Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PREM NATH RAINA AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT04/08/1983
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
PATHAK, R.S.
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1983 AIR 920 1983 SCR (3) 536
1983 SCC (4) 616 1983 SCALE (2)58
ACT:
Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 17 of 1976-a
measure of agrarian reform - Saved by Article 31A from
challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity
of Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 17 of 1976 on the
ground that the Act violated Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. The petitioners contended that as the Act
contained certain provisions which were not co-related to
agrarian welfare, the Act could not be said to be a measure
of agrarian reform and therefore not saved by Article 31A of
the Constitution.
Dismissing the petitions,
^
HELD: The Act is a measure of agrarian reform and is
saved by Art. 31A from the challenge under Arts. 14, 19 or
31 of the Constitution. [541 D]
The question as to whether any particular Act is a
measure of agrarian reform has to be decided by looking at
the dominant purpose of that Act. In the instant case the
dominant purpose of the statute is to bring about a just and
equitable redistribution of lands, which is achieved by
making the tiller of the soil the owner of the land which he
cultivates and by imposing a ceiling on the extent of the
land which any person, whether landlord or tenant, can hold.
The matters which are dealt with by the Act are essential
steps in any well conceived scheme of agrarian reform. The
decision in Kochuni was treated in Ranjit Singh as a special
case which cannot apply to cases where the general scheme of
legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its
provisions, something ancillary thereto in the interests of
rural economy has to be under taken to give full effect to
those reforms. [541 A-D, 541 D]
Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82 and
Kavalappara Rottarathil Kochuni & Ors. v. State of Madras &
Ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887, referred to.
The circumstance that the Act is made applicable to
agricultural lands situated within the limits of local
authorities will not affect its character as a measure of
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agrarian reform. If any land situated in a developed area is
used predominantly for the purpose of agriculture, it is
open to the legislature to
537
include that land in a scheme of agrarian reform so as to
make the tiller of that land its owner. The hypothetical
possibility that after becoming statutory owners of
agricultural lands situated in developed areas on payment of
a paltry price, the tillers will part with those lands at a
high price which lands in developed areas like urban areas
fetch, cannot affect the basic position that the Act is
conceived in the larger interest of agrarian reform. The
payment of a larger compensation to land-holders under a
land reform law than what would be payable under an Act like
the Urban Ceiling Act does not lead to the conclusion that
the former is not a measure of agrarian reform. [543 A-F]
Section 7(2)(b) of the Act creates an anomalous
situation, especially in the context of the definition of
’personal cultivation’ in section 2(12) of the Act. If it is
permissible to cultivate a land through another person as
specified in clauses (b) to (g) of section 2(12), there is
no reason why residence in the village where the land is
situated or in an adjoining village should be compulsory for
all persons, even for minors, widows, insane persons and
persons in detention. The exception made by the legislature
in favour of the members of defence forces ought to be
extended to these other persons also. The exclusion of a
constitutional challenge under Articles, 14, 19 and 31 which
is provided for by Article 31A does not justify in equity
the irrational violation or these articles. [543 G, 544 B-D]
Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 2
S.C.R. 1, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 4195 and 4445
of 1978, 8831, 8942 of 1981, 342-717, 803-804, 1005-1242,
6501-6746, 2860-3049, 3169-71, 3413-63, 7133-35 of 1982.
V.M. Turkunde and Naunit Lal for the petitioners in
W.P. Nos. 4196/82, 6501-6746, 2860-3049, 342-717/82, and
8831/81.
S.S. Javali, B.P. Singh and Raniit Kumar for the
petitioners in W.P. Nos. 4445/78, 8942, 1005-1242, 3413-3463
and 7133-35/82.
Sanjay Kaul and Ashok Panda for the petitioners in W.P.
No. 3169/82.
L.N. Sinha, Attorney General and R.K. Garg for the
respondent in W.P. Nos. 4195/82 and 4445/78.
Altaf Ahmed for the respondents in all other matters.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, CJ; By these Writ Petitions filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners challenge
the constitutional
538
validity of the Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 17 of
1976, on the ground that the Act violates the provisions of
Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. This challenge
is met by the State of Jammu & Kashmir with the short answer
that the impugned Act being a measure of agrarian reform,
Article 31A of the Constitution precludes a challenge to its
validity on the ground that it violates the provisions
contained in Articles 14,19 and 31.
