Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 9420-9423 of 1995
PETITIONER:
STAR CONSTRUCTION & TRANSPORT CO. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE INDIA CEMENTS LIMITED
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/2001
BENCH:
K.G.Balakrishna, S.R.Babu
JUDGMENT:
RAJENDRA BABU, J. :
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In respect of a dispute arising out of a money claim
made by the appellants against respondent the matter was
referred to arbitration. The reference was entered into in
January 1983. The arbitrators published their award on
15.2.1986 which, after setting out certain matters which
were preliminary in nature, inter alia, stated as under :-
We J.C. Shah and P.S. Subramaniam, Arbitrators
appointed by the parties do hereby award and order that the
Company (Indian Cements Ltd.) do pay to Star Construction
and Transport Company Rs. 65,00,000 (in words Rupees Sixty
Five Lacs) in full and final settlement of the claim of Star
Construction and Transport Company with interest at the rate
of 9(nine) per cent per annum from the date hereof; and we
further award and declare that all the disputes referred to
by the parties under the claim made by the Star Construction
and Transport Company and denied by the Indian Cements Ltd.
are finally disposed of by this Award and that no part of
the claim remains undetermined; and we further award and
order that each party to bear its respective cost of and
incidental to the arbitration proceeding including its share
of the amount of remuneration paid by it to the Arbitrators.
Made this 15th day of February, 1986 at Bombay, in
token whereof the Arbitrators have subscribed their
signatures which are duly attested.
The award was filed in court on 15.4.1986 in O.P. No.
174 of 1986 under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). A decree was passed
in terms of the award under Section 17(1) of the Act.
Thereafter, the respondent by its letter dated 8.8.1986 paid
a sum of Rs. 49 lacs while withholding a sum of Rs. 16
lacs which is stated to be money claims due to it in Suit
No. C.S. 246 of 1984 and C.S. 315 of 1984, although this
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was disputed by the appellants in their letter dated
5.8.1986. It was stated therein that a Reconciliation of
Account had been furnished to the arbitrators showing an
amount of about Rs. 16 lacs claimed to be due from them in
respect of which they had instituted the said two suits.
The respondent contended that the issues before the
arbitrators by way of several claims recorded in the award
which the arbitrators had settled did not take into account
moneys received by the appellants from it as advance and
moneys paid by them on their behalf and which stand to their
credit and accordingly credit should be given thereto. In
the two pending suits applications were filed under Order
XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to record the
satisfaction of the suit claim and dismiss the suit with
other incidental reliefs. The learned single Judge of the
High Court who was dealing with the suits passed a judgment
on 17.4.1989 allowing the applications by holding that it
was at the instance of the respondent that the claim in the
suit was brought in before the arbitrators on 8.2.1986 and
elected to claim this set off immediately under the award to
be pronounced which was not opposed by the appellants and,
therefore, under these circumstances, instead of an award of
Rs. 81 lacs, an award of Rs. 65 lacs was made. On appeal
the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment
of the learned Single Judge by holding that whether there
was a settlement or not between the parties is a matter to
be decided as an issue in the suit and that the award per se
cannot be considered as having resulted in a settlement of
suit claims.
The principal objection raised on behalf of the
respondent is that the two applications filed under Order
XXIII Rue 3 C.P.C. could not be maintained. It was also
disputed that the amounts claimed in the suits related to
the agreement dated 27.7.1979 which was not the subject
matter of arbitration. It was contended that the subject
matter of the suits could not be the subject matter of
arbitration without further submission by the parties
requesting the arbitrators to include the said matter and
factually there was no such submission. The learned single
Judge considered the case on the original statements filed
by the respondent before the arbitrators. The claim in suit
C.S. No. 315 of 1984 was for recovery of a sum of Rs.
19,75,821.60 together with interest on Rs. 14,55,625.08 and
the costs. The claim in the plaint comprised of a sum of
Rs. 9,20,452.17 being the difference between the value of
the assets taken over by the respondent and the amount was
stated to be due from the appellants to the respondent which
formed the subject matter of the agreement dated 27.7.1979
and a sum of Rs. 5,35,172.91 was said to be the liability
of the appellants on account of accrued and unavailed leave
of the workmen employed by the appellants. Other suit C.S.
No. 246 of 1984 was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs.
