Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 18
PETITIONER:
PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GURBAKSH SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
29/01/1962
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
SUBBARAO, K.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
CITATION:
1962 AIR 1172 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 838
CITATOR INFO :
APR 1968 SC1513 (12,14,15)
D 1974 SC 642 (8)
ACT:
Contempt of Court-Circular letter prohibiting
Government servant from seeking decision of Court
before exhausting official remedies-Proceeding on
such circular letter pending suit-It constitutes
contempt of Court-Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (32
of 1952), s. 3.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants, both public servants,
initiated departmental proceedings against the
respondent, another public servant, for having
sued the Government in the Subordinate Judge’s
Court at Amritsar for a declaration that a certain
sum of money was being illegally deducted from his
salary; the respondent brought the suit before
exhausting all his departmental remedies as
required by an official circular which directed
"that in the matter of grievances arising out of a
Government Servant’s employment conditions of
service the proper course is to seek redress from
the appropriate departmental and Government
authorities. Any attempt by a Government servant
to seek a decision on such issues in a Court of
law (even in cases where such a remedy is legally
admissible) without first exhausting the normal
official channels of redress can only be regarded
as contrary to official propriety and subversive
of good discipline and may well justify the
initiation of disciplinary action against the
Government servant". The respondent complained to
the High Court that the two appellants had
committed contempt of court punishable under s. 3
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, as their
action was tent amount to interfering with his
legal rights to seek redress in a court of law and
amounted to exerting pressure upon him to withdraw
the suit, thereby obstructing the judicial process
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 18
and interfering with the course of a suit pending
in a Court subordinate to the High Court, The High
Court held that the appellants were clearly guilty
of contempt but since they were merely carrying
out the instructions of the Government, the ends
of justice would be sufficiently met if they were
directed to abandon the departmental proceedings
and warned against complying with the said
instructions. It was contended on behalf of the
appellants that the circular letter, fairly
construed, did not impose any absolute ban but
merely imposed an obligation on a Government
servant to exhaust his departmental remedies
839
before taking recourse to a court of law and as
such did not constitute an interference with the
course of justice.
^
Held, (per S. K. Das and Subba Rao, JJ.),
that any conduct which interferes with or
prejudices parties litigant during the litigation
amounts to contempt of Court. The question is not
whether the action in fact interfered with but
whether it had a tendency to interfere with the
due course of justice. There was no doubt that the
proceedings initiated in the present case by the
appellants on the basis of the circular letter had
only one tendency, namely, to coerce the
respondent to withdraw the pending suit or not to
press it. The appellants must be held guilty of
contempt of court, and it would be no defence to
say that they were merely carrying out executive
directions contained in the circular letter.
The question at issue was not whether the
circular letter was valid in the abstract, but
whether the action taken against the respondent on
the basis of the circular letter at a time when
the suit was pending amounted to interference with
the due course of justice.
Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht, A. I. R.
1956 All. 160, referred to.
S. S. Roy v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1960 S.
C. 190 and Webster v. Bakewell Rural District
Council, L. R. 1916 1 Ch. 300, held inapplicable.
Per Dayal. J.-There could be no doubt that
pressure put on a party to a pending litigation to
act in a particular way would amount to contempt
of court, but the initiation of the proceedings by
the appellants revealed no such conduct. The
charge-sheet did not indicate that the
departmental proceedings were intended to put
pressure on the respondent to withdraw the suit.
The appellants who were doing their duty under the
circular letter, the validity of which was not in
question, could not be held to be guilty of
contempt of Court.
Cheriyan Joseph v. Dr. James Kalacherry,
A.I.R. 1952 Trav. Co. 75, approved.
Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S. Bisht, A.I.R.
1956 All. 160, considered.
Perera v. The King, 1951 W.N. 208, Rizwan-ul-
Hasan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R.
581 and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1169, referred to.
840
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 18
Departmental proceedings against Government
servants for acts of indiscipline are as much in
public interest as contempt proceedings and,
consequently, unless departmental action directly
affects the course of judicial proceedings it
cannot amount to contempt of Court. Whether the
departmental action would tempt the respondent to
withdraw the suit or deter other Government
servants from filing similar suits would be
considerations outside the scope of a contempt
proceeding and, therefore, irrelevant.
In re the South Shields (Thames Street)
Clearance Order, 1931, (1932) 172 L.T.J. 76,
referred to.
In re William Thomas Shipping Co. H.W. Dillon
JUDGMENT:
Thomas, (1930) 2 Ch. D. 368, distinguished.
In the instant case the departmental enquiry
against the respondent did not constitute a
parallel enquiry and tend to interfere with the
course of the litigation pending in Court and
therefore, no contempt of court had been
committed.
Saibal Kumar Gupta v. B. K. Sen, [1961] 3
S.C.R. 460, applied.
&
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeals Nos. 128 and 129 of 1959.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
November 5, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in Cr.
O. Nos. 20 and 27 of 1957.
B. K. Khanna, K. L. Hathi and P. D. Menon,
for the appellants.
