Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5698-5699 OF 2009
State of Punjab and Others …….Appellants
Versus
Dhanjit Singh Sandhu …..Respondent
JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J. :
1. These appeals are directed against the judgment and
order dated 8.1.2009 passed by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in C.W.P. No.8864 of 2007 and also order dated
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27.3.2009 passed in Review Petition No. 112 of 2009,
whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent was
allowed and the order dated 23.12.2004 passed by
appellant no.3 rejecting the application for refund of the
extension fee received by the appellant in excess of the
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rates mentioned in Rule 13 of the Punjab Regional and Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995 (in short ‘1995 Act’) in
the light of the judgment passed in C.W.P. No.13648 of 1998
| ate of P | unjab & |
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to-date interest has been set aside.
2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.
3. The respondent was allotted a plot of land measuring
400 square yards bearing No.2177 at Durgi Road, Urban
Estate Phase-II, Ludhiana vide allotment letter dated
1.4.1986. In terms of allotment, the respondent was
required to complete the construction of building within
three years from the date of issuance of the allotment letter
after getting the plans of the proposed building approved by
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the competent Authority. The case of the respondent-writ
petitioner is that there was no condition in the allotment
letter for charging extension fee in the case of failure to
complete construction of the building within the
aforementioned period of three years nevertheless as per
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clause 15 of the allotment letter, the allotment was subject
to the provisions of Punjab Estates (Development and
Regulation Act), 1964 and the Rules and Policies framed
thereunder.
4. It appears that in the year 1995, the State of Punjab
came with the legislation known as Punjab Regional and
Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (in short ‘PUDA
Act’). By the said Act, the Punjab Urban Estate
(Development and Regulation) Act 1964 (in short ‘1964 Act’)
and Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972 were
repealed. In exercise of power conferred under the Act, the
State Government framed rules called the Punjab Regional
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and Town Planning and Development (General) Rules 1995
(in short ‘1995 Rules’) which was published vide Notification
nd
dated 22 August, 1995. Rule 13 of the Rules specified the
time within which the building is to be constructed. It also
provides for extension of time limit subject to payment of
prescribed fee mentioned therein.
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5. The Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority
(in short ‘PUDA’) issued a circular dated 15.1.1998 revising
| fee char | geable f |
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commercial plots and by the said circular a very high rate of
extension fee was proposed to be charged. The respondent
from time to time deposited the extension fee so demanded
by the appellant. It is alleged that an amount of Rs.1.20 lacs
has been in excess charged from the respondent. The
appellant’s case is that the appellant in an attempt to nullify
the effect of the judgment rendered in Tehal Singh’s case
and to validate the demand of enhanced rate of extension
fee purportedly framed the Rules called Punjab Regional and
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Town Planning and Development (General) Second
Amendment Rules, 2001 (in short ‘2001 Rules’) giving
retrospective effect.
6. The respondent moved a writ petition being C.W.P. No.
7934 of 2004 praying inter alia for the directions to refund
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the excess fee charged from the respondent. It was
disposed of with the directions to the appellant to reconsider
the representation and to dispose of the same in the light of
| .W.P. No | .13648 o |
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case). In compliance with the aforesaid directions, the
respondent’s representation was considered and came to be
rejected by the appellant vide order dated 23.12.2004 on the
ground that in the facts and circumstances of the case the
instant case was not similar to Tehal Singh’s case.
7. The writ petition was finally heard by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court and relying on the ratio decided in Tehal
Sing’s case (supra) disposed of the writ petition, quashed the
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notice and directed the appellant to calculate the extension
fee as per Rule 13 of 1995 Rules. For better appreciation,
the concluding paragraphs 15 to 17 of the impugned order
are quoted hereinbelow:-
“ 15. When the facts of the present case are examined in
the light of the principle laid down by the Division Bench
judgment in Tehal Singh’s case (supra), we are left with
no doubt that the show cause notices issued to the
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| er wherein<br>n Tehal Sin<br>harging of | judgment r<br>gh's case (<br>extension f |
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16. In view of above, the writ petition
succeeds. The impugned notice dated
12.12.2006 (P-7) is hereby quashed. The
respondents are directed to calculate the
extension fee as per Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules.
