Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.14156/2015
DHEERAJ MOR PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 14676/2015, SLP(C) No. 24219/2015,
SLP(C) No. 30556/2015, W.P.(C) No. 77/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 130/2016, W.P.(C) No. 171/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 405/2016, SLP(C) No. 15764/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 414/2016, W.P.(C) No. 423/2016,
SLP(C) No. 23823/2016, S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 15018/2016,
SLP(C) No. 24506/2016, S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 15304/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 600/2016, W.P.(C) No. 598/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 601/2016, W.P.(C) No. 602/2016,
W.P.(C) No. 733/2016, W.P.(C) No. 189/2017,
W.P.(C) No. 222/2017, W.P.(C) No. 334/2017,
W.P.(C) No. 1171/2017
| O R D E R | ||
|---|---|---|
1. The issues raised in these petitions pertain to the
interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India in the
matter of appointment of District Judges by way of direct
recruitment.
2. The petitioners have raised mainly two contentions - (i) in
case a candidate has completed seven years of practice as an
advocate, he/she shall be an eligible candidate despite the fact
Signature Not Verified
that on the date of the application/appointment, he/she is in the
Digitally signed by
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2018.02.03
12:34:31 IST
Reason:
service of Union or State; (ii) the members who are in judicial
service as Civil Judge, Junior Division or Senior Division, in case
1
they have completed seven years as Judicial Officers or seven years
as Judicial Officer-cum-Advocate, they should be treated as
eligible candidates.
3. Extensive reference has been made to various judgments of this
Court which pertain to Article 233 of Constitution of India. To
provide a complete picture of the matter, we shall briefly discuss
the relevant cases.
1
4. The case of Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab and others
pertains to eligibility for appointment as District Judge counting
also the period of practice in Lahore High Court, before partition.
At paragraphs 11 and 13, this Court made the following
observations:
| “11. This is the background against which we have to | ||||||||||||||
| consider the argument of learned Counsel for the | ||||||||||||||
| appellant. | Even if we assume without finally | |||||||||||||
| pronouncing on their correctness that learned | ||||||||||||||
| Counsel is right in his first two submissions, viz., | ||||||||||||||
| that the word " advocate" in Cl. (2) of | Art. | |||||||||||||
| 23 3 | means an advocate of a Court in India and the | |||||||||||||
| appointee must be such an advocate at the time of | ||||||||||||||
| his appointment, no objection on those grounds can | ||||||||||||||
| be raised to the appointment of three of the | ||||||||||||||
| respondents who were factually on the roll of | ||||||||||||||
| Advocates of the Punjab High Court at the time of | ||||||||||||||
| their appointment; because admittedly they were | ||||||||||||||
| advocates in a Court in India and continued as such | ||||||||||||||
| advocates till the dates of their appointment. The | ||||||||||||||
| only, question with regard to them is whether they | ||||||||||||||
| can count. in the period of seven years their period | ||||||||||||||
| of practice in or under the Lahore High Court… | ” | |||||||||||||
| xxx xxx xxx | ||||||||||||||
| 13. … | It is perhaps necessary to add that we must | |||||||||||||
| not be understood to have decided that the | ||||||||||||||
| expression 'has been' must always mean what learned | ||||||||||||||
| Counsel for the appellant says it means according to | ||||||||||||||
| the strict rules of grammar. It may be seriously | ||||||||||||||
| questioned if an organic Constitution must be so | ||||||||||||||
| narrowly interpreted | , and the learned Additional | |||||||||||||
| Solicitor-General has drawn our attention to other | ||||||||||||||
| Articles of the Constitution like | Art. 5(c) | where | ||||||||||||
| in-the context the expression has a different | ||||||||||||||
| meaning. Our attention has also been drawn to the | ||||||||||||||
| decision of the Allahabad High Court in | Mubarak |
1 AIR 1961 SC 816
2
| Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji | AIR 1953 All 323 where a | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| different meaning was given to a similar expression | |||||||||||
| occurring in the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of | S. 86 | of | |||||||||
| the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We | |||||||||||
| consider | it unnecessary to pursue this matter | ||||||||||
| further because the respondents | we are now | ||||||||||
| considering continued to be advocates of the Punjab | |||||||||||
| High Court when they were appointed as district | |||||||||||
| judges and they had a standing of more than seven | |||||||||||
| years when so appointed. They were clearly eligible | |||||||||||
| for appointment under Cl. 2 of | Art. 233 | of the | |||||||||
| Constitution.” | |||||||||||
| (Emphasis Supplied) | |||||||||||
2
5. In Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. , this
Court interpreted the expression “the service” in clause 2 of
Article 233 to mean judicial service.