1,53,812.50 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
plaint and for costs. The claim of the respondent is that
this amount represented the motor vehicles tax demanded by
R.T.O. Salem for the period from 1.4.1974 to 31.3.1982.
According to the respondent, the amount was payable by the
appellants and the respondent was obliged to pay it when the
permits for the vehicles were transferred to it. It is
after the decree in terms of the award was passed that the
appellants wrote a letter to the respondent without
prejudice referring to reconciliation statement of account
filed by the respondent before the arbitrators showing an
amount of Rs. 16 lacs claimed to be due from the appellants
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and proposing that the respondent should pay a sum of Rs.
49 lacs being approximately the amount decreed in O.P. No.
174 of 1986 less the amount claimed by the respondent. The
appellants also undertook that on such payment being made
they would not execute the decree till these two suits are
disposed of or the matter is settled in a manner acceptable
to both parties. This proposal was accepted by the
respondent without prejudice and along with a letter dated
8.8.1986 a cheque of Rs. 49 lacs was sent by the respondent
to the appellants. In that letter it was made clear that in
respect of amounts settled by the arbitrators the claims in
the two suits were not included in the settlement arrived at
by the arbitrators. The appellants suggested that both the
parties or their advocates should obtain clarifications from
the arbitrators as to whether or not the amount shown by the
respondent as due to it in the statement of reconciliation
of accounts filed before the arbitrators had been adjusted
by them in awarding the sum of Rs. 65 lacs to the
appellants. The respondent did not agree to the suggestion
as in its opinion there was no scope for obtaining any
clarification from the arbitrators as there was no ambiguity
with regard to the issue before them. The stand of the
respondent is clear that the arbitration did not pertain to
the agreement dated 27.7.1979 but only the matters arising
under the agreement dated 20.8.1974. An affidavit of Shri
P.S. Subramaniam Iyer, one of the arbitrators and two
documents were filed which are zerox copies of the
statements filed by the respondent before the arbitrators on
8.2.1986. As the original statements filed before the
arbitrators were also produced in the suit with all other
records of the arbitrators, the learned single Judge did not
rely upon the affidavit of Shri P.S. Subramaniam Iyer as he
had not been examined before the court and he ignored the
same. However, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the
case on the basis of the original statements filed by the
respondent before the arbitrators which have been produced
in the court along with O.P. No. 174 of 1986 and a letter
dated 1.2.1986 written by Shri S. Padmanabhan, who was one
of the advocates appearing for the respondent, to the effect
that the respondent had worked out loss at Rs. 72.51 lacs
subject to adjustment of amounts payable and receivable. It
was also stated that items marked 9B to 9E could not be
accepted in working out the basis for any compromise. The
learned Judge proceeded to analyse the statement of
reconciliation of account which referred specifically to a
sum of Rs. 9,20,452.17 which is one of the amounts claimed
in suit C.S. No. 315 of 1984 and the other amount claimed
for leave wages as Rs. 5,35,000/- which are set out in para
6 of the plaint in C.S. No. 315 of 1984. With reference
to the claim in C.S. 246 of 1984 the amount was split into
two paras in the statement. A sum of Rs. 30,000/- was
shown as paid to R.T.O. towards differential tax and the
balance of Rs. 1,53,812.50 was shown as a separate entry
tax arrears in respect of vehicles taken over from the
appellants paid on 28.6.1982. Thus, the learned Judge came
to the conclusion that the amount claimed in the two suits
found place in the statement of reconciliation of account.
The learned Judge thereafter referred to proceedings dated
8.2.1986 in which the list of documents attached to the
original petition submitted during the arbitration
proceedings and the description given in the list attached
to the original petition contained 21 items The last of
which is further documents of claimant and respondent
compromise proposal and reconciliation of Accounts by
respondent. On this basis, the learned Judge found that it
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was clear that the arbitrators have taken into account the
statement of reconciliation of account filed by the
respondent before passing the award. The learned Judge
proceeded to observe that the arbitrators would not have
taken the statements on record but returned the same to the
respective parties and proceeded without any reference to
the said statement and, therefore, the respondent was taking
undue advantage of the fact that the award is a non-speaking
one. The learned Judge relying upon the decision of this
Court in Smt. Santa Sila Devi and another v. Dhirendra
Nath Sen and others, AIR 1963 SC 1677, held that the award
finally disposed of all the matters in difference inasmuch
as there is an express declaration by the arbitrators to
that effect and no part of the claim remained undetermined.