The needful shall be done within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall
pay the extension fee within a period of two
months from the date of receipt of the
calculation given in the fresh notice to be
issued by the respondents. The petitioner shall
further be entitled to consequential benefit to
get the site plans approved. The petitioner is
also held entitled to his costs.
17. The other connected writ petitions are also
disposed of in the above terms. It is, however,
clarified that in cases such as C.W.P. Nos. 8864
and 13765 of 2007, where the petitioners have
already paid the extension fee as per the rates
demanded by the respondents, which are
exorbitant and against the Division Bench
judgment of this Court in Tehal Singh's case,
the respondents are directed to re-calculate
the amount of extension fee as per the
provisions of Rule 13 of the Rules and refund
the over-payment alongwith interest 10% per
annum.”
JUDGMENT
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8. We have heard Mrs. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant.
| e, the p | lot in qu |
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the respondent vide an allotment letter dated 1.4.1986. In
terms of the allotment letter, the allottee had to fulfill the
terms and conditions enumerated in the said letter. The
terms and conditions of the said allotment are extracted
hereinbelow:-
“1. Plot No. 2177 Phase-II measuring 400 sq. yds. in
Durgri Rd. Urban Estate has been allotted to you.
The tentative price of the said plot is Rs. 51,000/-
2. The plot is preferential one and additional price
at the rate of 10% of the original normal price is Rs.
_____________________________________________________
3. Total price of the plot (normal) plus preferential
is Rs. 51,000/-
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4. The above price of the plot is subject to
variation with reference to the actual measurement
of the site as well as in cost of enhancement of
compensation by the court or otherwise and you
shall have to pay the additional price of the plot if
any, determined by the department, within 30 days
of the date of demand of in case of sale by
allotment.
5. You shall have to convey your
acceptance/refusal unless you refuse to accept the
allotment by a registered A/D letter within 30 days
of the issue of this allotment order and have to pay
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| you refus<br>nowledgm | e to acc<br>ent due |
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7. On payment of 100% of the purchase price of
the plot you shall have to execute in deed of
conveyance in the prescribed from in such manner
as may be directed by the Estate Officer.
8. Balance 7.5% of the purchase price shall be
payable either lump-sum within 60 days of the
issue of allotment order without any interest or in
four 2 six monthly equated instalment alongwith
interest at the rate of 7% per annum The first
installment shall fall due after the expiry of six
months from the date of issue of allotment order
th
and shall be payable on the 10 of the month
following in which it falls due.
9. Each remittance shall be remitted to the Estate
Officer by means of demand draft payable to him
drawn on any Scheduled Bank situated at the
nearest place to the Estate Officer. Each such
remittance shall be accompanied by a letter
showing particulars of the site i.e. plot No.
allotment No. and date of issue of allotment order
etc. In the absence of these particulars, the amount
shall not deem to have been received.
10. You shall have to pay separately for any
building
material trees, structures and compound wall etc.
existing in the plot at the time of allotment for
which
compensation has been assessed and paid by the
Government in x case you want to make use of the
same, failing which the government shall have the
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| have to c<br>rom the<br>getting th | omplete t<br>date of i<br>e plans |
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JUDGMENT
10. Further, it is clear that the allotment of the plot was
subject to the provisions contained in the 1964 Act. Section
10 of the Act envisages provision for resumption and
forfeiture of the land in case of breach of conditions of
allotment. Section 10 reads as under:-
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| he Estate<br>pon the tr<br>rder of | Officer m<br>ansferee<br>resumptio |
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11. In exercise of power conferred by 1964 Act, Rules were
framed in the year 1965 i.e. Punjab Urban Estate
(Development and Regulation) Rules, 1964. Rule 14 of the
said Rules categorically provided that the transferee shall
complete the building within three years from the date of
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issue of the allotment letter. In accordance with the Rules
and Regulations of erection of the building, the time limit
may be extended by the Estate Officer if he is satisfied that
failure to complete the construction of the building within
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the said period was due to the reasons beyond the control of
the allottee.
