S. ANIL KUMAR @ ANIL KUMAR GANNA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

1 REPORTABLE    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  937 OF 2006     S. ANIL KUMAR @ ANIL KUMAR GANNA  … APPELLANT VERUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the   appellant  th against the judgment dated 4   January, 2006 in Criminal  JUDGMENT Appeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the learned Single Judge  of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby the  learned   Single   Judge   reversed   the   judgment   of   acquittal  nd dated 2   August, 1999 passed by the Xth Additional City  Sessions Judge at Bangalore in S.C.No.86 /96 and convicted  and sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section  304­B and Section 498­A of the IPC. Page 1 2 The   Appellate   Court   imposed   sentence   of   rigorous  imprisonment   for   seven   years   for   the   offence   punishable  under Section 304­B of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment 

for the offence punishable under Section 498­A of the IPC.  The   Appellate   Court   further   ordered   that   the   sentences  shall run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution is briefly stated below: The   complainant­Parasmal's   sister   Meena   Kumari   was  th married to accused No.1, Anil Kumar on 13  December, 1990.  In   relation   to   the   said   marriage   a   demand   was   made   by  accused   Nos.1   and   3   to   5   for   dowry   of   an   amount   of  Rs.1,50,000/­ and gold weighing 800 gms. It was agreed by  JUDGMENT the bride's party to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/­ and 500 gms.  of   gold   as   dowry   and,   accordingly,   the   marriage   was  performed. After the marriage, Meena Kumari came to know  that   her   husband   Anil   Kumar,   accused   No.1   (appellant  herein) had developed illicit intimacy with accused No.2,  Sumithra   alias   Savitri,   wife   of   Kailaschand,   (PW­8).  After some time, accused Nos.1 and 3 to 5 began to treat  Page 2 3 Meena Kumari with cruelty since she failed to bring the  amount   demanded   by   accused   No.1   for   expansion   of   his  business.     Whenever   Meena   Kumari   came   to   her   brother's 

accused No.1 was given, but his demand did not subside. On  th 20   January, 1992 at about 7.00 a.m., Meena Kumari took  milk and went inside her house. After some time,  accused  No.1, Anil Kumar left the house. Thereafter Meena Kumari  came   out   of   the   house   and   requested   Smt.   Kamalamma,   a  neighbour to bring a nipple for putting the same to tap.  When Kamalamma brought the nipple, she found the door of  the house closed.  Meena Kumari did not open the door in  spite of knocking by  Kamalamma. At that time, Sarojamma,  JUDGMENT (PW­6) was also present. At about 9.00 a.m. the mother of  PW­6, Kailas and Anil Kumar came and knocked the door, but  the door was not opened.  Despite their efforts, door was  not   opened   and   there   was   no   response   from   inside.  Therefore, Anil Kumar put his hand through the ventilator  and   unlatched   the   door   and   opened   it.   When   they   went  inside, they found that Meena Kumari had hanged herself  from the fan and had committed suicide. The news spread  Page 3 4 and later, a friend of the accused Sri Shanthilal (PW­9)  came   and   he   gave   on   phone   a   message   to   Meena   Kumari's  elder   brother   S.     Parasmal   (PW­1),   who   was   residing   in 

way   to   Bangalore,   Parasmal   (PW­1),   learnt   that   Meena  Kumari had committed suicide. They reached the house of  the accused at about 5.00 p.m. and after ascertaining the  matter, Parasmal    (PW­1) went to the Police Station and  informed   the   Police.   The   Police   came   to   the   house   and  after inspecting the spot, took the complaint of PW­1. On  the basis of the same, he registered a case in Cr.No.33/92  against the accused Nos.1 and 2. Sri. M.V. Chengappa, PSI,  Hebbal   Police   Station   (PW­23)   started   with   the  JUDGMENT investigation and further investigation was taken up by,  Praveena,   ACP,   Yeshwanthpur   Sub­Division   (PW­24).   The  investigation disclosed that accused Nos.3 to 5 were also  involved in the matter. Therefore, they were added in the  list of the accused. After further investigation by S.V.D.  Souza (PW­25), Police Inspector, ADC, COD, Bangalore and  his successor,   B. Venkataramana, Police Inspector, ADC,  COD,   Bangalore   (PW­26)   a   chargesheet   was   placed   against  Page 4 5 the accused for the offences punishable under Section 498­ A and 304­B of the IPC and Sections 3,4 and 6 of the Dowry  Prohibition Act, 1961.