Bhagat Singh Chawla and K. R. Chowdhuri, for
the respondents.
1962. January 29. The Judgment of Das and
Subba Rao JJ, was delivered by Das, J. Dayal, J.
delivered a separate Judgment.
S. K. DAS, J.-These are two appeals on
certificates granted by the Punjab High Court
under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. They
have been heard together and this judgment will
govern them both.
The appeals are from the judgment and order
of the said High Court dated November 5, 1958, by
which it found the two appellants guilty of an
841
offence punishable under s. 3 of the Contempt of
the Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952) and directed
them, by way of punishment, to abandon the
departmental proceedings which had been taken
against the respondent Gurbaksh Singh for an
alleged contravention of the instruction contained
in a circular letter dated January 25, 1953,
issued by the Chief Secretary to the Punjab
Government and warned them against complying with
the said instructions.
The relevant facts are these. Gurbaksh Singh
respondent in the two appeals, was a Forester in
the Punjab Forest Department. Pratap Singh,
appellant in Criminal Appeal no. 128 of 1959, was,
at the relevant time, Chief Conservator of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 18
Forests, Punjab. Bachan Singh, appellant in the
other appeal, was Divisional Forest Officer,
Amritsar. It appears that in the year 1950 the
respondent supplied three lacs cubic feet of
timber to the various ordnance Depots under orders
of the then Chief Conservator of Forests. In 1954,
the then Chief Conservator of Forests sent a
letter to the respondent alleging that there had
been a short supply in the timber which was sent
to the Ordnance Depot at Chhoke and that there had
been a loss of Rs. 11,366 to the Government. By an
order conveyed in a letter dated July 16, 1956,
the State Government directed the Chief
Conservator of Forests to recover ten per cent. of
the loss i.e. Rs. 1,136 and odd annas from the
respondent Gurbaksh Singh. The letter further
stated that the recovery sought to be made from
the salary of the respondent was in accordance
with the rules contained in the Punjab Civil
Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, and
that an opportunity had already been given to the
Forester to submit an explanation and the order
for recovery was made after considering his
explanation. Gurbaksh Singh then instituted a suit
in the Court of the
842
Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar for a
declaration that the order of recovery made
against him was void and without effect. The suit
was followed by a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution which was, however, dismissed by the
Punjab High Court on May 20,1957. When the summons
in the suit instituted in the Court of the Senior
Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, was served on the
State Government, the Under Secretary to the said
Government in the Forest and Animal Husbandry
Departments, sent a memorandum to the Chief
Conservator of Forests in which the attention of
the latter was drawn to a circular letter issued
by the Chief Secretary on January 25, 1953. The
letter has been quoted in extenso in the judgment
of the High Court and was in these terms :
"I am directed to say that the question
of Government servants having recourse to
Courts of law in matters arising out of their
employment or conditions of service has been
engaging the attention of Government for some
time past and it is considered necessary to
lay down that in the matter of grievances
arising out of a Government servant’s
employment or conditions of service the
proper course is to seek redress from the
appropriate departmental and Governmental
authorities. Any attempt by a Government
servant to seek a decision on such issues in
a Court of law (even in cases where such a
remedy is legally admissible) without first
exhausting the normal official channels of
redress, can only be regarded as contrary to
official propriety and subversive of good
discipline and may well justify the
initiation of disciplinary action against the
Government servant. These instructions may,
therefore, be brought to the notice of all
Government servants of your
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 18
department/office."
843
The Under Secretary said in his memorandum that as
the respondent had not exhausted the departmental
remedies open to him before going to a court of
law, he had rendered himself liable to
disciplinary action as per the instructions
contained in the circular letter. The Under
Secretary then said :
"It may please be intimated immediately
as to what action you propose to take against
him."
On receipt of this memorandum, the appellant
Pratap Singh sent a copy thereof to the
Conservator of Forests, South Circle, and directed
that the respondent should be proceeded with in
accordance with the instructions aforesaid and a
copy of the proceedings recorded and orders passed
in the case should be forwarded to him. On receipt
of the said orders, the Conservator of Forests,
South Circle, passed an office order appointing
Bachan Singh, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 129
of 1959, to hold an enquiry against the respondent
for having contravened the instructions contained
in the circular letter quoted above. Bachan Singh
then drew up a charge-sheet against the respondent
and asked him to submit an explanation in writing
within 15 days. In the charge-sheet it was stated
that the respondent had gone to a court of law
before exhausting all his departmental remedies
and this was contrary to official propriety and
subversive of good discipline. The charge-sheet
appears to have been drawn up on or about August
30, 1957. Then, on September 14,1957, the
respondent made an application to the High Court
to the effect that the two appellants had
committed contempt of court punishable under s. 3
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In that
petition the allegation made was that appellant
Pratap Singh had framed and got served a charge-
sheet on the respondent and appellant Bachan Singh
was holding an enquiry into the
844
charge, which was tantamount to interfering with
the legal rights of the respondent to seek redress
in a court of law and also amounted to exerting
pressure upon him with the intent of restraining
him from pressing his suit. This, it was stated,
amounted to an obstruction of the judicial process
and interfered with the course of justice in
respect of the suit which was pending in the court
of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, a court
subordinate to the High Court. The High Court
issued notice to the appellants and after hearing
the parties came to the conclusion that though the
appellants were clearly guilty of an offence
punishable under s. 3 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952, they were merely endeavouring to comply
with the instructions of the Government, the
legality or propriety of which they had no reason
to doubt. In that view of the matter, the High
Court expressed the view that the ends of justice
would be amply met if the two appellants were
directed to abandon the departmental proceedings
which had been taken against the respondent and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 18
furthermore, if they were warned against complying
with the instructions contained in the circular
letter issued by the State Government.