12. Since the respondent-allottee failed to abide by the
| and did | not raise |
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liable to pay non-construction fee/extension fee which was
demanded from him in order to enable him to avoid
resumption of the plot to the appellant-authority. The
aforesaid demand was made by letters dated 6.1.1997 and
27.10.1999. The said letter dated 6.1.1997 is extracted
hereinbelow:-
“PUNJAB URBAN, PLANNING DEVELOPMENT
AUTHOR, SECTOR -32, SAMARALA ROAD, PUDA
COMPLEX, LUDHIANA REGISTERED
To,
D.S. Sandhu Superintending Engineer (PWD)
Office of the Chief Engineer, PWD B&R, Patna
JUDGMENT
No. PUDA/E.O./Ludhiana (Endst. No.
2177)96/34478 Dated 06.01.97,
Sub: Regarding payment of balance installment
resumption of plot of Urban Estate D Road,
Sector/ Phase-II at Ludhiana, residential/
commercial plot no. 2177. area 400.
With regard to the above subject.
2. Res. 26712/- the detail of which is given below
is recoverable from you as balance of
residential/commercial plot No. 2177, Urban
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| dersigned<br>f failure to<br>resumptio | on the<br>do so, ac<br>n of allot |
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1............amount of balance installments.
2. amount of enhanced compensation
3. extension fee 26712/-
4. interest
5. penalty
Total 26712
Sd/- Estate Officer In
English PUDA,
Ludhiana.”
13. In response to the aforesaid letter dated 6.1.1997, the
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respondent agreed to pay the extension fee imposed by the
Estate Officer of the appellant authority in order to avoid
resumption/auction of the plot.
14. Meanwhile, the State of Punjab enacted Punjab
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995.
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Rules were also framed under the said Act. By Section 183
of 1995 Act, earlier Act of 1964 and Punjab Housing
Development Board Act, 1972 were repealed with the saving
clause.
15. Subsequent to the aforesaid Act, by Notification dated
30.6.1995, Punjab Urban Development Authority was
established w.e.f. 1.7.1995 and the Board stood abolished
with effect from that date. Many other Acts were also
repealed. By the said Act Authority was empowered to deal
with the land and prescribe the fee in case where extension
of period for completion of building is set for by the allottee.
16. Since the High Court passed the impugned order
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following the decision rendered by the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Tehal Singh’s case, it would be proper to
refer the facts of that case.
17. In Tehal Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors . (C.W.P.
No.13648 of 1998), the petitioner filed the writ petition
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seeking a writ for quashing certain letters demanding
extension fee and striking down condition No.19 of allotment
letter, insofar as it relates to the charging of separate
| completi | on of co |
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Further mandamus was sought for directing the respondents
to charge extension fee from the petitioner under the
provisions of Rule 13 of 1995 Rules. The High Court after
referring various provisions of 1995 Acts and Rules made
thereunder observed as under:-
A conjoint reading of the various provisions of the 1995
“
Act and the 1995 Rules shows that the transfer of land
under sub-section (1) of Section 43 is not only subject to
the directions which may be given by the State
Government under the 1995 Act but also the conditions
which may be prescribed with regard to completion of
building of part thereof and with regard to extension of
period for such completion and payment of fee for such
extension. A perusal of rule 13 of the 1995 Rules along
with Section 180 (2) (i) and Section 2 (zc) of the 1995
Act shows that the time within which the building is to
be completed and other related matters are governed by
the 1995 Rules. Therefore, with the coming into force of
these Rules, the rates of extension fee prescribed by the
Board stood superseded and in terms of sub-rule (2) of
Rule 13 of the 1995 Rules, the petitioners became
eligible to seek extension of the specified time limit
subject to payment of the fee prescribed under sub-rule
(3) of Rule 13.”