claimed to be tried.   The prosecution examined in all 26  witnesses and closed its case.  As per prosecution PWs­1,  10,11,12,13,15   and   18   were   examined   with   regard   to   the  payment of dowry. To substantiate the allegation of the  dowry   harassment   they   examined   PWs­10,11,12,13,14,16   and  21 and other witnesses who saw the body hanging with fan.  PWs­2,   7   and   19   were   Panch   witnesses.   PW­17,   Dr.  Thirunavakkarasu was the Professor, Forensic Medicine, who  conducted   the   post­mortem   examination.   PW­21,   was   the  Taluk   Executive   Magistrate,   who   conducted   inquest  JUDGMENT proceedings. PWs.22 to 26 are the Police Officers.  4.   The   accused   in   their   statements   under   313   Cr.P.C.  denied   the   allegations   made   against   them.   On   behalf   of  defence one Vimal Kumar (DW­1) was examined to show that  there was no demand for dowry and no harassment was made  to Meena Kumari. It was suggested on behalf of the defence  that Meena Kumari had extra affinity towards PW­10, Ashok  Page 5 6 Kumar   Jain   and   perhaps   on   the   objection   raised   by   the  accused she might have committed suicide.  5.  The trial court on appreciation of evidence on record 

PW­1 and PW­12 and some others are contradictory and there  statements are not trustworthy. In view of such finding  the trial court acquitted the accused of all the charges  levelled against them.   6. One of the reasons shown by the trial court to come to  the   conclusion   that   the   statements   are   not   trustworthy,  was   that   PW­1,   complainant   nowhere   mentioned   in   the  complaint   that   demand   of   Rs.1,50,000/­   in   cash   and   800  gms. of gold as dowry was made as pre­condition to marry  Meena Kumari.  Such allegations were also not made before  JUDGMENT the Tahsildar (PW.21), as evident from the observation of  the trial court: “12.....It   is   an   undisputed   fact   that  nowhere   in   the   complaint   Ex.P3,   it   is  mentioned that the accused persons demanded  Rs.1.5 lacks and 800 grams of gold as dowry  as   a   pre­condition   to   marry   the   deceased  Meenakumari.   In   the   second   para   of   the  complaint, Ex.P.3, it is mentioned that the  marriage was done as per their request and  that to their satisfaction. At the time of  marriage,   they   gave   500   grams   of   gold  Page 6 7

JUDGMENT Page 7 8

13. From   the   evidence   of   PW­21   the  Tahsildar   it   is   crystal   clear   that   at   no  point of time, either PW­1 or as matter of  fact,   this   PW­18   never   stated   that   the  accused   persons   made   a   demand   for   Rs.1.5  lakhs   and   800   grams   of   gold   as   dowry.  Likewise, whatever PW­1 states in the chief  examination are all omissions which were not  stated   before   PW­21   the   Tahsildar  immediately after this incident. Absolutely  there   is   no   substance   in   PWs­1   and   12  telling that they paid Rs.10,000/­ at Benali  and   Rs.25,000/­   in   the   house   of   PW­1   at  Mysore to the first accused” 7. The High Court relied substantially on the submission  JUDGMENT made   by   the   learned   Addl.   SPP   appearing   for   the  prosecution   who   stated   that   there   are   abundant   material  placed   on   the   record   by   the   prosecution   including  depositions of PWs­1,10 to 16 and 21, many of whom spoke  about   the   demand   of   dowry,   payment   of   dowry   and   dowry  harassment.   It   was   contended   that   the   learned   Sessions  Judge because of minor discrepancies in the statements of  the prosecution witnesses has given the benefit of doubt  Page 8 9 in acquitting all the accused. The Sessions Judge had not  considered the provisions of Sections 113­A and 113­B of  the Evidence Act to be drawn against the accused. In view 

“ 8. Though   it   is   submitted   by   the   learned  Addl.SPP   that   there   is   abundant   material  regarding demand for dowry and payment of  dowry   for   the   settlement   of   marriage,   on  perusal   of   the   depositions   of  PWs.1,10,11,12,13,15 and 18, we are unable  to agree with his view. It is an admitted  fact that an amount of Rs.50,000/­ and gold  ornaments weighing about 500 gms were given  at  the time of marriage. The  evidence is  not sufficient to raise a presumption that  this   payment   of   money   as   dowry   was   on  demand by the accused nos.1 and 3 to 5. As  rightly   observed   by   the   learned   Sessions  Judge, they appear to be customary presents  given from the bride's side.” JUDGMENT Again   on   re­appreciation   of   evidence   of  PWs.1,10,11,12,13,14,15,16   and   21,   the   Appellate   Court  while holding that it was unable to find the allegations  involve accused Nos.2 to 5 observed as follows: “ 9......... It   is   not   the   case   of   the  prosecution that from those distant places  the accused Nos.3 to 5 tutored accused No.1  to demand dowry or ill­treat Meena Kumari.  Therefore, we do not find sufficient ground  to   interfere   in   the   conclusion   of   the  learned  Sessions   Judge   with  regard   to  the  Page 9 10 demand for dowry payment of dowry and dowry  harassment so far as the allegations relate  to accused Nos.3 to 5.”

