997 SC 1614,
25
held that if all the details are given in the dying
declaration, the same may not inspire confidence of
the Court inasmuch as a neatly structured dying
declaration may bring an adverse effect in the mind
of the court. The Court has to appreciate the dying
declaration as a whole to see whether a ring of
truth emerges from the same.
55. In the facts of this case, it has already been
noted that the evidence in the dying declaration
has been corroborated and in the various dying
declarations which have been given by the victim,
in some of them, the required rule of caution has
been followed specially in Exhibits 58, 87 and 48
and the statement given in the dying declaration is
fairly consistent. There is also endorsement that
the same has been read over and explained to the
declarant.
56. It is also not in dispute that the declarant
lived for more than fifteen days after the
aforesaid incident. Therefore, the victim was
physically in a position to give the declaration.
26
Doctors have also opined that the declarant was
conscious enough to make the declaration and all
the judicially evolved rules of caution were
observed in the instant case. That being the
position, this Court finds no error on the part of
the trial Court and High Court in finding the
appellant guilty and convicting her under Section
302.
57. We find no merit in this appeal. It is
dismissed accordingly.
.......................J.
(S.B. SINHA)
.......................J.
New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
March 23, 2009
27