On behalf of the appellants three points have
been urged in support of the contention that they
were not guilty of the offence of contempt of
court. Firstly, it has been argued that the
petition dated September 14, 1957, by which the
respondent prayed for action against the
appellants for contempt of court, stated that the
contempt was in respect of the High Court in which
a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
had been filed. That writ petition, it is pointed
out, was dismissed on May 20 1957 and the charge-
sheet against the respondent was drawn up on
August 30, 1957, i.e., about three months after
the writ petition in the High Court had been
dismissed. The argument before us is that where
the contempt is criminal in its nature, the
845
specific offence charged should be distinctly
stated and each step in the proceedings to punish
it should be fairly, properly and strictly taken.
It is argued that the application on behalf of the
respondent a made a grievance of interference with
the due course of justice in the matter of the
writ petition filed in the High Court, but the
High Court held the appellants guilty of a
different offence, namely, of interference with
the course of justice in respect of the suit
pending in the Court of the Senior Subordinate
Judge, Amritsar.
The second point which has been taken on
behalf of the appellants is that on a fair
construction of the terms of the circular letter
on which the two appellants took action against
the respondent, it should be held that it did not
constitute an interference with the course of
justice, inasmuch as it did not impose any
absolute ban on a Government servant to have
recourse to a court of law for the redress of his
grievances arising out of his employment or
conditions of his service, but merely imposed an
obligation on a Government servant to exhaust his
departmental remedies before taking recourse to a
court of law. It has been argued that on this view
of the circular letter, the action taken by the
appellants against the respondent did not
constitute an interference with the course of
justice in respect of the suit which was pending
in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge,
Amritsar.
Thirdly, it has been contended that in any
view of the matter appellant Pratap Singh, who
took no action beyond endorsing the memorandum of
the Under Secretary was not guilty of contempt of
court.
We propose now to deal with these three
points in the order in which we have stated them.
The first point can be very shortly disposed of.
It appears that the respondent filed two petitions
on September 14, 1957, in the Punjab High Court
which gave rise to two cases nos. 20 and 27 of
1957. These two cases were heard together. In the
petition
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 18
846
which gave rise to case no. 20 of 1957, a
grievance was made of interference with the course
of justice in the High Court in respect of the
writ petition which was dismissed by the High
Court on May 20, 1957. But in the second petition
filed on the same day, which gave rise to case no.
27 of 1957, the respondent clearly stated as
follows in para. 9 of his petition :
"Previously the petitioner filed a
petition under Section 3 of the Contempt of
Courts Act in this Hon’ble Court in respect
of this very charge-sheet on the ground that
this chargesheet related to the writ petition
that had been filed by the petitioner (Civil
Writ no. 528 of 1956). Now. however, the
respondents are taking up the plea that the
charge-sheet (annexure ‘A’) is not in respect
of the writ petition filed in the High Court
but concerns the suit which has been filed by
the petitioner and which is awaiting decision
in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at
Amritsar."
It is clear, therefore, that the High Court had
before it two petitions against the appellants, in
one of which a grievance was made of interference
with the course of justice in respect of the writ
petition and in the other a grievance was made of
interference with the course of justice in respect
of the suit which was awaiting decision in the
court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar.
The respondent further stated that "by forcing and
coercing him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not
to press it" the appellants were obstructing the
course of justice and had, therefore, committed
contempt of court punishable under s. 3 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In view of these
allegations in the second petition filed on
September 14, 1957, the first point urged on
behalf of the appellants must be overruled.
We now come to the second point which is of a
more substantial nature. We have already quoted
847
the terms of the circular letter dated January 25,
1953. There was some argument before us as to
whether the said circular letter contained
executive instructions only or laid down a rule as
to a condition of service. Our attention was drawn
to some institutions or departments of Government,
where a rule in similar terms laid down as one of
the conditions of service that it is improper for
a Government servant to take recourse to a court
of law before he has exhausted the normal official
channels of redress. Learned Advocates for the
parties were, however, agreed that no rule laying
down the conditions of service of Government
servants serving in the department to which the
respondent belonged imposed an obligation similar
to that imposed by the circular letter. We have,
therefore, proceeded in this case on the footing
that the circular letter contained executive
instructions only and did not embody a rule
governing the conditions of service. Therefore we
have not thought it necessary to consider what the
position would be if such a rule were made a
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 18
condition of employment for certain Government
servants, Other considerations would then arise
such as, the authority of the rule-making power to
make such a rule, and we must make it clear that
we are expressing no opinion on those other
considerations.