The petitioners are mostly small land-holders owning
agricultural lands in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The
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Government of Jammu & Kashmir introduced several land
reforms in the State, beginning with Tenancy Act VII of
1948. Jagirs and Muafis were abolished under that Act as a
result of which, approximately 9()00 owners of agricultural
lands lost their proprietary interest in about 4.5 lakh
acres of land. The State Legislature thereafter passed the
Tenancy (Amendment) Act VII of 1948, the Tenancy (Amendment)
Act of 1950, the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act of 1950,
the Tenancy (Amendment) Arts of 1956, 1962 and 1965, the J &
K Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment) Proceedings Act 1966, the
Agrarian Reforms Act of 1972 and finally the impugned Act,
17 of 1976. The last named Act received the assent of the
Governor on August 21, 1976. It was amended by the Amendment
Act of 1978 which received the assent of the Governor on
April 7, 1978.
We will presently explain in brief the nature of the
provisions of the impugned Act but, before we do so, it will
be useful to acquaint oneself with the various steps which
the Government of Jammu & Kashmir took in the direction of
land reforms, by passing the Acts to which we have referred
earlier. After abolishing the Jagirs and Muafis by the
Tenancy Act of 1948, restrictions were placed on the right
of the landlord to eject the tenant, by the Tenancy
(Amendment) Act of 1948, The landlord was, however, given
the right to resume the land from his tentant if he required
it bona fide for personal cultivation subject to ceiling on
his right of resumption. The Big Landed Estates Abolitions
Act of 1950 was quite a revolutionary piece of legislation
in the context of those times. A ceiling was placed by that
Act on the holding of proper ties at 182 Kanals, which comes
roughly to 23 acres. The land in excess of the ceiling was
expropriated without the payment of any compensation and the
tiller of the soil became the owner of the excess land. By
subsequent legislations, tenants were given protec tion in
the matter of rents, certain classes of non-occupancy
tenants came to be regarded as protected tenants and
landlords were given
539
a further opportunity for making applications for the
resumption of land. Thousands of applications were filed by
the landlords under the provisions of the Tenancy Amendment
Act of 1965 for resumption of lands from tenants but, later,
further proceeding in those applications were stayed. The
Janki Nath Wazir Committee pointed out anomalies in the
various measures taken by the State Legislature by way of
the land reforms and it made recommendations in order to
remove the inequities from which the land reforms
legislation undertaken by the State suffered. The State
Government constituted a Land Commission under the
Chairmanship of the then Revenue Minister, Syed Mir Kasim,
in 1963 to examine the Wazir Committee’s Report. In 1967,
the Sate Government appointed another Commission of Inquiry,
with Shri P.B. Gajendragadkar, retired Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, as its Chairman. The Gajendragadkar
Commission made various recommendations by its Report dated
December 1968. It also pointed out the defects from which
the Land Legislation in the Slate of Jammu & Kashmir
suffered and suggested ways and means for removing them.
This long and empirical process ultimately culminated in the
enactment of the Act of 1976 which is impugned in these
proceedings.
It is impossible to accept the contention of Shri V.M.
Tarkunde, who appears on be half of the petitioners, that by
reason of certain provisions of the impugned Act which are
not co-related to agrarian welfare, the Act cannot be said
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to be a measure of agrarian reform. The short title of the
Act shows that it was passed in order to provide for
transfer of lands to the tillers of the lands f-or the
purpose of better utilization of those lands Section 4 of
the Act provides that all rights, titles and interests in
lands, which were not cultivated personally in Kharif 1971,
shall be deemed to have been extinguished and shall vest in
the State, free from all encumbrances with effect from May
i, 1973. By section 5, all lands in excess of the ceiling
area on September 1, 1971 vested in the State on May 1,
1973. Section 7 provides for the resumption of lands by the
ex-landlords for bonafide personal cultivation, subject G to
the conditions mentioned in section 7 (2). Section 9
provides for payment of rent by the tillers of the soil to
the State for lands which have vested in the State. Section
11 provides for payment of the amount due on the outstanding
mortgages on lands. Section 11 provided that lands which
vest in the State under the impugned Act shall be deemed to
have been acquired by the State, for which payment shall be
determined and made in accordance with the
540
provisions of Schedule III. Section 13 lays down
restrictions on the utilization of lands of which tillers
become owners. Section 14 prescribes for the optimum
retainable area of the land, section 15 deals with the
manner of disposal of surplus land, while section 17 imposes
a prohibition on the transfer of lands. Chapter III of the
Act deals with the jurisdiction of several revenue officers
and Tribunals appointed under the Act and lays down the
procedure which they are required to follow. Chapter IV
contains supplemental provisions. Chapter V provides for
penalties for the infringement of the provisions of the Act,
while Chapter VI provides for certain miscellaneous matters.
