Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5183 of 2001
PETITIONER:
SALKIA BUSINESSMENS ASSOCIAITON & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2001
BENCH:
S.Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju
JUDGMENT:
Raju, J.
Leave granted.
The simple as well as an important question arising in the
appeal is as to what is the efficacy of an order passed by the Court in
terms of the memorandum of compromise or an agreement, filed in a
proceedings on the basis of which the Court proceedings came to be
finally disposed of.
Shorn of all unnecessary details, it would suffice if a reference
is made to the order dated 13.2.1991 passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Order No.14861 (W) of
1990. The said proceedings came to be initiated by the Appellant
Association, the members of whom were carrying on business as
Traders and businessmen on the Grand Trunk Road (North) in and
around Salkia Chowrasta, apprehending displacement and demolition
of the places of their business for the construction of a fly-over,
against Howrah Municipal Corporation, Howrah Improvement Trust,
their respective authorities as well as the State. In the said
proceedings, an application for settling the disputes has been filed by
the parties and the learned counsel appearing for the parties also
submitted that the Writ Petition be disposed of in terms of the said
application for settlement. The learned Judge, on noticing the above
facts ordered, Let there be an order that the Writ Petition is disposed
in terms of the settlement made by the parties. Xerox copy of the
application for settlement and the order passed today be given to the
parties. Let the Writ Petition be disposed of accordingly.
The authorities, instead of abiding by the terms of the orders
noticed supra, seem to have indicated that spaces would be allotted
to the members of the Association by way of alternate
accommodation and that the same be accepted by them on
ownership basis. It was also said that the alternative accommodation
would be provided at No.24, 25, Dol Gobinda Singha Lane, where
only the Municipal Corporation has made provision for giving
alternate accommodation. Aggrieved, the appellants moved the High
Court by means of another Writ Petition Civil Order No.16348 (W)
of 1996 seeking for directions to allot alternate accommodation in
terms of the earlier orders of Court, binding between parties and not
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to flout the same. It may be noticed at this stage and as found
adverted to by the learned Single Judge in the present proceedings
clause (viii) of the terms of compromise which became part and
parcel of the order of the Court, read thus:-
(viii) The respondents-Authorities shall see
that the displaced persons will get alternative
permanent accommodation on G.T. Road
between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram
Dhanga Road, excepting owners of petrol
pump and factories, if any. However, these
persons will be rehabilitated appropriately by
the Rehabilitation Committee of the earliest in
terms of paragraph 9 of this settlement.
The learned Single Judge, by his order dated 11.10.96,
dismissed the Writ Petition, in limine, as of no merits. The learned
Judge seems to be of the view that the obligations arising out of the
terms of the earlier settlement are of the shape of a contract
between the parties by the joint petition and any purported breach
thereof being one of terms of the contract between parties, if at all,
cannot be fruitfully remedied legally by enforcing the terms of the
contract between parties but the remedy would lie to seek for
compensation which remedy, according to the learned Judge,
cannot be available in writ jurisdiction.
The learned Single Judge further proceeded to observe that the
proposals said to have been made by the authorities over which, the
appellants felt aggrieved do not purport to alter the place of alternate
accommodations and the nature of settlement relating to such
accommodation. In his view, the basic purpose of entering into such
an agreement was to provide alternative accommodation to the
members of the petitioners, in view of the project and that the
substantive terms of such settlement being one relating to alternative
accommodations, the appellants cannot demand a particular area or
a particular mode of such alternative accommodation and
consequently no violation of Article 14 or grievance of arbitrariness
could be made out.
Aggrieved, the appellants pursued the matter before a Division
Bench in F.M.A.T. No.3655 of 1996 and the Division Bench also by
its order dated 16.3.2000, concurred with the view of the learned
Single Judge, by observing that the claims of the appellants not only
involved adjudication of disputed facts but greater public interest call
for rejection of the appellants claims. Hence, this appeal. Shri
Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Shri
Tapas Ray, learned senior counsel for the respondents, were heard.
The learned counsel on either side invited our attention to relevant
portions of the earlier orders as also those passed in the present
proceedings in support of their respective stand.
We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned
senior counsel on either side. The learned Single Judge as well as
the Division Bench of the High Court have not only over simplified the
matter but seem to have gone on an errand, carried away by some
need to balance hypothetical public interest, when the real and only
question to be considered was as to whether the respondent-
authorities are bound by the orders passed by the court on the basis
of the compromise memorandum, and whether the proposed move
on their part did not constitute flagrant violation of the orders of court
very much binding on both parties. The High Court failed to do
justice to its own orders. If courts are not to honour and implement
their own orders, and encourage party litigants be they public
authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a
go-bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders
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of the court the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the
process a costly consequence to be jealously averted by all and at
any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country. It does not, in
our view, require any extraordinary exercise to hold that the
memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part
of the orders of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was
finally disposed of on 13.2.1991 in the terms noticed supra
notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same
in the order. The orders passed in this regard admits of no doubt or
give any scope for controversy. While so, it is beyond ones
comprehension as to how it could have been viewed as a matter of
mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of
the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms
thereof in letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order dated 13.2.91
stood, it was not permissible to go behind the same to ascertain the
substance of it or nature of compliance when the manner, mode and
place of compliance had already been stipulated with meticulous care
and detail in the order itself. The said decision was also not made to
depend upon any contingencies beyond the control of parties in the
earlier proceedings.
The Division Bench of the High Court equally fell into the same
error and went, in our view, aside and beside the real issue and point
before them. The orders of the High Court under challenge are set
aside. The respondents are obliged and as public-authorities are
bound to comply with the orders dated 13.2.91, particularly
clause/paragraph (viii) of it, relating to the place or site of allotment of
alternative sites and other stipulations, in letter and spirit giving the
said order full effect. The appeal shall stand allowed, accordingly.
No costs.
J.
[ S. Rajendra Babu ]
J.
[ Doraiswamy Raju ]
August 8, 2001.