Assuming that the circular letter contained
certain executive instructions what then is the
position? It should perhaps be made clear at the
very outset that the question before us is not so
much the validity of the circular letter in the
abstract, but the propriety of the action taken
against the respondent on the basis of the
circular letter at a time when his suit was
awaiting decision in the court of the Senior
Subordinate Judge at Amritsar. It must not,
however, be assumed that we are holding the
circular letter to be valid in the sense that
compliance with it will, in no circumstances,
amount to contempt of court. We do not come to any
such
848
conclusion. The argument before us is that the
circular letter did not impose an absolute ban on
a Government servant seeking redress of his
grievances arising out of his employment or
service conditions in a court of law ; it is
submitted that all that it did was to ask
Government servants to exhaust first the normal
Official channels of redress before proceeding to
a court of law. The emphasis, it is stated, is on
propriety and discipline in the conduct of a
Government servants and it has been submitted that
judged from that point of view the circular letter
cannot be said to constitute an interference with
the course of justice in any court of law.
Theoretically and in the abstract, this may be
true; and if the circular letter merely lays down
that Ordinarily a Government servant should
exhaust his departmental remedies before going to
a court of law, no objection can be taken to it.
Speaking generally, a Government servant does not
ordinarily go to court unless and until he fails
to get what he considers to be justice from the
departmental authorities. But we have to consider
in this case a somewhat different problem, namely,
the action taken against the respondent during a
pending litigation, as though going to a court of
law before exhausting departmental remedies must
in all cases be visited with punishment.
What, after all, is contempt of court? "To
speak generally, contempt of court may be said to
be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during the litigation." (Oswald’s Contempt of
Court, 3rd Edition, page 6.) We are concerned in
the present case with the second part, namely, "to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant
during the litigation". In the case under our
consideration the respondent had instituted a suit
in the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge,
Amritsar,
849
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 18
in respect of his grievance that a certain sum of
money was being illegally deducted from his
salary. On behalf of the respondent it was alleged
that he had no further departmental remedies to
exhaust, inasmuch as the order by which a part of
his salary was being deducted was a final order
made by the Punjab Government after considering
the respondent’s explanation. On behalf of the
appellants it has been contended that the
respondent had still a further remedy by way of an
appeal to the Governor. That is a matter with
which we are not really concerned, as it relates
to the question whether the respondent had or had
not violated the terms of the circular letter. We
are concerned with the action that was taken
against the respondent on the footing, right or
wrong, that he had violated the instructions. Of
the circular letter. His suit was pending in the
court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar.
When the summons in the suit was served on the
Government, the Under Secretary to Government,
drew the attention of one of the appellants to the
circular letter and asked the latter to intimate
to Government what action he proposed to take
against the respondent. Appellant Pratap Singh
then forwarded the memorandum of the Under
Secretary to the Conservator of Forests, South
Circle, and in his forwarding endorsement Pratap
Singh directed that the respondent should be
proceeded with in accordance with the instructions
in the circular letter and that a copy of the
proceedings recorded and orders passed should be
forwarded to him. It appears, therefore, that
appellant Partap Singh was not merely content with
forwarding the memorandum of the Under Secretary.
He directed his subordinate officer to take action
against the respondent. In accordance with that
direction a proceeding was drawn up against the
respondent and the appellant Bachan Singh was
asked to enquire into it. The appellant Bachan
Singh then drew up a
850
charge-sheet and in that charge-sheet it was
stated that the respondent had gone to a court of
law before exhausting all his departmental
remedies. What would be the effect of these
proceedings on the suit which was pending in the
court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar ?
From the practical point of view, the institution
of the proceedings at a time when the suit in the
court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar,
was pending could only be to put pressure on the
respondent to withdraw his suit, or face the
consequences of disciplinary action. This, in our
opinion, undoubtedly amounted to contempt of
court. There are many ways of obstructing the
Court and "any conduct by which the course of
justice is perverted, either by a party or a
stranger, is a contempt; thus the use of threats,
by letter or otherwise, to a party while his suit
is pending; or abusing a party in letters to
persons likely to be witnesses in the cause, have
been held to be contempts". (Oswald’s Contempt of
Court, 3rd Edition, page 87). The question is not
whether the action in fact interfered, but whether
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 18
it had a tendency to interfere with the due course
of justice. The action taken in this case against
the respondent by way of a proceeding against him
can, in our opinion, have only one tendency,
namely, the tendency to coerce the respondent and
force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not
press it. If that be the clear and unmistakable
tendency of the proceedings taken against the
respondent, then there can be no doubt that in law
the appellants have been guilty of contempt of
court, even though they were merely carrying out
the instructions contained in the circular letter.
