Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GOVERNMENT SERVANT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETYLIMITE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/08/1998
BENCH:
SUJATA V. MANOHAR, M. SRINIVASAN
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
[With C.A.No. 8425/94, W.P. (C) No. 758/93, C.A. Nos.
8428/94, 8429/94, 8430/94 and 5652/95]
J U D G M E N T
Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J.
The appellants are the owners of properties in Delhi
which are governed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,
1957 or the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Prior to coming into
force of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, these
properties were governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act of
1958.
By the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 sub-
sections 3(c) and (d) were added in Section 3 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958. These provide that nothing in the
said Act shall apply "(c) to any premises, whether
residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds three
thousand and five hundred rupees"; or "(d) to any premises
constructed on or after the commencement of the Delhi Rent
Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, for a period of ten years
from the date of completion of such construction". On the
said provisions coming into force the appellants received
notices under Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act for the assessment year 1988-89 and for subsequent years
proposing to revise the rateable value of their properties.
The footnote to these notices stated that this was in view
of the amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1988.
Assessments which were made pursuant to such notices were
made by calculating the rateable value of the property on
the basis of the actual annual rent received. These and
similar notices and assessments are the subject matter of
challenge in the present proceedings.
Under Section 113 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957, the Corporation shall levy, inter alia, property
taxes. Under Section 114 the property taxes shall be levied
on lands and buildings in Delhi and shall consist of the
following, namely, (inter alia) under sub-section (d) a
general tax of not less than ten and not and not more than
thirty percent of the rateable value of lands and buildings
within the urban areas. Section 116 provides as follows:-
"116. Determination of
rateable value of lands and
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buildings assessable to property
taxes - (1) The rateable value of
any lands and buildings assessable
to property taxes be the annual
rent at which such land or building
might reasonably by expected to let
from year to year less -
(a) a sum of ten per cent of
the said annual rent which
shall be in lieu of all
allowances for costs or
repairs and insurance, and
other expenses, if any,
necessary to maintain the land
or building in a state to
command that rent, and
(b) the water tax or the
scavenging tax or both, if the
rent is inclusive of either or
both of the said taxes:
Provided that if the rent is
inclusive of charges for water
supplied by measurement, then, for
the purpose of this section the
rent shall be treated as inclusive
of water tax on rateable value and
the deduction of the water tax
shall be made as provided therein:
provided further that in respect of
any land or building the standard
rent of which has been fixed under
the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control
act, 1952 (38 of 1952), the
rateable value thereof shall not
exceed the annual amount of the
standard rent so fixed.
[Explanation - The expressions
"water tax" and "scavenging tax"
shall mean such taxes of that
nature as may be levied by an
appropriate authority.]
(2)..............
(3)..............
To determine the quantum of property tax, therefore, it
is necessary to arrive at the rateable value of the land or
building. Under Section 116(1) the rateable value is the
annual rent at which such land or building might reasonably
be expected to be let from year to year less certain
deductions. We have to consider how the annual rent at which
such property might be reasonably expected to be let, is to
be arrived at when the rent of the property is not
controlled under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 or any
other rent control legislation.
In the case of The Corporation of Calcutta v. Sm. Padma
Debi and Ors. (1962 [3] SCR 49), this Court considered
Section 127?(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. This
Section was similar to Section 116(1) of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1917. Under Section 127(a) the annual value
of the land for building shall be deemed to be gross annual
rent at which the land or building might at the time of
assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year
less certain deductions. The Court observed that the word
"reasonably" is not capable of precise definition. It said,
(at page 55)" ‘Reasonable’ signifies ‘in accordance with
reason.’ In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact.
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Whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. A bargain between a
willing lessor and willing lessee uninfluenced by any
extraneous circumstances may afford a guiding test of
reasonableness. An inflated or deflated rate of rent based
upon fraud, emergency, relationship, and such other
considerations may take it out of the bounds of
reasonableness. Equally it would be incongruous to consider
fixation of rent beyond the limits fixed by penal
legislation as reasonable. Under the Rent Control Act, the
receipt of any rent higher than the standard rent fixed
under the Act is made penal for the landlord."
Therefore, where there is legislation fixing the
standard rent of the premises, the rent at which the
premises could be reasonably expected to be let cannot
exceed the statutory ceiling. But where there is no between
a willing lessor and willing lessee uninfluenced by any
extraneous circumstances, affords a good test of
reasonableness.
The same principle was reiterated by this Court in
Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor and Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal
committee and ors. (1980 [1] SCC 685 at page 687). After
quoting the above passage from The Corporation of Calcutta
v. Sm. Padma Debi and ors. (Supra), this Court held that the
actual rent payable by a tenant to the landlord would, in
normal circumstances, afford reliable evidence of what the
landlord might reasonably expect to get from a hypothetical
tenant, unless the rent is inflated or depressed by reason
of extraneous considerations such as relationship,
expectation of some other benefit etc. There would
ordinarily be, in a free market close approximation between
the actual rent received by the landlord and the rent which
he might reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical
tenant.
In the case of Dr. Balbir Singh and Ors. etc. Etc. v.
Municipal Corporation, Delhi and ors. (1985 [2] SCR 439 at
pate 452), also this Court reiterated the test laid down in
the above two cases and repeated that in a free market there
would ordinarily be a close approximation between the actual
rent received by the landlord and the rent which he might
reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical tenant.
(See also East India Commercial Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Corporation
of Calcutta (1998 [4] SCC 368).
