Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 517
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 4812 OF 2023]
MANJUNATH TIRAKAPPA MALAGI AND ANR …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
GURUSIDDAPPA TIRAKAPPA MALAGI (DEAD
THROUGH LRS) …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of pure civil proceedings initiated
at the hands of the present appellants in the year 2003. The
appellants filed a suit for declaring a compromise decree
entered into between the respondents (defendants) as null and
void, and not binding on the appellants. Additionally, the
appellants also sought partition of a certain share in the
Signature Not Verified
ancestral property, which was in the possession of the
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.04.21
17:11:46 IST
Reason:
defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellants
1
vide order dated 02.03.2007. Thereafter, the appellants filed
the first appeal before the High Court, which has also been
dismissed by the impugned order dated 23.09.2022.
3. Since the present matter concerns various suits, we would like to
state the facts of the matter in short and the same are as
follows:
(a) In 1974, a family partition takes place between brothers
and their father, i.e. appellants’ father, his five brothers
and appellants’ grandfather, and the family property was
partitioned which was registered.
(b) Thereafter, in the year 1998, the appellants filed a suit
(O.S No.219/1998) against their father and mother
seeking partition and division of ancestral property by
metes and bounds. However, during the pendency of this
suit, the grandfather of the appellants filed a different
suit (O.S No.58/1999) for partition in which his six sons,
including appellants’ father, were a party. In that, it was
stated that a part of the joint family property (7 acres of
land) was mistakenly left out of the 1974 partition. Vide
order dated 18.01.2000, Trial Court passed a decree
based on a compromise between the defendants under
2
which that 7 acres of land was equally divided amongst
the appellants’ father, his five brothers and appellants’
grandfather. Consequently, 1 acre out of the 7 acres fell
to the share of the appellants’ father.
(c) Taking into consideration the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000, the Trial Court, vide order dated
02.08.2002, decreed the appellants’ partition suit (O.S
No.219/1998), and the appellants together received half
of the share of their father’s property. Consequently,
both cases were decided. The 1999 suit was decided on
18.01.2000 by a decree of compromise and later the
1998 suit was decided on 02.08.2002 based on the
decree of compromise passed in 1999 suit.
(d) From here, the main dispute arises. In 2003, the
appellants filed the present suit (No.1/2003) seeking a
declaration that the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000 is null and void as, according to the
appellants, the 7 acres of land was their father’s property
and not the ancestral property. Thus, the appellants’
claim that they are entitled to half of the 7 acres of land
(hereinafter referred to as ‘suit property’). This is the suit
3
with which we are dealing in the present appeal. This
suit of the appellants was dismissed by the Trial Court,
and then the first appeal filed by the appellants has also
been dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned
order dated 23.09.2022. Now, appellants are before us.
4. It is the case of the appellants that they are the sons of
Tirakappa Gurusiddappa Malagi, who had colluded with his
father (appellants’ grandfather) and brothers (appellants’
uncles) to deprive the appellants of their rights. Appellants
contend that the suit property (7 acres of land) was purchased
by their grandmother in the name of their father when he was
a minor and thus, suit property was rightly not included in the
1974 partition. However, according to the appellants, their
father, in collusion with his father and brothers, got the suit
property partitioned by a compromise decree, and this has led
to the reduction of the appellants’ share in the suit property.
They further argue that the compromise decree should be set
aside as they were never made a party to that suit in which the
compromise decree was passed.
5. On the contrary, the other side would argue that the appellants’
interest was represented by their father in the suit in which the
4
compromise decree was passed. It has also been argued that
the Trial Court and High Court were correct in holding that the
appellants’ suit was barred by principles of res judicata as well
as under Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’).
6. We have heard both sides and perused the material before us.
There are concurrent findings of the Courts below against the
7.
appellants. The appellants vehemently argue that since the suit
property is not an ancestral property, it cannot be partitioned
amongst their father, grandfather and father’s brothers.
However, the appellants miserably failed to prove that the suit
property is not a part of the ancestral property. After going
through the records, we are of the considered view that the
Trial Court correctly concluded that although the suit property
was purchased in the name of the appellants’ father, it was
purchased from the family funds and, thus, it is a joint family
property.