We have been referred to a large number of
decisions dealing with various aspects of contempt
of court. We consider it unnecessary to refer to
them all, because it is clear to us that any
conduct which interferes with or prejudices
parties litigant
851
during the litigation is undoubtedly contempt of
court. There is, however, one decision which is
very much in point and to which we must refer. In
Shankar Lal Sharma v. M. S Bisht (1) in very
similar circumstances it was held by the Allahabad
High Court that if any kind of threat or any
action which may amount to a threat is held out to
a person who approached the Civil Courts for a
redress of his grievances, with a view to induce
him to forego the assistance of the Civil Courts
the action amounts to a contempt of court. In that
case also an employee of the Public Works
Department of Uttar Pradesh moved the High Court
for the grant of a writ. While the writ petition
was pending in the High Courts the Chief Engineer.
P.W.D., U.P., purporting to act in accordance with
certain directions contained in a circular letter
asked for an explanation from the employee as to
why he has submitted a writ application to the
High Court. The learned Judges expressed the view
that there was no doubt that the action taken by
the Chief Engineer in accordance with the
instructions contained in the circular letter
amounted to a threat with a view to induce the
employee to forego the assistance of the Civil
Courts. An unqualified apology having been
tendered in the case, no further action was taken.
On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed on
the decision of this Court in S. S. Roy v. State
of Orissa(2). That was a case in which a First
Class Magistrate misconceiving his powers and
exercising a jurisdiction act vested in him by law
and without any justifying circumstances made an
order under s. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, by
which a Civil Court peon was restrained from
executing a warrant of arrest issued by an
Additional Munsif in connection with the execution
of a money decree: the Magistrate was not
influenced by any extraneous consideration or
dishonest motive in making the
852
order and it was held that the Magistrate was not
guilty of contempt of the Court of the Additional
Munsif, because there was nothing to suggest any
wilful culpability on his part. We are unable to
agree with the learned Advocate for the Appellants
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 18
that the principle of that decision should apply
to the present case. The appellants in the instant
case were not judicial officers who misconceived
their powers. They were no doubt carrying out
executive instructions given by their employer,
but they carried out those instructions at a time
when a civil suit was pending and they carried out
the instructions in such a manner as to exert
pressure on the respondent to withdraw the suif.
That in the finding at which the high Court
arrived and on that finding the appellants were
clearly guilty of contempt of court. The decision
in Webster v. Bakewell Rural District Council (1)
on which also learned Advocate for the appellants
relied is not in point. That was case in which the
yearly tenant of a cottage and land, adjoining a
highway and farming part of a settled estate
issued a writ against the local authority for an
injunction to restrain an alleged trespass on his
land; the solicitor of the tenant for life wrote
to the local authority with a view to arrange the
matter and at the same time wrote to the tenant
that the tenant for life required him to withdraw
the writ, and that, if he did not comply, his
tenancy would be determined. It was heldthat the
solicitor had not committed a conr tempt of court.
The decision proceeded on thefootings that the
tenant for life had the right to turn out the
yearly tenant and there was nothing to prevent the
tenant for life, who was the landlord, from
exercising his legal rights if he did so honestly
to protect the rights he had in the property.
"We have, therefore, come to the conclusion
that the appellants were guilty of contempt of the
853
Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar
and in awarding the sentence the High Court
correctly took into consideration the circumstance
that the appellants were merely carrying out the
instructions contained in the circular letter.
Though that circumstance does not afford a defence
to the charge, it is undoubtedly a consideration
relevant to the sentence.
As to the third point that appellant Pratap
Singh took no action beyond endorsing the
memorandum of the Under Secretary, we have already
dealt with it and pointed out that he not merely
endorsed the memorandum of the Under Secretary but
directed the Conservator of Forests, South Circle,
to institute a proceeding against the respondent
for having contravened the instructions contained
in the circular letter.
This disposes of all the points urged on
behalf of the appellants. In our opinion, there
are no grounds for interference with the judgment
and order of the High Court dated November 5,
1958. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J,-I have held the advantage
of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, S.
K. Das, J., but regret my inability to agree that
the appellants are guilty of contempt of Court.
The facts leading to the conviction of the
appellants in the two appeals, have been fully
mentioned in the majority judgment and I need not
repeat them here. For the purpose of these cases,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 18
I assume the validity of the Circular issued by
the Government in 1953. That has not been
challenged by the opposite party. If an employee
acts against the directions contained in the
Circular, it is just and proper that action be
taken. If action is taken and that be considered
per se to amount to the commission of contempt of
Court, the directions in the Circular can be
disobeyed with impugnity and
854
the Circular, though valid, would remain a dead
letter. It would then be incongruent to hold that
any action taken in pursuance of it would per se
amount to contempt of the Court to which the
Government servant had gone for adjudication.
