Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 348 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Hari Mohan Mandal
RESPONDENT:
State of Jharkhand
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/03/2004
BENCH:
DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3784/2003
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J
Leave granted.
Appellant along with four others faced trial for
alleged commission of offence punishable under Section
302, 302 read with Section 120B, 307, 302 read with
Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
the ’IPC’). The Trial Court found the appellant Hari
Mohan Mandal and two other accused persons Chandra
Mohan and Vijay to be guilty. Two others, namely,
Gajadhar Mandal and Rameswar Mahto were acquitted.
While Chandra Mohan was found guilty of offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC, accused-appellant
Hari Mohan Mandal and Vijay Mandal were found guilty of
the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Each was
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
In appeal, a Division Bench of the Jharkhand High
Court dismissed the appeal so far as the accused
Chandra Mohan and present appellant are concerned, but
directed acquittal of the accused Vijay Mandal. The
sentence as imposed by the Trial Court was maintained
so far as the accused appellant is concerned.
Prosecution version as unfolded during trial in a
nutshell is as follows:
At about 6.30 a.m. on the date of occurrence i.e.
12.2.1994, the informant along with his uncles, Narayan
Mandal (hereinafter described as ’the deceased’) and
Janardhan Mandal (PW-1) had gone for husking the paddy
in the pounding mill of Sikandar Mahto, situated at
Godda Pirpaiti Pitch Road. After their arrival, the
three accused persons Chandra Mohan Mandal, Hari Mohan
Mandal and Vijay Mandal also went there. They had kept
their paddy bag at the Mill on the previous day. Both
the parties entered into an altercation regarding the
husking of their paddy first. The appellant, Hari Mohan
Mandal forcibly put his paddy into the hauler. When
deceased Narayan Mandal objected, all the accused
persons abused him and the accused Chandra Mohan Mandal
brought out a knife from his waist and gave 3-4 knife
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blows on his abdomen. On being injured deceased Naryana
Mandal fell down. When Janardhan Mandal (PW-1) went to
rescue him, then the accused Hari Mohan Mandal took the
knife from Chandra Mohan Mandal and stabbed on his head
and eye. He also fell down on being injured. Accused
Vijay Mandal assaulted by throwing bricks hitting eye
of Janardhan Mandal (PW-1). The bricks thrown at the
informant Guddu Kumar (PW-5) by accused Vijay Mandal
did not hit him. Thereafter, all the accused person
fled away. Narayan Mandal died at the spot. The
injured, Janardhan Mandal (PW-1) was sent to Sadar
Hospital for treatment on a rickshaw. Rameshwar Mahto,
father of mill owner, Sikandar Mahto and Joginder Mahto
(PW-9) saw the alleged occurrence. On alarm, the
villagers assembled there. The informant (PW-5) put the
dead body of Narayan Mandal on a trolley with the help
of others. Fard beyan (Ext. 4) of the informant Guddu
Kumar Mandal (PW-5) was recorded by S.I., R.K.
Bharamchari (PW-11) Officer-in-charge, Godda P.S. on
12.2.1994 at 9.20 a.m. at the P.O. Village Punasia,
P.S. Godda Town. After investigation charge-sheet under
Sections 302, 307 IPC was submitted. Supplementary
charge-sheet under Sections 302, 307, 109/34 IPC was
submitted against Gajadhar Mandal and Rameshwar Mahto,
who were acquitted by the Trial Court.
In order to bring home the accusations 13
witnesses were examined by the prosecution. The Trial
Court found the evidence of injured A-1 and the
informant Guddu Kumar (PW-5) to be cogent and credible.
Placing reliance on their evidence, the Trial Court
found 3 accused persons guilty but found that the
prosecution has not established its case so far as the
co-accused Gajadhar Mandal and Rameshwar Mahto are
concerned and accordingly directed their acquittal.