8. Since the suit property was not taken into consideration during
the partition in the year 1974, the grandfather of the
appellants filed a suit seeking partition in which the suit
property was equally divided amongst the appellants’ father, his
5
brothers and appellants’ grandfather. The appellants’ interest
was represented by their father, and pursuant to the
compromise decree, the appellants’ father received his part of
the share. Subsequently, as per the decree dated 02.08.2002
passed in Suit no.219/1998 filed by the appellants, the
appellants have also been held jointly entitled to a half share of
their father’s share of the suit property. In other words,
appellants were jointly held entitled to 0.5 acres of land. We are
unable to understand how the appellants can claim it to be an
act of fraud.
9. Through the decree dated 02.08.2002 passed in suit
(No.219/1998) filed by the appellants, the entire share of the
appellants’ father, which he had received in the 1974 partition
and by compromise decree, was further partitioned amongst
the appellants and their father. This decree was never
challenged by the appellants. Nevertheless, they filed a fresh
suit in the year 2003 seeking cancellation of the compromise
decree and further seeking partition of the suit property. The
appellants’ ground for challenging the said compromise decree
is that the appellants’ father was coerced by his brothers and
father to enter into the said compromise.
6
10. Let us discuss the law governing a consent decree. Order 23 Rule
3 of CPC, which deals with compromise decree, reads as
follows:
“3. Compromise of suit .— Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or
compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or
where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of
the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit,
the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or
satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in
accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties
to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the
agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as
the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and
denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction
has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the
question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the
purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such
adjournment.
Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is
void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872
(9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within
the meaning of this rule ”
Thus, a reading of the above provision makes it clear that
before passing a decree on the basis of a compromise, the
Court has to satisfy itself that the suit has been adjusted by a
7
lawful compromise. Once the Court passes a compromise
decree after such a satisfaction, the decree cannot be
challenged in an appeal as no appeal lies against a compromise
1
decree .
11. Also, a compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh
suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh suit challenging the
consent decree on the ground of the legality of the compromise
under Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC, which reads as follows:
“3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a
decree on the ground that the compromise on which
the decree is based was not lawful
.”
12. The only remedy against a compromise decree is to file a recall
application. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 summed up the position of law as
follows:
The position that emerges from the amended
“17.
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
having regard to the specific bar contained in Section
96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the
court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
1
Section 96(3) of CPC: No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the
Court with the consent of parties.
8
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of
Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside
a compromise decree on the ground that the
compromise was not lawful in view of the bar
contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court
which passed the consent decree, by an order on an
application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to
approach the court which recorded the compromise
and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that
there was no compromise. In that event, the court
which recorded the compromise will itself consider and
decide the question as to whether there was a valid
compromise or not. This is so because a consent
decree is nothing but contract between parties
superimposed with the seal of approval of the court.
The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on
the validity of the agreement or compromise on which
it is made…”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, even if we accept the contention of the appellants that
their father was coerced by his brothers and father (appellants’
grandfather) to enter into a compromise, which led to the
passing of the consent decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid
remedy. In that situation, the appellants’ father should have
9
filed a recall application before the Court that had passed the
decree. The appellants’ father has never done so! Moreover, he
had admitted the consent decree and never questioned its
validity.
13. Additionally, the appellants' argument that the suit property is
not a joint family property but was purchased by their
grandmother in the name of the appellants’ father and that he
is now trying to deprive the appellants from the suit property
as their relations have turned sour, is of no help to them. This
is because if the appellants’ grandmother had purchased the
suit property in the name of the appellants’ father, and it is not
a part of the ancestral property then in that case it would be
the property of the appellants’ father as of now, since he is
alive, and he is at full liberty to dispose of the same as per his
wishes. Be that as it may, if the father of the appellants has no
grievance against the consent decree, then we are unable to
understand how the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.
14. In any case, the appellants’ case has no merits. The appellants’
suit is also barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC as it did not
include all the properties which were part of their earlier suit.
The present suit is also hit by the principles of res judicata or
10
by constructive res judicata as the appellants cannot re-agitate
their claim regarding the partition of the suit property, which
has already been partitioned as a result of previous litigations.
The Trial Court and High Court have dealt with these issues in
detail. We are not required to go into the same as we have
already given our reasons above for holding that the appellants’
suit is bereft of any merits.
15. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the
impugned order dated 23.09.2022 passed by the High Court.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
16. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
17.
………………………………, J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
………………………………, J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 21, 2025.