There is nothing in the charge-sheet framed
against the appellants by Bachan Singh, Divisional
Forest officer, which can amount to contempt of
Court. The Charge relates to misconduct and
indiscipline. The evidence in support of the
charge is mentioned in the charge sheet to be that
Gurbaksh Singh had gone to the Court of law before
exhausting all the souroes as ordered in the
Circular and which was contrary to official
propriety and that thereby he had rendered himself
liable to disciplinary action. There was nothing
in the description of the charge or in the
description of the evidence in support of it,
which, in any way, referred to the merits of the
case or directed Gurbaksh Singh to do, in
connection with that case. For the purposes of the
charge laid against him, the merits of the civil
case were irrelevant. The charge was with respect
to misconduct and indiscipline which exnsisted
simply in his going to Court without exhausting
all the normal official channels of redress.
Gurbaksh Singh had simply to point out that he had
exhausted all the official channels open to him
and that therefore, he had not acted in
contravention of the directions given in the
Circular.
The charge-sheet did not, in any way,
threaten Gurbaksh Singh with any consequences in
view of his continuing his suit. His continuing
the suit will not be in contravention of the
Circular and therefore, will not be misconduct or
indiscipline on account of his contravening the
directions of the Circular. I am unable,
therefore, to conclude from the Departmental
charge-sheet against Gurbaksh Singh during the
pendency of his suit in Court that the
Departmental proceedings were in
855
order to put pressure on him to withdraw his suit
or face the consequences of disciplinary action.
Even if Gurbaksh Singh does not withdraw the suit,
the basis of the charge against him would stand
and he will have to meet it. There is no
indication in the charge-sheet, or in any other
circumstance, that in case he withdraws the suit
the charge would be dropped. He committed the act
of indiscipline and he has to answer for it if the
Department considers it expedient to take
Departmental action.
I do not dispute the legal proposition that
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 18
if any pressure is put on a party in order to make
him act in a particular manner with respect to
pending litigation, that would amount to contempt
of the Court in which the matter be pending. I
however fail to see any such conduct on the part
of the appellants in the action taken by them
against Gurbaksh Singh.
Reference may now be made to certain cases
having a bearing on the question before us for
determination.
The cases reported as Hrishikesh Sanyal v. A.
P. Bagchi (1) and Radhey Lal v. Niranjan Nath (2)
hold that a person does not commit contempt of
Court if during the pendency of a certain
proceeding he takes recourse to other judicial
proceedings open to him, even though the latter
proceedings put the other party to loss, because
everybody is entitled to take recourse to law.
It was held in Baldeo Sahai v. Shiva Datt (3)
that the plaintiff’s son’s serving a notice on the
defendant telling him that either he should pay
damages for a defamatory statement about him in
the written statement within a certain time or he
would bring action against him for defamation, did
not constitute contempt of Court.
In Kamta Prasad v. Ram Agyan (4) it was held
that a party cannot be said to be interfering with
856
the course of justice and to be guilty of contempt
of Court when he makes an offer for the settlement
of the dispute between the parties out of Court
and, as part of the settlement, suggests that the
pending litigation should be withdrawn and,
failing it, threatens to take legal proceedings
open to him under the law. Reliance was placed for
this view on the decision in Webster v. Bakewell
Rural District Council (1).
The principle behind all these cases is that
such action of the person which he takes in
pursuance of his right to take legal action in a
Court of law or in just making a demand on the
other to make amends for his acts will not amount
to interfering with the course of justice, even
though that may require some action on the part of
the other party in connection with his own
judicial proceeding, as a party is free to take
action to enforce his legal rights.
The case reported as Shankar Lal Sharma v. M.
S. Bisht(2) does go against the appellants. I
however do not agree with the conclusion in that
case that the calling for an explanation from the
employee as to why he had submitted a writ
application in the High Court, in contravention of
certain directions contained in the Government
Circular of 1952, was an attempt to hold out a
threat of Departmental action against him in order
to induce him to withdraw the application he had
presented for the protection of his rights under
the Constitution.
On the other hand, in the case reported as
Cheriyan Joseph v. Dr. James (3), a different view
was expressed. The plaintiff instituted a suit for
a declaration that a certain resolution was not
binding upon the church or the parish in which he
resided and for a permanent injunction to restrain
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 18
857
the defendants from acting in pursuance of that
resolution. The Vicar of that church was one of
the defendants. The Bishop’s letter to the
plaintiff contained a threat to excommunicate him
and to claim damages from him in case he did not
withdraw his suit forthwith. The plaintiff was
subsequently excommunicated. Thereafter, he
applied for contempt of Court proceedings against
the Bishop and the Vicar, alleging that the letter
and the excommunication were calculated to
interfere and obstruct the course of justice, as
their object was to cow him down into submission
and to compel him under the threat of
excommunication to abandon the suit which he had
filed and which he was entitled to prosecute. In
considering the question, it was observed:
"On the other hand the contents of the
letter indicate that it was conceived by
respondent 1 (the Bishop) and that he was
acting in the exercise of his legitimate
right of safeguarding the interests of the
church. We are not prepared to assume as the
petitioner’s learned counsel wants us to
assume that respondent 2 (the Vicar) was
responsible for the despatch of this letter.
