Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
NARESH CHANDRA GANGULI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS(and connected petition)
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/05/1959
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
KAPUR, J.L.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION:
1959 AIR 1335 1960 SCR (1) 412
ACT:
Preventive Detention--Object and ground of such detention-
Distinction--Ground Meaning of--Copy of order to be served
on detenu-Contents-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (4 Of
1950), ss . 3,7.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Pre-
ventive Detention Act, 1950. The copy of the grounds of the
order of detention served on him stated that he was detained
as he had been acting in a way prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars
stated in its four paragraphs. Paragraph 1 stated, inter
alia, that the appellant had, in a meeting of the refugees
vilified the Prime Minister of India for his unsympathetic
attitude towards the sufferings of the refugees and gave
expression to violent feelings regarding his person while
referring to the recent Nehru-Noon Pact; paragraph 2 stated
that he called upon the members of his party to build up a
strong movement against the implementation of the pact and
tried to rouse passion by alleging the Prime Minister had no
sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated that at another
meeting he denounced the pact and stressed the need of
forming a militia with the youths of the country for the
safety of the people living in border areas and paragraph 4,
that he intended -to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned,
and was likely to instigate plans endangering the personal
safety of the Prime Minister. The High Court, on an
application under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, while
upholding the order of detention, held that the said
paragraphs were really not the grounds of detention but
merely pieces of evidence on which the only ground of
detention, namely, acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, was based, that paragraph 4 was
merely an inference of fact having a bearing on the ground
of detention. It was contended, inter alia, on appeal that
paragraph 4 was extremely vague and devoid of particulars,
and that the allegations made had no rational connection
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with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act and so he was
deprived of his right to make an effective representation.
All this was, however, denied on behalf of the State.
Held, that the High Court had overlooked the difference
between the objects of detention specified in cls. (a) and
(b) of s. 3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts which
constitute the grounds envisaged by S. 7 of the Act.
412
Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, read
together, contemplate that the copy of the order passed by
the detaining authority under S. 3(2) Of the Act to be
served on the detenu should contain, (1) a preamble reciting
in terms one or more of the sub-clauses of cls. (a) and (b)
of s. 3(1) as its object or objects, (2) the grounds
contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which
led to the passing of the order of detention, informing the
detenu as to why he was detained, and (3) particulars, if
and where necessary, but not those referred to in sub-ss.
(3) and (4) Of s. 3 of the Act.
In the instant case, however, the error of confusion made by
the High Court could not invalidate its order since the
grounds of detention, characterised by the High Court as
recitals of fact, read together, were in no way ambiguous,
indefinite or irrelevant to the object of the detention,
namely, the maintenance of public order and did not deprive
the detenu of his right of representation.
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhay Vaidya [1951] S.C.R.
167, considered.
Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu Kashmir. [1956]
S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 59
of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the January 8,
1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Misc. Case No.
126 of 1958.
AND
PETITION No. 51 OF 1959.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant
and petitioner.
B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for the respondents.
1959. May 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SINHA J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fitness granted
by the Calcutta High Court, is directed against the order of
that Court, dated January, 8, 1959, in Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 126 of 1958, refusing to issue a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus in respect of one Ram Prasad
Das (who will hereinafter be referred to as ’the
petitioner’). This Court, by an order
413
dated April 20, 1959, directed that the application of the
petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution, for a similar
writ in respect of the same person, be posted for hearing
immediately after the aforesaid criminal appeal, and that it
shall not be necessary that the petitioner be produced
before this Court at the time of the hearing of the writ
petition. Hence, both the matters, relating as they do, to
the same subject-matter, have been heard together and will
be disposed of by this judgment.
It appears that Naresh Chandra Ganguli, an advocate,
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practising in the Calcutta High Court, made an application
under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as
a friend, on behalf on the petitioner, in detention in the
Dum Dum Central Jail in 24 Parganas, under the orders of the
Government of West Bengal. The application was made to the
Calcutta High Court on the following allegations: The peti-
tioner is the Secretary of the West Bengal Committee of the
Bharatiya Jana Sangha, one of the four big political
parties, as recognized by the Election Commission of India.