6. In Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
3
and Others. , this Court considered the question as to whether
judicial officers who had seven years standing at the Bar before
entering service would be eligible for appointment as District
Judges. To quote:
“1. The petitioners in the several writ petitions
now before us as well as the appellants in Civil
Appeal No. 548 of 1982 and the petitioners in Writ
Petitions Nos. 6346-6351 of 1980 which we dismissed
on October 11, 1984 were members of the Uttar
Pradesh Judicial Service in 1980 when all of them,
in response to an advertisement by the High Court of
Allahabad, applied to be appointed by direct
recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial
Service. They claimed that each of them had
completed 7 years of practice at the bar even before
their appointment to the Uttar Pradesh Judicial
Service and were, therefore, eligible to be
appointed by direct recruitment to the Higher
Judicial Service. …”
(Emphasis Supplied)
After referring to the text of Article 233, this Court held as
2
AIR 1966 SCC 1987
3 (1985) 1 SCC 225
3
follows :-
“3. … It is only in respect of the persons covered
by the second clause that there is a requirement
that a person shall be eligible for appointment as
District Judge if he has been an advocate or a
pleader for not less than 7 years. In other words,
in the case of candidates who are not members of a
Judicial Service they must have been advocates or
pleaders for not less than 7 years and they have to
be recommended by the High Court before they may be
appointed as District Judges, while in the case of
candidates who are members of a Judicial Service the
7 years’ rule has no application but there has to be
consultation with the High Court. A clear
distinction is made between the two sources of
recruitment and the dichotomy is maintained. The two
streams are separate until they come together by
appointment. Obviously the same ship cannot sail
both the streams simultaneously..”
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Satya Narain Singh (supra), the Court specifically referred
to Rameshwar Dayal (supra) to note that Article 233 is a self
contained provision regarding appointment of District Judges.
Finally, at paragraph 5, after discussing Chandra Mohan (supra), it
was held that:
“5. Posing the question whether the expression “the
service of the Union or of the State” meant any
service of the Union or of the State or whether it
meant the Judicial Service of the Union or of the
State, the learned Chief Justice emphatically held
that the expression “the service” in Article 233(2)
could only mean the Judicial Service. But he did not
mean by the above statement that persons who are
already in the service, on the recommendation by the
High Court can be appointed as District Judges,
overlooking the claims of all other seniors in the
Subordinate Judiciary contrary to Article 14 and
Article 16 of the Constitution.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
4
7. In Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik and Others. , a
4 (2013) 5 SCC 277
4
three-judge Bench of this Court held that the appellants did not
cease to be advocates while working as Assistant District
Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Deputy Advocate General. In arriving at
this decision, this Court also dealt with the expression, “if he
has been for not less than 7 years an advocate” in Article 233(2).
Paragraphs 51 and 102 read as follows :-
“51. From the above, we have no doubt that the
expression, “the service” in Article 233(2) means
the “judicial service”. Other members of the service
of the Union or State are as it is excluded because
Article 233 contemplates only two sources from which
the District Judges can be appointed. These sources
are: ( i ) judicial service; and ( ii ) the
advocate/pleader or in other words from the Bar. The
District Judges can, thus, be appointed from no
source other than judicial service or from amongst
advocates. Article 233(2) excludes appointment of
District Judges from the judicial service and
restricts eligibility of appointment as District
Judges from amongst the advocates or pleaders having
practice of not less than seven years and who have
been recommended by the High Court as such.”
xxx xxx xxx
“102. As regards construction of the expression,
“if he has been for not less than seven years an
advocate” in Article 233(2) of the Constitution, we
think Mr Prashant Bhushan was right in his
submission that this expression means seven years
as an advocate immediately preceding the
application and not seven years any time in the
past. This is clear by use of “has been”. The
present perfect continuous tense is used for a
position which began at sometime in the past and is
still continuing. Therefore, one of the essential
requirements articulated by the above expression in
Article 233(2) is that such person must with
requisite period be continuing as an advocate on
the date of application.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. Vijay Kumar Mishra and Another. v. High Court of Judicature at
5
Patna and Others. is a case where an advertisement was issued
5 (2016) 9 SCC 313
5
inviting applications from eligible advocates for direct
recruitment for the post of District Judge. Pursuant to the
advertisement, the appellants appeared in the preliminary as well
as main examination. In the meantime, the appellants qualified for
the Subordinate Judicial Service of the State of Bihar and joined
service in August, 2015. The result of the mains examination for
the post of District Judge was declared in January, 2016 and the
appellants qualified for the same. However, they were denied
permission by the Registrar General of Patna High Court to appear
for the interview in view of Article 233(2) of the Constitution, as
they were already in the State Subordinate Judicial Service. To
quote Chelameswar, J. :-
“7. It is well settled in service law that there is
a distinction between selection and appointment.