JUDGMENT
18. The Court further came to the following conclusions:-
“We have thoughtfully considered the
respective submissions. In our opinion, Shri
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| 995 Act m<br>de by the<br>ave been | akes it<br>erstwhile<br>made un |
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19. Consequently the Court declared the notices
demanding enhanced extension fee as illegal and ultra vires
to the provisions of 1995 Act under the Rules made
thereunder.
JUDGMENT
20. It is worth to mention here that the aforesaid judgment
rendered in Tehal Singh’s case was challenged before the
Supreme Court in S.L.P. No.18500-18501 of 1999 and was
dismissed on 10.11.2000, but the said order of dismissal was
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modified by the Supreme Court by order dated 12.2.2001 in
the following terms.
| The ap | peals are |
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21. As noticed above, the facts are quite different from the
facts in Tehal Singh’s case. In the instant case, the
respondents-allottees accepted the terms and conditions of
the allotment letter and possession were taken but they did
not raise any construction upto 2000. There was a specific
condition that non-construction of building would lead to the
resumption of the said plot under the provisions of the Acts
and the Rules. As noticed above, when the allottees did not
raise construction on the plot, the demand was raised for
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payment of non-construction fee/extension fee in order to
avoid resumption of the plot by the Authority, allottee paid
the extension fee. After availing the benefit of extension on
payment of extension fee, the allottee sent a letter to the
Estate Officer demanding refund of the extension fee on the
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basis of amended Rule 13 of 1995 Rules. The said demand
was rejected by the Estate Officer by passing the reasoned
order in compliance of the directions of the High Court. In
| t case, | we have |
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in holding that the ratio decided in Tehal Singh’s case will
not apply in the instant case. In our considered opinion
defaulting allottes of valuable plots cannot be allowed to
approbate and reprobate by first agreeing to abide by terms
and conditions of allotment and later seeking to deny their
liability as per the agreed terms.
22. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a
species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties.
As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the
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provisions of a statute. (vide C.I.T. vs. Mr. P. Firm Maur ,
AIR 1965 SC 1216) .
It is settled proposition of law that once an order has
been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party
and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on
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any ground. (Vide Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service,
Amravati & Ors. , AIR 1969 SC 329). In R.N. Gosain vs.
| 93 SC 3 | 52, this |
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under:–
“Law does not permit a person to both
approbate and reprobate. This principle is
based on the doctrine of election which
postulates that no party can accept and reject
the same instrument and that “a person cannot
say at one time that a transaction is valid and
thereby obtain some advantage, to which he
could only be entitled on the footing that it is
valid, and then turn round and say it is void for
the purpose of securing some other
advantage.”
23. This Court in Sri Babu Ram Alias Durga Prasad vs.
Sri Indra Pal Singh (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1998 SC 3021,
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and P.R. Deshpande vs. Maruti Balram Haibatti , AIR
1998 SC 2979, the Supreme Court has observed that the
doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel- the
principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in
it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species
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of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in
equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his
actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak,
| which he | otherwi |
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24. The Supreme Court in The Rajasthan State Industrial
Development and Investment Corporation and Anr.
vs. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd.
and Anr. , AIR 2013 SC 1241, made an observation that a
party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and
loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly
accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order,
is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of
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such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to
do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to
violate the principles of right and good conscience.
25. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the
rule of estoppel the principle that one cannot approbate and
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reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by
election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or
equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a
| ded, by | way of h |
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or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right
which he would have otherwise had.
26. Be that as it may, so far as the instant case is
concerned, the High Court has totally overlooked the facts of
the present case and allowed the writ petition. The
impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in law and is
hereby set aside. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as
JUDGMENT
to costs.
…………………………...J.
(Dr. B.S. Chauhan)
…………………………….J.
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(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
March 14, 2014.
JUDGMENT
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