On or about October 7, 1958, towards evening, when the
petitioner was coming out of the Basanta Cabin, a tea stall,
at the crossing of the College Street and Surya Sen Street,
after having addressed a meeting at the College Square, he
was stopped on the street by the police and was taken to the
office of the Special Branch (Police) on Lord Sinha Road.
From there, he was sent to the Dum Dum Central Jail, where
he was served with an order. being Order No. 83 dated
October 7, 1958, purporting to have been made by the
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, under the provisions of
the Preventive Detention Act (No. IV, of 1950) (hereinafter
referred to as ’the Act’). The order is in these terms:-
" ORDER Dated 7-10-58.
No. 83.
Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as
Sri Ram Prasad ]-)as, son of late Bepin Behari Das of
Village P-S-P Dist. and of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta
that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner
prejudicial
414
to the maintenance of Public Order it is
necessary so to do.
Now therefore in exercise of the Powers
conferred by Section 3(2) of the Preventive
Detention Act 1950 (IV of 1950) 1 made this
order directing that the said Sri Ram Prasad
Das be detained.
Given under my hand and seal of office.
Sd/- Illegible,
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta."
On or about October 8, 1958, the petitioner was served, in
the Dum Dum Central Jail, with a further order, being Order
No. 85 dated October 8, 1958, which is as follows:
" Government of West Bengal.
Office of the Commissioner of Police,
Calcutta.
Dated 8-10-58.
No. 85.
Grounds for detention under clause (ii) of
clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of
1950).
To
Sri Rain Prasad Das S/O Bepin Behari Das, of
6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.
You are being detained in pursuance of a
detention order made in exercise of power
conferred by Section 3(2) (c) of the P.D. Act
1950 (Act IV of 1950) on the ground that you
are acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, as evidenced by
the particulars given below:-
1.That on 13-9-58 you attended a meeting of
Eastern Indian Refugee Council held at the
Refugee office at’ 6 Murlidhar Sen Lane and
vilified Prime Minister of India for his
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allegedly turning a deaf ear to the untold
miseries of the refugees and while referring
to the recent agreement between the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan you vented
feelings of violence against the Prime
Minister of India by emphasising that in order
to save the refugees and the territories of
the Indian Union, Sri Nehru should be
murdered, if necessary and so the need of
another Nathuram Godse was felt now.
415
2. That in course of discussion with
members of your party on 17-9-58 at 6,
Murlidhar Sen Lane, you stated that the Indian
Prime Minister had made a Present of certain
Indian enclaves to Pakistan in pursuance of
the policy of appeasement which has been
initiated by the Late Mahatma Gandhi and
called upon the members to build uP strong
movement against the implementation of Nehru-
Noon Pact. You also tried to. rouse passions
by alleging that the Indian Prime Minister had
no sympathy for West Bengal.
3. That on 26-9-58 you attended another
meeting of the South Durtolla Branch of the
Jana Sangha at Jatin Mitter Park, where you
denounced the aforesaid agreement between the
two Prime Ministers and stressed the need of
forming a militia with the youths of the
country for the safety of the people living in
border areas and urged all to enrol themselves
for the said purpose.
4. That you intend to proceed to Delhi on
9-10-58 and that you are likely to instigate
plans which may adversely affect the personal
security of the Prime Minister of India.
Your action above is bound to result in the
maintenance of public order being
prejudicially affected.
You are hereby informed that you may make a
representation to the State Government against
the detention order and that such
representation should be addressed to the
Assistant Secy. Home (Special) Department,
Government of West Bengal, and forwarded
through the Supt. of the Jail in which you are
detained as early as possible.
You are also informed that u/s 10 of the P.D.
Act 1950 (IV of 1950) the Advisory Board
shall, if you desire to be heard hear you in
person and that if you desire to be so heard
by the Advisory Board you should intimate such
desire in- your representation to the State
Government.