held   responsible   for   any   demand   of   dowry   or   dowry  harassment. The trial court acquitted all the accused No.1  to 5 for offences punishable under Sections 3,4 and 6 of  the Dowry Prohibition Act and accused Nos.2 to 5 for an  offence punishable under Section 498­A of the IPC with the  following observation: “ 10.....Of   course,   a   suggestion   has   been  made that as informed by Meena Kumari, there  was illicit relationship between the accused  nos.1   and   2.   But   this   has   not   been  substantiated   by   any   material.   Merely  because some witness says that they learned  from   Meena   Kumari   that   there   was   illicit  relationship between accused Nos.1 and 2 and  of that it was the cause for marital discord  between accused nos.1 and Meena Kumari, that  cannot   be   accepted.   Considering   all   these  materials,   we   hold   that   the   acquittal   of  accused nos. 1 to 5 for offences punishable  under   Sections   3,4   and   6   of   the   Dowry  Prohibition Act and accused nos.2 to 5 for  an offences punishable under Sections 498­A  of the IPC does not need interference.” JUDGMENT Page 10 11 9. In spite of such finding referring to the statements  made by PWs.1,10 to 16 and 21 the Appellate Court held  that   accused   No.1­appellant   herein   is   liable   to   be 

“The   learned   Sessions   Judge   lost   sight   of  the   presumption   that   is   available   in  Sections 113­A and 113­B of the Evidence Act  and ignoring the evidence of PWs.1, 10 to 16  and   21,   held   that   there   was   no   dowry  harassment, so far as the allegation relates  to the accused no.1. We find absolutely no  reason   to   discard   the   evidence   of   these  witnesses so far as the allegations relate  to the accused no.1 and consequently he is  liable   to   be   convicted   for   the   offences  under   Sections   498­A,   304­B   of   the   IPC.  Since   the   dowry   harassment   by   the   accused  nos.2   to   5   has   not   been   proved,   the  acquittal granted to them does not need any  interference.” JUDGMENT 10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if  one view has been taken by the trial court which is not  perverse,   it   was   not   open   to   the   Appellate   Court   to  substitute   such   view   to   re­appreciate   the   evidence   for  coming to a different conclusion.  11. Per contra, according to the learned counsel for the  State, the High Court was right in reversing the judgment  Page 11 12 of   acquittal   passed   by   the   trial   court   in   view   of  sufficient   evidence   of   PWs.10   to   16   and   21   recorded   to  show   that   the   appellant   has   subjected   deceased   to 

suicide.  12. This   Court   in   the   case   of     Rohtash   vs.   State   of  Haryana,   ( 2012) 6 SCC 589,   held that only in exceptional  cases where there are compelling circumstances and where  the  judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the High  Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. In the  said   case   the   following   observation   was   made   by   this  Court: “27.  The High Court interfered with the  order of acquittal recorded by the trial  court. The law of interfering with the  judgment of acquittal is well settled.  It   is   to   the   effect   that   only   in  exceptional   cases   where   there   are  compelling   circumstances   and   the  judgment   in   appeal   is   found   to   be  perverse,  the   appellate   court   can  interfere   with   the   order   of   the  acquittal.   The   appellate   court   should  bear   in   mind   the   presumption   of  innocence   of   the   accused   and   further  that   the   trial   court’s   acquittal  bolsters   the   presumption   of   innocence.  Interference in a routine manner where  the   other   view   is   possible   should   be  JUDGMENT Page 12 13 avoided, unless there are good reasons  for interference.”  13. We have gone through the evidence of the prosecution 

prosecution.   We   find   that   there   are   contradictory  statements   which   cannot   be   stated   to   be   a   minor  contradiction   as   was   suggested   by   the   learned   Addl.SSP  before   the   Appellate   Court.   The   improvement   in   the  statements of PW.1 and 12 is clear.  The allegation about  the demand of dowry of Rs.1,50,000/­ and 800 gms. of gold  ornaments and harassment and torture made by accused No.1  on deceased was not disclosed and  mentioned in the First  Information   Report   or   before   the   Tahsildar(PW.21)   who  recorded   the   initial   evidence.   In   Ex.P.2   and   complaint  JUDGMENT Ex.P.3   absolutely   there   is   no   evidence   to   show     that  Rs.25,   000/­   was   demanded   and   Rs.10,000/­   was   given   to  accused   No.1   either   at   Benali     or   at   Mysore.   Further,  payment   of   Rs.50,000/­   and   500   gms.   of   gold   to   accused  No.1 as dowry was also not established beyond reasonable  doubt.  Page 13 14 14. Once   the   prosecution   failed   to   prove   the   basic  ingredients   of   harassment   or   demand   of   dowry   and   the  evidence   brought   on   record   were   doubted   by   the   trial 

113­B of the Evidence Act.   The presumption of innocence  of   the   accused   being   primary   factor,   in   absence   of  exceptional compelling circumstances and perversity of the  judgment, it was not open to the High Court to interfere  with the judgment of the trial court in a routine manner. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned  th judgment dated 4  January, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No.1042  of   1999   passed   by   the   High   Court,   allow   the   appeal   by  nd restoring the judgment dated 2  August, 1999 of the trial  JUDGMENT court.   The   appellant   is   on   bail,   his   bail   bonds   stand  discharged. …………………......…………………………….J.        (A.K. PATNAIK) .......……………………………………………….J.              (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA) NEW DELHI, JULY 3, 2013. Page 14