Therefore, the annual rent actually received by the
landlord, in the absence of any special circumstances, would
be a good guide to decide the rent which the landlord might
reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical tenant.
Since the premises in the present case are not controlled by
any rent control legislation, the annual rent received by
the landlord is what a willing lessee, uninfluenced by other
circumstances, would pay to willing lessor. Hence, actual
annual rent, in these circumstances, can be taken as the
annual rateable value of the property for the assessment of
property tax. The municipal corporation is, therefore,
entitled to revise the rateable value of the properties
which have been freed from rent control on the basis of
annual rent actually received unless the owner satisfies the
municipal corporation that there are other considerations
which have affected the quantum of rent.
It was then submitted on behalf of the appellants that
if the annual rent actually received is taken as the basis
for determining the rateable value of the property, the
property tax will become a tax on income of the owner. Such
a tax would be beyond the legislative competence of the
state legislature. being a tax on income, it can be levied
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only by the Central Government and it would not fall in
entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. It would, in fact, fall in entry 82 of List I
which deals with taxes on income other than agricultural
income. Now, Entry 49 of List II covers taxes on lands and
buildings. As the High Court has pointed out, the three
lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution have no
relevance to the Union Territory of Delhi since the
Parliament can made law respecting all the entries in all
the three lists. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act is, in
fact, Parliamentary Legislation. Nevertheless, as the
argument has been advanced before us at some length and it
may affect other municipal legislations, we will briefly
deal with it.
A similar argument in connection with the Punjab Urban
Immovable property Tax Act, 1940 was advanced before the
Federal Court in the case of Ralla Ram v. The Province of
East Punjab (AIR 1949 [36] Federal Court 81). The property
tax under the said Act was based on the annual value of the
property. Negativing the argument that this was a tax on
income and hence was not covered by List II, Item 42,
dealing with taxes on lands and buildings under the
Government of India Act, 1935, the Court said that a proper
approach is to look at the true nature and character of the
legislation or its pith and substance. If the substance of
the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not
invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are
outside the authorised field. The Court analysed the
provisions of the said Act and observed that in every case
the actual profit derived from the property would not
necessarily be its annual value. it is possible to conceive
of cases in which the property to be taxed does not actually
yield any income whatsoever, though every property must have
some notional annual value. The method of arriving at the
quantum of tax should not be mixed up with the nature of the
tax itself. The essential character of the tax was property
tax and not a tax on income. It said, (page 86) "This case
demolishes the broad contention that wherever the annual
value is the basis of a tax, that tax becomes a tax on
income. it shows that there are other factors to be taken
into consideration and that it is the essential nature of
the tax charged and not the nature of the machinery which is
to be looked at."
The Federal Court had referred to the full bench
decision of the Bombay High Court Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v.
Province of Bombay and Ors. (AIR 1940 Bombay. 64) which also
deals with the urban immovable property tax to be
calculated by the municipal commissioner. The same view has
been taken by this court in the case of Patel Gordhandas
Hargovindas v. Municipal commissioner, Ahmedabad (19634 [2]
SCR 608). In this case the municipal corporation of
Ahmedabad had imposed a rate on vacant land within the
municipal limits. The rate was the percentage of valuation
based upon capital. The contention was that this was a tax
on capital and not a tax on property and was, therefore,
beyond the legislative Province of East Punjab (Supra) and
emphasised the importance of the distinction between the
levy of a tax and the machinery of its calculation including
the method of calculation and said that the subject matter
of the tax was obviously something other than the measure
provided to quantify tax by levying the tax on a percentage
of the capital value of the land taxed. The entire scope of
the charging Section was not changed. The tax was,
therefore, a tax on land.
It is thus well settled that an Act of the State
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legislature entitling a municipal corporation to levy
property tax on the basis of rateable value of land and
building calculated by the yardstick of annual rent at which
such property can reasonably be leased to a hypothetical
lessee, is valid and within its legislative competence. The
tax remains property tax and cannot be viewed as a tax on
income. (See also Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India and
Ors. (1981 [2] SCC 135, Assistant commissioner of Urban Land
Tax and Ors. v. The Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., etc.
(1970 [1] SCR 268), and India Cement Ltd. and ors. v. State
of Tamil Nadu and ors. (1990 [1] SCC 12).
Looking to the charging section of the Delhi Municipal
corporation Act, 1917 which clearly imposes a tax on
property and Section 116 which deals with the method of
determination of this tax with reference to the rateable
value of lands and buildings, the property tax levied cannot
be viewed as tax on income. The basis of valuation is the
hypothetical annual rent which a willing lessor would
receive from a willing lessee. Obviously in case where the
property is self-occupied there is no question of the owner
receiving any income. In the case of properties which are
covered by the Delhi Rent Control Act, there may be many
cases where the annual rent received by a landlord in
respect of a property may be different from its annual
rateable value. A property tax under the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act is, therefore, not a tax on income. Since
the position is well settled we need not elaborate on such
instances.
Learned counsel for the Delhi Municipal Corporation has
pointed out that in the case of self-occupied properties the
Delhi Municipal Corporation has continued to fix the
rateable value on the basis that the property is governed by
the Delhi Rent control Act. The arguments of the appellants,
therefore, have centred on properties which are let out and
which are not subject to rent control.
In the premises, we agree with the impugned judgment
and order of the Delhi High Court. The appeals and the writ
petition are, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be
no orders as to costs.