Sd/- Illegible,
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta,"
416
On or about October 11, 1958, the petitioner
was served with another order which is in
these terms:
" Government of West Bengal.
Home Department, Special Section.
Order
Calcutta, 11-10-58.
No. 1882 H. S.
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In exercise of the power conferred by Section
3(2) of the Preventive Detention -Act, 1950
(IV of 1950), the Governor is pleased to
approve order No. 83 dated the 7-10-58 made
under Section 3(2) of the said Act by the
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta directing
that Sri Ram Prasad Das son of Late Bepin
Behari Das of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta
be detained.
By order of the Governor.
Sd/- Illegible,
Dy. Secty. to the Govt. of West Bengal."
The petitioner made a representation in writing against the
order of detention aforesaid, denying and refuting the
grounds of his detention, set out above. He particularly
denied the allegation contained in ground No. 1 aforesaid,
as totally false, and stated that there was no meeting, as
alleged, on September 13, 1958, and that he had not made any
speech attributed to him in the said ground. He also denied
that he had advocated in any meeting for the formation of a
militia, as alleged. But he claimed that he had a right to
express his views about the policy of the Government or the
Prime Minister, relating to Pakistan and/ or about Nehru-
Noon Pact or similar other Agreements. He denied that he
indulged in any violent speeches, or that he tried to rouse
passions. His further contention was that the ground No. 4
was extremely vague in the absence of any particulars about
how, where and when and in what manner, he was likely to
instigate any plan which was to adversely affect the
personal security of the Prime Minister of India, and the
nature or particulars of any such contemplated plan.
In his application to the High Court, the petitioner also
submitted that the grounds supplied to him, had
417
no rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3
of the Act, and that, therefore, he was deprived of his
right to make an effective representation. He also alleged
that he was a member of a political party opposed to the
party in power, and held definitely pronounced views about
the failure of the Government to tackle the problem of
refugees, as also about the relationship between the
Government and the State of Pakistan. He also claimed to be
a leader of the refugees, and as such, had been relentlessly
criticising the policies of the present Government. He
further asserted that the order of detention passed against
him, was a clear case of political victimisation. He
alleged further that the order of detention, on the face of
it, was malafide, and was a clear infringement of his
fundamental right to freedom of speech and association,
guaranteed by the Constitution.
On November 28, 1958, the petitioner was brought to the
Writers’ Buildings in Calcutta, and placed before the
Advisory Board as constituted under the Act. The petitioner
was heard in person by the Advisory Board on that date, and
on the next day, that is, November 29, 1958, after the
hearing by the Advisory Board, another order, being order
No. 1967 H. S., dated November 29, 1958, made by the
Governor of West Bengal, was issued, confirming the
aforesaid order of detention No. 83 dated October 7, 1958,
set out above, and continuing the petitioner’s detention
till the expiration of 12 months from the date of detention.
On those allegations, the petitioner submitted to the High
Court that the orders aforesaid, relating to his detention
in the Dum Dum Central Jail, were"’ illegal, invalid, ultra
vires, void and inoperative."
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An affidavit in opposition, on behalf of the State of West
Bengal and other opposite parties, was sworn to by the
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta-opposite party No. 3 in the
case- In the aforesaid affidavit, the deponent averrred that
he was satisfied on the records and materials placed before
him that the petitioner was a person likely to act in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and
that with a view to preventing him from doing so, it
418
was necessary to make the order of detention on the grounds
mentioned in the Order No. 85 dated October 8, 1958 (set out
above). He also averred that the orders of detention
aforesaid, together with the grounds and all other relevant
particulars, were reported by him to the Government of West
Bengal, which, after duly considering the same, duly
approved of the orders of detention. It was also stated in
the affidavit that the petitioner personally appeared before
the Advisory Board on November 28, 1958, and the Advisory
Board, upon a consideration of the records and materials
placed before it, and the representation made by the
petitioner, and after hearing the petitioner in person,
reported to the Government’ of West Bengal that in the
opinion of the Advisory Board, there was sufficient cause
for the -detention of the petitioner. The Commissioner of
Police further stated in the affidavit that he had duly
passed and signed the orders of detention after considering
the records and materials in respect of the petitioner, in
exercise of the powers conferred under the Act, bona fide
and without any malice whatsoever, on being satisfied about
the necessity of the said orders of detention. He also
stated that he denied all statements of facts to the
contrary, contained in the affidavit in support of the
petition, and he undertook to produce the original records
in the Court at the hearing. Allegations of victimisation
on political grounds, and that the order of detention was
mala fide and in infringement of the fundamental rights of
the petitioner, were specifically denied.