The learned Judge also gave further findings that when the
appellants had approached the arbitrators with a particular
claim and the respondent in defence put forth its claim
arising out of the same contract but crystalised to a large
extent by the agreement dated 27.7.1979 which, in fact, set
off before the arbitrators there was no necessity for
submission of a fresh or independent reference, much less
through court and relied upon the following passage in
Russell on Arbitration, 9th Edn, at pages 102 and 103 :-
It has been often held that a submission by A and B
of the one part and C of the other, of all matters in
difference between them authorises the arbitrator to decide
on all matters that either of the two has against the third
jointly or severally, such as an action by A alone against
C, on the ground that the words are to be taken
distributively. This view was adopted in the Court of
Exchequer and affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber Six
partners by two bonds submitted to arbitration all matters
relating to their trade. By the one bond three of them
became jointly and severally bound to the other three to
obey the award as to all matters between the partners or any
of them. But the second bond the latter three became bound
to the former three in like manner. It was held that the
arbitrator was authorised to award on a matter in dispute
between two co- obligators only, on the ground that the
reference was of all matters between them or any of them
Winter v. White (1819) IB & B 350.
A reference of all matters in difference gives an
arbitrator power over all matters down to the period of the
submission, but does not except under very special
circumstances, enable him to award on future and contingent
claims, or to give damages in respect of money demands
becoming due after the date of the submission, though
pursuant to an agreement made previous to it, or indeed
respecting any subjects of dispute arising after the
reference.
Even if the submission be of all differences and of
anything in anywise relating thereto these latter words do
not extend the power of the arbitrators to matters which
though relating to the existing differences, arise after the
date of the submission nor do they authorise the calculation
and awarding of interest subsequent to that date.
The parties may, however, if they please give the
arbitrator power to determine on contingent claims, or on
matters in dispute or demands arising after the date of the
submission and this course has often been perused.
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The learned Judge, therefore, held that it was open to
the arbitrators to arbitrate the same. Alternatively, the
learned Judge proceeded to state that even if the reference
was limited, it was open to the parties to enlarge the scope
thereof as it was not a reference made by a court. The
statements in writing filed by the parties before the
arbitrators were sufficient to serve the purpose and the
absence of signature of any representative of the respondent
does not at all matter. The learned Judge also proceeded to
consider that the respondent had elected to claim set off
before the arbitrators and having chosen to work out that
remedy it is not open to the respondent to pursue the same
by ignoring the award. It was held that the respondent
having obtained the benefit under the award, namely, the
adjustment of the amounts due from the appellants as against
the amounts found payable to the appellants, it is not open
to the respondent to challenge the validity of the award in
the proceedings, particularly when the appellants had not
raised any objection to a decree being passed by the court
in terms of the award. Appeals were filed before the
Division Bench of the High Court by the respondent, which
were allowed relegating the parties to thrash out the
question whether there is a settlement or not between the
parties is a matter to be decided as an issue in the suit
and that the award per se cannot be considered as having
resulted in a settlement of the suit claim. These appeals
are directed against that order of the Division Bench of the
High Court. Shri F.S.Nariman, learned senior Advocate for
the appellants, submitted that if the conclusion is that the
award has resulted in a settlement of the suit claim, the
court ought to have given a finding that there was a
settlement between the parties and hence nothing remains in
the suit to be decided. He focussed his attention mostly to
the question that the award on the face of it indicates the
settlement of the suit claim. To support this proposition,
he heavily relied upon the view expressed by the learned
Single Judge while disposing of the suits on the basis of
the applications filed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 CPC to
which we have made elaborate reference. He submitted that
the fact is that the reference to the arbitration was made
in pursuance of clause 24 of the agreement dated 20th
August, 1974 as a private reference validly made without the
intervention of the court. He submits that clause 24 is
very wide in its terms to include all questions of
difference whatsoever touching upon the agreement or subject
matter thereof or arising out of or in relation thereto and
whether as to construction of the agreement or otherwise.
When the appellants approached the arbitration with a
particular claim, the respondent in defence thereto put
forward its claim arising out of the same contract but
crystallised to a large extent by the agreement dated
27.7.1979. The later agreement between the parties emerged
only out of the earlier contract which was the foundation of
the transaction between the parties. The respondent pleaded
only a set off or a counter-claim before the arbitrators
while defending the claim put forward by the appellants.
