Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SATNAM SINGH AND ORS.S.K.SINGAL AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA,CHANDIGARH, THROUGH ITS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/1997
BENCH:
J.S. VERMA, S.P. KURDUKAR
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3704 OF 1990
J U D G M E N T
J.S. Verma, J.
High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 1973 (for short the "Rules") were made by
the Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in
exercise of powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 229
read with Article 231 of the Constitution of India. By order
dated March 18, 1974, the Chief Justice of the High Court
made these rules applicable with effect from March 1, 1974;
and the rules involving financial implications were referred
to the Central Government through Chandigarh Administration
for obtaining approval as required by the Proviso to Clause
(2) of Article 229 of the Constitution. It was expressly
mentioned in the order that "all new appointments made after
March 1, 1974 have been regulated by the new rules". The
Chief Justice also directed the office by the order dated
April 19, 1974 to circulate the new rules to the entire
staff and all concerned. Publication of rules in this manner
was made and the rules, except those involving financial
implications, came into force in actual working with effect
from March 1,1974. The circulation note dated April 24, 1974
of the Deputy Registrar, Administration clearly records this
fact.
Rule 16 of the above Rules prescribed the quota for
filling the posts of Assistants by specifying that 50% of
the posts shall be filled by direct recruitment and the
remaining 50% posts were to be filled by promotion from the
clerks on the establishment of the Court. Rule 30 prescribed
the method of determining seniority. These rules did not
involve any financial implications and according to the
aforesaid order of the Chief Justice of the High Court they
were treated as effective from March 1, 1974.
A controversy has arisen about the date on which rules
16 and 30 came into force because the rules involving
financial implications are held to have come into force from
a later date.
This date has significance because the quota provided by
these rules was abolished from January 20, 1978 and the
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availability of number of vacancies for the direct recruits
would be more if the period of quota rule is longer. Writ
petitions filed in the High Court have led to the impugned
judgment. Neither side is fully satisfied with the decision.
Civil Appeal No. 3704 is by promotes and Civil Appeal
No.3705 is by direct recruits against the same judgment
dated February 21, 1989.
As earlier stated, the High Court sent a proposal for
approval of the Government to the rules involving financial
implications at the time of applying these rules with effect
from March 1, 1974 by order of the Chief Justice. The
proposal for approval was made only in respect of rules 26,
27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA, II and III of the said Rules.
These rules related to pay, special pay and pension etc. so
that they undoubtedly related to financial matters and
required the approval envisaged by the Proviso to Clause (2)
of Article 229 of the Constitution. The correspondence
between the High Court and the Government is clear to
indicate that the proposal for approval of the Government
and the approval accorded to the same related only to rules
26, 27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA, II and III only. The
Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice (Department
of Justice) letter No.30/8/83-Jus., dated September 25, 1985
to the Home Secretary, Union Territory Administration,
Chandigarh with a copy to the Registrar, High Court, clearly
says that the approval of the President was only to these
rules involving financial implications. There can be no
doubt whatsoever that the entire exercise, from the proposal
by the High Court to approval of the President related only
to rules 26, 27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA, II and III of
the said Rules relating to certain conditions of service
involving financial implications and not to the remaining
rules contained in the High Court Establishment (Appointment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1973. Our concern in these
matters is confined only to the date of enforcement of rules
16 and 30 prescribing the quota for the direct recruits and
promotes and the mode of determination of seniority between
them.
The contention of the direct recruits is that rules 16
and 30 along with remaining rules which did not involve
financial implications and, therefore, did not require
approval of the Government came into force with effect from
March 1, 1974 by order of the Chief Justice of the High
Court. On the other hand, the promotes contend that the
entire set of rules came into force only on January 23,
1975, the date of the notification which was published in
the Gazette dated February 1, 1975. The contention of the
promotes is based on the decision in an earlier litigation
which related to applicability of the rules involving
financial implications. That decision is Sunder Sham Kapoor
and others Vs. The Hon’ble Chief Justice, Punjab and Haryana
High Court, Chandigarh and others, 1987(4), SLR 460.
As earlier stated, the significance of the date on
which rules 16 and 30 long with the remaining rules, other
than those sent for approval of the Government is for the
reason that the number of posts available for recruitment
from the two sources - direct recruits and promotes - has to
be calculated from that date only. There was no prescription
of quota prior to that date and subsequent to January 20,
1978 when by amendment made in the Rules the provision for
quota was abolished. It is only between the date of
enforcement of the quota rule and its abolition on January
20, 1978 that this question arises and it assumes
significance because the longer period of quota rule is
beneficial to the direct recruits.