The matter was heard by a Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court (Guha Roy and H. K. Sen, JJ.), which, by its
order dated January 8, 1958, discharged the Rule. In the
course of its judgment, the High Court made the following
observations:-
On a reading of the order however, it is
quite clear to us that paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and
4 do not state the grounds of the order.
There is only one ground of the order and that
is that the petitioner was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
and the remaining paragraphs of the order make
it quite clear that what are stated
419
in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 constitute
different pieces of evidence by which the
authority making the order came to the
conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and therefore should be detained
under the Act."
Hence, the High Court, on a construction of s. 3 of the Act,
came to the conclusion that the grounds of detention in
respect of the petitioner, were not vague, and that the
statement in para. 4 of the detention order No. 85 dated
October 8, 1958, quoted above, was not a ground but only a
piece of evidence out of several such pieces of evidence on
which the ground of detention was based. It was further
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pointed out that para. 4 aforesaid, was not by itself a
ground of the order, but merely an inference of fact which
had some bearing on the ground of the order. The High Court
also pointed out that there was no ambiguity in the
recitals, including these in para. 4 aforesaid. In that
view of the matter, the order of detention of the petitioner
was upheld, and the Court further held that the question
whether the whole’ order was bad on the ground that one of
the grounds was too vague, did not arise in the case.
The petitioner moved the Calcutta High Court for a
certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this
Court. The Chief Justice of the High Court, delivering the
order of the Division Bench of that Court, granting the
necessary certificate, observed that the view of the High
Court that para. 4 aforesaid, was not a ground of detention
but only one of the items of evidence in support of the
ground, raised a serious question to be determined by this
Court, particularly because a view contrary to the one taken
by the High Court in the instant case, appeared to have been
taken by this Court and by the Calcutta High Court itself in
a number of decisions. That is how this appeal has come to
this Court. Besides preferring the aforesaid appeal, the
petitioner moved this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, praying for a writ in the nature of habeas
corpus, and a Constitution Bench, by its order dated April
20, 1959, directed that this appeal be posted for
420
hearing by a Constitution Bench, on May 11, 1959, on a
cyclostyled paper book, and that the filing of the petition
of appeal and the statements of cases be dispensed with.
The Court further ordered that the application under Art. 32
of the Constitution, be posted for hearing immediately after
the criminal appeal. That is how both the matters have been
placed one after the other for hearing before us.
The order under appeal takes the view that the various
grounds of detention, are stated in s. 3 (1)(a) (i) (ii)
(iii) and (b) of the Act, and that there can be no grounds
apart from those. The High Court then, on a reading of the
Order No. 85, set out above, has held that paragraphs 1, 2,
3 and 4 are not the grounds of detention, as contemplated by
s. 3 of the Act, but that they only constitute different
pieces of evidence by which the authority making the order
came to the conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which
was the only ground on which the order of detention in
question was founded. The High Court was right in its
literal construction of the order impugned in this case,
which proceeds to recite the four numbered paragraphs,
preceded by the introductory clause " as evidenced by the
particulars given below." But the case of The State of
Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1), has laid it down that
cl (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, confers two distinct
though interrelated rights on the petitioner, namely, (1)
the right to be informed of the grounds on which the order
of detention has been made, and (2) the right to be enabled,
at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation
against the order. This Court further pointed out in that
case, that the grounds which have a rational connection with
the objects mentioned in s. 3, have to be supplied. As soon
as that is done, the first condition of a valid detention is
complied with. The second condition of such a detention is
fulfilled only after the detenu has been supplied with such
information as will enable him to make a representation. If
the information supplied in order to enable a detenu
(1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
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421
to make a representation, does not contain sufficient
particulars, the detenu is entitled to ask for further
particulars which will enable him to make a representation.