Thus there was no necessity for submission of a fresh or
independent reference and much less through a Court. The
fallacy in this approach is that when the reference was made
in respect of the disputes arising out of the agreement
dated 20.8.1974 and those disputes had to be settled no
claim by way of set off or a counter-claim was raised by the
respondent herein. It is only at the last stage of the
proceedings a reconciliation statement is stated to have
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been filed which, it is said, has reference to certain
claims made in the two suits and those claims are stated to
have been taken into consideration in the non-speaking award
in deciding the claims of the parties by the arbitrators.
In the case of a non-speaking award, trite to say that the
mental process of the arbitrators in reaching the conclusion
cannot be gone into or examined as the same are not
disclosed in the award. Therefore, to glean into the minds
of the arbitrators to find out whether they included the
claims stated to have been made in the reconciliation
statement is a very torturous process, not an easy one,
hazarded with too many difficulties. To get out of such a
quagmire Shri Nariman very astutely contended that there was
a reference to the documents filed in the case and the
reconciliation statement is one such which was also produced
before the court when the award was filed for passing the
decree in terms thereof which would indicate that this was
present to the minds of the arbitrators. Whether it is so
or not can only be imagined and not definitely inferred from
the facts. Therefore, this line of reasoning adopted by the
learned Single Judge does not appeal to us nor are we
impressed with the alternative view taken by him that even
assuming that the scope of the original reference was
limited, it was open to both parties to enlarge the same
before the arbitrators as it was not a reference made by a
court. Even if it were so, there is no way of finding out
the rationale on which the arbitrators passed the award.
Though it may have been permissible to refer such a dispute,
whether in fact done so, is the question. That is a matter
which is under serious dispute between the parties. Shri
Nariman pointed out the conflict in decisions in relation to
the question whether the matters in difference in a pending
suit can be referred to the arbitration without the order of
the court and when the same would result in settlement of
claim in the suit. However, that aspect also does not arise
for consideration at this stage of the proceedings. We may
also notice that the learned Single Judge is of the view
that the respondent having taken advantage of the award
which, in fact, took note of the reconciliation statement
they are estopped from contending that there is no
significance of the suit claims in the arbitration
proceedings. Again, this view proceeds on the basis of
award being made after taking note of the reconciliation
statement, which conclusion we have pointed out to be
slippery. Hence this aspect also does not assist the
appellants.
In this case, applications are filed under Order
XXIII, Rule 3 CPC. This rule is a provision for making a
decree on any lawful agreement or compromise between the
parties during the pendency of the suit by which claim is
satisfied or adjusted. The agreement, compromise or
satisfaction may relate to the whole of the suit or part of
the suit or it may also include matters beyond the subject
matter of the suit. But Rule 3 clearly envisages a decree
being passed in respect of part of subject matter on a
compromise. Whether in fact there has been compromise or
adjustment of the suit claim or any part thereof is itself
put in dispute in this case. Unless it is clearly
established that such accord or compromise has been entered
into between the parties, the powers under Order XXIII Rule
3 CPC could not be exercised. The respondents case is that
the claim made in the suit were never before the arbitrators
in any form and even the figures mentioned in the
reconciliation statement also do not pertain to the suit
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claim and the scope of reference to the arbitrators does not
enable them to make an award on that aspect of the matter.
Those objections have to be dealt with appropriately on full
trial. That is the course now adopted by the Division Bench
of the High Court. Although many other arguments were
addressed before us as to the scope of the proceedings
before an arbitrator as to how in the course of arbitration,
additional claims can be raised before them and an
adjudication thereof, if results, an award is binding on
parties. These aspects also do not help the appellants in
any manner for we find that there must be factual foundation
for those claims and established in the course of a trial.
Uninfluenced by the views of the Division Bench we have
examined the correctness of the order of the learned Single
Judge made in the two suits on applications filed under
Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and we are clearly of the opinion
that the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be
sustained. The Division Bench of the High Court has not
shut out the case put forth by the appellants but only
relegated the parties to work out their respective rights in
an appropriate manner in the course of a suit. Therefore,
we find no merit in these appeals and the same shall stand
dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.