Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2475-2476 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.22705-22706 of 2013)
M/s. Sherali Khan Mohamed Manekia …Appellant(s)
versus
The State of Maharashtra
and others …
Respondent(s)
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M.Y. Eqbal, J. :
Leave granted.
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2. In the instant appeals by special leave the appellant
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assailed the order dated 14 January, 2013 passed by the
learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Court
Receiver’s Report No.25 of 2007 and Additional Report No.
383 of 2012, whereby the High Court while disposing of the
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Report of the Court Receiver held that after the disposal of
First Appeal No. 767 of 1998 and dismissal of the special
leave petition, the Receiver deemed to have been
discharged.
3. It appears that the suit property was declared as
evacuee property and the same was purchased by the
appellant in an auction sale as far back as on 15.6.1964. In
the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit being Civil Suit No.
37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court seeking
specific performance of the sale of the property and
possession and interim relief of injunction restraining the
defendants therein from carrying on further construction on
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the suit property. The appellant further made a prayer for
appointment of Receiver.
4. The trial court rejected the prayer for appointment of
Receiver by order dated 3.5.1980 and against that, appellant
moved the High Court in First Appeal, which was finally
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heard and order dated 22.7.1980 was passed appointing the
Court Receiver. The High Court while making appointment
of the Receiver directed to take possession of the suit
| ersons w | ho were |
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any part of the suit property were continued to remain in
possession. The Receiver was directed to collect rent and
compensation as the case may be from all the persons in
actual possession after verifying from them their present
right to remain in possession. The High Court further
directed that the Receiver should take suitable direction
from the court if he was presented with any particular
difficulty.
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5. Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed of on
4.2.1998. While disposing the suit, the trial court gave
liberty to the plaintiff-appellant to move the High Court for
directions for taking possession of the suit property from the
Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court.
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6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court,
First Appeal was filed being F.A. No.767 of 1988, which was
finally heard and dismissed by the High Court vide judgment
| The sp | ecial lea |
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the judgment of the High Court was also dismissed on
19.2.2007.
7. It further reveals from the record that the Court
Receiver so appointed submitted Report No.25/2007 before
the High Court seeking directions with regard to the
encroachment on the suit property and handing over
possession to the appellant. The Court Receiver also
submitted Additional Report No.383 of 2012. The High Court
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after taking into consideration these Court Receiver’s
reports, passed the impugned order holding that the receiver
shall be deemed to have been discharged after the dismissal
of the first appeal by the High Court, followed by dismissal of
the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court.
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8. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Shyam Divan,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
submitted that even after the disposal of the appeal,
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Court Receiver continues in his office till he is discharged
and fulfills all the incidental obligations that are cast upon
him by virtue of his appointment and till he renders account
to the Commissioner of Accounts.
9. The short question, therefore, that falls for
consideration is as to whether after the disposal of the
appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether he
continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed by
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the Court?
10. The High Court in the impugned order observed:
“The directions cannot be issued only on
assumption that this Court was monitoring the
matter for all these years irrespective of disposal of
the Appeal from Order. That may be the
understanding of parties, but before me nothing has
been placed which would enable me to hold that
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| ence and<br>iver or hi<br>. The Cou | meeting<br>s represe<br>rt Receive |
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To my mind these are thoroughly misconceived
proceedings and the remedy of the Plaintiffs/Decree
Holders lies elsewhere. They cannot insist on the
Court passing orders only because of continued
correspondence and meetings with the Court
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| re they ca<br>t, insist o<br>iver. Equ | nnot in th<br>n directio<br>ally, the |
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11. In paragraph 49 of the order the High Court noted the
following:-
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“Therefore, the record of that case was perused by
the learned judge in its entirety and he found that
the order was passed discharging the Court receiver
on 26.11.1992 and at the same time continuing him
for certain period to enable parties to file the Appeal
from the said order. The Appeals were filed, but
same were dismissed by a Division Bench and the
Special Leave Petition which was filed before the
Supreme Court also came to be dismissed on
27.07.1993. The issue was whether the Court
Receiver became functus officio right from the date
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when the order was passed on 26.11.1992
discharging the Court receiver or whether the Court
Receiver continued to be in charge of the property on
account of pendency of his reports before the Court
and for the other reasons pointed out by the counsel
for the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.2 therein.”
| en a | Receiver |
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interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is
necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment
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in the final judgment. In Halsbury Laws of England, 3 Edn.,
Vol. 32 (Lord Simond) at page 386 says :-
“When a receiver is appointed for a limited
time, as in the case of interim orders, his office
determines on the expiration of that time without
any further order of the court, and if the appointment
is ‘until judgment or further order’ it is brought to an
end by the judgment in the action. The judgment
may provide for the continuance of the receiver, but
this is regarded as a new appointment. If a further
order of the court, though silent as to the
receivership, is inconsistent with a continuance of
the receiver, it may operate as a discharge.”
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When a receiver has been appointed on an
interlocutory application without any limit of time, it
is not necessary to provide for the continuance of his
appointment in the final judgment. The silence of
the judgment does not operate as a discharge of the
receiver or determination of his powers. So also the
appointment of a receiver by the judgment in an
administration action need not be continued by the
order, no further consideration.”
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13. In Law of Receiver, 4 Edn. by James L. High, the
following observation appears at page 985:-
| And w<br>nt was ma | hen the<br>de is afte |
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14. In our view, when a Receiver is appointed pending suit
or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the property by
taking possession or otherwise and to keep an account of
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rent and profits that may be realized by the Receiver and to
submit it before the court till the lis is finally decided.
Ordinarily the function of receivers who are appointed comes
to an end with the final decision of the case. However, even
after the final decision, the Court has the discretion to take
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further assistance of the Receiver as and when the need
arises. In the instant case, admittedly, the appellants have
already put the decree in execution for recovery of
| are, ther | efore, o |
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Executing Court while executing the decree may take
assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or
Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in
accordance with law and not more than that.
15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not
find any error in the impugned order passed by the High
Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, of no merit and are
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
…………………………….J.
[ M.Y. Eqbal ]
…………………………….J
[Kurian Joseph]
New Delhi
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February 27, 2015
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