He was legally bound to obey the commands of
his Bishop and all that he did was to comply
with the direction given to him by the Bishop
in as innocuous a manner as possible.
Therefore, in our judgment, respondent 2
cannot be taken to task for obeying an order
sent to him by respondent 1."
On the question of the letter amounting to
contempt of Court, it was said at the end of the
same page:
"The facts seem to us to be more similar
to the case reported as Webster v. Bakewell
Rural District Council (L.R. 1916 1 Ch. 300).
There
858
it was held that the threat to assert one’s
legal rights against another if he chose to
continue in action started by him, would not
amount to contempt. In the present case also
the threat held out by respondent 1 was that
the petitioner had already incurred a censure
by the church and that if he persisted in
asserting his rights in the suit filed by him
in the Court of the District Munsif of
Alleppy, respondent I would exercise the
lawful right of excommunicating the
petitioner for the wrongful act done by him."
The Vicar was not held guilty of contempt of
Court. I think in this case the Judges took a
correct view of thee matter.
The case before us is a still stronger case
for holding that no contempt of Court took place
since the action taken against Gurbaksh Singh did
not ask him to withdraw the suit he had
instituted.
The observations of the Privy Council in
Perea v. The King(1) lead to the same conclusion.
Mr. Perera, a member of the House of
Representatives of Ceylon and is such a Visitor of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 18
the Jail, made certain remarks in the Visitor’s
Book, which were considered to amount to contempt
of court by the Supreme Court of Ceylon. On
appeal, the Privy Council said.
"Their Lordships are satisfied that the
order against the appellant ought not to have
been made... But Mr. Perera, too, has rights
that must be respected, and their Lordships
are unable to find any thing in his conduct
that comes within the definition of contempt
of court. That phrase has not lacked
authoritative interpretation. There must be
involved some ’act done’ or writing published
calculated to bring a court or a Judge of the
859
court into contempt or to lower his
authority’; or some thing ’calculated to
obstruct or interfere with the due course of
justice or the lawful process of the court’:
See, Reg. v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36.
What has been done here is not at all
that kind of thing. Mr. Perera was acting in
good faith and in discharge of what he
believed to be his duty as a member of the
legislature. His information was inaccurate,
but he made no public use of it, contenting
himself with entering his comment in the
appropriate instrument, the visitors’ book,
and writing to the responsible Minister. The
words that he used made no direct reference
to the Court, or to any judge of the court,
or, indeed, to the course of justice, or to
the process of the courts.... Finally his
criticism was honest criticism on a matter of
public importance. When these and no other
are the circumstances that attend the action
complained of there cannot be contempt of
court."
It can be said in the present case that the
appellants acted in good faith and in discharge of
what they believed to be their duty as officers of
Government to comply with the directions given in
the Circular to which attention had been drawn by
the Under Secretary to the Government, by his
letter enquiring what action was proposed to be
taken against Gurbaksh Singh. The action taken was
on the departmental basis. No publicity was given
to it. The words used in the charge made no
reference to the merits of the case, to the judge
or the Court or to the course of justice or to the
process of the Courts. The action was taken in the
interest of discipline of the services and
therefore in public interest.
860
In Rizwan-ul-Hasan v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh(1) this Court said.
"As observed by Rankin C.J., in
Anantalal Singha v. Alfred Henry Watson
(I.L.R. 58 Cal. 884, 895), the jurisdiction
in contempt is not to be invoked unless there
is real prejudice which can be regarded as a
substantial interference with the due course
of justice and that the purpose of the
court’s action is a practical purpose and it
is reasonably clear on the authorities that
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 18
the court will not exercise its jurisdiction
upon a mere question of propriety."
It follows that even if the action of the
appellants be considered to be improper, that will
not justify holding them guilty of contempt of
Court when their action in no way prejudiced the
trial of the suit.
In Bradima Prakash Sharma v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh(2), it was stated:
"It would be only repeating what has
been said so often by various judges that the
object of contempt proceedings is not to
afford protection to judges personally from
imputations to which they may be exposed as
individuals; it is intended to be a
protection to the public whose interests
would be very much affected if by the act or
conduct of any party, the authority of the
court is lowered and the sense of confidence
which people have in the administration of
justice by it is weakened."
Contempt of Court proceedings are in public
interest and so are Departmental proceedings
against Government employees for any act of
indiscipline committed by them. It is therefore
only when the Departmental action directly affects
the course of the judicial proceeding that it can
861
amount to interfering with the course of justice
and consequently, to contempt of Court. If it does
not do so, there can be no case of contempt of
Court.