Every person who is successful in the selection
process undertaken by the State for the purpose of
filling up of certain posts under the State does not
acquire any right to be appointed automatically.
Textually, Article 233(2) only prohibits the
appointment of a person who is already in the
service of the Union or the State, but not the
selection of such a person. The right of such a
person to participate in the selection process
undertaken by the State for appointment to any post
in public service (subject to other rational
prescriptions regarding the eligibility for
participating in the selection process such as age,
educational qualification, etc.) and be considered
is guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution.
8. The text of Article 233(2) only prohibits the
appointment of a person as a District Judge, if such
person is already in the service of either the Union
or the State. It does not prohibit the consideration
of the candidature of a person who is in the service
of the Union or the State. A person who is in the
service of either the Union or the State would still
have the option, if selected, to join the service as
a District Judge or continue with his existing
employment. Compelling a person to resign from his
job even for the purpose of assessing his
suitability for appointment as a District Judge, in
our opinion, is not permitted either by the text of
Article 233(2) nor contemplated under the scheme of
6
the Constitution as it would not serve any
constitutionally desirable purpose.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. This Court took note of the judgment in Satya Narain Singh
(supra) but distinguished it holding that:
“10. In first of the abovementioned judgments, the
appellant-petitioners before this Court were members
of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service. In response
to an advertisement by the High Court, they applied
to be appointed by direct recruitment to the Uttar
Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (District Judges).
It appears from the judgment “as there was a
question about the eligibility of the members of the
Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service to appointment by
direct recruitment to the higher Judicial Service …”
( Satya Narain case , SCC p. 227, para 1), some of
them approached the High Court by way of writ
petitions which were dismissed and therefore, they
approached this Court. It is not very clear from the
judgment, as to how the question about their
eligibility arose and at what stage it arose. But
the fact remains, by virtue of an interim order of
this Court, they were allowed to appear in the
examination. The argument before this Court was that
all the petitioners had practised for a period of
seven years before their joining the Subordinate
Judicial Service, and therefore, they are entitled
to be considered for appointment as District Judges
notwithstanding the fact that they were already in
the Judicial Service.
11. It appears from the reading of the judgment in
Satya Narain Singh case that the case of the
petitioners was that their claims for appointment to
the post of District Judges be considered under the
category of members of the Bar who had completed
seven years of practice ignoring the fact that they
were already in the Judicial Service. The said fact
operates as a bar undoubtedly under Article 233(2)
for their appointment to the Higher Judicial
Service. It is in this context this Court rejected
their claim. The question whether at what stage the
bar comes into operation was not in issue before the
Court nor did this Court go into that question.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
This Court also held that the decision in Deepak Aggarwal
7
(supra) had no relevance to the issue at hand.
10. In the supplementing opinion, Sapre, J. made the following
observations which are extremely pertinent in this context :-
21. Mr Ranjit Kumar, Solicitor General of India
appearing for the respondent (High Court), however,
contended that the word “ appointed ” occurring in Article
233(2) of the Constitution should necessarily include
the entire selection process starting from the date of
submitting an application by the person concerned till
the date of his appointment. It was his submission that
if any such person is found to be in service of the
Union or the State, as the case may be, on the date when
he has applied then such person would suffer
disqualification prescribed in clause (2) of Article 233
and would neither be eligible to apply nor be eligible
for appointment to the post of District Judge.
22. This submission though looks attractive, is not
acceptable. Neither the text of Article and nor the
words occurring in Article 233(2) suggest such
interpretation. Indeed, if his argument is accepted, it
would be against the spirit of Article 233(2). My
learned Brother for rejecting this argument has narrated
the consequences, which are likely to arise in the event
of accepting such argument and I agree with what he has
narrated.
23. In my view, there lies a subtle distinction between
the words “ selection ” and “ appointment ” in service
jurisprudence. (See Prafulla Kumar Swain v. Prakash
Chandra Misra .) When the Framers of the Constitution
have used the word “ appointed ” in clause (2) of Article
233 for determining the eligibility of a person with
reference to his service then it is not possible to read
the word “ selection ” or “ recruitment ” in its place. In
other words, the word “ appointed ” cannot be read to
include the word “ selection ”, “ recruitment ” or
“ recruitment process ”.