Schedule III defines ’compensation’ to mean the sum of money
payable for land at the market value, while the word
’amount’ is defined to mean the sum of money payable in lieu
of extinguishment of rights in land at rates other than the
market rate. The maximum amount payable for the
extinguishment of the rights of the landlords is Rupees one
thousand per kanal. These and other cognate matters which
are dealt with by the Act are essential steps in any well-
conceived scheme of agrarian reform.
It is urged by learned counsel led by Shri Tarkunde and
by Shri Sanjay Kaul who appeared in person, that certain
provisions of the impugned Act have no bearing upon agrarian
reform and those provisions cannot have the protection of
Article 31A. Section 7 of the Act is said to be one such
provision. It provides by sub-section (1) for the resumption
of lands for bona fide personal cultivation by ex-landlords
but by sub-section (2) it imposes certain conditions on the
right of resumption. One of those conditions is that the
applicant for resumption, other than a member of the Defence
Forces, must, within six months of the commencement of the
Act, take up normal residence in the village in which the
land sought to be resumed is situated or in an adjoining
village, for the purpose of cultivating the land personally.
The other provision of the Act on which special stress was
laid by counsel for the petitioners is the one contained in
clause (f) of section 7(2) which lays down certain criteria
for determining the extent of land which may be resumed.
Stated briefly, where a person was entitled to rent in kind
from the tiller during kharif 1971, the extent of land
resumable by such person has to bear the same proportion to
the total land comprised in the tenancy as the rent in kind
bears to the total produce; and where a person was entitled
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to rent in cash during Kharif 1971, the extent of land
resumable by him has to be regulated by the extent of rent
in kind to which such rent in cash can be
541
commuted in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections
(3) and (8) of section 9. We are unable to hold that these
and connected provisions of the impugned Act show that the
Act is not a measure of agrarian reform. The question as to
whether any particular Act is a measure of agrarian reform
has to be decided by looking at the dominant purpose of that
Act. In Ranjit Singh v. State of Pnnjab(1), it was held on a
review of authorities that a large and liberal meaning must
be given to the several expressions like ’estate’, ’rights
in an estate’ and extinguishment and modification’ of such
rights which occur in Article 31A. The decision in
Kochuni(1) to which our attention was drawn by Shri
Tarkunde, was treated in Ranjit Singh as a special case
which cannot apply to cases where the general scheme of
legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its
provisions, something ancillary thereto in the interests of
rural economy has to be undertaken to give full effect to
those reforms. In our case the dominant purpose of the
statute is to bring about a just and equitable
redistribution of lands, which is achieved by making the
tiller of the soil the owner of the land which he cultivates
and by imposing a ceiling on the extent of the land which
any person, whether land- lord or tenant, can hold.
Considering the scheme and purpose of the Act, we cannot but
hold that the Act is a measure of agrarian reform and is
saved by Article 31A from the challenge under Articles 14,
19 or 31 of the Constitution. Article 31 has been repealed
by the 44th Amendment with effect from June 20, 1979 and for
future purposes it ceases to have relevance. Reduced to a
constitutional premise, the argument of the petitioners is
that the particular provisions of the Act are discriminatory
and are therefore violative of Article 14; that those
provisions impose unreasonable restrictions on their
fundamental rights and are therefore violative of article
19. This argument is not open to them by reason of article
31A.
It may be mentioned that The Constitution (Application
to Jammu and Kashmir) order, 1954, which was passed by the
President of India in exercise of his powers under article
370 of the Constitution, makes article 31A applicable to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir with the modification that the
proviso to clause (1) of that article stands deleted and for
sub-clause (a) of clause (2) the following sub-clause is
substituted:
542
"(a) "estate" shall mean land which is
occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes
or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for
pasture, and includes-
(i) sites of buildings and other structures on
such land;
(ii) trees standing on such land;
(iii) forest land and wooded waste;
(iv) area covered by or fields floating over
water;
(v) sites of jandars and gharats;
(vi) any jagir, inam, muafi or mukarrari or other
similar grant, but does not include-
(i) the site of any building in any town
area or village abadi or any land
appurtenant to any such building or
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site,
(ii) any land which is occupied as the site
of a town or village; or
(iii) any land reserved for building purposes
in a municipality or notified area or
cantonment or town area or any area for
which a town planning scheme is
sanctioned."