11
12
2025 INSC 517
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 4812 OF 2023]
MANJUNATH TIRAKAPPA MALAGI AND ANR …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
GURUSIDDAPPA TIRAKAPPA MALAGI (DEAD
THROUGH LRS) …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of pure civil proceedings initiated
at the hands of the present appellants in the year 2003. The
appellants filed a suit for declaring a compromise decree
entered into between the respondents (defendants) as null and
void, and not binding on the appellants. Additionally, the
appellants also sought partition of a certain share in the
Signature Not Verified
ancestral property, which was in the possession of the
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2025.04.21
17:11:46 IST
Reason:
defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit of the appellants
1
vide order dated 02.03.2007. Thereafter, the appellants filed
the first appeal before the High Court, which has also been
dismissed by the impugned order dated 23.09.2022.
3. Since the present matter concerns various suits, we would like to
state the facts of the matter in short and the same are as
follows:
(a) In 1974, a family partition takes place between brothers
and their father, i.e. appellants’ father, his five brothers
and appellants’ grandfather, and the family property was
partitioned which was registered.
(b) Thereafter, in the year 1998, the appellants filed a suit
(O.S No.219/1998) against their father and mother
seeking partition and division of ancestral property by
metes and bounds. However, during the pendency of this
suit, the grandfather of the appellants filed a different
suit (O.S No.58/1999) for partition in which his six sons,
including appellants’ father, were a party. In that, it was
stated that a part of the joint family property (7 acres of
land) was mistakenly left out of the 1974 partition. Vide
order dated 18.01.2000, Trial Court passed a decree
based on a compromise between the defendants under
2
which that 7 acres of land was equally divided amongst
the appellants’ father, his five brothers and appellants’
grandfather. Consequently, 1 acre out of the 7 acres fell
to the share of the appellants’ father.
(c) Taking into consideration the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000, the Trial Court, vide order dated
02.08.2002, decreed the appellants’ partition suit (O.S
No.219/1998), and the appellants together received half
of the share of their father’s property. Consequently,
both cases were decided. The 1999 suit was decided on
18.01.2000 by a decree of compromise and later the
1998 suit was decided on 02.08.2002 based on the
decree of compromise passed in 1999 suit.
(d) From here, the main dispute arises. In 2003, the
appellants filed the present suit (No.1/2003) seeking a
declaration that the compromise decree dated
18.01.2000 is null and void as, according to the
appellants, the 7 acres of land was their father’s property
and not the ancestral property. Thus, the appellants’
claim that they are entitled to half of the 7 acres of land
(hereinafter referred to as ‘suit property’). This is the suit
3
with which we are dealing in the present appeal. This
suit of the appellants was dismissed by the Trial Court,
and then the first appeal filed by the appellants has also
been dismissed by the High Court vide the impugned
order dated 23.09.2022. Now, appellants are before us.
4. It is the case of the appellants that they are the sons of
Tirakappa Gurusiddappa Malagi, who had colluded with his
father (appellants’ grandfather) and brothers (appellants’
uncles) to deprive the appellants of their rights. Appellants
contend that the suit property (7 acres of land) was purchased
by their grandmother in the name of their father when he was
a minor and thus, suit property was rightly not included in the
1974 partition. However, according to the appellants, their
father, in collusion with his father and brothers, got the suit
property partitioned by a compromise decree, and this has led
to the reduction of the appellants’ share in the suit property.
They further argue that the compromise decree should be set
aside as they were never made a party to that suit in which the
compromise decree was passed.
5. On the contrary, the other side would argue that the appellants’
interest was represented by their father in the suit in which the
4
compromise decree was passed. It has also been argued that
the Trial Court and High Court were correct in holding that the
appellants’ suit was barred by principles of res judicata as well
as under Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’).
6. We have heard both sides and perused the material before us.
There are concurrent findings of the Courts below against the
7.
appellants. The appellants vehemently argue that since the suit
property is not an ancestral property, it cannot be partitioned
amongst their father, grandfather and father’s brothers.
However, the appellants miserably failed to prove that the suit
property is not a part of the ancestral property. After going
through the records, we are of the considered view that the
Trial Court correctly concluded that although the suit property
was purchased in the name of the appellants’ father, it was
purchased from the family funds and, thus, it is a joint family
property.