24. In my opinion, there is no bar for a person to apply
for the post of District Judge, if he otherwise,
satisfies the qualifications prescribed for the post
while remaining in service of the Union/State. It is
only at the time of his appointment (if occasion so
arises) the question of his eligibility arises. Denying
such person to apply for participating in selection
process when he otherwise fulfils all conditions
prescribed in the advertisement by taking recourse to
8
clause (2) of Article 233 would, in my opinion, amount
to violating his right guaranteed under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Some of the learned counsel have also invited our attention to
All India Judges' Association and others v. Union of India and
6 7
others , Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India and others and
8
State of Assam v. Horizon Union and another .
12. In the order dated 03.04.2017 in Sukhda Pritam and Anr v.
Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan and Anr which is one of the cases
in the batch, there is also a reference to rules framed by certain
states which provide that “in computing the period of seven years
there shall be included a period during which he (a candidate) has
held judicial office”. This is also an issue which is required to
be considered.
13. In view of the various decisions of this Court, one major
issue arising for consideration is whether the eligibility for
appointment as district judge is to be seen only at the time of
appointment or at the time of application or both. Thus, having
regard to the contentions and the materials placed before us and
having regard to the ratio and observations in the cases referred
to above, some of which are apparently diverse, we are also of the
view that these cases involve substantial questions of law as to
the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that this matter should be placed
before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting an
appropriate Bench.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that all the
petitioners herein, by virtue of interim orders, have appeared in
the written examinations and in some cases they have also attended
the interview. We are informed that in some of the cases,
appointment of other eligible candidates is held up on account of
pendency of these cases.
6 (2002) 4 SCC 247
7 (1992) 2 SCC 428
8 [1967] 1 SCR 484
9
15. The Registry may seek appropriate orders from Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India having regard to the special circumstances
referred to above, for an early posting.
| ..........................J. | |
| [KURIAN JOSEPH] | |
| ..........................J. | |
| [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR] | |
| NEW DELHI; | |
| JANUARY 23, 2018. |
10
ITEM NO.19 COURT NO.5 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 14156/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 19-02-2015
in WPC No. 9303/2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi)
DHEERAJ MOR PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 14676/2015 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT ON IA 1/2015
FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. ON IA 2/2015
FOR [APPLICATION FOR DELETION OF RESPONDENTS] ON IA 3/2015
FOR [APPLICATION FOR DIRECTION] ON IA 5/2016
FOR CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION ON IA 91709/2017)
SLP(C) No. 24219/2015 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR [PERMISSION TO FILE ANNEXURES] ON IA 2/2015)
SLP(C) No. 30556/2015 (XI)
W.P.(C) No. 77/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAR AND ARGUE IN PERSON ON IA
1/2016 FOR GRANT OF INTERIM RELIEF ON IA 2/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 130/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR GRANT OF INTERIM RELIEF ON IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 171/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR GRANT OF INTERIM RELIEF ON IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 405/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
IA 1/2016 FOR CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION ON IA 100165/2017)
SLP(C) No. 15644/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
[APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 15764/2016 (XI)
([APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 1/2016)
11
W.P.(C) No. 414/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 15750/2016 (XI)
W.P.(C) No. 423/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 23823/2016 (XI)
([APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 1/2016)
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 15018/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR PERMISSION TO FILE SLP/TP ON IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 24506/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
[APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 1/2016)
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 15304/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
PERMISSION TO FILE SLP/TP ON IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 19222/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
[PERMISSION TO FILE ANNEXURES] ON IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 600/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 594/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016
FOR INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT ON IA 42562/2017 and IA
No.56839/2017-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS)
W.P.(C) No. 598/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
DISPENSING WITH SERVICE OF NOTICE ON IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 601/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 602/2016 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2016)
SLP(C) No. 22240/2016 (XI)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR
[PERMISSION TO FILE ANNEXURES] ON IA 1/2016
FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. ON IA 2/2016)
W.P.(C) No. 733/2016 (X)
(WITH APPLN(S) FOR IA 1/2016
[APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 2/2016)
12
W.P.(C) No. 189/2017 (X)
([APPLICATION FOR DIRECTION] ON IA 48734/2017)
W.P.(C) No. 222/2017 (X)
(WITH IA 1/2017)
W.P.(C) No. 334/2017 (X)
(FOR CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION ON IA 44985/2017)
W.P.(C) No. 1171/2017 (X)
(FOR ADMISSION and IA No.130292/2017-CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION)
Date : 23-01-2018 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KURIAN JOSEPH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
For the parties
Mr. P.S. Patwalia,Sr.Adv.