The grievance of the petitioners is that not only do
certain provisions of the Act militate against agrarian
reform, but those provisions will involve the State
Government into payment of considerable ’amounts’ to land-
holders for the extinction and acquisition of their rights,
which would be far greater than the amounts which the State
Government would be liable to pay under Acts like the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Agricultural lands
which are situated within the limits of municipalities and
Town Area Committees are also comprehend within the scope of
the Act and the apprehension of the petitioners is that,
after the tillers become statutory purchasers of those
lands, they will be free to dispose them of at urban prices
which have escalated sky-high. Another facet of the same
argument
543
is that no agrarian reform is involved in applying the
impugned statute to lands situated in urban agglomerations.
These arguments are not relevant for deciding the
question as to whether the dominant purpose of the Act is
agrarian reform. The payment of a larger compensation to
land-holders under a Land Reform Law than what would be
payable under an Act like the Urban Ceiling Act does not
lead to the conclusion that the former is not a measure of
agrarian reform The extent and mode of payment of
compensation for the extinction of a land-holder’s right is
a matter for the legislature to decide and the circumstance
that the compensation or the amount fixed by the legislature
in any given case is excessive, will not make the law any-
the-less a measure of agrarian reform. In the same manner,
the circumstance that the impugned statute is made
applicable to agricultural lands situated within the limits
of Local Authorities will not affect its character as a
measure of agrarian reform. If any land situated in a
developed area is used predominantly for the purpose of
agriculture, it is open to the legislature to include that
land in a scheme of agrarian reform so as to make the tiller
of that land its owner. The apprehension expressed by the
petitioners that, after becoming statutory owners of
agricultural lands situated in developed areas on payment of
a paltry price, the tillers will part with those lands at a
high price which lands in developed areas like urban areas
fetch, is hypothetical though not unreal. Not unreal,
because the temptation to trade in immovable property is
common to agriculturists and non-agriculturists alike. But
the hypothetical possibility that the lands will be disposed
of by to-day’s tillers to-morrow, cannot affect the basic
position that the Act is conceived in the larger interest of
agrarian reform. Besides, section 13 which places
restriction on utilisation of lands, section 17 which
imposes restrictions to a limited extent on the transfer of
such lands and section 14 which prescribes the optimum land
which can be retained even by an erstwhile tenant are
effective deterrents against profit-oriented disposal of
high-priced lands.
Before parting with this case, we would like to observe
that section 7(2) (b) of the Act creates an anomalous
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situation, especially in the context of the definition of
’personal cultivation’ in section 2(12) of the Act. One of
the conditions imposed by section 7(2) (b) on the right of a
land-holder to resume land is that, unless he is a member of
the defence forces, he must take his residence in the
544
village in which the land is situated or in an adjoining
village. "Personal cultivation" is defined in section 2(12)
to mean cultivation by any member of one’s family or by a
khana-nishin daughter or a khana-damad or a parent of the
person or by other relations like the son, brother or sister
who are specified in the various clauses of section 2(12).
Under clause (g) of section 2(12), a land-holder who is a
minor, insane, physically disabled, incapacitated by old age
or infirmity, a widow or a person in detention or in person
can cultivate the land through a servant or hired labourer
under the personal supervision of his or her guardian or
agent. If it is permissible to cultivate a land through
another person as specified in clauses (b) to (g) of section
2(12), it is difficult to understand why residence in the
village where the land is situated or in an adjoining
village should be compulsory for all persons, even for
minors, widows, insane persons and persons in detention. The
exception made by the legislature in favour of the members
of defence forces ought to be extended to these other
persons also, The exclusion of a constitutional challenge
under Articles 14, 19 and 31 which is provided for by
Article 31A does not justify in equity the irrational
violation of these articles. This Court did observe in Waman
Rao(l) that: "It may happen that while existing inequalities
are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and
incidentally" but the legislature has to take care to see
that even marginal and incidental inequalities are not
created without rhyme or reason. The Government of J & K
would do well to give fresh consideration to the provisions
contained in section 7 (2) and modify the provisions
regarding residence in order that they may accord with
reason and commonsense. Article 31A does not frown upon
reason and commonsense
For these reasons, we uphold the constitutional
validity of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, 1976
and dismiss these petitions. There will be no order as to
costs.
H.S.K. Petition dismissed
545