8. Since the suit property was not taken into consideration during
the partition in the year 1974, the grandfather of the
appellants filed a suit seeking partition in which the suit
property was equally divided amongst the appellants’ father, his
5
brothers and appellants’ grandfather. The appellants’ interest
was represented by their father, and pursuant to the
compromise decree, the appellants’ father received his part of
the share. Subsequently, as per the decree dated 02.08.2002
passed in Suit no.219/1998 filed by the appellants, the
appellants have also been held jointly entitled to a half share of
their father’s share of the suit property. In other words,
appellants were jointly held entitled to 0.5 acres of land. We are
unable to understand how the appellants can claim it to be an
act of fraud.
9. Through the decree dated 02.08.2002 passed in suit
(No.219/1998) filed by the appellants, the entire share of the
appellants’ father, which he had received in the 1974 partition
and by compromise decree, was further partitioned amongst
the appellants and their father. This decree was never
challenged by the appellants. Nevertheless, they filed a fresh
suit in the year 2003 seeking cancellation of the compromise
decree and further seeking partition of the suit property. The
appellants’ ground for challenging the said compromise decree
is that the appellants’ father was coerced by his brothers and
father to enter into the said compromise.
6
10. Let us discuss the law governing a consent decree. Order 23 Rule
3 of CPC, which deals with compromise decree, reads as
follows:
“3. Compromise of suit .— Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or
compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or
where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of
the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit,
the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or
satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in
accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties
to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the
agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as
the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and
denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction
has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the
question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the
purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such
adjournment.
Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is
void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872
(9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within
the meaning of this rule ”
Thus, a reading of the above provision makes it clear that
before passing a decree on the basis of a compromise, the
Court has to satisfy itself that the suit has been adjusted by a
7
lawful compromise. Once the Court passes a compromise
decree after such a satisfaction, the decree cannot be
challenged in an appeal as no appeal lies against a compromise
1
decree .
11. Also, a compromise decree cannot be challenged by filing a fresh
suit as there is a bar on filing a fresh suit challenging the
consent decree on the ground of the legality of the compromise
under Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC, which reads as follows:
“3-A. Bar to suit.— No suit shall lie to set aside a
decree on the ground that the compromise on which
the decree is based was not lawful
.”
12. The only remedy against a compromise decree is to file a recall
application. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 summed up the position of law as
follows:
The position that emerges from the amended
“17.
provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree
having regard to the specific bar contained in Section
96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the
court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
1
Section 96(3) of CPC: No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the
Court with the consent of parties.
8
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of
Rule 1 Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside
a compromise decree on the ground that the
compromise was not lawful in view of the bar
contained in Rule 3-A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court
which passed the consent decree, by an order on an
application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to
approach the court which recorded the compromise
and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that
there was no compromise. In that event, the court
which recorded the compromise will itself consider and
decide the question as to whether there was a valid
compromise or not. This is so because a consent
decree is nothing but contract between parties
superimposed with the seal of approval of the court.
The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on
the validity of the agreement or compromise on which
it is made…”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, even if we accept the contention of the appellants that
their father was coerced by his brothers and father (appellants’
grandfather) to enter into a compromise, which led to the
passing of the consent decree, a fresh suit is still not a valid
remedy. In that situation, the appellants’ father should have
9
filed a recall application before the Court that had passed the
decree. The appellants’ father has never done so! Moreover, he
had admitted the consent decree and never questioned its
validity.
13. Additionally, the appellants' argument that the suit property is
not a joint family property but was purchased by their
grandmother in the name of the appellants’ father and that he
is now trying to deprive the appellants from the suit property
as their relations have turned sour, is of no help to them. This
is because if the appellants’ grandmother had purchased the
suit property in the name of the appellants’ father, and it is not
a part of the ancestral property then in that case it would be
the property of the appellants’ father as of now, since he is
alive, and he is at full liberty to dispose of the same as per his
wishes. Be that as it may, if the father of the appellants has no
grievance against the consent decree, then we are unable to
understand how the appellants can be allowed to challenge it.
14. In any case, the appellants’ case has no merits. The appellants’
suit is also barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC as it did not
include all the properties which were part of their earlier suit.
The present suit is also hit by the principles of res judicata or
10
by constructive res judicata as the appellants cannot re-agitate
their claim regarding the partition of the suit property, which
has already been partitioned as a result of previous litigations.
The Trial Court and High Court have dealt with these issues in
detail. We are not required to go into the same as we have
already given our reasons above for holding that the appellants’
suit is bereft of any merits.
15. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with the
impugned order dated 23.09.2022 passed by the High Court.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
16. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
17.
………………………………, J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
………………………………, J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 21, 2025.
11
12