Therefore, if there is an infringement of either of the two
rights, and any one of the two conditions precedent to a
valid detention, as aforesaid, has not been fulfilled, the
detenu has a right to approach this Court for a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus. In other words, the grounds for
making an order of detention, which have to be communicated
to the detenu as soon as practicable, are conclusions of
facts, and are not a complete recital of all the relevant
facts. Therefore, the grounds, that is to say, those
conclusions of facts, must be in existence when the order of
detention is made, and those conclusions of facts have to be
communicated to the detenu as soon as may be.
This Court, and naturally, the High Courts, have treated the
recitals in the orders of detention, with particular
reference to the several clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1)
(a) and (b) of the Act, as stating the object to be achieved
in making the order of detention. The order of detention
may also contain recitals of facts upon which it is based.
If the order of detention also contains the recitals of
facts upon which it is founded, no further question arises,
but if it does not contain the recitals of facts which form
the basis of the conclusions of fact, justifying the order
of detention, then, as soon as may be (now, under s. 7,
within a maximum period of five days from the date of
detention), the person detained has to be informed of those
facts which are the basic facts or the reasons on which the
order of detention has been made. Section 3 of the Act
requires the authority making an order of detention, to
state the fact of its satisfaction that it is necessary to
make the order of detention of a particular person, with a
view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial
to one or more of the objects contained in clauses and sub-
clauses of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. Section 7
requires that the person detained should be communicated the
grounds on which the order of detention has been made, so
a,-, to afford him the earliest opportunity to make a
422
representation against the order, to the appropriate
Government. The statement of facts contemplated by s. 7,
would, thus, constitute the grounds, and not the matters
contained in one or more of the clauses and sub-clauses
under s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act. Section 3 also
requires that when an order of detention has been made, the
State Government concerned has to be apprised of the order
of detention as also of the grounds on which the order of
detention has been made, together with such other
particulars as have a bearing on the order and the grounds.
And finally,, after the order has been approved by the State
Government, that Government, in its turn, has to report to
the Central Government the fact of the detention, together
with the grounds on which the order of detention had been
made; and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the
State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the
order. Thus, on a consideration of the provisions of ss. 3
and 7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenu has to
be served with a copy of the order passed by the authority
contemplated by sub-s. (2) of s. 3, containing, firstly,
recitals in terms of one or more of the subclauses of cl.
(a) and (b) of s. 3(1), which we may call the ’Preamble’,
and secondly, the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the
conclusions of fact which have led to the passing of the
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order of detention, informing the detenu as to why he was
being detained. lf the grounds do not contain all the
particulars necessary for enabling the detenu to make his
representation against the order of his detention, he may
ask for further particulars of the facts, and the authority
which passed the order of detention is expected to furnish
all that information, subject, of course, to the provisions
of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 ; that is to say, the person detained
shall not be entitled to the disclosure of such facts as the
authority making the order, considers against public
interest to disclose. Thus, the order of detention to be
served upon the person detained would usually consist of the
first two parts, namely, the preamble and the grounds, but
it may also consist of the third part, namely, the
423
particulars, if and when they are required or found to be
necessary. But it has to be noted that the particular,,
referred to in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3, would not be
identical with the particulars which we have called the
third part of the order. The State Government, as also the
Central Government, would, naturally, be placed in
possession of all the relevant facts and particulars on
which the order of detention has been passed. But those
particulars may contain such details of facts as may not be
communicated, in public interest, to the person detained.