In Re the South Shields (Thames Street)
Clearance Order, 1931(1) certain articles were
published suggesting that the appellants by their
appeal were keeping the tenants out of the new
houses, that they were hindering the progress of
housing in the borough and causing the corporation
to lose the rent of the new houses. It was argued
that the articles constituted contempt not as
affecting the mind of the Court that would hear
the appeal, but as tending to deter the appellants
and other from coming to the Court and presenting
their appeal and that the articles were thus
calculated to affect the course of justice. It was
held that the rule ought not to be granted as the
issue of the writ of attachment in the case would
be an extension of the jurisdiction of the court
on contempt beyond anything that could justify it.
It is to be noticed that in that case nothing was
said on the merits of the matter for consideration
in the appeal, though reference was made to the
adverse results of the pendency of the appeal on
the tenants, the corporation and the progress of
housing and it was said that in view of the
publicity of such contemplated adverse effects,
the appellants and other persons might be deterred
from taking similar matters to Court and therefore
those articles cause obstruction to the course of
justice. Such a contention was not accepted, as it
would be extending the jurisdiction of the Court
in matters of contempt. Such a possibility of a
certain act with respect to the conduct of a party
or a few persons interested in similar cause in
future was held not to amount to contempt of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 18
Court.
I have already stated that no threat is held
out to Gurbaksh Singh in the contents of the
charge-sheet with respect to withdrawing or not
862
withdrawing the suit. Any consideration that to
avoid Departmental action he be tempted to
withdraw the suit or that other Government
servants would be deterred from instituting
similar suits, will be beyond the scope of
considerations for the determination of the
question whether the appellants committed contempt
of Court or not.
In In re The William Thomas Shipping Co. H.
W. Dillon & Sons. Ltd. v. The Company, In re Sir
Robert Thomas (1) it was said:
"I think that to publish injurious
misrepresentations directed against a party
to the action, especially when they are
holding up that party to hatred or contempt,
is liable to affect the course of justice,
because it may in the case of a plaintiff,
cause him to discontinue the action from fear
of public dislike, or it may cause the
defendant to come to a compromise which he
otherwise would not come to, for a like
reason."
This would make publication of injurious
misrepresentations against a party to an action,
contempt of Court, if they had a tendency to cause
that party to come to a compromise which he
otherwise would not come to. The facts of the
present case do not in any way correspond to this
case even if on his own, Gurbaksh Singh, to avoid
Departmental action, discontinues the suit, as the
action taken does not in any way make such
injurious misrepresentation of the party, if any,
as would hold him up to hatred or contempt.
Lastly, I may refer to the judgment of this
Court in Saibal Kamar Gupta v. B. K. Sen (2).
Proceeding in revision against the Sessions
Judge’s orderfor further enquiry on a complaint
filed by one Bimala Kanta Rov Choudhury against B.
K. Sen, under s. 497, I. P. C., were pending in
the
863
High Court. B. K. Sen held the office of
Commissioner of the Calcutta Corporation. The
Corporation appointed a Special Committee of three
Councillors to enquire into the allegations
levelled against certain officials, including B.
K. Sen, of the Corporation, who were alleged to
have been taking advantage of their office in
carrying on business in their own names. The
Special Committee issued a questionnaire to B. K.
Sen. Some of the questions related to his giving
appointments to certain persons who were related
to certain witnesses in the case, his giving
appointments to certain persons and condoning the
punishment previously inflicted on one person, as
they were helping him in continuing the defence in
that case and to his being instrumental in
securing the appointment of another probable
prosecution witness. The High Court considered
this action of the Special Committee to amount to
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 18
gross contempt of Court and convicted the members
of the Special Committee for it. On appeal to this
Court, the order was set aside. This Court said in
the majority judgment.
"The record does not establish that at
any time the appellant had made comments on
the case under s. 497, Indian Penal Code,
pending against B. K. Sen or in respect of
any matter pending in connection with that
case in the Calcutta High Court....The
questionnaire nowhere suggested that B. K.
Sen had made these appointments in order to
suborn prosecution witnesses in that case or
that he had made the appointments with a view
to preventing Bimala Kanta Roy Choudhury from
producing witnesses to prove his case against
B. K. Sen....The Special Committee had
embarked upon an enquiry on the directions of
the Corporation in order to discover
malpractice on the part of the Corporation’s
servants. Malpractices of the
864
part of a servant of the Corporation would
presumably include making unworthy
appointments. The ascertainment of the motive
for the appointment would be merely
incidental to the main purpose of the
enquiry. It would be difficult to conclude
therefrom that the Special Committee were
holding a parallel enquiry on matters pending
decision by a court of law and that thereby
their action tended to interfere with the
course of justice."
The same, with greater emphasis, can be said in
the present case. The Departmental enquiry against
Gurbaksh Singh did not tend to interfere with the
course of justice. Bachan Singh, appellant, was
conducting the enquiry under the orders of Pratap
Singh. Pratap Singh directed the enquiry under
orders from Government. Neither of them would
commit contempt of Court in discharging his duty.
I am therefore of opinion that the facts of
the case do not make out that the appellants, by
their alleged conduct, committed contempt of
Court. I would therefore allow their appeals.
BY COURT: In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, these appeals are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
865