During trial and in appeal, the evidence of the
eyewitnesses were questioned on the ground of witnesses
being partisan and the alleged suppression of the
genesis of the dispute. The Trial Court and the High
Court did not accept the stand and found the evidence
to be cogent. Strong reliance was placed on the
evidence of injured witness PW-1 and also other
eyewitness PW-5. The High Court found that the
prosecution has established its case, so far as
accused-appellant is concerned and co-accused Chander
Mohan Mandal is concerned. But found evidence to be
insufficient in respect of accused Vijay Mandal.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that both the Trial Court and the
High Court have not analysed the evidence in the proper
perspective. The so-called eyewitnesses were not
reliable and their version was not believable.
Furthermore, the occurrence allegedly took place
regarding husking of paddy and without any pre-
mediation the alleged attacks were made. In any event,
the offence under Section 307 is not made out, so far
as the appellant is concerned taking into account the
injuries sustained by PW-1, and the life imprisonment
as awarded is harsh.
In response, learned counsel for the State
supported judgments of the Trial Court and the High
Court and further submitted that in view of the
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analysis made and the nature of the injuries proved to
have been inflicted no interference is called for.
We find no scope for any deficiency in the
evidence of PWs 1 and 5 to warrant rejection. The plea
of the appellant that the same is full of blemishes has
not been substantiated. On the contrary, the same has
a ring of truth.
In the factual scenario noted above, it has to be
seen whether Section 307 IPC has application. Said
provision reads as follows:
"Whoever does any act with such
intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine; and,
if hurt is caused to any person by such
act, the offender shall be liable
either to imprisonment for life, or to
such punishment as is hereinbefore
mentioned."
To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death
should have been inflicted. Although the nature of
injury actually caused may often give considerable
assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention
of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from
other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to actual
wounds. The Section makes a distinction between an act
of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may
not be attended by any result so far as the person
assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in
which the culprit would be liable under this Section.
It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to
the victim of the assault should be sufficient under
ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person
assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the
act, irrespective of its result, was done with the
intention or knowledge and under circumstances
mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be
criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is
sufficient in law, if there is present an intent
coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
It is sufficient to justify a conviction under
Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with
some overt act in execution thereof. It is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death
should have been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has
been with the avowed object or intention to cause
death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the
injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually
causing death are really factors which are wholly
irrelevant for adjudging the culpability under Section
307 IPC. The Section makes a distinction between the
act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court
has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result,
was done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the Section. Therefore, it
is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under
Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted
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on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.
This position was highlighted in State of
Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors. (1983 (2) SCC
28) and in R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004 (2)
Supreme 78)
In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC
843) it was observed in para 6 that mere fact that the
injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut
any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself
sufficient to take the act out of the purview of
Section 307.
Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge
that death will be caused is a question of fact and
would depend on the facts of a given case. The
circumstance that the injury inflicted by the accused
was simple or minor will not by itself rule out
application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative
question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be,
and not nature of the injury.
The injuries noticed on PW-1 by the doctor PW-6
are as follows:
(a) One incised wound over left supra orbital area
obliquely placed in oozing condition. Dimension
8 cm x 2 cm x 2.5 cm.
(b) One incised wound over left molar area of the
face 6 cm x 2 cm x 2.5 cm in oozing condition.
(c) One abrasion over the left patellar area 6 cm x
4.5 cm.
(d) One bruise over both eye lids on left side 5 cm x
3 cm and 4.5 cm x 2.5 cm.
(e) Illegible at multiple site.
(f) the whole left eye was reddened due to extensive
conjunctival hemorrhage.
The first injury was said to be grievous and the
opinion so far injury no. 6 is concerned, was kept
reserved.
The first injury was certainly on a vital part and
taking into account the injuries on the various parts
of the body, Section 307 IPC has been rightly invoked.
The accused has been rightly convicted for offences
punishable under Section 307 IPC. However, taking into
account the fact that the altercations took place at
the time of husking paddy and there was no pre-
meditation or planning of the attack, custodial
sentence of five years would meet the ends of justice.
It is to be noted that scope for consideration in the
appeal was limited to the nature of offence and
consequently the sentence.
The appeal stands dismissed so far as conviction
is concerned, but is partly allowed to the extent of
sentence as indicated above.