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In the present case the High Court has taken the view
that the commencement of the entire set of Rules including
Rules 16 and 30 was from January 23, 1975 and not March 1,
1974. The view taken in the earlier decision in Sunder Sham
Kapoor has been followed. In our opinion, the significant
distinction between the present case and Sunder Sham Kapoor
the subject matter related to salaries and allowances with
other consequential benefits and, therefore, they involved
financial implications governed by the Rules which required
approval of the Government in accordance with the proviso to
Clause 2 of Article 229. That being so, the rules on which
the claim was based in Sunder Sham Kapoor came into force
only when the approval of the President was accorded with
the direction that the same would be effective from the date
of their issue. The publication of the notification dated
January 23, 1975 made in the Gazette was, therefore, treated
as the date of enforcement of the Rules which required
approval of the President under the proviso to Clause 2 of
Article 229. No such approval was required for the remaining
rules including Rules 16 and 30 and, therefore, the order of
the Chief Justice enforcing the Rules with effect from March
1, 1974 brought into force these remaining rules on that
day. The distinction has been overlooked by the High Court
in applying the decision of Sunder Sham Kapoor in the
present case also.
The relevant part of Article 229 is as under:
"229. Officers and servants and the
expenses of High Courts.-
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Subject to the provisions of
any law made by the Legislature of
the State, the conditions of
service of officers and servants of
a High Court shall be such as may
be prescribed by rules made by the
Chief Justice of the Court or by
some other Judge or officer of the
court authorised by the Chief
Justice to make rules for the
purpose:
Provided that the rules made under
this clause shall, so far as they
relate to salaries allowances,
leave or pensions, require the
approval of the Governor of the
State.
(3) xxx xxx xxx"
Clause (2) of Article 229 enacts that conditions of
service of officers and servants of High Court shall be such
as may be prescribed by Rules made by the Chief Justice of
the Court, Subject to the provisions of any law made by the
Legislature of the State. The proviso carves out the
exception, requiring the approval of the Governor of the
State only in respect of the rules "so far as they relate to
salaries, allowances, leave or pensions". Thus the approval
according to the proviso is required only in respect of
those rules which relate to salaries, allowances, leave or
pensions and not to other rules relating to the conditions
of service of the officers and servants of the High Court.
To read the proviso to require approval thereunder to the
entire set of rules including those which do not relate to
"salaries, allowances, leave or pensions" would be to
enlarge the scope of the proviso by reading into it more
than what is enacted therein. A proviso has to be strictly
construed inasmuch as it carves out an exception to the
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general rule. The general rule enacted in the main part is
not to be unduly restricted by expanding the content of the
proviso which is intended to carve out the exception from
the general rule. The plain words of the proviso to Clause
(2) of Article 229 leave no doubt that the requirement of
approval thereunder is confined to the rules only so far as
they relate to salaries etc., and no more. It is settled
that a proviso cannot expand or limit the clear meaning of
the main provision.
Viewed at from a different angle the conclusion reached
is the same. It is open to the Chief Justice to frame two
different sets of rules whereby the rules relating to
salaries, allowances, leave or pensions are made separately
in one set while the other set relates to other conditions
of service. If the exercise is performed in this manner only
that set of rules which relates to salaries etc. involving
financial implications requires the approval according to
the proviso to Article 229 (2) while the other set does not
require any such approval and can be enforced by the Chief
Justice straight away by his order. The result cannot be any
different if only one set of rules is made by the Chief
Justice incorporating both kinds of rules.
We have no doubt that all the rules framed by the Chief
Justice except for Rules 26, 27 and 34 and Schedules I, IA,
2 and 3 which alone were sent for approval according to the
proviso to clause (2) of Article 229, came into force with
effect from March 1, 1974 by virtue of the order of Chief
Justice of the High Court. This is how the High Court
understood it till some doubt was created because of the
significant distinction in the decision in Sunder Sham
Kapoor being overlooked. It is, therefore, clear that Rules
16 providing for the quota and Rule 30 prescribing the mode
of determining seniority came into force with effect from
March 1, 1974. The quota for the direct recruits and
promotees has to be worked out accordingly and the vacancies
have to be filled on that basis. The High Court is required
to calculate the vacancies and adjust the appointments to
the vacancies on this basis.
For the aforesaid reason the impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside. The High Court would now proceed to
calculate the number of vacancies available to direct
recruits and promotees on this basis and to make
consequential adjustment in the cadre of assistants,
accordingly.