Mr. R. C. Kaushik, AOR
Mr. Yasir Rauf,Adv.
Ms. Natasha,Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Hegde,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Abhilash M.R.,Adv.
Mr. Hemant Pandey,Adv.
Mr. A. Mariarputham,Sr.Adv.
Mr. A. Subba Rao,Adv.
Mr. Annam D. N. Rao, AOR
Mr. A. Venkatesh,Adv.
Mr. Rahul Mishra,Adv.
Mr. Pravin H. Parekh,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Kshatrashal Raj,Adv.
Mr. Utkarsh Dixit,Adv.
Ms. Tanya Chaudhry,Adv.
Ms. Aishwarya Dash,Adv.
For M/s. Parekh & Co.
Ms. Kiran Suri,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Bharat Singh,Adv.
Mr. M.K. Maroria,Adv.
Ms. Prerna Kumari,Adv.
Mr. Jayant Bhushan,Sr.Adv.
Mr. A. V. Rangam, AOR
Mr. Buddy A. Ranganadhan,Adv.
Ms. Aachal Arora,Adv.
13
Mr. B.S. Mor,Adv.
Mr. Neeraj Mor,Adv.
Mr. Yassir,Adv.
Mr. R. C. Kaushik, AOR
Ms. Nida D.,Adv.
For Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, AOR
Mr. Harish Pandey, AOR
Mr. Manish Kumar,Adv.
Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, AOR
Mr. Abhishek, AOR
Mr. Santosh Kumar,Adv.
Mr. Deepak Anand, AOR
Ms. Manju Jetley, AOR
Mr. Shashank Singh,Adv.
Mr. Ravindra S. Garia, AOR
Ms. Nilofar Khan, AOR
Mr. O.P. Bhadani, AOR
Mr. S.S. Pandey,Adv.
Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, AOR
Mr. K.K. Jha,Adv.
Mr. Prabhakar T.,Adv.
Mr. Pankaj Kr. Mishra,Adv.
Ms. Archana Mishra,Adv.
Mr. Shuchi Singh, AOR
Mr. Krishna Kant Dubey,Adv.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Srivastav,Adv.
Mr. Pankaj Kr. Mishra,Adv.
Ms. Archana Mishra,Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Dubey, AOR
Mr. Aditya Sharma,Adv.
Mr. Satyenda Kumar Srivastav,Adv.
Mr. Bankey Bihari, AOR
Mr. Amit K. Thakur,Adv.
Mr. Ashutosh Jha, AOR
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, AOR
14
Mr. Nishe Rajen Shonker, AOR
Mr. Abhilash M.R.,Adv.
Mr. P.P. Nayak,Adv.
Mr. Ajay Pal, AOR
Ms. Bhupinder,Adv.
Ms. Vandana M. Hooda,Adv.
Mr. Manish Singhvi,Adv.
Mr. D. K. Devesh, AOR
Mr. U.P. Singh,Adv.
Mr. S.K. Roshan,Adv.
Mr. Daya Krishan Sharma, AOR
Petitioner-in-person
Mr. Akhilesh Tripathi,Adv.
Mr. Devesh Kumar Tripathi, AOR
Mr. Pankaj Kumar Mishra, AOR
Ms. Archana Mishra,Adv.
Ms. Rachana Srivastava, AOR
Mr. Sukrit Kapoor,Adv.
Ms. Sudipta Sarkar,Adv.
Mr. Yashvardhan,Adv.
Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, AOR
Mr. Ambuj Dixit,Adv.
Mr. Saksham Maheshwari,Adv.
Mr. Sunny Choudhary, AOR
Mr. Mrinmay Bhattmewara,Adv.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, AOR
Mr. Amit Sharma,Adv.
Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, AOR
Mr. Abhikalp Pratap Singh,Adv.
Mr. Abhisth Kumar, AOR
Mr. A. Subba Rao, AOR
Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, AOR
Mr. Avnish M. Oza,Adv.
Mr. Chirag Jain,Adv.
Mr. Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, AOR
Mr. Mahaling Pandarge,Adv.
15
Mr. Nishant R. Katneshwarkar,Adv.
Mr. Praveen Swarup,Adv.
Mr. Sushil Jain,Adv.
Ms. Sumi P.S.,Adv.
The Court made the following
O R D E R
SLP (C) NOS.15644/2016, 19222/2016, 15750/2016, 22240/2016 AND
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.594/2016
De-tag and list these matters on 08.02.2018.
REST OF THE MATTERS
In view of the signed order, place this matter before Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench.
(NARENDRA PRASAD) (RENU DIWAN)
COURT MASTER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed “reportable” order, as above, is placed on the file)
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