M/S SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 27-02-2015

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2475-2476 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.22705-22706 of 2013) M/s. Sherali Khan Mohamed Manekia …Appellant(s) versus The State of Maharashtra and others … Respondent(s) JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. : Leave granted. JUDGMENT 2. In the instant appeals by special leave the appellant th assailed the order dated 14 January, 2013 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Court Receiver’s Report No.25 of 2007 and Additional Report No. 383 of 2012, whereby the High Court while disposing of the 1 Page 1 Report of the Court Receiver held that after the disposal of First Appeal No. 767 of 1998 and dismissal of the special leave petition, the Receiver deemed to have been discharged. 3. It appears that the suit property was declared as evacuee property and the same was purchased by the appellant in an auction sale as far back as on 15.6.1964. In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court seeking specific performance of the sale of the property and possession and interim relief of injunction restraining the defendants therein from carrying on further construction on JUDGMENT the suit property. The appellant further made a prayer for appointment of Receiver. 4. The trial court rejected the prayer for appointment of Receiver by order dated 3.5.1980 and against that, appellant moved the High Court in First Appeal, which was finally 2 Page 2 heard and order dated 22.7.1980 was passed appointing the Court Receiver. The High Court while making appointment of the Receiver directed to take possession of the suit
ersons who were
any part of the suit property were continued to remain in possession. The Receiver was directed to collect rent and compensation as the case may be from all the persons in actual possession after verifying from them their present right to remain in possession. The High Court further directed that the Receiver should take suitable direction from the court if he was presented with any particular difficulty. JUDGMENT 5. Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed of on 4.2.1998. While disposing the suit, the trial court gave liberty to the plaintiff-appellant to move the High Court for directions for taking possession of the suit property from the Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court. 3 Page 3 6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court, First Appeal was filed being F.A. No.767 of 1988, which was finally heard and dismissed by the High Court vide judgment
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the judgment of the High Court was also dismissed on 19.2.2007. 7. It further reveals from the record that the Court Receiver so appointed submitted Report No.25/2007 before the High Court seeking directions with regard to the encroachment on the suit property and handing over possession to the appellant. The Court Receiver also submitted Additional Report No.383 of 2012. The High Court JUDGMENT after taking into consideration these Court Receiver’s reports, passed the impugned order holding that the receiver shall be deemed to have been discharged after the dismissal of the first appeal by the High Court, followed by dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court. 4 Page 4 8. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that even after the disposal of the appeal,
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Court Receiver continues in his office till he is discharged and fulfills all the incidental obligations that are cast upon him by virtue of his appointment and till he renders account to the Commissioner of Accounts. 9. The short question, therefore, that falls for consideration is as to whether after the disposal of the appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether he continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed by JUDGMENT the Court? 10. The High Court in the impugned order observed: “The directions cannot be issued only on assumption that this Court was monitoring the matter for all these years irrespective of disposal of the Appeal from Order. That may be the understanding of parties, but before me nothing has been placed which would enable me to hold that 5 Page 5
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JUDGMENT To my mind these are thoroughly misconceived proceedings and the remedy of the Plaintiffs/Decree Holders lies elsewhere. They cannot insist on the Court passing orders only because of continued correspondence and meetings with the Court 6 Page 6
re they ca<br>t, insist o<br>iver. Equnnot in th<br>n directio<br>ally, the
11. In paragraph 49 of the order the High Court noted the following:- JUDGMENT “Therefore, the record of that case was perused by the learned judge in its entirety and he found that the order was passed discharging the Court receiver on 26.11.1992 and at the same time continuing him for certain period to enable parties to file the Appeal from the said order. The Appeals were filed, but same were dismissed by a Division Bench and the Special Leave Petition which was filed before the Supreme Court also came to be dismissed on 27.07.1993. The issue was whether the Court Receiver became functus officio right from the date 7 Page 7 when the order was passed on 26.11.1992 discharging the Court receiver or whether the Court Receiver continued to be in charge of the property on account of pendency of his reports before the Court and for the other reasons pointed out by the counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.2 therein.”
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interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment rd in the final judgment. In Halsbury Laws of England, 3 Edn., Vol. 32 (Lord Simond) at page 386 says :- “When a receiver is appointed for a limited time, as in the case of interim orders, his office determines on the expiration of that time without any further order of the court, and if the appointment is ‘until judgment or further order’ it is brought to an end by the judgment in the action. The judgment may provide for the continuance of the receiver, but this is regarded as a new appointment. If a further order of the court, though silent as to the receivership, is inconsistent with a continuance of the receiver, it may operate as a discharge.” JUDGMENT When a receiver has been appointed on an interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is not necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment in the final judgment. The silence of the judgment does not operate as a discharge of the receiver or determination of his powers. So also the appointment of a receiver by the judgment in an administration action need not be continued by the order, no further consideration.” 8 Page 8 th 13. In Law of Receiver, 4 Edn. by James L. High, the following observation appears at page 985:-
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14. In our view, when a Receiver is appointed pending suit or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep an account of JUDGMENT rent and profits that may be realized by the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the lis is finally decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers who are appointed comes to an end with the final decision of the case. However, even after the final decision, the Court has the discretion to take 9 Page 9 further assistance of the Receiver as and when the need arises. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellants have already put the decree in execution for recovery of
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Executing Court while executing the decree may take assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in accordance with law and not more than that. 15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, of no merit and are dismissed. JUDGMENT …………………………….J. [ M.Y. Eqbal ] …………………………….J [Kurian Joseph] New Delhi 10 Page 10 February 27, 2015 JUDGMENT 11 Page 11