From what has been said above, it is clear that the High
Court was in error in so far as it treated what we have
called the preamble’ as the grounds of detention
contemplated by s. 7 of the Act. But this error, as will
presently appear, has not affected the legality, propriety
or correctness of the order passed by the High Court in the
habeas corpus proceedings before it. The High Court, as
already indicated, after making those observations which we
have held to be erroneous, proceeded further to say that
there was no ambiguity in the recitals of facts, as the High
Court characterised them and which we have called the
grounds.
The contention raised before the High Court has been
repeated before us, that the grounds contained in para. 4,
are vague and indefinite, not enabling the person detained
to make his representation. It will appear from the
paragraph aforesaid that the petitioner intended to proceed
to Delhi on October 9,1958, with a view to instigating plans
against the personal security of the Prime Minister. It is
clear that the place, date and purpose of the planned
nefarious activity, have all been stated as clearly as could
be expected. But it was argued that it was also necessary
to state the details of the plan to be hatched in Delhi.
There are several answers to this contention. Paragraph 4
has reference to something which was apprehended but lay in
the womb of the future. From the nature of the fact that it
was not an event which had already happened but what was
apprehended to be in the contemplation of the detenu and his
associates, if any, no further details of the plan could
possibly be
424
disclosed. As was observed in the decision of this Court in
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1) (at pp.
184 and 185), vagueness is a -relative term. Its meaning
must vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.
What may be said to be vague in one case, may not be so in
another, and it could not be asserted as a general rule that
a ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of the
detained person can be to deny it. If the statement of
facts is capable of being clearly understood and is
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sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to make
his representation, it cannot be said that it is vague.
Further, it cannot be denied that particulars of what has
taken place, can be more definitely stated than those of
events which are yet in the offing. In the very nature of
things, the main object of the Act is to prevent persons
from doing something which comes within the purview of any
one of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3(1) of the Act.
It was next contended that some of the grounds at least are
irrelevant. This was not said of the first paragraph of the
grounds, set out above. It was said of paragraphs 2, 3 and
4 that they are irrelevant to the main object of the order
of detention, namely, the "maintenance of public order". In
our opinion, there is no substance in this contention
either. All the statements in the four paragraphs of the
grounds, which have to be read together as being parts of a
connected whole, calling upon persons to " build up strong
movement against the implementation of Nehru-Noon Pact", and
to "rouse passions by alleging that the Indian Prime
Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal", cannot be said to
be wholly unconnected with the maintenance of public order.
Similarly, denouncing the agreement between the two Prime
Ministers and stressing the need of forming a militia with
the youths of the country, cannot be said to have no
repercussions on the maintenance of public order. And
lastly, any instigation against the personal safety of the
Prime Minister of India cannot but have a deleterious effect
on the maintenance of public order,
(1) (1951) S.C.R. 167.
425
It was sought to be argued that any weak link in the chain
of facts and circumstances, said to have been the basis of
the order of detention, would affect the legality of the
whole order. This argument postulates that there are many
grounds which are either vague or irrelevant. In this
connection, particular reliance was placed on the
observations of this Court in Dwarka Dass Bhatia v. The
State of Jammu and Kashmir (1), to the effect that if some
of the reasons on which the order of detention had been
based, are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court
ought to quash the order, because it is not in a position to
know which of the reasons or the grounds, had operated on
the mind of the authorities concerned, when they decided the
pass the impugned order. As already pointed out, no such
situation arises in this case, because, in our opinion, none
of the grounds is either vague or irrelevant. It may also
be pointed out that the ground of irrelevance wag not urged
before the High Court, but even so, we allowed the
petitioner’s counsel to urge that ground before us, and
having heard him on that aspect of the matter, we have no
doubt that there is no justification for the contention that
any of the matters taken into consideration by the
authorities concerned in the matter of the detention of the
petitioner, was irrelevant.
For the reasons given above, it must be held that there is
no merit in this appeal or in the application under Art. 32
of the Constitution. They are, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal and application dismissed.
(1) (1956) S.C.R. 948.
54
426